The single-minded animal: shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition
"This book provides an account of discursive or reason-governed cognition by synthesizing research in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and evolutionary anthropology. Using the grasp of a natural language as a model for the autonomous or self-governed rationality of discursive...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York ; London
Routledge,
2022
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book provides an account of discursive or reason-governed cognition by synthesizing research in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and evolutionary anthropology. Using the grasp of a natural language as a model for the autonomous or self-governed rationality of discursive cognition, and drawing on research concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of intentionality and norm psychology in human beings, the author provides a semantics for individual intentions, collective intentions, and normative attitudes. This semantics interprets claims about collective intentions and claims about what people ought and may do as the expression of plans of action that involve taking the points of view of other people within a community. This has important consequences for our understanding of both the natural basis and the social relevance of intentional and normative mental states, and my formal account of the semantic content of the claims we use to give expression to these mental states integrates well with research in evolutionary anthropology and social psychology concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of norm psychology and collective intentionality in human beings and other primates. The Single-Minded Animal will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on normativity, collective intentionality, social and development psychology, and evolutionary anthropology"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xx, 378 Seiten 13 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780367708702 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents List of Figures Acknowledgements Preface Introduction: Rationality, Autonomy, and Shared Intentionality Opening Remarks A Normative Understanding of Rationality as Autonomy The Study of Discursive Cognition from the Standpoint of Psychological Nominalism Remarks on Some Terminology Concerning the Phenomena of Intentionality A Unified View of the Person in Nature Philosophical and Scientific Cross-Pollination Some Explanatory Resources: Ideas of Gene-Culture Coevolution, Niche Construction, and Social Practices The Near-Abroad Philosophical and Scientific Landscape Evolutionary Anthropology as a Framework for Philosophical Investigation into the Nature of Discursive Cognition On the Scientific Image of Discursive Cognition Reasoning Analogically about Shared Intentionality Single-Minded Practical Cognition Understanding the Intentional Modalities by Analogy with the Deontic Modalities Object Naturalism, Subject Naturalism, and Deflationary Talk of Shared Intentionality Overview of the Book xv xvi xvii 1 1 3 6 9 13 16 17 21 26 28 32 36 39 40 43
x Contents PARTI 1 The Lamp of Reason and the Mirror of Nature Systematic and Edifying Philosophy Balancing Textual Exegesis and the Study of Picturing Mirroring and Picturing The Archimedean Point Picturing as a Warrant on Ascriptions of Spatio-Temporal Knowledge From Isomorphic Picturing to Analogical Reasoning Analogical Reasoning and Scientific Progress An Illustration and a Look Ahead On Discursive and Nondiscursive Cognition 2 Evolutionary Anthropology and Shared Practical Picturing Picturing from Theoretical and Practical Standpoints Tomasello’s Program and Some Concerns About its Viability Minimal Theories of Cognition Picturing as a Basis for Minimal Theories of Cognition Higher-Order Thinking and Minimal Theories of Mindreading Higher-Order Thinking and Shared Practical Picturing Entrainment, Motor-Representational Neural Mirroring, and Task Co-Representation The Explanatory Structure of A Natural History of Human Thinking Some Remarks on Psychological Nominalism and Physiological Studies of Cognition Looking Ahead 3 Deontic Picturing and Obedience to Linguistic Norms Psychological Nominalism and the Normativity of Language Survey of Arguments Against the Normativity of Meaning Common Ground Grades of Normativity 51 51 53 54 58 60 65 69 74 76 81 81 82 85 89 91 94 96 101 103 105 108 108 109 113 114
