Innovation competition: the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Baden-Baden
Nomos
2022
München C.H.Beck 2022 |
| Ausgabe: | 1st edition |
| Schriftenreihe: | European commercial law
volume 73 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltstext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | 287 Seiten 22.7 cm x 15.3 cm |
| ISBN: | 9783848787692 3848787695 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Kurz, Katrin Silja |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1256142093 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Innovation competition |b the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU |c Katrin Silja Kurz |
| 250 | |a 1st edition | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Baden-Baden |b Nomos |c 2022 | |
| 264 | 1 | |a München |b C.H.Beck |c 2022 | |
| 300 | |a 287 Seiten |c 22.7 cm x 15.3 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht |a European commercial law |v volume 73 | |
| 502 | |b Dissertation |c Bucerius Law School |d 2021 | ||
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a Europäische Union |0 (DE-588)5098525-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a Dow Chemical Company |g Midland, Mich. |0 (DE-588)129862-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. |g Wilmington, Del. |0 (DE-588)55477-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Missbrauchsverbot |0 (DE-588)4123774-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Marktbeherrschung |0 (DE-588)4037627-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Innovation |0 (DE-588)4027089-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Unternehmenszusammenschluss |0 (DE-588)4321280-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Fusionskontrolle |0 (DE-588)4071521-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | |a Innovationswettbewerb | ||
| 653 | |a Innovation | ||
| 653 | |a Wettbewerbsrecht | ||
| 653 | |a Kartellrecht | ||
| 653 | |a Wirtschaftsrecht | ||
| 653 | |a Europarecht | ||
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Europäische Union |0 (DE-588)5098525-5 |D b |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. |g Wilmington, Del. |0 (DE-588)55477-7 |D b |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Dow Chemical Company |g Midland, Mich. |0 (DE-588)129862-8 |D b |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Unternehmenszusammenschluss |0 (DE-588)4321280-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Marktbeherrschung |0 (DE-588)4037627-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 5 | |a Missbrauchsverbot |0 (DE-588)4123774-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 6 | |a Innovation |0 (DE-588)4027089-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 7 | |a Fusionskontrolle |0 (DE-588)4071521-8 |D s |
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| 710 | 2 | |a Verlag C.H. Beck |0 (DE-588)1023902869 |4 pbl | |
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| 830 | 0 | |a European commercial law |v volume 73 |w (DE-604)BV007738755 |9 73 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m X:MVB |q text/html |u http://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=6eef934e548a413ca543ae3ffdd6594b&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm |3 Inhaltstext |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m DNB Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033301217&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a vlb |d 20220315 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#vlb | |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033301217 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1817469535689637888 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
AND
ACRONYMS
15
I)
INTRODUCTION
21
II)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION:
THE
DOW/DUPONT
DECISION
24
A)
INNOVATION,
COMPETITION
AND
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
24
1)
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
25
(A)
DEFINITION
AND
GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
25
(B)
THE
NOTION
OF
COMPETITION
IN
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
27
2)
INNOVATION
AND
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
30
(A)
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AS
AN
OBJECTIVE
IN
THE
EU
TREATIES
31
(B)
EUROPEAN
RESEARCH
AREA
33
(C)
COMPETITIVENESS
OF
THE
UNION
34
(D)
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
VS.
