Patronage at work: public jobs and political services in Argentina

In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services - such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) bec...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Oliveros, Virginia 1976- (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:BSB01
UBG01
Volltext
Summary:In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services - such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges
Item Description:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 24 Nov 2021)
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (xv, 249 Seiten)
ISBN:9781009082525
DOI:10.1017/9781009082525

There is no print copy available.

Interlibrary loan Place Request Caution: Not in THWS collection! Get full text