Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary: the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law
"This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population. The work consists of seven Part...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
London ; New York
Routledge
2022
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Comparative constitutional change
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis Register // Gemischte Register |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population. The work consists of seven Parts. Part I outlines the volume's ambitions and provides an introduction. Part II discusses the theoretical framework and clarifies the terminology adopted in the book. Part III provides an in-depth insight into the constitutional identity of Poles and Hungarians and argues that an unbalanced constitutional identity has been moulded throughout Polish and Hungarian history in which emotional traits of collective victimhood and collective narcissism, and a longing for a charismatic leader have been evident. Part IV focuses on the emergence of illiberal constitutionalism, and, based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses, argues that illiberal constitutionalism is neither modern authoritarianism nor authoritarian constitutionalism. This Part contextualizes the issue by putting the deterioration of the Rule of Law into a European perspective. Part V explores the legal nature of illiberal legality when it is at odds and in compliance with the European Rule of Law, illiberal democracy, focusing on electoral democracy and legislative processes, and illiberalization of human rights. Part VI investigates whether there is a clear pattern in the methods of remodeling, or distancing from constitutional democracy, how it started, consolidated, and how its results are maintained. The final part presents the author's conclusions and looks to the future"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 224 Seiten 3 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781032007304 9781032007366 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a22000008c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV047493612 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20221017 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 211004s2022 a||| b||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781032007304 |c hardback |9 978-1-032-00730-4 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781032007366 |9 9781032007366 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1266188898 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV047493612 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-521 |a DE-12 | ||
| 084 | |a OST |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 084 | |a MG 80065 |0 (DE-625)122863:12041 |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MG 92065 |0 (DE-625)122873:12041 |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MG 98065 |0 (DE-625)122877:12041 |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MG 98060 |0 (DE-625)122877:12040 |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MG 80060 |0 (DE-625)122863:12040 |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MG 92060 |0 (DE-625)122873:12040 |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Drinóczi, Tímea |d 1978- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1207345601 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary |b the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |c Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała |
| 264 | 1 | |a London ; New York |b Routledge |c 2022 | |
| 300 | |a xi, 224 Seiten |b 3 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) |c 24 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Comparative constitutional change | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Ambitions -- Why Hungary and Poland -- Insight into the book -- Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" -- Illiberal(ism) -- Constitutional democracy -- Historical and emotional trajectory -- Post-communist past and beyond -- Possible root cause : the combination of the above -- The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism -- A comparative perspective-looking for constraints -- Contextualization : the European rule of law as a constraint on public power -- Illiberal legality -- lliberal democracy -- lliberalization of human rights -- Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution -- lliberal judicialization of politics -- Pushing the limits and bouncing back -- Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy -- Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal -- Illiberal constitutionalismis a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet -- In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail -- Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner -- Lessons learned, mostly, for others | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population. The work consists of seven Parts. Part I outlines the volume's ambitions and provides an introduction. Part II discusses the theoretical framework and clarifies the terminology adopted in the book. Part III provides an in-depth insight into the constitutional identity of Poles and Hungarians and argues that an unbalanced constitutional identity has been moulded throughout Polish and Hungarian history in which emotional traits of collective victimhood and collective narcissism, and a longing for a charismatic leader have been evident. Part IV focuses on the emergence of illiberal constitutionalism, and, based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses, argues that illiberal constitutionalism is neither modern authoritarianism nor authoritarian constitutionalism. This Part contextualizes the issue by putting the deterioration of the Rule of Law into a European perspective. Part V explores the legal nature of illiberal legality when it is at odds and in compliance with the European Rule of Law, illiberal democracy, focusing on electoral democracy and legislative processes, and illiberalization of human rights. Part VI investigates whether there is a clear pattern in the methods of remodeling, or distancing from constitutional democracy, how it started, consolidated, and how its results are maintained. The final part presents the author's conclusions and looks to the future"-- | |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 2010-2020 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Verfassungsrecht |0 (DE-588)4062801-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4011413-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Autoritärer Staat |0 (DE-588)4256521-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Menschenrecht |0 (DE-588)4074725-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Ungarn |0 (DE-588)4078541-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Polen |0 (DE-588)4046496-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Rule of law / Poland | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Rule of law / Hungary | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Civil rights / Poland | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Civil rights / Hungary | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Populism / Poland | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Populism / Hungary | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Poland / Politics and government / 21st century | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Hungary / Politics and government / 21st century | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Civil rights | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Politics and government | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Populism | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Rule of law | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Hungary | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Poland | |
| 653 | 4 | |a 2000-2099 | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Polen |0 (DE-588)4046496-9 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Ungarn |0 (DE-588)4078541-5 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Verfassungsrecht |0 (DE-588)4062801-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4011413-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Menschenrecht |0 (DE-588)4074725-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 5 | |a Autoritärer Staat |0 (DE-588)4256521-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 6 | |a Geschichte 2010-2020 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1041725183 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe, PDF |z 978-1-003-17535-3 |w (DE-604)BV047452034 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Literaturverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Register // Gemischte Register |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 940 | 1 | |q BSB_NED_20220110 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032894834 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 340.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 437 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 437 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804182820654940160 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents List of illustrations Foreword Acknowledgements I Introduction: Ambitions and comparison viii ix xii 1 I Amhitions 1 II Why Hungary and Poland? 4 1 Differences 5 2 Similarities 10 III Insight into the book 13 II Terms: Constitutionalism, ffliberal(ism), and constitutional democracy 17 I Constitutionalism in the term ailliberal constitutionalism” 17 1 The need for a new term 17 2 Entangling or disentangling 21 3 Words disentangled 23 4 Conceptual differences 25 II Illiberal(ism) 35 1 Illiberal polity and constitutionalism 35 2 Illiberal in the term “illiberal constitutionalism” 36 3 The term “illiberal(ism)” in the economic and social sphere 40 III Constitutional democracy 42 1 Substantive constitutional democracy 42 2 Formal constitutional democracy and illiberal constitutionalism 44 III Identity: Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and values I Historical and emotional trajectory 47 I Framework of investigation 47 46
vi Contents 2 Hungarian national identity - more than a stereotype 49 3 National identity and Poland 55 II Post-communist past and beyond 60 III Possible root cause: the combination of the above 64 1 Populism - playing with emotions 65 2 Collective narcissism and collective victimhood 68 IV Limits: Comparative perspective I The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism 71 II A comparative perspective - looking for constraints 73 III Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public power 83 1 Rule of Law as a context-related notion 83 2 “European” in the term “European Rule of Law” 85 3 “Rule of Law” in the term “European Rule of Law” 90 4 The European Rule of Law ֊ a rudimentary concept 94 V Limits: Constraints in constitutional design and identity I Illiberal legality 96 1 The term 96 2 Legal features of illiberal legality 98 II Illiberal democracy 108 1 The term 108 2 Electoral democracy - illiberalization 111 3 Procedure in parliament 115 III Illiberalization of human rights 124 1 Steps towards illiberalization and common challenges 124 2 Struggling with international and supranational obligations 127 3 The illiberal vision of human rights 132 4 Emerging new understanding of human rights (third phase of illiberalization) 148 VI Stability: How “illiberal limits” emerge and work I Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution 150 1 Bird’s-eye view of 1989-2020: dismemberments, replacements, formal, informal, and abusive amendments 151 2 Formal constitutional changes 153 3 Informal unconstitutional constitutional
changes 157
Contents vii 4 The paradox of unconstitutional formal and informal constitutional amendments 169 5 Capturing key positions 171 II Illiberal judicialization ofpolitics 173 1 Bird’s-eye view of legal constitutionalism and juristocracy, so ... 175 2 ... illiberal constitutionalism is not about political constitutionalism but... 179 3 ... illiberal judicialization of politics 180 III Pushing the limits and bouncing back 184 1 Rules 184 2 Techniques 185 TV Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy 190 1 Militant democracy 190 2 The multi-tiered amendment designs and references to transnational norms 192 3 Application of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments - and a paradox 193 4 Empowering citizens 194 5 Emergency judicial power 194 6 Other ... 195 VII Conclusions 197 1 Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal 197 2 Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet 197 3 In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail 198 4 Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner 198 5 Lessons learned, mostly, for others ... 199 Bibliography Index ■ 200 220
Bibliography Part I Acunha, FJG and Benvindo, JZ, “Democratic Decay in Brazil and the New Global Popu lism”, INT’L ASS’N CONST. L. BLOG (6 June2017), https://blog-iaclaidc.org/ test-3/2018/5/26/democratic-decay-in-brazil-and-the-new-global-populism. Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25 (1173) (2018). Daly, TG, “Diagnosing Democratic Decay”, Conference paper, Comparative Constitu tional Law Round-table, Gilbert and Tobin Centre for Public Law, UNSW Law School (7 August 2017), www.academia.edu/34052302/Diagnosing_Democratic_Decay. Daly, TG, “Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field” (2019), https:// Unk.sprmger.com/article/10.1007/s40803-019֊00086-2. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A (eds), Rule of Law, Common Values and Illiberal Con stitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union (Routledge, 2020). Eichhorn, J, Kupsch, V, and Mohr, LMM, “How European Publics and Policy Actors Values an Open Society: Key Insight Across Countries” (Open Society European Policy Institute2019), http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org/images/finalreports/OST019-18-Key-Insights_v5.pdf. Frantz, E and Kendall-Taylor, A, “The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism is Becoming More Formidable” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (2017) 57. Fülöp, É, Csertő, I, lig, В, Szabó, Z, Slugoski, B, and László, J, “Emotional Elaboration of Collective Traumas in Historical Narratives” (2014) http://real.mtak.hu/20201/3/em otional_elaboration_of_collective_traumas.pdf. Ginsburg, T and Huq, AZ,
How to Save Constitutional Democracy? (University of Chicago Press, 2018). Granat, M and Granat, К, The Constitution of Poland: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Pubfishing, 2019) 32-33. Hajdú, T, “A magyar identitás szabadságharcos - interjú Szabó Zsolttal, az ELTE Szo ciálpszichológia tanszékének adjunktusával”, Mindset Pszichológia (18 November 2017), http://mindset.co.hu/a-magyar-identitas-szabadsagharcos-intei1u-szabo-zsolttal-az-elte-s zocialpszichologia-tanszekenek-adjunktusaval/. Hanley, S, “Understanding the Illiberal Tum: Democratic Backsliding in the Czech Republic”, www.tandfonlme.com/doi/fúll/lO.1080/21599165.2018.1493457. Humphrey, T, “Democracy and the Rule of Law: Founding Liberal Democracy in Post-Communist Europe”, Colum. J. E. Eur. L. 2 (2008) 94, 124. Huq, AZ and Ginsburg, T, “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy” UCLA Law Review65 (2018) 95.