INNOVATION
36
3)
THE
POSITION
OF
COMPETITION
LAW:
INNOVATION
AS
A
DRIVING
FORCE
40
(A)
BACKGROUND:
THE
PROCESS
OF
CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION
41
(B)
COMPETITION
RULES
IN THE
TREATIES
42
(C)
SECONDARY
COMPETITION
LAW:
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
45
(D)
GUIDELINES
AND
APPROACHES
FROM
OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
AND
AREAS
OF
LAW
48
4)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
49
B)
THE
DOW/DUPONT
DECISION
50
1)
OVERVIEW
OF
THE
DECISION
50
2)
THE
COMMISSION
'
S
LEGAL
BASIS
FOR
INNOVATION
CONCERNS
IN
MERGER
CONTROL
52
(A)
LEGAL
BASIS
IN
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
52
(B)
THE
COMMISSION
'
S
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
AND
INNOVATION
54
(C)
THE
COMMISSION
REFERS
TO
US
GUIDELINES
AND
EU
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
GUIDELINES
57
3)
THEORY
OF
HARM
IN
DOW/DUPONT
60
4)
UNDERLYING
RATIONALE
63
9
C)
CLASSIFICATION
AND
APPRAISAL
65
1)
THEORY
OF
HARM
AND
UNDERLYING RATIONALE
65
2)
UNILATERAL
EFFECTS
ANALYSIS
69
3)
PROTECTIVE
PURPOSE
AND
TIME
HORIZON
69
4)
INNOVATION
MARKETS,
INNOVATION
SPACES
AND
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
75
5)
NO
PRODUCT/PIPELINE
ANALYSIS
79
6)
IMPORTANCE
OF
SPECIFIC
INDUSTRY
FEATURES
80
7)
WRITTEN
EVIDENCE
OF
REDUCING
INNOVATION
EFFORTS
82
8)
INTEGRATION
OF
THE
COMMISSION
'
S
APPROACH
INTO
THE
EXISTING
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
83
D)
ECONOMIC
FOUNDATION
88
1)
ANNEX
4
OF
THE
DOW/DUPONT
DECISION
88
(A)
COMPETITION
IN
INNOVATION
90
(B)
PRODUCT
MARKET
COMPETITION
94
(C)
EFFICIENCIES:
FOCUS
ON
APPROPRIABILITY
96
(D)
DYNAMIC
MARKET
FEATURES
98
2)
THE
FEDERICO
I
LANGUS
I
VALLETTI
PAPERS
99
3)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
101
E)
REMEDIES:
DIVESTMENT
OF
R&D
ORGANIZATION
105
F)
WHAT
IS
NEW
IN
DOW/DUPONT?
107
1)
PRECEDING
INNOVATION
CASES
107
(A)
CASES
INCORPORATING
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
ASPECTS
108
(B)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
117
2)
INNOVATION
MARKET
ANALYSIS
118
(A)
CONCEPT
OF
THE
INNOVATION
MARKET
ANALYSIS
118
(B)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
120
(C)
CRITIQUE
ON
THE
INNOVATION
MARKET
APPROACH
121
G)
IN
NEED
OF
A
NEW
THEORY?
125
1)
THE
POTENTIAL
COMPETITION
DOCTRINE
125
2)
THE
FUTURE
MARKETS
CONCEPT
126
3)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
127
H)
IS
THE
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
VALID?
129
1)
LINK
BETWEEN
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
130
(A)
STANDARD
FOR
INCORPORATING
ECONOMIC
REASONING
IN
COMPETITION
LAW
131
(B)
THE
SCHUMPETER/ARROW
CONTROVERSY
134
(C)
NOTION
OF
APPROPRIABILITY
135
10
(D)
ADDITIONAL
FACTORS
DETERMINING
THE
RELATION
BETWEEN
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
136
(E)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
138
2)
MEASURING
INNOVATION
CAPACITY
140
3)
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN
PRICE
AND
INNOVATION
142
4)
PRESUMPTION
TOWARDS
DECREASED
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES:
WEIGHING
OF
OTHER
FACTORS
144
5)
EFFICIENCIES
146
(A)
EFFICIENCIES
IN
THE
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
148
(B)
EFFICIENCY
ASSESSMENT
IN
DOW/DUPONT
150
(C)
APPRAISAL
152
(1)
EFFICIENCIES
ARE
PART
OF
THE
UNDERLYING
THEORY
OF
HARM:
NO
BURDEN
OF
PROOF
WITH
THE
PARTIES
152
(2)
EFFICIENCY
CRITERIA
OF
THE
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
ARE
NOT
FIT
FOR
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
157
(D)
CONCLUSION
ON
EFFICIENCIES
160
6)
GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS
OF
THE
SIEC
TEST
161
7)
LEGAL
CERTAINTY
AND
THE
RIGHT
TO
REALIZE
CONCENTRATIONS
OF
UNDERTAKINGS
164
(A)
CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS
166
(B)
APPLICATION
IN
DOW/DUPONT
167
8)
APPROPRIATE
REMEDIES
170
I)
CONCLUSION
171
III)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
THE
SCOPE
OF
ITS
APPLICATION
IN
EU
COMPETITION
LAW
173
A)
RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENTS
ACCORDING
TO
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
173
1)
POSSIBLE
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
CONCERNS
IN
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
175
(A)
INNOVATION
ASPECTS
IN
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
176
(B)
COMPETITION
IN
INNOVATION
IN
REGULATIONS
AND
GUIDELINES
ON
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
177
(C)
INNOVATION
MARKETS
IN
U.S.
