Knowing the adversary: leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations
States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inference...
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1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ
Princeton University Press
[2014]
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Ausgabe: | Course Book |
Schriftenreihe: | Princeton Studies in International History and Politics
146 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments.Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework-called selective attention-that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries.Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security |
Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (360 pages) 2 tables |
ISBN: | 9781400850419 |
DOI: | 10.1515/9781400850419 |
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author | Yarhi-Milo, Keren 1978- |
author_facet | Yarhi-Milo, Keren 1978- |
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dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
discipline_str_mv | Politologie |
doi_str_mv | 10.1515/9781400850419 |
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index_date | 2024-07-03T18:54:15Z |
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institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781400850419 |
language | English |
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spelling | Yarhi-Milo, Keren 1978- aut Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations Keren Yarhi-Milo Course Book Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2014] © 2014 1 online resource (360 pages) 2 tables txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Princeton Studies in International History and Politics 146 Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments.Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework-called selective attention-that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries.Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security In English POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh Detente Intelligence service International relations World politics 20th century https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400850419 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Yarhi-Milo, Keren 1978- Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh Detente Intelligence service International relations World politics 20th century |
title | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations |
title_auth | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations |
title_exact_search | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations |
title_exact_search_txtP | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations |
title_full | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations Keren Yarhi-Milo |
title_fullStr | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations Keren Yarhi-Milo |
title_full_unstemmed | Knowing the adversary leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations Keren Yarhi-Milo |
title_short | Knowing the adversary |
title_sort | knowing the adversary leaders intelligence and assessment of intentions in international relations |
title_sub | leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations |
topic | POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General bisacsh Detente Intelligence service International relations World politics 20th century |
topic_facet | POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General Detente Intelligence service International relations World politics 20th century |
url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400850419 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT yarhimilokeren knowingtheadversaryleadersintelligenceandassessmentofintentionsininternationalrelations |