Bibliography 201 Jacobsohn, GJ and Roznai, Y Constitutional Revolution (Yale University Press, 2020). Kurunmäki, J and Marjanen, J “Isms, Ideologies and Setting the Agenda for Public Debate”, Journal of Political Ideologies 23(3) (2018) 256-282. Laszlo, J, “Narratív pszichológia”, Pszichológia 28 (2008), http://real.mtak.hu/2385/l/ 49413_ZJl.pdf. Lijphart, A, Patterns of Democracy - Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale University Press, 2012) 192. Liihrmann A and Lindberg SI, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New about It?” Democratization 7 (2019) 1099. Midler, J-W, What is Populismi (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 16. Murray, M, “Narrative Psychology and Narrative Analysis” in P.M. Camie, J.E. Rhodes, and L. Yardley (eds), Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding Perspectives in Methodology and Design (2003), 95И112. American Psychological Association, https:// doi.org/10.1037/10595-006. Pinheiro, VM, Ilarraz, M, and Mestriner, MT, “The Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis on the Bra zilian Legal System - A Report on the Functioning of the Branches of the Government and on the Legal Scrutiny of Their Activities”, The Theory and Practice ofLegL·lation, 8:i-2,193-212. Popp-Baier, U, “Narrative Psychology”, in ALC Runehov and L Oviedo (eds), Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions (Springer, 2013). Sadłoń, W, “Differentiation, Polarization and Religious Change in Poland at the Turn of 20th and 21st century”, Przeglqd Religioznawczy -The Religious Studies Review 4(262) (2016) 33-35. Sadurski, W, “How Democracy Dies (in
Poland): Ą Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Popu list Backsliding”, Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 18/01 (2018) 4^8. Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 3-5. Sadurski, W, “Constitutional Democracy in the Time of Elected Authoritarians”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2(331) (2020) 324-333. Schwartz, SH and Bardi, A, “Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule On Value Priorities in Eastern Europe”, Political Psychology 2 (1997) 407-408. Tushnet, M, “The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism?”, Florida Law Review, 69 (2017) 1367-1384. Versteeg, M and Ginsburg, T, “Measuring the Rule of Law: A Comparison of Indicators”, Law and Social Inquiry 1 (2017) 101. Walker, G, “The Idea of Nonli beral Constitutionalism”, Ethnicity and Group Rights39 (1997). Partii Alviar, H and Frankenberg, G (eds), Authoritarian Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, 2019). Bellamy, R, “Constitutionalism”, www.britannica.com/topic/constitutionalism. Bernatt, M and Ziółkowski, M, “Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism”, Wash. Int’l L.J. 28 (487) (2019) 505-516. Blokker, P, New Democracies in Crisis? (Routledge, 2015). Blokker, P, “Populist Constitutionalism”, VerfBlog (4 May 2017), https://verfassungsblog. de/populist-constitutionalism/. Blokker, P, “Populist Constitutionalism, Popular Engagement, and Constitutional Resistance”, https://reconnect-europe.eu/blog/blokker-populist-constitutionalisrn/, 7 February 2019. Bogaards, M, “De-democratization in Hungary: Diffusely Defective Democracy”, Democratization 8 (2018) 1491.
202 Bibliography Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25(1173) (2018) 1175. Brownlee, J, “Authoritarianism after 1989”, Harvard International Review, 4(2010). Bugarić, B, “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: ‘Lands In-Between’ Democracy and Authoritarianism”, Inťl J. Const. L. 13(219) (2015). Buzogány, A and Varga, M, “The Ideational Foundations of the Illiberal Backlash in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary”, Review of International Political Economy 25 (6) (2018) 811-828. Castillo-Ortiz, Paolo, “The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe”, European Constitutional Law Review 15(1) (2019) 48-72. Chan, C, “Thirty Years from Tiananmen: China, Hong Kong, and the Ongoing Experi ment to Preserve Liberal Values in an Authoritarian State”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 17(2) (2019) 443. Cheung, A, ‘“For My Enemies, the Law’: Abusive Legalism”, Candidacy paper, JSD Pro gram, NYU School of Law, 15 January 2018. Corrales, J, “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela”, Journal of Democracy 26 (2015) 38-43. Csaba, L, “Unorthodoxy in Hungary: An Illiberal Success Story?”, Post Communist econo mies, DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2019.1641949. Csaky, ZS, Nations in Transition: Dropping the Democratic Façade (Freedom House, 2020), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democra tic-facade#Facade. Csink, L, “Rule of Law in Hungary. What Can Law and Politics Do?” in T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała (eds), Ruk of
Law, Common Values and Illiberal Constitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union (Routledge, 2021). Diamond, L, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”,/. Democracy 26(142) (2015). Dixon, R and Landau, D Abusive Constitutional Borrowing: Legal Globalization and the Subversion of Liberal Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2021). Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Politics in Contemporary Hungary”, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 1 (2016) 63-98. Elster, J, “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction”, The University of Chicago Law Review 58(2) (1991) 447-482. Fabry, A, The Political Economy of Hungary: Prom State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism (Springer, 2019). Farinacci-Femós, JM, “Post-Liberal Constitutionalism”, Tulsa L. Rev. 54(1) (2018). Fraenkel, E, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 1941) 3-7. Frankenberg, G, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Coming to Terms with Modernity’s Nightmares” in H Alviar and G Frankenberg (eds), Authoritarian Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, 2019) 18-24, 36. Frantz, E and Kendall-Taylor, A, “The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism is Becoming More Formidable?”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (2017) 57. Frohnen, BP, “Is Constitutionalism Liberal?”, Campbell L. Rev. 33(529) (2011). Gardbaum, S, “The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, German L.J. 14(2229) (2013). Gingsburg, T and Huq, AZ, How to Save Constitutional Democracy? (University of Chicago Press, 2018). Gyulai, A, “Reality Free of Ideology.
Viktor Orbán’s Realism and Illiberalism”, https://ecp r.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/41864.
Bibliography 203 Halmai, G, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and Constitutionalism”, German Law Journal 20 (2019). Halmai, G, “The Making of‘Illiberal Constitutionalism’ with or without a New Constitution: The Case of Hungary and Poland”, in D Landau and H Lemer (eds), Comparative Con stitution Making (Edward Elgar, 2019). Halmai, G, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe”, EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2019/05. Henkin, L, “Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs”, Indiana Law Journal 4 (1992) 885, 886. Howse, R, “Populism and its Enemies”, Workshop on Public Law and the New Populism, Jean Monnet Center, NYU Law School, 15-16 September 2017. Ip, EC, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Politics of Constitutional Review in the Chinese Special Administrative Region (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Keane, J, New Despotism (Harvard University Press, 2020). Kochenov, D and Jakab, A (eds), The Enforcement ofEU Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017). Körösényi, A, Illés, G, and Gyulai, A, The Orbán Regime: Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making (Roudedge, 2020). Landau, D, “Abusive Constitutionalism”, U.C. Davis L. Rev. 47(189) (2013). Landau, D, “Populist Constitutions”, The University of Chicago Law Review 85 (2018) 521. Law, DS, “Alternatives to Liberal Constitutional Democracy”, Md. L. Rev. 77(223) (2017). Levitsky, S and Way, LA, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democ racy 2 (2002). Levitsky, S and Way, LA, “The Myth of Democratic Recession”, Democracy26(45) (2015) 48. Ludwikowski, R, “Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the
Concept of Constitu tional Supremacy”, Cardozo Journal of International Comparative Law 9 (2001) 253-296. Lührmann, A and Lindberg, SI, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It?” Democratization 7 (2019) 1097, 1098. Magyar, B, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary (CEU Press, 2016). Merkel, W, Puhle, H-J, Croissant, A, and Thierry, P, Defekte Demokratk: Band 1; Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie: Band 2 (Verlag, 2006) Mészáros, G, “Carl Schmitt in Hungary: Constitutional Crisis in the Shadow of Covid-19”, MTA ĽWP 2020/17, https://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp/carl-schmitt-in-hungary-con stitutional-crisis-in-the-shadow-of-covid-19. Mudde, C and Rovira Kaltwasser, C, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2017) 34. Müller, J-W, “Populism and Constitutionalism ” in C Rovira Kaltwasser, P Taggart, P Ochoa Espejo, and P Ostiguy (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Populism (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2017). Müller, J-W, “The Problem with ‘Illiberal Democracy’”, Soc. Eur. (27 January 2016), www.socialeurope.eu/the-problem-with-illiberal-democracy. Müller, J-W, What is Populismi (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 3. Norris, P, “Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risk”, 28(2) Journal of Democracy (2017) 14-15. Norris, P, “Measuring Populism Worldwide”, Harvard Kennedy School, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP 20-002, 2.