GUIDELINES
183
(D)
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN
EXISTING
CONCEPTS
AND
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
IN
DOW/DUPONT
185
11
2)
APPLICABILITY
OF
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
IN
THE
SCOPE
OF
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
187
(A)
R&D
COOPERATION
187
(1)
NEGATIVE
EFFECTS
ON
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
188
(AA)
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
OF
THE
COOPERATING
PARTIES
188
(BB)
THIRD
PARTY
INCENTIVES
193
(CC)
ECONOMIC
FINDINGS
ON
THE
INTERRELATION
BETWEEN
COOPERATION
AND
INNOVATION
195
(2)
REDUCED
NUMBER
OF
ENTITIES
PERFORMING
R&D
198
(3)
NO
ADJUSTMENT
OF
GUIDELINES
200
(B)
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
202
3)
CONCLUSION
205
B)
ABUSE
OF
A
DOMINANT
POSITION
ACCORDING
TO
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
207
1)
POSSIBLE
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
CONCERNS
IN
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
208
(A)
LEGAL
BASIS
FOR
INCORPORATING
INNOVATION
CONCERNS
208
(B)
FACTORS
DETERMINING
MARKET
POWER
211
(C)
INNOVATION-DRIVEN
COMPETITIVE
PRESSURE
IN
GERMAN
LAW
217
(1)
APPLICATION
IN
PRACTICE
218
(2)
APPRAISAL
222
2)
INCORPORATING
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
INTO
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
224
(A)
THE
RATIONALE
BEHIND
DOW/DUPONT
AND
ARTICLE
102
TFEU:
ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
225
(B)
OLIGOPOLISTIC
MARKET
STRUCTURE
226
(C)
SIEC
TEST
VERSUS
DOMINANT
POSITION
227
(D)
DYNAMIC
ASPECTS
IN
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
229
3)
KINDS
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
THAT
INTERRELATE
WITH
INNOVATION
CAPACITY
230
(A)
DEFINITION
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
231
(B)
KINDS
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
IMPACTING
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
232
(1)
REFUSAL
TO
SUPPLY
233
(2)
MISUSE
OF
REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
235
(3)
DISCRIMINATION
236
(4)
TREATMENT
OF
THOSE
AND
OTHER
KINDS
OF
CONDUCT
238
4)
POWERS
OF
THE COMMISSION
WITH
RESPECT
TO
IMPORTANT
INNOVATORS
242
(A)
FINES
AND
PROCEDURAL
PRINCIPLES
243
(B)
OTHER
COMMISSION
POWERS
251
5)
CONCLUSION
252
12
C)
ALLOCATION
OF
THE
RESULT
IN
PRIMARY
LAW
253
1)
FUNCTION
OF
ARTICLE
101
AND
102
TFEU
IN
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
253
2)
DEVELOPMENT
OF
THE
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
254
3)
INTERRELATION
BETWEEN
ARTICLE
101
AND
102
TFEU
AND
THE
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
255
4)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
ARTICLE
101
AND
102
TFEU
256
5)
CONCLUSION
257
IV)
SUMMARY
259
A)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
IN
DOW/DUPONT
259
1)
RATIONALE
IN
