Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing
Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism-the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of tw...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ
Princeton University Press
[2015]
|
| Ausgabe: | Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only |
| Schriftenreihe: | Soochow University Lectures in Philosophy
5 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 DE-859 DE-860 DE-739 DE-473 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism-the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Mai 2019) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9781400873913 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9781400873913 |
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| 520 | |a Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism-the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology | ||
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| spelling | Pritchard, Duncan Verfasser aut Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing Duncan Pritchard Pilot project. eBook available to selected US libraries only Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2015] © 2016 1 online resource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Soochow University Lectures in Philosophy 5 Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Mai 2019) Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism-the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology In English PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Skepticism https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873913 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Pritchard, Duncan Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Skepticism |
| title | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing |
| title_auth | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing |
| title_exact_search | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing |
| title_full | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing Duncan Pritchard |
| title_fullStr | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing Duncan Pritchard |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic Angst Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing Duncan Pritchard |
| title_short | Epistemic Angst |
| title_sort | epistemic angst radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing |
| title_sub | Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing |
| topic | PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Skepticism |
| topic_facet | PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology Belief and doubt Knowledge, Theory of Skepticism |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873913 |
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