The material theory of induction:
"The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Calgary, Alberta
University of Calgary Press
2021
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| Schriftenreihe: | BSPS open series
No. 1 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. Which that is, and its extent, is determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference."-- |
| Beschreibung: | XI, 668 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9781773852539 9781773852751 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. Which that is, and its extent, is determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference."-- | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Induction (Logic) | |
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| 653 | 0 | |a Logic | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Induction (Logic) | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Inference | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Prolog 1. The Material Theory of Induction Stated and Illustrated Inductive inferences are not warranted by conformity with some universally applicable formal schema. They are warranted by background facts. The theory is illustrated with the help of Marie Curie’s inductive inference over the crystallographic properties of radium chloride. 2. What Powers Inductive Inference? The principal arguments for the material theory are given. Any particular inductive inference can fail reliably if we try it in a world hostile to it. For an inference to be warranted, the world must be hospitable to it, and this is a contingent factual matter. The material theory asserts that there are no universal rules of inductive inference. All induction is local. Chapters 3-9 will show how popular and apparently universal rules of inductive inference are defeasible and that their warrants in individual domains are best understood as derivingfrom particular backgroundfacts. 3. Replicability of Experiment There is no universal inductive principle in science formulated in terms of replicability of experiment. Replication is not guaranteed to have inductive force. When it does, the force derives from background facts peculiar to the case at hand. 4. Analogy Efforts to characterize good analogical inferences by their form have collapsed under the massive weight of the endless complexity needed to formulate a viable, general rule. For scientists, analogies are facts not argument forms, which fits nicely with the material view. 5. Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Values: A Skeptical Critique Talk
of epistemic values in inductive inference misleads by suggesting that our preference for simpler theories is akin to a free choice, such as being a vegetarian. The better word is criterion, since these values are not freely chosen but must prove their mettle in guiding us to the truth.
6. Simplicity as a Surrogate There is no viable principle that attaches simpler hypotheses to the truth. Appeals to simplicity are shortcuts that disguise more complicated appeals to background facts. 7. Simplicity in Model Selection Statistical techniques, such as the Akaiké Information Criterion (AIC), do not vindicate appeals to simplicity as a general principle. AIC depends on certain strong background assumptions independent of simplicity. We impose a simplicity interpretation on the formula it produces. 8. Inference to the Best Explanation: The General Account There is no clearly defined relation of explanation that confers special inductive support on some hypotheses or theories. The important, canonical examples of inference to the best explanation can be accommodated better by simpler schemes involving background facts. The successful hypotheses or theories accommodate the evidence. The major burden in real cases in science is to show that competing accounts fail, either by contradicting the evidence or taking on burdensome evidential debt. 9. Inference to the Best Explanation: Examples This chapter collects many examples from the history of science that illustrate the general claims of Chapter 8. Chapters 10-16 address Bayesian confirmation theory, which has become the default account of inductive inference in philosophy ofscience, in spite of its weaknesses. Chapters 10,11, and 12 address general issues. Chapters 13-16 display systems in which probabilistic representation of inductive strengths of supportfails. 10. Why Not Bayes While probabilistic analysis of
inductive inference can be very successful in certain domains, it must fail as the universal logic of inductive inference. For an inductive logic must constrain systems beyond mere logical consistency. The resulting contingent restrictions will only obtain in some domains. Proofs of the necessity of probabilistic accounts fail since they require assumptions as strong as the result they seek to establish. x Contents
11. Circularity in the Scoring Rule Vindication of Probabilities 387 The scoring rule approach employs only the notion of accuracy and claims that probabilistic credences dominate. This chapter shows that accuracy provides little. The result really comes from an unjustified fine-tuning of the scoring rule to a predetermined result. 12. No Place to Stand: The Incompleteness of All Calculi of Inductive Inference 435 An inductively complete calculus of inductive inference can take the totality of evidential facts of science and, from them alone, determine the appropriate strengths of evidential support for the hypotheses and theories of science. This chapter reviews informally a proof given elsewhere that no calculus of inductive inference, probabilistic or not, can be complete. 13. Infinite Lottery Machines 469 An infinite lottery machine chooses among a countable infinity of outcomes without favor. While the example is used to impugn countable additivity, it actually also precludes even finite additivity. 14. Uncountable Problems 519 If we enlarge the outcome spaces to continuum size, we find further inductive problems that cannot be accommodated by a probabilistic logic. These include problems derived from the existence of metrically nonmeasuable sets. 15. Indeterministic Physical Systems 573 The indeterminism of a collection of indeterministic systems poses problems in inductive inference. They cannot be solved by representing strengths of inductive support as probabilities, unless one alters the problem posed. 16. A Quantum Inductive Logic 613 While the examples of
Chapters 13-15 were simplified, this chápter proposes that there is a non-probabilistic inductive logic native to quantum mechanics. Epilog 653 Index 657 Contents XI
|
| adam_txt |
Contents Prolog 1. The Material Theory of Induction Stated and Illustrated Inductive inferences are not warranted by conformity with some universally applicable formal schema. They are warranted by background facts. The theory is illustrated with the help of Marie Curie’s inductive inference over the crystallographic properties of radium chloride. 2. What Powers Inductive Inference? The principal arguments for the material theory are given. Any particular inductive inference can fail reliably if we try it in a world hostile to it. For an inference to be warranted, the world must be hospitable to it, and this is a contingent factual matter. The material theory asserts that there are no universal rules of inductive inference. All induction is local. Chapters 3-9 will show how popular and apparently universal rules of inductive inference are defeasible and that their warrants in individual domains are best understood as derivingfrom particular backgroundfacts. 3. Replicability of Experiment There is no universal inductive principle in science formulated in terms of replicability of experiment. Replication is not guaranteed to have inductive force. When it does, the force derives from background facts peculiar to the case at hand. 4. Analogy Efforts to characterize good analogical inferences by their form have collapsed under the massive weight of the endless complexity needed to formulate a viable, general rule. For scientists, analogies are facts not argument forms, which fits nicely with the material view. 5. Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Values: A Skeptical Critique Talk
of epistemic values in inductive inference misleads by suggesting that our preference for simpler theories is akin to a free choice, such as being a vegetarian. The better word is criterion, since these values are not freely chosen but must prove their mettle in guiding us to the truth.