Contents xi Comparison with Boghossian’s ACRE Model of Rule Following and Tuomela’s Collective Pattern-Governed Behavior Deontic Picturing as a Foundation for Rule-Obeying Rationality Avoiding the Regress Argument The Individual Dimension of Linguistic Normativity The Historical Dimension of Linguistic Normativity Responding to the Impossibility Argument Three Remarks Rationality, Autonomy, and the Power of Spirit 118 121 125 125 127 131 134 136 PART II 4 Discursive Deontic Cognition Semantically Evaluating Descriptive and Prescriptive Sentences Planning Expressivism and Discursive Cognition Problem Space Introducing Hyperplans Hyperplans, Prior Intentions, and Intentions in Action On the Way Hyperplanners Choose Single-Mindedness and indifference An Illustration A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive and Prescriptive Sentences Worries about Types of Inconsistency Summary 5 Understanding What We Ought and Shall Do The Moral “Ought” and the Intentional “Shall” Planning from Deontic and Intentional Frames of Mind Summary of Deontic Hyperstate Semantics Introducing Genuine Agency into the Semantics Sellarsian “We Shall”s Issues of “Shall” and “Not” Intentional Hyperplans and Non-Akratic Hyperstates Individual and Shared Intentions A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive and Prescriptive Sentences, Revised 145 145 148 150 153 155 158 159 162 163 168 172 175 175 180 181 184 185 187 190 191 194
xii Contents A Deontic-Intentional Hyperstate Semantics for Logically Complex Sentences Some Features of a Deontic-Intentional Hyperstate Semantics Ճ Note on Bratman’s Theory of Shared Intentions Worlds, Plans, and Proofs Summing Up and Looking Ahead 6 From the Grunts and Groans of the Cave to the Light of Discursive Cognition: Climbing Jones’s Ladder Reconsidering Psychological Nominalism Inferentialism as a Testbed for Constructing an Account of the Evolution of Discursive Cognition An Overview of Meaning-Use Diagrams Normative Attitudes, Imperatives, and Purposive Practices Practical Rationality as the Ground of Theoretical Rationality Summary 7 On the Scientific Image of the Foundations of Discursive Cognition Analogical Reasoning and Hypothesis Testing Overview of the Book Thus Far From the Heteronomy of Conscious Communication to the Autonomy of Self-Conscious Rationality Hypotheses and Predictions Testing the Theory against the Existing Literature Predictions for Future Research Expanding Tomasello’s Evolutionary Anthropology Subject Naturalism as a Basis for Deflationary Readings of Representational Talk about Intentional and Deontic Facts 194 196 200 201 207 210 210 214 216 222 234 238 241 241 243 247 249 250 253 259 261 PART III 8 Discursive and Nondiscursive Cognition: Questions of Conceptual and Ontological Priority Revisiting Concerns about the Ontological Foundations of Shared Intentionality 265 265
Contents xiii Overview of the Problem Space An Alternative View on Questions of Ontological and Conceptual Priority in Practical Cognition Analogical Understanding and New Hypotheses Questions of Ontological Priority Concerning Individual and Shared Intentionality: Spirit as an “Absolute Substance which is the Unity of the Different Independent Self-Consciousnesses” Questions of Conceptual Priority Concerning Discursive Individual and Shared Intentionality: І-Mode Intentionality and We-Mode Intentionality Nondiscursive Shared Intentionality and Deontic Picturing are Ontologically Prior to Discursive Individual Intentionality Considerations of Deontic and Intentional Cognition in the Exercise of Practical Rationality Is Single-Minded Cognition the Organ of Semantic Self-Consciousness? 9 Comparing Plan-Conditional World-Mind Expressions of Shared Intentionality with TruthConditional Mind-World Representations of Shared Intentionality Shared Intentionality: From Planning States to Truth Conditions Gilbert on the Normativity of Shared Intentionality Non-Gilbertian Normativity in Shared Intentionality Collective Commitment as an Intermediate Form of Shared Intentionality Kinds of Normativity and Shared Intentionality We-Mode Intentionality and Pro-Group І-Mode intentionality World-Mind Planning Conditions and Mind-World Truth Conditions Ludwig’s Analysis of “We Intend to A” The Planning Expressivist Analysis of “We Shall A” Specifies the Planning Content of Ludwig’s ana lysis for “We Intend to A” An Illustration Summary 266 270 272 275 276 278 282 285 288 288 291 295 297 301
302 305 307 310 315 316