204 Bibliography Nusserger, A, “The European Court of Human Rights and the Rule of Law - A Tale of Hopes and Disillusions” in M Zubrik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World. Essays in Honor of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2017). Pinelli, C, “Illiberal Regimes in the Perspective of Comparative Constimtionalism”, Revista di diritti comparati 1 (2017), 5, 6. Puddington, A, “Breaking Down Democracy: Global Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians”, https://freedomhouse.org/sitcs/default/fiJcs/June2017_FH_Rcport_ Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf, June 2017. Ruprik, J, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Surging Illiberalism in the East”, J. Democracy 27(77) (2016) 137. Sadurski, W, “How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding”, Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 18/01 (2018). Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 25, 243. Sanecka-Tyczyńska, J, “Prawa i Sprawiedliwości krytyka Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polaskiej z 1997 r.” [“Law and Justice Criticism of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997”], 4 (147) Przegląd Sejmowy (2018) 83-88. Scheppele, KL, “Autocratic Legalism”, U. Chi. L. Rev. 85(545) (2018). Sheiring, G, www.tni.org/en/article/hungarys-regime-is-proof-that-capitalism-can-be-deeplyauthoritarian. Somer, M, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown: Old vs. New and Indigenous vs. Global Authoritarianism”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2016). Son, BN, Confucian Constitutionalism in East Asia (Routledge, 2016) 174. Stopler, G,
“Semi-liberal Constitutionalism” 8Global Constitutionalism (2019), 94—122. Stubbs, P and Lendvai-Bainton, N, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism, Radical Conservativism and Social Policy Within the European Union: Croatia, Hungary and Poland” 51(2) Development and Change (2019) 554. Thio, L-А, “Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Online Publication Date: Nov 2012, doi.T0.1093/oxfordhb/ 9780199578610.013.0001. Tóth GA, “Authoritarianism” in R Grote, F Lachenmann, and R Wolfhim (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford Constitutional Law; online resource, 2017). Tóth, GA, “Illiberal Rule of Law? Changing Features of Hungarian Constitutionalism” in M Adams, A Meuwese, and EH Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017). Tushnet, M, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism”, Cornell Law Review 100 (2015). Tushnet, M, “The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism”, Fla L. Rev. 69 (2017). Tushnet, M and Bugaric, B, “Populism and Constitutionalism: An Essay on Definitions and Their Implications” (21 April 2020), http://nrs.harvard.edu/um-3:HUL.InstRepos: 42660123. Walker, G, “The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism”, Ethnicity and Group Rights 39 (1997). Waluchow, W, “Constitutionalism” in EN Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo sophy (Spring 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/con stitutionalism/. Zajadło, J, “Podwójne państwo”, http://konstytucyjny.pl/jerzy-zajadlo-podwojne-pa nstwo/ (20.10.2020). Zakaria, F, “The Rise
of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs 6 (1997) 22. Zakaria, F, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (W. W. Norton and Company, 2007).
Bibliography 205 Zgut, E, “Authoritarian Regime Durabili ty. The Bread and Butter of Hungarian and Polish Backsliding during COVID-19”, https://visegradinsight.eu/authoritarian-regime-dura bility-hungary-poland/. Part ПІ Ady, E, “Ismereden Korvin-kódex margójára” [“Side-note to the Unknown KorvinCodex”] Figyelő (1905). Augustyniak, P, Homo Polacas. Eseje o polskiej duszy [Homo Polacas. Essays about Polish soul] (Znak, Kraków 2015). Bar-Tal, D, Chernyak-Наі, L, Schori, N, and Gundar, A, “A Sense of Self-perceived Col lective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts”, 91 (874) International Review of the Red Cross (2009) 237. Bauman, Z, Etykaponowoczesna [The Late Modem Ethics] (Wydawnictwo Aletheia, Warszawa, 2012). Bibó, I, Válogatott tanulmányok I-IV, Második kötet: EÜorzult magyar alkat, zsákutcás magyar történelem [Selected papers I-IV, 2nd vol: Distorted Hungarian character, Hungarian history with a dead end] (1948), http://mek.oszk.hu/02000/02043/html/350.html. Bień-Kacała, A and Tarnowska, A, “Power of Authority: A Few Words About the Chief of State One Hundred Years Ago and the Present”, 6(46) Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (2018) 125-135. Bień-Kacała, A, “Informal Constitutional Change: The Case of Poland” 6(40) Przeglçtd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (2017), 199-218. Bień-Kacała, A, “Równość czy hierarchiczność? Kilka słów o wartościach w państwie, prawie i społeczeństwie” (“Equality or Hierarchy? A Few Words About Values in the State, Law and Society”), Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze XL(2018) 17-30. Bień-Kacała, A, “Polexit is Coming or is it Already Here? Comments on the Judicial
Inde pendence Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal”, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 28 April 2020, at www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/polexit-is-coming֊or-is-it-already-here-comm ents-on-the-judicial-independence-decisions֊of-the-poUsh-constitutional-tribunal. Bień-Kacała, A, Tarnowska, A, and Włoch, W, “The Nation, Delegation, and Constitu tional Change in Poland”, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2018) 355-377. Bień-Kacała, A, Tarnowska, A, and Wioch, W, “Nation - Delegation - Constitution: Reconsidering Role of Religion in Polish Identity Development”, Bratislava Law Review 1 (2019) 6-25. Bilewicz, M, Być gorszymi [To Be Worse] (Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2008) 43-47. Bilewicz, M, Miįdzy idealizacjg. a hiperkrytycyzmem. Pokka niepamiįc historyczna i jej źródła [Between Idealization and Hypercriticism: Poland Historical Oblivion and its Sources] (Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych, Warszawa, Seria ANALIZY) September 2018,1-8. Bíró-Nagy, A, “Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: The Social Background and Practical Steps of Building an Illiberal state”, www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/illiberals/ilU beral_democracy_in_hungary_the_social_background_and_practical_steps_of_building_a n_illiberal_state (2017) 35. Boyd, D and Salusmszky, I (eds), Re-reading Frye (University of Toronto Press, 1999). Cichocka, A and Cislak, A, “NationaUsm as Collective Narcissism” ScienceDirect Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 34 (2020) 69-74. Cieger, A, “Alkotmányosság és nemzeti identitás - a magyar történelem kontextusában. Vázlat” [“Constitutionaüsm and National Identity - In the
Context of Hungarian History. Draft”], http://ateUer.org.hu/upload/category/mta_elte_ateUer/kotoerokl.3_cieger_andras.pdf.
206 Bibliography Csordas, G, “A Farewell to Central Europe” (July 2016), www.literaturhauseuropa.eu/en/ observatory/blog/a-fàrewell-to-central-europe. Diamond, L, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”, Journal ofDemocracy 1 (2015) 149. Doliński, D and Grzyb, T, Posłuszni do bólu: O uległości wobec autorytetu w 50 lat po ehperymencie Milgrama [Painfully Obedient: On the Submission to Authority 50 Tears Afier Milgram’s Experiment] (Smak Słowa, 2017). Drezner, DW, “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air”, Eletcher F. World Affi 41 (2017) 23. Drinóczi, T, “Concept of Quality in Legislation - Revisited: Matter of Perspective and a General Overview”, Statute Law Review 3 (2015). Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System” Wienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (2017) 139-151. Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Identity in Europe: The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach”, German Law Journal 21(2) (2020) 105-130. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “Extra-legal Particularities and Illiberal Constitutionalism: The Case of Hungary and Poland”, Hungarian Journal ofLegal Studies ‘1 (2018) 338-354. Drogosz, M (ed), Jak Polacy przegrywają, jak Polacy wygrywaję [How the Poles Lose, How the Poles Win] (Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, 2005). Feischmidt, M and Majtényi, В, The Rise of Populist Nationalism: Social Resentment and Capturing the Court in Hungary (Central European University Press, 2019). Forgas, JP and Lantos, D, “Understanding Populism: Collective Narcissism and the
Col lapse of Democracy in Hungary”, www.sydneysymposium.unsw.edu.au/2019/chap ters/ForgasSSSP2019%20.pdf, 28. Fukuyama, F, “The Rise of Populist Nationalism”, www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/ en/articles/news-and-expertise/francis-fokuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801. html (2018). Fülöp, É, Péley, В and László, J, “A történelmi pályához kötött érzelmek magyar törté nelmi regényekben” [“History-related Emotions in Hungarian Historical Novels”J, http://real.mtak.hU/2385/l/49413_ZJl.pdf, 56-77. Fülöp, É, Csertő, I, lig, В, Szabó, Zs, Slugoski, В, and László, J, The Psychology of Nar ratives in JP Forgas, О Vincze, and J Laszlo (eds), Social Cognition and Communication (Psychology Press, 2014). Fülöp, É, Csertő, I, lig, В, Szabó, Zs, Slugoski, В, and László, J, “Emotional Elaboration of Collective Traumas in Historical Narratives”, http://real.mtak.hu/20201/3/em otional_elaboration_of_collective_traumas.pdf. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, A and Sledzinska-Simon, A, “Victimhood of the Nation as a Legally Protected Value in Transitional States - Poland as a Case Study”, https://ssrn.eom/a bstract=3120407, 5. Golec de Zavala, A, Dyduch-Hazar, K, and Lantos, D, “Collective Narcissism: Political Consequences of Investing Self-Worth in the Ingroup’s Image”, 40(1) Advances in Political Psychology (2019) 46. Granat, M and Granat, К, The Constitution ofPoland: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2019) 13-14. Gross, JT, Neighbors: The Destruction oftheJewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton University Press, 2001). Gross, JT, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After
Auschwitz (Random House, 2006). Gross, JT, Złote żniwa: Rzecz o tym, со siį działo na obrzeżach zagłady Żydów (Golden Harvest: What was happening on the outskirts of the extermination of the Jews) (Znak, 2011).