DOW/DUPONT
259
2)
PROTECTIVE
PURPOSE
AND
TIME
HORIZON
261
3)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
INNOVATION
SPACES
262
4)
THE
APPROACH
IN
DOW/DUPONT
IS
NOVEL
AND
NECESSARY
263
5)
UNDER
CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES,
A
LINK
BETWEEN
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
MAY
BE
ESTABLISHED
TO
THE
REQUISITE
LEGAL
STANDARD
264
6)
OTHER
FACTORS
IMPACTING
INNOVATION
MUST
BE
TAKEN
INTO
ACCOUNT
266
7)
THE
TREATMENT
OF
EFFICIENCIES
MUST
BE
ALTERED
WITH
RESPECT
TO
INNOVATION
267
8)
DOW/DUPONT
IS
ANCHORED
IN
PRIMARY
LAW
270
B)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
THE
SCOPE
OF
ITS
APPLICATION
IN
EU
COMPETITION
LAW
271
1)
RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENTS
ACCORDING TO
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
271
(A)
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
AN
ASSESSMENT
UNDER
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
271
(B)
NO
APPLICATION
OF
THE
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
IN
CASE
OF
R&D
COOPERATION
272
(C)
NO
APPLICATION
OF
THE
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
IN
COOPERATION
SETTINGS
IN
GENERAL
275
2)
ABUSE
OF
A
DOMINANT
POSITION
ACCORDING
TO
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
276
(A)
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
THE
ASSESSMENT
UNDER
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
276
(B)
THE
NOTION
OF
AN
"
IMPORTANT
INNOVATOR
"
DEVELOPED
IN
DOW/DUPONT
MAY
BE
USED
TO
DETERMINE
MARKET
DOMINANCE
276
(C)
THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
INNOVATION
CAPACITY
IN
ABUSE
OF
DOMINANCE
CASES
IS
RESTRICTED
TO
CERTAIN
KINDS
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
277
13
(D)
THE
POWERS
OF
THE
COMMISSION
MAY
BE
RESTRICTED
IN
SETTINGS
INVOLVING
IMPORTANT
INNOVATORS
278
(E)
THE
CRITERIA
SET
UP
IN
DOW/DUPONT
FOR
DETERMINING
AN
IMPORTANT
INNOVATOR
MAY
BE
USED
IN
THE CONTEXT
OF
ABUSE
OF
DOMINANCE
279
3)
ALLOCATION
OF
THE
RESULT IN
PRIMARY
LAW
280
BIBLIOGRAPHY
281
14 |
| adam_txt |
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
LIST
OF
ABBREVIATIONS
AND
ACRONYMS
15
I)
INTRODUCTION
21
II)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION:
THE
DOW/DUPONT
DECISION
24
A)
INNOVATION,
COMPETITION
AND
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
24
1)
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
25
(A)
DEFINITION
AND
GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
25
(B)
THE
NOTION
OF
COMPETITION
IN
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
27
2)
INNOVATION
AND
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
30
(A)
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AS
AN
OBJECTIVE
IN
THE
EU
TREATIES
31
(B)
EUROPEAN
RESEARCH
AREA
33
(C)
COMPETITIVENESS
OF
THE
UNION
34
(D)
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
VS.