xiv Contents 10 The Power of Spirit 319 Shared Intentionality, Rational Agency, and Autopoiesis Deontic Power as a Power of Normative Mindshaping Đeontic Power in the Autonomous Intentional Collective Deontic Power as the Power of Spirit The Power of Spirit as a Power of Autopoiesis Purposeful Acts and Realized Deeds in the Negotiations of Modernity 330 Conclusion: Systematic and Edifying Philosophy Reconsidered 335 Discursive Cognition as Self-Government Contributions to Ongoing Research Philosophical Inquiry into Beauty, Truth, and Goodness as the Self-Conscious Exercise of Evolved and Educated Capacities to Sense, Think, and Act Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 319 320 322 323 327 335 336 339 Addressing Concerns over Deontic Expressivist Analyses of Negation and Disjunction 344 De Re and De Dicto Modality on a Deontic-lntentional Hyperstate Semantics 349 Establishing that Negation, Quantification, and the Deontic Modalities Bear the Right Relations on a Deontic-lntentional Hyperstate Semantics 351 Bibliography 353 Index 373
|
| adam_txt |
Contents List of Figures Acknowledgements Preface Introduction: Rationality, Autonomy, and Shared Intentionality Opening Remarks A Normative Understanding of Rationality as Autonomy The Study of Discursive Cognition from the Standpoint of Psychological Nominalism Remarks on Some Terminology Concerning the Phenomena of Intentionality A Unified View of the Person in Nature Philosophical and Scientific Cross-Pollination Some Explanatory Resources: Ideas of Gene-Culture Coevolution, Niche Construction, and Social Practices The Near-Abroad Philosophical and Scientific Landscape Evolutionary Anthropology as a Framework for Philosophical Investigation into the Nature of Discursive Cognition On the Scientific Image of Discursive Cognition Reasoning Analogically about Shared Intentionality Single-Minded Practical Cognition Understanding the Intentional Modalities by Analogy with the Deontic Modalities Object Naturalism, Subject Naturalism, and Deflationary Talk of Shared Intentionality Overview of the Book xv xvi xvii 1 1 3 6 9 13 16 17 21 26 28 32 36 39 40 43
x Contents PARTI 1 The Lamp of Reason and the Mirror of Nature Systematic and Edifying Philosophy Balancing Textual Exegesis and the Study of Picturing Mirroring and Picturing The Archimedean Point Picturing as a Warrant on Ascriptions of Spatio-Temporal Knowledge From Isomorphic Picturing to Analogical Reasoning Analogical Reasoning and Scientific Progress An Illustration and a Look Ahead On Discursive and Nondiscursive Cognition 2 Evolutionary Anthropology and Shared Practical Picturing Picturing from Theoretical and Practical Standpoints Tomasello’s Program and Some Concerns About its Viability Minimal Theories of Cognition Picturing as a Basis for Minimal Theories of Cognition Higher-Order Thinking and Minimal Theories of Mindreading Higher-Order Thinking and Shared Practical Picturing Entrainment, Motor-Representational Neural Mirroring, and Task Co-Representation The Explanatory Structure of A Natural History of Human Thinking Some Remarks on Psychological Nominalism and Physiological Studies of Cognition Looking Ahead 3 Deontic Picturing and Obedience to Linguistic Norms Psychological Nominalism and the Normativity of Language Survey of Arguments Against the Normativity of Meaning Common Ground Grades of Normativity 51 51 53 54 58 60 65 69 74 76 81 81 82 85 89 91 94 96 101 103 105 108 108 109 113 114
Contents xi Comparison with Boghossian’s ACRE Model of Rule Following and Tuomela’s Collective Pattern-Governed Behavior Deontic Picturing as a Foundation for Rule-Obeying Rationality Avoiding the Regress Argument The Individual Dimension of Linguistic Normativity The Historical Dimension of Linguistic Normativity Responding to the Impossibility Argument Three Remarks Rationality, Autonomy, and the Power of Spirit 118 121 125 125 127 131 134 136 PART II 4 Discursive Deontic Cognition Semantically Evaluating Descriptive and Prescriptive Sentences Planning Expressivism and Discursive Cognition Problem Space Introducing Hyperplans Hyperplans, Prior Intentions, and Intentions in Action On the Way Hyperplanners Choose Single-Mindedness and indifference An Illustration A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive and Prescriptive Sentences Worries about Types of Inconsistency Summary 5 Understanding What We Ought and Shall Do The Moral “Ought” and the Intentional “Shall” Planning from Deontic and Intentional Frames of Mind Summary of Deontic Hyperstate Semantics Introducing Genuine Agency into the Semantics Sellarsian “We Shall”s Issues of “Shall” and “Not” Intentional Hyperplans and Non-Akratic Hyperstates Individual and Shared Intentions A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive and Prescriptive Sentences, Revised 145 145 148 150 153 155 158 159 162 163 168 172 175 175 180 181 184 185 187 190 191 194