Bibliography 207 Humphrey T, “Democracy and the rule of law: founding Uberal democracy in post-Communist Europe”, Colum J. E Eur. L 2(94) (2008) 116. Jacobsohn, G, Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press, 2010). Koncewicz, TT, “Unconstitutional Capture and Constitutional Recapture: Of the Rule of Law, Separation of Powers and Judicial Promises”, Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l Regio nal Econ. L. Just., Working Paper 3/17. Krastev, I and Holmes, S, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and its Discontents”, Journal of Democracy 3 (2018) 118-122. Ladányi, J, Önpusztító nemzeti habitus [Self-destructive National Habitus] (L’Harmattan, 2015) 19-23. László, J, “Narratív pszichológia”, Pszichológia 4 (2008), http://real.mtak.hu/2385/l/ 49413_ZJl.pdf, 5. Lendvai, P, The Hungarians: A Thousand Tears of Victory in Defeat (Princeton University Press, 2004). Leszczyński, A, No dno po prostu jest Polska: Dlaczego Polacy tak bardzo nie lubig swojego kraju i innych Polaków [Poland Hits Rock Bottom: Why Poles Do Not Like Their Country and Other Poles] (W.A.B., 2017) 255-264. Michalik, E and Santorski, J, Polska na kozetce [Poland on the Couch] (Książki Burda, 2016). Miklóssy, K and Nyyssönen, H, “Defining the New Polity: Constitutional Memory in Hungary and Beyond”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies (2018), 5-9. Miller-Idriss, C (2019) “The Global Dimensions of Populist Nationalism”, The International Spectator, 54(2), 17-34, doi:10.1080/03932729.2019.1592870. Milosz, Czeslaw, Historia literatury polskiej [History of Polish Literature] (Znak, 1993) 263-264. Müller, J-W, What
is Populismi (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Murray, M, “Narrative Psychology and Narrative Analysis” in PM Camie, JE Rhodes, and L Yardly (eds), Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding Perspectives in Methodology and Design (American Psychological Association, 2003) 110. Novak, B, “Setback for Orbán as Opposition in Hungary Gains Ground in Elections”, (14 October 2019) www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/europe/hungary-elections-orban. html. Nyyssönen, H and Metsälä, J, “Highlights of National History? Constitutional Memory and the Preambles of Post-Communist Constitutions”, European Politics and Society 21(3) (2020), 323-340. Petőfi, S, “The Magyar Noble”, http://mek.oszk.hU/06500/06567/06567.htm#49. Plattner, J, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 1(21) (2010) 88. Pogány, I, “The Crisis of Democracy in East Central Europe: The ‘New Constitutionalism’ in Hungary”, European Public Law (2013) 341-367. Rajcsányi, G, “Viktor Orbán’s Hungary: Orbanist Politics and Philosophy from a Hungarian Perspective”, www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=8e914238-5bca-e235-el76f8d502f4a33f groupld=288143,123. Rosenfeld, M, “Constitutional Identity” in M. Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 756-776. Ruprik, J, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Surging Illiberalism in the East”, J. Democracy 27(77) (2016) 84. Sajó, A, “Militant Democracy and Transition Towards Democracy” in A Sajó (ed) Militant Democracy (2004) 217, 218.
208 Bibliography Sajó, A, “Militant Democracy and Emotional Politics”, Constellations 19 (2012) 563.Sajó, A, “The Constitution of Illiberal Democracy as a Theory About Society” Polish Socio logical Review 4 (2018) 405MI0. Schmidt, A, “Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary. Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections”, Pokki Przegląd Politologiczny 6(2) (2018) 88. Schwartz, SH and Bardi, A, “Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule on Value Prio rities in Eastern Europe”, Political Psychology 2 (1997) 407-408. Skopska, G, “Law and Society in a Natural Laboratory: The Case of Poland in the Broader Context of East-Central Europe” in M Kaase, V Sparschuh, and A Wenninger (eds), Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe: Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociology (1989-2001) (Social Science Information Centre/Collegium Budapest, 2002) 597. Spirò, G, “Két középkeíet-európai mentalitás az államiság szempontjából” Irodalmi és Társadalmi havi lap 6(2000) (2007) 7. Stambulski, M, “Nostalgie Constitutional Identity”, Journal of the Polish Section of IR 3 (2019) 104. Tarnowska, A, “The Sovereignty Issue in the Public Discussion in the Era of the Polish 3rd May Constitution (1788-1792)” in U Müßig (ed), Reconsidering Constitutional For mation I, National Sovereignty, A Comparative Analysis of the Juridification by Con stitution (Springer International Publishing, 2016) 233. Toomey, M, “History, Nationalism, and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán’s Illiberal Hungary”, New Perspectives 26(1) (2018). Vincze, О and László, J, “A narratív
perspektíva szerepe a történelemkönyvekben” (“The Role of Narratives in History Textbooks”), http://real.mtak.hU/2385/l/49413_ZJl.pdf, 33. Waterbury, MA, “Populist Nationalism and the Challenges of Divided Nationhood: The Politics of Migration, Mobility, and Demography in Post 2010 Hungary”, East Eur opean Politics and Societies and Cultures 34(4) (2020) 962-983. doi:doi:10.1177/ 0888325419897772. Weber, M, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Routledge, 1930). Wojciechowski, Z, Nacjokratyzm, czyli rządy sejmikowe (Drukarnia Uniwersytetu Poznańs kiego Poznań, 1936) 20-21. Wojciszke, В (ed), Jacy są Polacy? Badania opinii społecznej jako źródło wiedzy psycholo gicznej [ What Are Poks Likel Social Feedback Survey as a Source of Psychological Knowl edge] (Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN, 1995). Wrzesiński, W, Charakter narodowy Polaków: Z rozważań historyka [National Character of Poles: From the Historian’s Reflections] (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004). Zajenkowska, A (ed), Pokka na kozetce: Sila obywatekkiej refleksyjności [Poland on the Couch: The Power of Civic Reflexivity] (Smak Słowa, 2016). Zamoyski, A, The Polish Way: A Thousand-Tear History of the Poks and Their Culture (Hippocrene Books, 2012). Zászkaliczky, M, “Eszmetörténeti szempontok a történeti alkotmányosság közép- és kora újkori magyarországi történetéhez” [“Some Considerations on the Hungarian Mediaeval and Modem History of the Historical Constitutionalism, from the Perspective of History of Ideas”] Közjogi Szemle 3 (2015) 14-25. Part IV Adams, M, Meuwese, A, and Ballin,
EH (eds), Constitutionalism and the Ruk of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Bibliography 209 Beatty, DM, “The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 49 (2001). Bień-Kacała, A, “Informal Constitutional Change”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 6(40) (2017) 199-218. Bogdandy von, A, MacGegor, EF, Antoniazzi, MM, Piovesan, F, and Soley, X (eds), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New lus Com֊ типе (Oxford University Press, 2017). Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25(7) (2018). Broberg, M, “Preliminary References as a Means for Enforcing EU Law” in Kochenov and Jakab (eds), 111. Closa, C and Kochenov, D (eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Corrales, J, “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela”, Journal of Democracy 26 (2015) 38. Daly, TG, “Diagnosing Democratic Decay”, www.academia.edu/34052302/Diagnosing_ DemocraticJDecay. Drinóczi, Tímea, “The Rule of Law: The Hungarian Perspective” in Drinóczi and BieńRacala (eds) 119-132. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and Illiberal Constitutionalism” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1-2) (2020) 171-192. Fallon, KM, Jr, “‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse”, Columbia Law Review 1 (1997) 7. Finek, DE, “Judicial Review: The United States Supreme Court Versus the German Con stitutional Court”, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 20(1) (1997) 123-157.
Fuller, L, The Morality of Law (Yale University Pressl969). Ginsburg, T, “Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law”, New York University Journal of International Law Politics 38 (2006) 757. Gosalbo-Bono, R, “The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the European Union and the United States”, University ofPittsburgh Law Review 72 (2010) 289. Groppi, T, “Constitutional Revision in Italy: A Marginal Instrument for Constitutional Change” in X Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2016) 218-220. Halmai, G, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and Constitutionalism”, German Law Journal 20 (2019). Henderson, L, “Authoritarianism and the Rule ofLaw”, Indiana Law Jotiniai66 (1991) 396. Hoflmann-Riem, W, “The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe - Standards and Impact”, European Journal of International Law 2 (2014) 595. https://europeanla wblog.eu/2019/12/02/the-independence-of-the-disciplinary-chamberofthe-polish֊sup reme-court-or-how-to-forget-about-discipline/. Jakab, A and Bodnár, E, “The Rule of Law, Democracy and Human Rights in Hungary: Tendencies from 1989 until 2019” in Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (eds) 105-118. Jakab, A and Kochenov, D, “Introductory remarks” in Kochenov and Jakab (eds), 2-3. Kochenov, D, “The EU and the Rule ofLaw - Naïveté or a Grand Design?”, University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper Series 2018, 510. Kochenov, D and Jakab, A (eds), The Enforcement ofEU Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017).