6. Simplicity as a Surrogate There is no viable principle that attaches simpler hypotheses to the truth. Appeals to simplicity are shortcuts that disguise more complicated appeals to background facts. 7. Simplicity in Model Selection Statistical techniques, such as the Akaiké Information Criterion (AIC), do not vindicate appeals to simplicity as a general principle. AIC depends on certain strong background assumptions independent of simplicity. We impose a simplicity interpretation on the formula it produces. 8. Inference to the Best Explanation: The General Account There is no clearly defined relation of explanation that confers special inductive support on some hypotheses or theories. The important, canonical examples of inference to the best explanation can be accommodated better by simpler schemes involving background facts. The successful hypotheses or theories accommodate the evidence. The major burden in real cases in science is to show that competing accounts fail, either by contradicting the evidence or taking on burdensome evidential debt. 9. Inference to the Best Explanation: Examples This chapter collects many examples from the history of science that illustrate the general claims of Chapter 8. Chapters 10-16 address Bayesian confirmation theory, which has become the default account of inductive inference in philosophy ofscience, in spite of its weaknesses. Chapters 10,11, and 12 address general issues. Chapters 13-16 display systems in which probabilistic representation of inductive strengths of supportfails. 10. Why Not Bayes While probabilistic analysis of
inductive inference can be very successful in certain domains, it must fail as the universal logic of inductive inference. For an inductive logic must constrain systems beyond mere logical consistency. The resulting contingent restrictions will only obtain in some domains. Proofs of the necessity of probabilistic accounts fail since they require assumptions as strong as the result they seek to establish. x Contents
11. Circularity in the Scoring Rule Vindication of Probabilities 387 The scoring rule approach employs only the notion of accuracy and claims that probabilistic credences dominate. This chapter shows that accuracy provides little. The result really comes from an unjustified fine-tuning of the scoring rule to a predetermined result. 12. No Place to Stand: The Incompleteness of All Calculi of Inductive Inference 435 An inductively complete calculus of inductive inference can take the totality of evidential facts of science and, from them alone, determine the appropriate strengths of evidential support for the hypotheses and theories of science. This chapter reviews informally a proof given elsewhere that no calculus of inductive inference, probabilistic or not, can be complete. 13. Infinite Lottery Machines 469 An infinite lottery machine chooses among a countable infinity of outcomes without favor. While the example is used to impugn countable additivity, it actually also precludes even finite additivity. 14. Uncountable Problems 519 If we enlarge the outcome spaces to continuum size, we find further inductive problems that cannot be accommodated by a probabilistic logic. These include problems derived from the existence of metrically nonmeasuable sets. 15. Indeterministic Physical Systems 573 The indeterminism of a collection of indeterministic systems poses problems in inductive inference. They cannot be solved by representing strengths of inductive support as probabilities, unless one alters the problem posed. 16. A Quantum Inductive Logic 613 While the examples of
Chapters 13-15 were simplified, this chápter proposes that there is a non-probabilistic inductive logic native to quantum mechanics. Epilog 653 Index 657 Contents XI |
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| spelling | Norton, John D. 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)1089176759 aut The material theory of induction John D. Norton Calgary, Alberta University of Calgary Press 2021 XI, 668 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier BSPS open series No. 1 "The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. Which that is, and its extent, is determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference."-- Induction (Logic) Inference Logic Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9781773852546 BSPS open series No. 1 (DE-604)BV047686754 1 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033256497&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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