xii Contents A Deontic-Intentional Hyperstate Semantics for Logically Complex Sentences Some Features of a Deontic-Intentional Hyperstate Semantics Ճ Note on Bratman’s Theory of Shared Intentions Worlds, Plans, and Proofs Summing Up and Looking Ahead 6 From the Grunts and Groans of the Cave to the Light of Discursive Cognition: Climbing Jones’s Ladder Reconsidering Psychological Nominalism Inferentialism as a Testbed for Constructing an Account of the Evolution of Discursive Cognition An Overview of Meaning-Use Diagrams Normative Attitudes, Imperatives, and Purposive Practices Practical Rationality as the Ground of Theoretical Rationality Summary 7 On the Scientific Image of the Foundations of Discursive Cognition Analogical Reasoning and Hypothesis Testing Overview of the Book Thus Far From the Heteronomy of Conscious Communication to the Autonomy of Self-Conscious Rationality Hypotheses and Predictions Testing the Theory against the Existing Literature Predictions for Future Research Expanding Tomasello’s Evolutionary Anthropology Subject Naturalism as a Basis for Deflationary Readings of Representational Talk about Intentional and Deontic Facts 194 196 200 201 207 210 210 214 216 222 234 238 241 241 243 247 249 250 253 259 261 PART III 8 Discursive and Nondiscursive Cognition: Questions of Conceptual and Ontological Priority Revisiting Concerns about the Ontological Foundations of Shared Intentionality 265 265
Contents xiii Overview of the Problem Space An Alternative View on Questions of Ontological and Conceptual Priority in Practical Cognition Analogical Understanding and New Hypotheses Questions of Ontological Priority Concerning Individual and Shared Intentionality: Spirit as an “Absolute Substance which is the Unity of the Different Independent Self-Consciousnesses” Questions of Conceptual Priority Concerning Discursive Individual and Shared Intentionality: І-Mode Intentionality and We-Mode Intentionality Nondiscursive Shared Intentionality and Deontic Picturing are Ontologically Prior to Discursive Individual Intentionality Considerations of Deontic and Intentional Cognition in the Exercise of Practical Rationality Is Single-Minded Cognition the Organ of Semantic Self-Consciousness? 9 Comparing Plan-Conditional World-Mind Expressions of Shared Intentionality with TruthConditional Mind-World Representations of Shared Intentionality Shared Intentionality: From Planning States to Truth Conditions Gilbert on the Normativity of Shared Intentionality Non-Gilbertian Normativity in Shared Intentionality Collective Commitment as an Intermediate Form of Shared Intentionality Kinds of Normativity and Shared Intentionality We-Mode Intentionality and Pro-Group І-Mode intentionality World-Mind Planning Conditions and Mind-World Truth Conditions Ludwig’s Analysis of “We Intend to A” The Planning Expressivist Analysis of “We Shall A” Specifies the Planning Content of Ludwig’s ana lysis for “We Intend to A” An Illustration Summary 266 270 272 275 276 278 282 285 288 288 291 295 297 301
302 305 307 310 315 316
xiv Contents 10 The Power of Spirit 319 Shared Intentionality, Rational Agency, and Autopoiesis Deontic Power as a Power of Normative Mindshaping Đeontic Power in the Autonomous Intentional Collective Deontic Power as the Power of Spirit The Power of Spirit as a Power of Autopoiesis Purposeful Acts and Realized Deeds in the Negotiations of Modernity 330 Conclusion: Systematic and Edifying Philosophy Reconsidered 335 Discursive Cognition as Self-Government Contributions to Ongoing Research Philosophical Inquiry into Beauty, Truth, and Goodness as the Self-Conscious Exercise of Evolved and Educated Capacities to Sense, Think, and Act Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 319 320 322 323 327 335 336 339 Addressing Concerns over Deontic Expressivist Analyses of Negation and Disjunction 344 De Re and De Dicto Modality on a Deontic-lntentional Hyperstate Semantics 349 Establishing that Negation, Quantification, and the Deontic Modalities Bear the Right Relations on a Deontic-lntentional Hyperstate Semantics 351 Bibliography 353 Index 373 |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T18:24:26Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:14:24Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780367708702 |