210 Bibliography Krieger, H, Nolte, G, and Zimmermann, A (eds), The International Ruk of Law: Rise or Declinei (Oxford University Press, 2019). Krygier, M, “The Rule of Law: Pasts, Presents, and Two Possible Futures,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 12 (2016). Lenaertes, K, “New Horizons for the Rule of Law Within the EU”, German Law Journal 21 (2020) 34. Levitsky, S and Way, LA, “The Myth of Democratic Recession”, Democracy 26(45) (2015) 46-48. Lührmann, A and Lindberg, SI, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It?” Democratization 7 (2019) 1103-1104. Madeja, A, “The European Values and the Rule of Law” in T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała (eds), Rule of Law, Common Values and IUiberal Constitutionalism. Poland and Hun gary within the European Union (Routledge, 2021) 45-76. May, C and Winchester, A (eds), Handbook of the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, 2018). McDonald, L, “Positivism and the Formal Rule of Law: Questioning the Connection”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 26 (2001) 93. Menocal, AR, Fritz, V and Rakner, L, “Hybrid Regimes and the Challenge of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries”, South African Journal of Inter national Affairs 1 (2008) 15-30. Moravcsik, A, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe”, International Organizations 54 (2000) 243-244. Nusserger, A, “The European Court of Human Rights and the Rule of Law - A Tale of Hopes and Disillusions” in Marek Zubrik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World. Essays in Honor of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Wydawnictwo Sejmove,
2017) 162-165. Palombella, G, “Beyond Legality - Before Democracy: Rule of Law in the EU Two Level System” in Closa and Kochenov (eds). Platiner, MF, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy”,/. Democracy 21(1) (2010) 81-92. Puddington, A, “Breaking Down Democracy: Global Strategies, and Methods of Modem Authoritarians”, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH__Report_ Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf, June 2017. Raz, J, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue”, Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977). Raz, J, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in J Raz (ed), The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979). Rosenfeld, M, “Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy”, Southern California Law Review 74 (2001) 1313, 1350. Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 211-213. Scheppele, KL, “Autocratic Legalism”, The University of Chicago Law Review 85 (2018). Sellers, M, “What is the Rule of Law and Why it is Important?” in JR Silkenat, JRE Hickey Jr, and PD Barenboim (eds), The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat) (Springer, 2014) 3-6 (the Rule of Law has a Western European origin). Simonelli, MA, “Thickening Up Judicial Independence: The ECJ Ruling in Commission v. Poland (C-619/18)”, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/07/08/thickening-up-judi cial-independence-the-ecj-ruling-in-commission-v-poland-c-619-18/. Tamanaha, BZ, “The History of the Rule of Law”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2012) 233. Tóth, GA, “Illiberal Rule of Law? Changing Features of Hungarian Constitutionalism” in M
Adams, A Meuwese, and EH Ballin, (eds), Constitutionalism and the Ruh of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Bibliography 211 Tushnet, M, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism”, Cornell Law Review 100 (2015) 72. Varju, M, “A magyar jogrendszer és az Európai Unió joga: tíz év tapasztalata” [“The Hungarian Legal System and the Law of the European Union: Experiences of Ten Years”] in A Jakab and G Gajduschek (eds), A magyar jogrendszer állapota (MTA Tár sadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, 2016) 143-171. Versteeg, M and Ginsburg, T, “Measuring the Rule of Law: A Comparison of Indicators”, Law and Social Inquiry 1 (2017) 100. Waldron, J, “The Concept of the Rule of Law”, Georgia Law Review 1 (2008) 59-60. Włoch, W, “‘Where the Laws Do Not Govern, There is No Constitution’: On the Rela tionship between the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism” in Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (eds), ո. 39, 77-101. Wróblewska, I, “The Rule of Law: The Polish Perspective” in Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (eds), 133-150. Zanghellini, A, “The Foundations of the Rule of Law”, Tale Journal of Law the Humanities 2 (2016) 216. Zimmermann, A, “Understanding the Rule of Law: Conceptions and Perspective”, http://alrf.msk.ru/understanding_the_rule_of_law_conceptions_and_perspectives. Zinonos, P, “The Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court or How to Forget About Discipline”, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/12/02/ the-independence-of-the-disciplinary-chamber-of-the-polish-supreme-court-or-how-toforget- about-discipline/. Part V Alberti, E, Czibik, A, Fazekas, M, Herczog, E, Ungar, К, Bálint, S, Tóth, W, and Johannes, IJ, “The Quality of Hungarian Legislation 2013-2014” (Budapest, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/hungary/sites/default/files/docs/body/legislation_eu_2014_rep ort_l50216_2100.pdf. Alberti, E, Czibik, A, Fazekas, M, Herczog, E, Ungar, К, Bálint, S, Tóth, W, and Johannes, IJ, “Impact Assessments Public Consultation and Legislation in Hungary 2011-2014” (Budapest, 2015) www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/legisla tion_2014_report_150630.pdf, 83. Arato, L, “Homophobia is on the Rise in Hungary”, www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/ News/Data-news/Homophobia-is֊on-the֊rise-in-Hungary (30 October 2019); https:// index.hu/kulfold/eurologus/2019/09/24/egyre_tobb_rnagyart_zavarnak_ajmelegek/. Arnold, R and Cerny, L, “The Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU by the German Federal Constitutional Court with References to the Other Federal Courts”, Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Iuridica 4 (2018), https://karolinum.cz/data/ clanek/6407/Iurid_64_4_0065.pdf, 65, 77. Bard, К and Bárd, Pa, “Összhang vagy kollízió? Hol tart Magyarország 25 évvel az EJEEhez való csadakozás után a strasbourgi elvárásoknak való megfelelésben?” [“Harmony or Collision? Where is Hungary 25 Years After Joining the ECHR in Terms of Compliance to Expectations of Strasbourg?”], Állam és Jogtudomány 4 (2017) https://jog.tk.mta. hu/uploads/fìles/2017-04֊BardK-BardP.pdf, 17-18. Bárd, P and Bárd, К, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Hungarian Legal System”, http://real.mtak.hu/65944/l/Bard_Bard_Comparative_study_on_ the_implementation_of_the_ECHR_at_the_national_level_ENG_149_168_u.pdf, 152. Bar-Siman-Tov, I, “Semiprocedural Judicial Review”, Legisprudence 3
(2012).
212 Bibliography Bar-Siman-Tov, I, “Covid-19 meets politics: the novel coronavirus as a novel challenge for leg islatures”, The Theory and Practice ofLegislation 8(1-2) (2020) 11-48 (free online access). Bematt, M and Ziółkowski, M, “Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism”, Washington International Law Journal 28 (2019) 499-501. Bień-Kacała, A, “Gloss to the Judgement of Constitutional Tribunal of 16 March 2017 (Kp 1/17)”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 4 (2017) 255-262. Bień-Kacała, A, Tarnowska, A and Włoch, W, “The Nation, Delegation, and Constitutional Change in Poland”, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 59(4) (2018) 355-377. Bień-Kacała, A, “Illiberal Democracy in Action: Polish Kind of Symbolic Legislation”, Eur opean Studies. The Review ofEuropean Law, Economics and Politics 6 (2019) 268-278. Bíró-Nagy, A and Laid, G, Orbán 10. Az elmúlt évtized a Magyar társadalom szemével, (© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung - Policy Solutions, 2020), https://www.policysolutions.hu/ userfiles/Orbán 10jBnal .pdf, 78. Bodnar, A, “Strasbourg Steps ln”, VerfBlog, 2020/7/07, https://verfessungsblog.de/stra sbourg-steps-in/. Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25(7) (2018) . Bucholc, M, “Fencing Off the Difference: On ‘LGBT-Free Zones’ in Poland”, VerfBlog, 2020/8/26, https://verfassungsblog.de/fencing-off-the-difference/. Burea, G de and Morijn, J, “Repression of Freedom of Expression in Poland: Renewing support for Wojciech Sadurski”, VerfBlog, 2020/6/03, https://vcrfassungsblog.de/rep ression-of-freedom-of-
expression-in-poland-renewing-support-for-wojciech-sadurski/. Burea, G de, Morijn, J, and Steinbeis, M, “Stand with Wojciech Sadurski: his freedom of expression is (y)ours”, VerfBlog, 2019/11/18, https://verfassungsblog.de/sta nd-with-wojciech-sadurski-his-freedom-of-expression-is-yours/. Csaky, Z., Hâtions in Transition: Dropping the Democratic Eaçade (Freedom House, 2020), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade#Fa cade, 25. Csatlós, E, “The Application of International Law as an Instrument of Interpretation in Hungary - the Practice of the Constitutional Court and Ordinary Courts in a Com parative Approach”, http://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/7049/8/2961433.pdf, 137. Dojcsák, D, Farkas, E, Fazekas, T, Hegyi, A, Kádár, A, and Szabó, M, “The New Law on the Right to Assembly in Hungary as Applied in the Practice”, http://41iberty.eu/wp-con tent/uploads/2020/08/The-New-Law֊on֊the֊Right֊to-Assembly-in-Hungary-as-Applie d-in-Practice.pdf, 49. Drinóczi, T, “Dialogic Interaction and Legislation on Parliamentary Election in Hungary 2010-2014” Osteurope Recht 4 (2014) 452-467. Drinóczi, T, “Concept of Quality in Legislation - Revisited: Matter of Perspective and a General Overview” Statute Law Review 3 (2015) 225-227. Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Democratic Backsliding in Light of the Recent Emergency Cor onavirus Legislation” Public Jurist, Hong Kong University Political Science Magazine, June 2020, www.hkuglc.org/government-and-laws-committee-hku-public-jurist. Drinóczi, T, “Legislation in Hungary” in U Karpen and H Xanthaki (eds),
Legislation in Europe. A Country by Country Guide (Hart Publishing, 2020). Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and Illiberal Constitutionalism” The Themy and Practice ofLegislation 8(1-2) (2020) 171-192. Górski, M, “The Dialogue Between Selected CEE Courts and the ECtHR”, in A Wyrozumska (ed), TransnationalJudicial Dialogue on International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2017) 239-240.