INNOVATION
36
3)
THE
POSITION
OF
COMPETITION
LAW:
INNOVATION
AS
A
DRIVING
FORCE
40
(A)
BACKGROUND:
THE
PROCESS
OF
CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION
41
(B)
COMPETITION
RULES
IN THE
TREATIES
42
(C)
SECONDARY
COMPETITION
LAW:
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
45
(D)
GUIDELINES
AND
APPROACHES
FROM
OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
AND
AREAS
OF
LAW
48
4)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
49
B)
THE
DOW/DUPONT
DECISION
50
1)
OVERVIEW
OF
THE
DECISION
50
2)
THE
COMMISSION
'
S
LEGAL
BASIS
FOR
INNOVATION
CONCERNS
IN
MERGER
CONTROL
52
(A)
LEGAL
BASIS
IN
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
52
(B)
THE
COMMISSION
'
S
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
AND
INNOVATION
54
(C)
THE
COMMISSION
REFERS
TO
US
GUIDELINES
AND
EU
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
GUIDELINES
57
3)
THEORY
OF
HARM
IN
DOW/DUPONT
60
4)
UNDERLYING
RATIONALE
63
9
C)
CLASSIFICATION
AND
APPRAISAL
65
1)
THEORY
OF
HARM
AND
UNDERLYING RATIONALE
65
2)
UNILATERAL
EFFECTS
ANALYSIS
69
3)
PROTECTIVE
PURPOSE
AND
TIME
HORIZON
69
4)
INNOVATION
MARKETS,
INNOVATION
SPACES
AND
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
75
5)
NO
PRODUCT/PIPELINE
ANALYSIS
79
6)
IMPORTANCE
OF
SPECIFIC
INDUSTRY
FEATURES
80
7)
WRITTEN
EVIDENCE
OF
REDUCING
INNOVATION
EFFORTS
82
8)
INTEGRATION
OF
THE
COMMISSION
'
S
APPROACH
INTO
THE
EXISTING
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
83
D)
ECONOMIC
FOUNDATION
88
1)
ANNEX
4
OF
THE
DOW/DUPONT
DECISION
88
(A)
COMPETITION
IN
INNOVATION
90
(B)
PRODUCT
MARKET
COMPETITION
94
(C)
EFFICIENCIES:
FOCUS
ON
APPROPRIABILITY
96
(D)
DYNAMIC
MARKET
FEATURES
98
2)
THE
FEDERICO
I
LANGUS
I
VALLETTI
PAPERS
99
3)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
101
E)
REMEDIES:
DIVESTMENT
OF
R&D
ORGANIZATION
105
F)
WHAT
IS
NEW
IN
DOW/DUPONT?
107
1)
PRECEDING
INNOVATION
CASES
107
(A)
CASES
INCORPORATING
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
ASPECTS
108
(B)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
117
2)
INNOVATION
MARKET
ANALYSIS
118
(A)
CONCEPT
OF
THE
INNOVATION
MARKET
ANALYSIS
118
(B)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
120
(C)
CRITIQUE
ON
THE
INNOVATION
MARKET
APPROACH
121
G)
IN
NEED
OF
A
NEW
THEORY?
125
1)
THE
POTENTIAL
COMPETITION
DOCTRINE
125
2)
THE
FUTURE
MARKETS
CONCEPT
126
3)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
127
H)
IS
THE
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
VALID?