| language | English |
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| physical | xx, 378 Seiten 13 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) 25 cm |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Routledge, |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy |
| spelling | Stovall, Preston Verfasser (DE-588)1247492265 aut The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition Preston Stovall New York ; London Routledge, 2022 xx, 378 Seiten 13 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy "This book provides an account of discursive or reason-governed cognition by synthesizing research in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and evolutionary anthropology. Using the grasp of a natural language as a model for the autonomous or self-governed rationality of discursive cognition, and drawing on research concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of intentionality and norm psychology in human beings, the author provides a semantics for individual intentions, collective intentions, and normative attitudes. This semantics interprets claims about collective intentions and claims about what people ought and may do as the expression of plans of action that involve taking the points of view of other people within a community. This has important consequences for our understanding of both the natural basis and the social relevance of intentional and normative mental states, and my formal account of the semantic content of the claims we use to give expression to these mental states integrates well with research in evolutionary anthropology and social psychology concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of norm psychology and collective intentionality in human beings and other primates. The Single-Minded Animal will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on normativity, collective intentionality, social and development psychology, and evolutionary anthropology"-- Entwicklungspsychologie (DE-588)4014963-8 gnd rswk-swf Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd rswk-swf Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd rswk-swf Kollektive Intentionalität (DE-588)4705604-6 gnd rswk-swf Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4135408-4 gnd rswk-swf Discursive psychology Intentionality (Philosophy) Cognition Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 s Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 s Kollektive Intentionalität (DE-588)4705604-6 s Entwicklungspsychologie (DE-588)4014963-8 s Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4135408-4 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9781003154679 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032926025&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Stovall, Preston The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition Entwicklungspsychologie (DE-588)4014963-8 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd Kollektive Intentionalität (DE-588)4705604-6 gnd Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4135408-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4014963-8 (DE-588)4031630-0 (DE-588)4790832-4 (DE-588)4705604-6 (DE-588)4135408-4 |
| title | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition |
| title_auth | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition |
| title_exact_search | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition |
| title_full | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition Preston Stovall |
| title_fullStr | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition Preston Stovall |
| title_full_unstemmed | The single-minded animal shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition Preston Stovall |
| title_short | The single-minded animal |
| title_sort | the single minded animal shared intentionality normativity and the foundations of discursive cognition |
| title_sub | shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition |
| topic | Entwicklungspsychologie (DE-588)4014963-8 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd Kollektive Intentionalität (DE-588)4705604-6 gnd Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4135408-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Entwicklungspsychologie Kognition Normativität Kollektive Intentionalität Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032926025&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stovallpreston thesinglemindedanimalsharedintentionalitynormativityandthefoundationsofdiscursivecognition |