Bibliography 213 Grácián, D and Mikut, G, “Requiem for a Dream: Academie Freedom Under Threat in Democracies”, International Higher Education Nr 90, Summer 2017. Griglio, E, “Parliamentary Oversight Under the Covid-19 Emergency: Striving Against Executive Dominance”, The Theory and, Practice of Legislation 8(1-2) (2020) 49-70 (free online access). Hamulak, О, Sulyok, M, and Kiss, LN, “Measuring the ‘EU’ clidean distance between EU law and the Hungarian Constitutional Court - focusing on the position of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, Czech Tearbook of Public Private International Law 10 (2019) 145-148. Kastelik-Smaza, A., “The Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in Poland”, Acta Universitatis Carolinat -TuridicaA (2018) https://karolinum.cz/data/ clanek/6410/Iurid_64_4_0101.pdf, 112. Kazai, V, “The Illiberal Challenge to the Rule of Law Principle: The Neglected Procedural Aspect (With Special Focus on Hungary)”, 2019 ESIL Annual Research Forum, Göt tingen (4-5 April 2019), available https://ssm.com/abstract=3513204. Klamert, M., “The Implementation and Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in Austria”, Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Iuridica 4 (2018), https://karoli num.cz/data/clanek/6409/Iurid_64_4_0089.pdf, 89, 99. Klink В van, Beers, В van, and Poort, L (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw (Springer International Publishing, 2016) 1-2. Kosar, D and Petrov, J, “The Architecture of the Strasbourg System of Human Rights: The Crucial Role of the Domestic Level and the Constitutional Courts in
Particular”, ZaöRV 77 (2017), https://www.zaoerv.de/77_2017/77_2017_3_a_585_621.pdf, 617. Kúria, A, “Az Alaptörvény követelményeinek érvényesülése a bírósági ítélkezésben’ Jog gyakorlat-elemző Csoportja2016.El.II.JGY.K.l” https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/defa ult/files/joggyak/alaptorveny_osszefoglalo_velemeny.pdf, 194. Kustra-Rogaska, A and Hamulak, O, “Keeping Distance: Chapters from Randomized (NonApplication of the European Court of Human Rights before the Polish Constitu tional Tribunal”, Baltic Journal of European Studies 4(9) (2019) 90. Łakomieć, К, “Academic Freedom(s) in the Drift Towards Authoritarianism (4/4) Poland”, https://ds.hypotheses.org/6391 (15 November 2019). Magyar, B., Post-Communist Mafia State 0 The Case of Hungary (Noran Libro, 2016). Nagy, ТА, “Parlamenti sebesség” [“Parliamentary speed”], http://meltanyossag.hu/ files/meltany/imce/kp_parlamenti_sebesseg_120228.pdf. Pech, Land Scheppele, KL, “Poland and the European Commission, Part III: Requiem for the Rule of Law”, VerfBlog, 2017/3/03, at http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-a nd֊the֊european֊commissionpart-iii֊requiem-for-the-rule-of-law/. Pinheiro, VM, Ilarraz, Mand Mestriner, MT, “The Impacts of the COVID -19 Crisis on the Brazilian Legal System - A Report on the Functioning of the Branches of the Govern ment and on the Legal Scrutiny of Their Activities”, The Theory and Practice of Legisla tion 8(1-2) (2020) 193-212 (free online access). Polgári, E, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Hungarian Judicial Practice”, Fundamentum 5
(2008) 74—80. Polgári, E, “Az Alkotmánybíróság esete az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezményével” [“The Constitutional Court and the European Convention of Human Rights”] Fundamentum 4 (2015) 6. Pólyák, G, “Media in Hungary: Three Pillars of an Illiberal Democracy” in E Polonska and E Beckett (eds), Public Service Broadcasting and Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies (Paigrave Macmillan) 284r֊285.
214 Bibliography Popelier, P, Maymanyan, M, and Vanderbrawaene, W, eds, The Kok of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia, 2013). Reichman, H, “Academic Freedom Threatened in Poland”, 19 February 2016, academe blog.org. Sadura, P and Sierakowski, S, “Political Cynicism: The Case of Poland”, http://politica lcritique.org/cee/poland/2019/poles-political-cynicism-research-report/, 15-16. Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 139. Sárosi, P, “David Takes on Goliath: The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Hungary”, 11 October 2020, https://autocracyanalyst.net/david-takes-on-goliath-struggle-for-aca demic-freedom-in-hungary/. Schmidt, A, “Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections”, Polski Przeględ Politologiczny 2 (2018) 82. Schumpeter, J, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd edn (Allen Unwin, 1947), chs 21-23. Sçkowska-Kozlowska, К, “The Istanbul Convention in Poland” in J Niemi, L Peroni, and V Stoyanova, International Law and Violance against Women. Europe and the Istanbul Convention (Roudedge, 2020) 261. Skomerska-Muchowska, I, “The Dialogue of the CEE Constitutional Court in the Era of Constitutional Pluralism” in A Wyrozumska (ed), Transnational Judicial Dialogue on International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódz kiego, 2017) 118. Sokołowski, JK and Stolicki, D, “Przyczyny opóźnień w transpozycji dyrektyw europejskich do polskiego porządku prawnego w świetle analizy ilościowej krajowego procesu legis lacyjnego” [“Reasons for Delays in
the Transposition of European Directives into the Polish Legal Order in the Light of Quantitative Analysis of the National Legislative Process”], Przeględ Politologiczny 2 (2017) 39-54. Szabó Z, “Többpólusú alapjogvédelmi rendszer a gyakorlatban - a kormánytisztviselők indokolás nélküli felmentésének tükrében” [“Multilevel Protection of Human Rights in Practice - in the Light of Dismissal of Government Officials Without Justification”], Pro Futuro 1 (2015) 138. Szlachta, В, “Aksjologia Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku. Perspektywa badacza myśli politycznej” [“The Axiology of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997: The Perspective of the Researcher of Political Thought”] Przeględ Sejmowy 6(143) (2017) 125-150. Trócsányi, L, “New Challenges Facing Democracy and the Rule of Law”, Hungarian Review 3 (2017), http://hungarianreview.com/article/20171117_new_challenges_fa cmg_democracy_and_the_rule_of_law. Tushnet, M, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism”, Harvard Public Law Working PapersNol3—47 (2013), 72. Tushnet, M, “The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism”, Fla L. Rev. 69 (2017). Uhlmann, Fand Scheifele, E, “Legislative Response to Coronavirus (Switzerland)”, The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1-2) (2020) 115-130 (free online access). Uitz, R, “Nemzetközi emberi jogok és a maygar jogrend” [“International Human Rights and the Hungarian Legal Order”], https://jog.tk.hu/uploads/files/08_Uitz_Renata.pdf. Urbinati, N, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (University of Chicago Press, 2006) 43. Varju, M, “A magyar jogrendszer és az Európai Unió joga: tíz
év tapasztalata” [“The Hun garian Legal System and the law of the European Union: Experiences of Ten Years”]’, in A Jakab and G Gajduschek, eds, A magyar jogrendszer állapota (MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Jogtudományi Intézet, 2016) 142-164.
Bibliography 215 Vármy E, “Az Alkotmánybíróság és az Európai Bíróság. Együttműködő alkotmánybír áskodás?” [“The Constitutional Court and the Court of the EU. Coopareting Judicial Review?”] Állam és Jogtudomány 2 (2019) 66-70. Wikę, R, Stokes, В, and Simmons, К, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Job:. Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity (11 July 2016), www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/ 07/ll/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees֊will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/. Wróblewska, I, “The Rule of Law: The Polish Perspective” in T Drinóczi and A BieńKacala (eds), Rule of Law, Common Values and Illiberal Constitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union (Routledge, 2021) 133-150. Wyrozumska, A, “The Central and Eastern European Judiciary and Transnational Judicial Dialogue on International Law” in A Wyrozumska (ed), Transnational Judicial Dialo gue on International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2017) 23. Wyrzykowski, M, “Bypassing the Constitution Or Changing the Constitutional Order Outside the Constitution” in A Szmyt and В Banaszak (eds), Transformation of Law Systems in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in 1989-2015, Liber Amicorum in Honorem Prof. Dr. Dres. H.C. Rainer Arnold (Gdańsk University Press, 2016). Wyrzykowski, M, “Wrogie przejęcie’ porządku konstytucyjnego” [“‘Hostile Takeover’ of the Constitutional Order”], http://konstytucyjny.pl/wrogie-przejecie-porzadku-kon stytucyjnego-miroslaw-wyrzykowski (9.10.2020). Xanthaki, H
and Karpen, U (eds), Legislation and Legisprudence in Europe: A Comprehen sive Guide for Scholars and Legislative Practitioners (Hart Publishing, 2017). Zakaria, F, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” Foreign Affaires 76 (1997) 22. Zakaria, F, The Future ofFreedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (W.W. Norton and Company, 2007). Part VI Albert, R, “How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions”, Dublin University Law Journal 38 (2015). Albert, R, “Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment”, Yale J. Inti L. 43 (2018). Albert, R, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (Oxford University Press, 2019). Antal A, “Politikai és jogi alkotmányosság Magyarországon” [“Political and Legal Con stitutionalism in Hungary”] Politikatudományi Szemle 3 (2013). Balicki, R, “Bezpośrednie stosowanie konstytucji” [“Direct Application of a Constitution”], Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa 4 (2016) 13-19. Bellamy, R, Political Constitutionalism: A Reptiblican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Bien-Kacala, A, “Polish Constitutional Tribunal: A Systemic Reform or a Hasty Political Change”, DPCE Online 1 (2016) 1-14. Bień-Kacała, A, “Poland Within the EU: Dealing with the Populist Agenda”, OsteuropaRecht 4(63) (2017) 428-443 and “Polish Constitutional Tribunal: A Systemic Reform or a Hasty Political Change”, DPCE Online 1 (2016) 1-14. Bień-Kacała, A and Jackiewicz, A, “Militant Democracy: Demokracja, która sama się broni(?)” [“Militant Democracy: A Democracy that Defends Itself]?)”], Państwo i Prawo 8
(2017) 25411.