129
1)
LINK
BETWEEN
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
130
(A)
STANDARD
FOR
INCORPORATING
ECONOMIC
REASONING
IN
COMPETITION
LAW
131
(B)
THE
SCHUMPETER/ARROW
CONTROVERSY
134
(C)
NOTION
OF
APPROPRIABILITY
135
10
(D)
ADDITIONAL
FACTORS
DETERMINING
THE
RELATION
BETWEEN
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
136
(E)
INTERMEDIATE
RESULT
138
2)
MEASURING
INNOVATION
CAPACITY
140
3)
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN
PRICE
AND
INNOVATION
142
4)
PRESUMPTION
TOWARDS
DECREASED
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES:
WEIGHING
OF
OTHER
FACTORS
144
5)
EFFICIENCIES
146
(A)
EFFICIENCIES
IN
THE
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
148
(B)
EFFICIENCY
ASSESSMENT
IN
DOW/DUPONT
150
(C)
APPRAISAL
152
(1)
EFFICIENCIES
ARE
PART
OF
THE
UNDERLYING
THEORY
OF
HARM:
NO
BURDEN
OF
PROOF
WITH
THE
PARTIES
152
(2)
EFFICIENCY
CRITERIA
OF
THE
HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
ARE
NOT
FIT
FOR
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
157
(D)
CONCLUSION
ON
EFFICIENCIES
160
6)
GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS
OF
THE
SIEC
TEST
161
7)
LEGAL
CERTAINTY
AND
THE
RIGHT
TO
REALIZE
CONCENTRATIONS
OF
UNDERTAKINGS
164
(A)
CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS
166
(B)
APPLICATION
IN
DOW/DUPONT
167
8)
APPROPRIATE
REMEDIES
170
I)
CONCLUSION
171
III)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
THE
SCOPE
OF
ITS
APPLICATION
IN
EU
COMPETITION
LAW
173
A)
RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENTS
ACCORDING
TO
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
173
1)
POSSIBLE
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
CONCERNS
IN
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
175
(A)
INNOVATION
ASPECTS
IN
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
176
(B)
COMPETITION
IN
INNOVATION
IN
REGULATIONS
AND
GUIDELINES
ON
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
177
(C)
INNOVATION
MARKETS
IN
U.S.
GUIDELINES
183
(D)
DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN
EXISTING
CONCEPTS
AND
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
IN
DOW/DUPONT
185
11
2)
APPLICABILITY
OF
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
IN
THE
SCOPE
OF
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
187
(A)
R&D
COOPERATION
187
(1)
NEGATIVE
EFFECTS
ON
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
188
(AA)
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
OF
THE
COOPERATING
PARTIES
188
(BB)
THIRD
PARTY
INCENTIVES
193
(CC)
ECONOMIC
FINDINGS
ON
THE
INTERRELATION
BETWEEN
COOPERATION
AND
INNOVATION
195
(2)
REDUCED
NUMBER
OF
ENTITIES
PERFORMING
R&D
198
(3)
NO
ADJUSTMENT
OF
GUIDELINES
200
(B)
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
202
3)
CONCLUSION
205
B)
ABUSE
OF
A
DOMINANT
POSITION
ACCORDING
TO
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
207
1)
POSSIBLE
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
CONCERNS
IN
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
208
(A)
LEGAL
BASIS
FOR
INCORPORATING
INNOVATION
CONCERNS
208
(B)
FACTORS
DETERMINING
MARKET
POWER
211
(C)
INNOVATION-DRIVEN
COMPETITIVE
PRESSURE
IN
GERMAN
LAW
217
(1)
APPLICATION
IN
PRACTICE
218
(2)
APPRAISAL
222
2)
INCORPORATING
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
INTO
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
224
(A)
THE
RATIONALE
BEHIND
DOW/DUPONT
AND
ARTICLE
102
TFEU:
ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
225
(B)
OLIGOPOLISTIC
MARKET
STRUCTURE
226
(C)
SIEC
TEST
VERSUS
DOMINANT
POSITION
227
(D)
DYNAMIC
ASPECTS
IN
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
229
3)
KINDS
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
THAT
INTERRELATE
WITH
INNOVATION
CAPACITY
230
(A)
DEFINITION
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
231
(B)
KINDS
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
IMPACTING
INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
232
(1)
REFUSAL
TO
SUPPLY
233
(2)
MISUSE
OF
REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
235
(3)
DISCRIMINATION
236
(4)
TREATMENT
OF
THOSE
AND