216 Bibliography Bień-Kacała, A, “Informal Constitutional Change: The Case of Poland”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 6(40) (2017) 199-218. Bień-Kacała, A, “Równość czy hierarchiczność? Kilka słów o wartościach w państwie, prawie i społeczeństwie” [“Equality or Hierarchy? Few Words about Values of State, Law and Society”] Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze 40 (2018) 17-30. Bień-Kacała, A, “Polexit is Corning or is it Already Here? Comments on the Judicial Inde pendence Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal”, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 28 April 2020, at www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/polexit-is-coming-or-is-it-already-here֊comm ents-on-the-judicial-independence-decisions-of-the-pofish-constitutional-tribunal. Bień-Kacała, A, “Verfassungsdurchbrechung or Informal Constitutional Change. The Polish Experience”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 5(57) (2020) 29-47. Chronowski, N, Drinóczi, T, and Zeller, J, “Túl az Alkotmányon” [“Beyond the Constitution”], Közjogi Szemle 4 (2010). Closa, C., “Ran Hirschi, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press, 2004”, ICON4(3) (2006) 581-586. Colón-Ríos, JI, “A New Typology of Judicial Review of Legislation”, Global Con stitutionalism 3(2) (2014) 143-169. Colón-Ríos, JI, “Judge-made Constitutional Changes”, in X Contiades and A Fotiadou, eds, Routledge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Routledge 2021) 217-230. Contiades, X, ed, Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2012). Contiades, X and Fotiadou, A, “Introduction” in X Contiades and A Fotiado (eds), Rou tledge
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2021) 14. Csink, L and Fröhlich, J, “Az Alaptörvény és az Átmeneti rendelkezések viszonya” Páz mány Law Working Papers, No 2012/02, available at www.plwp.jak.ppke.hu/images/ files/2012/2012-2.pdf. Czarnota, A, “The Constitutional Tribunal”, VerfBlog, 2017/6/03, https//verfassungs blog.de/the-constitutional-tribunal/. Diamond, L, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”,/. Democracy 29(142) (2015) 149. Dixon, R and Landau, D, “Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy”, UC Davis Law Review 53 (2020) 1313. Dixon, R and Landau, D, “Tiered Constitutional Design”, 2018, at https://ssrn.eom/a bstract=2953755,l, 63. Dixon, R and Landau, D, “Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments”, ICON 3 (2015) 606, 629. Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Politics in Contemporary Hungary”, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 1 (2016), 63-98. Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System”, Vienna J. Inťl Const. L. 1(139) (2017). Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Identity in Europe: The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach”, German Law Journal 21(2) (2020) 105-130. Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Abuse of Constitutional Emergency Regimes - Also in the Light of the COVID-19 Crisis”. MTA LWP 13/2020, https://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp/hunga rian-abuse-of-constitutional-emergency-regimes-also-in-the-light-of-the-covid-19-crisis. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and
Illiberal Constitutionalism”, Theory and Practice of Legislation 1-2 (2020). Eichhorn, J, Kupsch, V, and Mohr, LMM, “How European Publics and Policy Actors Values an Open Society Key Insight Across Countries” (Open Society European Policy Institute, 2019), http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org/images/finalreports/OSI-019T8Key-Insights_v5 .pdf.
Bibliography 217 Pesnic, FN, “Can Civic Education Make a Difference for Democracy? Hungary and Poland Compared”, Political Studies4 (2016) 966-978. Gardbaum, S., “The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, German Law Review 12(14) (2013) 2230-2248. Garlicki, L and Garlicka, ZA, “External Review of Constitutional Amendments? Interna tional Law as a Norm of Reference”, Israel Law Review 44 (2011) 343-368. Garlicki, L, “Sądy a Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej” [“Courts and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland”] Przegląd Sądowy 7-8 (2Ö16) 23-25. Garlicki, L, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne [Polish Constitutional Law] (Wolters Kluwer, 2016) 76-78. Ginsberg, T, “Arato on Constitution Making in Hungary and the 4/5 Rule”, I-CONnect Blog (6 April 2011), www.iconnectblog.com/2011/04/arato-on֊constitution-makingm-hungary-and-the-45-rule/. Ginsberg, T, “When Courts Compete: A Reputational Perspective” in M Zubik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World, Essays in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Kancelaria Sejmu Wydawnictwo Sejmowe Kancelaria Sejmu, 2017) 61-70. Górski, G and Górska-Szymczak, J, “Trybunał Konstytucyjny w Sporze z Prezydentem, Rządem i Parlamentem w 2015 r.” [“The Constitutional Tribunal in an Argument with the President, the Government and the Parliament in 2015”], Przegląd Sejmowy S (2018) 39-57. Hale, HE, “25 Years After The USSR What’s Gone Wrong?”,/. Democracy 27(24) (2016). Halmai, G and Scheppele KL, “Orbán is Still the Sole Judge of his Own Law”, VerfBlog, 2020/4/30, https://verfassungsblog.de/orban-is-still-the-sole֊judge-of-
hís֊own-law/. Halmai, G, “Illiberal Constitutionalism in East-Central Europe”, EUI Working PaperLAW 2019/05.Ord Halmai, G, “How COVID-19 Unveils the True Autocrats: Viktor Orbán’s Ermächti gungsgesetz”, Inťl J. Const. L. Blog, Apr. 1, 2020, www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/ how-covid-19-unveils-the-true-autocrats-viktororbans-ermachtigungsgesetz/. Halmai, G, “The Decline of Liberal Democracy in Europe’s Midst”, 2016, www.eurozine. com/the-decline-of-liberal-democracy-in-europes-midst/. Halmai, G and Scheppele, KL, “Don’t Be Fooled by Autocrats!: Why Hungary’s Emer gency Violates Rule of Law”, VerfBlog, 2020/4/22, https://verfassungsblog.de/dont֊ be-fooled-by-autocrats. Hermann, M, Wyroki interpretacyjne Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z perspektywy teoretycznopmwnej [Interpretative Judgements of Constitutional Tribunal from a Theoretical Perspective] (Warszawa, 2015). Hirschi, R Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, 2004). Humphrey, T, “Democracy and the Rule of Law: Founding Liberal Democracy in PostCommunist Europe”, Colum J. E Eur. L 2(94) (2008). Kardas, P and Gutowski, M, “Konstytucja z 1997 r. a model kontroli konstytucyjności prawa” [“1997Constitution and a Model of Constitutional Review”], Palestra 4 (2017) 11-30. Kelemen, К, “The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Concept of National Con stitutional Identity”, IANUS - Diritto e finanza 23(15-16) (2017). Koncewicz, TT, “Constitutional Fidelity and the Polish Constitution”, Blog of the Inter national Journal of Constitutional Law, 11 August 2017,
tvww.iconnectblog.com/ 2017/08/constitutional-fidelity-and-the-polish-constitution. Koncewicz, TT, “On the Strategic Reading of the Constitutional Document. Mapping out Frontiers of New Constitutional Research”, Przegląd Konstytucyjny 2 (2018), 16-45.
218 Bibliography Kninke, H and Hellqvist Frey, S, “Social Rights in Denmark” in К Wojtyczek (ed), Social Rights as Fundamental Rights (Eleven International Publishing, 2016) 119. Landau, D, “Abusive Constitutionalism”, UC Davis Law Review 3 (2013). Lavapuro, J, Ojanen, T, and Scheinin, M, “Rights-based Constitutionalism in Finland and the Development of Pluralist Constitutional Review”, ICON 2 (2011). Law, DS and Whalen, R, “Comparing Amendment and Replacement” in X Contiades and A Fotiado (eds), Routkdge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Roudedge, 2021) 96. Maćkiem, P, “Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-determination”, I-CON 3 (2006) 494-495. Magyar B, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case ofHungary (CEU Press, 2016). Martin C, “The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the ‘Reinterpretation’ of Japan’s War Powers”, Fordham Inti L.J. 40(427) (2017). Masternak-Kubiak, M, “Dopuszczalność nieformalnej zmiany Konstytucji RP (uwagi w kontekście prawa wyborczego obywateli Unii Europejskiej)” [“Admissibility of informal amendment to the Constitution RP (comments in the context of the electoral law of EU citizens)”] in B. Banaszak, M. Jabłoński, and S. Jarosz-Żukowska (eds), Prawo w służbie państwu i społeczeństwu [Law in the Service of the State and Society] (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2012). Matczak, M, “How to Demolish an Independent Judiciary with the Help of a Constitutional Court”, VerfBlog, 2017/6/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-demoUsh-an-indep endent-judiciary-with-the-help-of-a-constitutional-court/,
doi:10.17176/20170623-1033 09 (31.10.2017). Mazmanyan, A, “Judicialization of Politics: The Post-Soviet Way”, I-CON 13(1) (2015) 200-218. Menocal, AR, Fritz, V, and Rakner, L, “Hybrid Regimes and the Challenge of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries”, S. Afr.J. InťLAff. 15(1) (2008), 29-40. DOI: doi:10.1080/10220460802217934. Młynarska-Sobaczewska, A, “Rytualne ofiary a moralność publiczna: Analiza argumentacji Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (K 52/13) i Sţidu Najwyższego USA (508 U.S. 520.1993)” [“Ritual Sacrifices and Public Morality: Analysis of Arguments of the Constitutional Tribu nal (K 52/13) and US Supreme Court (508 U.S. 520.1993)”], Państwo i Prawo 4 (2017). Młynarska-Sobaczewska, A, “Wybór sędziów konstytucyjnych jako element legitymizacji S£du konstytucyjnego” [“Election of the Constitutional Judges as an Element of Legiti macy of the Constitutional Court”], Państwo i Prawo 5 (2018) 43-62. Morawski, L, “A Critical Response”, VerfBlog, 2017/6/03. Muller, Jan-Wemer, “Militant Democracy” in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law {Oxford University Press, 2011) 1253-1268. Ojanen, T. “Constitutional Amendment in Finland” in X. Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2016) 107-109. Ohver, D. and Fusaro, C. eds. How Constitutions Change? A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing, 2016). Pap, AL and Sledzińska-Simon, A, “Mandatory Voting as a Tool to Combat the ‘New Populism’”, TCONnect Blog (19 April 2017), iconnectblog.com/2017/04/mandator y-voting֊and֊the-new-populism/. Pasquino, P,
“Neutrality in Constitutional Conflicts Resolution: Preliminary Observations” in M Zubik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World, Essays in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2017).