OTHER
KINDS
OF
CONDUCT
238
4)
POWERS
OF
THE COMMISSION
WITH
RESPECT
TO
IMPORTANT
INNOVATORS
242
(A)
FINES
AND
PROCEDURAL
PRINCIPLES
243
(B)
OTHER
COMMISSION
POWERS
251
5)
CONCLUSION
252
12
C)
ALLOCATION
OF
THE
RESULT
IN
PRIMARY
LAW
253
1)
FUNCTION
OF
ARTICLE
101
AND
102
TFEU
IN
THE
INTERNAL
MARKET
253
2)
DEVELOPMENT
OF
THE
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
254
3)
INTERRELATION
BETWEEN
ARTICLE
101
AND
102
TFEU
AND
THE
EC
MERGER
REGULATION
255
4)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
ARTICLE
101
AND
102
TFEU
256
5)
CONCLUSION
257
IV)
SUMMARY
259
A)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
IN
DOW/DUPONT
259
1)
RATIONALE
IN
DOW/DUPONT
259
2)
PROTECTIVE
PURPOSE
AND
TIME
HORIZON
261
3)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
INNOVATION
SPACES
262
4)
THE
APPROACH
IN
DOW/DUPONT
IS
NOVEL
AND
NECESSARY
263
5)
UNDER
CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES,
A
LINK
BETWEEN
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
MAY
BE
ESTABLISHED
TO
THE
REQUISITE
LEGAL
STANDARD
264
6)
OTHER
FACTORS
IMPACTING
INNOVATION
MUST
BE
TAKEN
INTO
ACCOUNT
266
7)
THE
TREATMENT
OF
EFFICIENCIES
MUST
BE
ALTERED
WITH
RESPECT
TO
INNOVATION
267
8)
DOW/DUPONT
IS
ANCHORED
IN
PRIMARY
LAW
270
B)
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
AND
THE
SCOPE
OF
ITS
APPLICATION
IN
EU
COMPETITION
LAW
271
1)
RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENTS
ACCORDING TO
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
271
(A)
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
AN
ASSESSMENT
UNDER
ARTICLE
101
TFEU
271
(B)
NO
APPLICATION
OF
THE
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
IN
CASE
OF
R&D
COOPERATION
272
(C)
NO
APPLICATION
OF
THE
INNOVATION
COMPETITION
APPROACH
IN
COOPERATION
SETTINGS
IN
GENERAL
275
2)
ABUSE
OF
A
DOMINANT
POSITION
ACCORDING
TO
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
276
(A)
STARTING
POINTS
FOR
THE
ASSESSMENT
UNDER
ARTICLE
102
TFEU
276
(B)
THE
NOTION
OF
AN
"
IMPORTANT
INNOVATOR
"
DEVELOPED
IN
DOW/DUPONT
MAY
BE
USED
TO
DETERMINE
MARKET
DOMINANCE
276
(C)
THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
INNOVATION
CAPACITY
IN
ABUSE
OF
DOMINANCE
CASES
IS
RESTRICTED
TO
CERTAIN
KINDS
OF
ABUSIVE
BEHAVIOR
277
13
(D)
THE
POWERS
OF
THE
COMMISSION
MAY
BE
RESTRICTED
IN
SETTINGS
INVOLVING
IMPORTANT
INNOVATORS
278
(E)
THE
CRITERIA
SET
UP
IN
DOW/DUPONT
FOR
DETERMINING
AN
IMPORTANT
INNOVATOR
MAY
BE
USED
IN
THE CONTEXT
OF
ABUSE
OF
DOMINANCE
279
3)
ALLOCATION
OF
THE
RESULT IN
PRIMARY
LAW
280
BIBLIOGRAPHY
281
14 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Kurz, Katrin Silja |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1256142093 |
| author_facet | Kurz, Katrin Silja |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Kurz, Katrin Silja |
| author_variant | k s k ks ksk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV047919609 |
| classification_rvk | PS 3380 PN 760 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1309907132 (DE-599)DNB1253475474 |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| discipline_str_mv | Rechtswissenschaft |
| edition | 1st edition |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| id | DE-604.BV047919609 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:33:23Z |
| indexdate | 2024-12-04T01:00:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)117513-0 (DE-588)1023902869 |
| isbn | 9783848787692 3848787695 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033301217 |
| oclc_num | 1309907132 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-703 DE-M382 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-703 DE-M382 DE-11 |
| physical | 287 Seiten 22.7 cm x 15.3 cm |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Nomos C.H.Beck |
| record_format | marc |
| series | European commercial law |
| series2 | Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht European commercial law |
| spelling | Kurz, Katrin Silja Verfasser (DE-588)1256142093 aut Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU Katrin Silja Kurz 1st edition Baden-Baden Nomos 2022 München C.H.Beck 2022 287 Seiten 22.7 cm x 15.3 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht European commercial law volume 73 Dissertation Bucerius Law School 2021 Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Dow Chemical Company Midland, Mich. (DE-588)129862-8 gnd rswk-swf E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Wilmington, Del. (DE-588)55477-7 gnd rswk-swf Missbrauchsverbot (DE-588)4123774-2 gnd rswk-swf Marktbeherrschung (DE-588)4037627-8 gnd rswk-swf Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmenszusammenschluss (DE-588)4321280-3 gnd rswk-swf Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 gnd rswk-swf Innovationswettbewerb Innovation Wettbewerbsrecht Kartellrecht Wirtschaftsrecht Europarecht (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Wilmington, Del. (DE-588)55477-7 b Dow Chemical Company Midland, Mich. (DE-588)129862-8 b Unternehmenszusammenschluss (DE-588)4321280-3 s Marktbeherrschung (DE-588)4037627-8 s Missbrauchsverbot (DE-588)4123774-2 s Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 s Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 s DE-604 Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (DE-588)117513-0 pbl Verlag C.H. Beck (DE-588)1023902869 pbl Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF 978-3-7489-3336-6 European commercial law volume 73 (DE-604)BV007738755 73 X:MVB text/html http://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=6eef934e548a413ca543ae3ffdd6594b&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm Inhaltstext DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033301217&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p vlb 20220315 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#vlb |
| spellingShingle | Kurz, Katrin Silja Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU European commercial law Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Dow Chemical Company Midland, Mich. (DE-588)129862-8 gnd E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Wilmington, Del. (DE-588)55477-7 gnd Missbrauchsverbot (DE-588)4123774-2 gnd Marktbeherrschung (DE-588)4037627-8 gnd Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 gnd Unternehmenszusammenschluss (DE-588)4321280-3 gnd Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)129862-8 (DE-588)55477-7 (DE-588)4123774-2 (DE-588)4037627-8 (DE-588)4027089-0 (DE-588)4321280-3 (DE-588)4071521-8 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU |
| title_auth | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU |
| title_exact_search | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU |
| title_full | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU Katrin Silja Kurz |
| title_fullStr | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU Katrin Silja Kurz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU Katrin Silja Kurz |
| title_short | Innovation competition |
| title_sort | innovation competition the novel theory of harm in the dow dupont merger and its application in the scope of article 101 and 102 tfeu |
| title_sub | the novel theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont merger and its application in the scope of Article 101 and 102 TFEU |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Dow Chemical Company Midland, Mich. (DE-588)129862-8 gnd E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Wilmington, Del. (DE-588)55477-7 gnd Missbrauchsverbot (DE-588)4123774-2 gnd Marktbeherrschung (DE-588)4037627-8 gnd Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 gnd Unternehmenszusammenschluss (DE-588)4321280-3 gnd Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Dow Chemical Company Midland, Mich. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Wilmington, Del. Missbrauchsverbot Marktbeherrschung Innovation Unternehmenszusammenschluss Fusionskontrolle Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=6eef934e548a413ca543ae3ffdd6594b&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033301217&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV007738755 |
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