Bibliography 219 Popelier, P, Verstraelen, S., Vanheule, D., and Vanlerberghe, B. (eds), The Effects ofJudi cial Decisions in Time (Intersentia, 2014). Puhl, J, “A Whiff of Corruption in Orbán’s Hungary”, Spiegel (17 January 2017), www.sp iegel.de/intemational/europe/a-whiff-of-corruption-in-orban-s-hungary-a-1129713.html. Roznai, Y, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits of Constitutional Amendment Powers, PhD thesis, 2014, The London School of Eco nomics and Political Science (LSE), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/915/l/Roznai_Uncon stitutional-constitutional-amendments.pdf, 158-160. Roznai, Y, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (Oxford University Press, 2017). Sajó, A, “Militant Democracy and Emotional Politics”, Constellations 4 (2012) 562-572. Sárkózy, T, “Magyarország kormányzása 2010-2014” [“Governance of Hungary 2010-2014”] Új Magyar Közigazgatás 2 (2015). Scheppele, KL, “Orbán’s Emergency”, https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/03/21/kim lane-scheppcle-orbans-emergency/,https://vcríassun gsblog.de/pandemic-as-con stitutional-moment/. Schiffer, A, “Különleges jogbizonytalanság” [“Extraordinary Legal Uncertainty”], http s://mandiner.hu/cikk/20200313_kulonleges_jogbizonytalansag (13 March 2020). Schwartz, SH and Bardi, A, “Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule on Value Prio rities in Eastern Europe”, Political Pscychology 2 (1997). Sejersted, F, “The Norwegian Parliament and European Integration - Reflections from Medium-Speed Europe” tn E Smitjh, ed, National Parliaments as Cornerstones of
the European Integration (Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1996). Siems, M., Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 78-79. Sokolewicz, W, “Komentarz do art. 235” [“Commentary to the Art. 235”] in L. Garlicki (ed), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Vol II [The Constitution of the Republic of Poland] (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2001) 4. Sólyom L, “Alkotmányértelmezés az új alkotmánybíróságok gyakorlatában” [“Constitutional interpretation in the practice of new constitutional courts”], Fundamentum 2 (2002) 18-20. Stumpf I, “A kormány alkotmányos jogállása” [“Constitutional Status of the Govern ment”], Új Magyar Közigazgatás 2 (2015). Szmulik, B, “Opinia w sprawie uwag do nowelizacji ustawy z dnia 25 czerwca 2015 r. о Trybunale Konstytucyjnym przygotowanych przez Komisję Wenecką” [“Opinion on the Comments to the Amendment of the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tri bunal by the Venice Commission”], Przegląd Sejmowy 5 (2016) 81-100. Tordai, C, “A közjog határai a járványveszély idején” [“Limits of Public Law during a Pandemic”], https://igyirnankmi.atlatszo.hu/2020/03/16/a-kozjog-hatarai-a-jarva nyveszely-idejen/ (16 March 2020). Uzelac, A, “Survival of the Third Legal Tradition”, Supreme Court Law Review 49 (2010), (2nd) 377-396. Available atSSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2498760. Wróblewska, I, Zasada państwa prawnego w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego RP [ The Rule of Democratic State Ruled by Law in Judgements of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (TNOIK, 2010) 48-50.
Index abortion 7, 8,126,134,137,139,141, 143,144,168,170,179,181,184,189, 190 abusive: constitutionalism see con stitutionalism; legalism see legalism; con stitutional review 160, 179 Amendment to the Fundamental Law: First 154,164; Third 154; Fourth 99,101, 151,152,155,156,164,170,187; Fifth 156,187; Sixth 155; Seventh 101,152, 155,156,157,166,188; Eighth 152, 156; Ninth 101,138,157,186,187 amendments: formal 12, 15, 152, 154, 163, 164, 166, 169,177; informal 15, 133, 151, 152, 154,160, 163, 165, 166, 169, 170, 176; unconstitutional constitutional 15, 33, 99, 153, 159, 170, 187, 193 arbitrary 72, 84, 94 Article 2 TEU 92 Article 4 TEU 67 Article 7 procedure 46, 96, 106 assembly: Act 136 asylum-seekers see migrants Austrian Habsburg Monarchy 55 authoritarian: constitutionalism 15, 18, 23, 28, 30, 31, 73, 74, 99; capitalism 41; regime 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 35, 45, 72, 79, 85, 100, 109, 197; state 72, 124; system see regime authoritarian authoritarianisation see process authoritarianism: competitive 18, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35; consolidated 82; modern 1, 15, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 45, 73, 83, 197, 198; populist 17, 30, 31 autocracy: electoral 79; hard-line 75; moderate 82; plebiscitary 17, 30 autocratic: legalism see legalism autocratisation see process autonomy 11, 61, 62, 63, 137, 199 BTI 3, 74, 75, 82 capitalism 40, 41 Catholic 4, 6, 9, 56, 57, 68, 69, 111, 132, 133, 140, 142 CEE 42, 43, 44, 67, 70, 71, 174, 175, 177, 178 CEU 131, 132, 138 Charter see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eur opean Union 90, 125
Christian: democracy 37; Europe 53, 57, 68, 187 CJEU 69, 87, 95, 103, 131, 132, 138, 140, 146, 162, 163, 185, 188, 189 collective: guilt 54; memory 48, 53, 56, 139; narcissism 14, 46, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 150, 198; victimhood 14, 46, 53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 65, 68, 198 common good 61 communism 14, 60, 61, 62 conservativism 39, 62, 63 constitution: capturing 15, 150; democratic 192; façade 27, 85; illiberal 9,12, 38, 133; invisible 12, 33, 38,100,150,158, 160,171,177,181,183; mixed 133; small 151; socialist 151; 3 May 55 1997 Constitution 5, 38, 100, 151,152, 159, 163, 166, 167, 172, 183, 192 constitutional: change 33,63,151,153,157, 158,160,161,162,163,166,167,168, 181; comparative law 3,22,30; culture 38, 151,157; design 5,6,7,9,13,14,15,24, 25,40,42,96,121,132,192,197,198, 199; dialogue 103; emergency see emer gency; law 32, 34, 37,94,146,154,175;
Index supremacy 87; system 4,9,10,15,30,31, 33,38,131,152,170,192,193 Constitutional Court: Germany 89; Hun gary 11, 89 constitutional change: informal 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 166, 167, 181 constitutional democracy: formal 44, 45; substantive 38, 42, 45, 64, 85, 159, 170, 171, 191, 194 Constitutional Tribunal: Poland 8, 59, 89 constitutionalism: abusive 18, 31, 33, 85; authoritarian 15, 18, 23, 28, 30, 31, 73, 74, 83, 99; capturing 15, 150; hybrid 30, 73; illiberalization 1, 45, 198; legal 173, 174, 175, 178, 180; liberal 3, 4, 10, 13, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 35, 36, 40, 43, 44, 45, 63, 72, 87, 108, 110, 124,151,170, 175,195, 197,198, 199; mixed 23, 24, 30; modern 100; multilevel 21, 72, 86; non-liberal 24,25; political 16, 39, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180; populist 17, 31, 32, 33 constitutionalist 15, 22, 25, 44, 74, 198 constraint 5, 13, 15, 21, 24, 31, 33, 34, 45, 74, 83, 98, 99, 100, 124, 197, 198 consultation 101, 116, 117, 119, 138, 148 cosmetic changes 154,156,184, 187, 188 Council of Europe 3 Court of Justice of the European Union see CJEU COVTD-19: emergency see emergency; management of the crisis 113, 120, 168; pandemic 8, 13, 69, 71, 79, 101, 111, 113, 159, 166, 167, 188 cyclical assemblies 136, 180 democracy: constitutional see constitutional democracy; diffusely defective 18; elec toral 15, 29, 79, 111; flawed 81; illiberal 2,15,26, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 70, 96, 108, 109, 111, 113, 150, 185, 188, 191, 197, 198; Uberal 25, 27, 38, 43, 63, 72, 79, 190,194; militant 190, 191, 195; plebiscitary leader 18; semi-consolidated 79, 111 democratic: development 37, 38;
dete rioration 110; state 78, 90; recession 30 demonstrations 56, 95, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 157 deterioration: Rule of Law 15; democratic see democratic disciplinary: chamber see Supreme Court: Disciplinary Chamber dismemberment 151 221 ECHR see European Convention on Human Rights ЕГО Democracy Index 3, 74, 79, 81 elections: general 13; local 2, 8, 62, 109, 112; parUamentary 2, 6; presidential 121, 167 emergency: constitutional 110, 113, 117, 122, 123, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 157, 159, 160, 167, 168, 169, 188; COVID-19 136, 145; crisis situation caused by mass migration 166; epidemic 167; judicial review 194, 195; measures 110,123, 181; Special Legal Order 166, 182; pandemic 117, 159, 168; statutebased 121, 122, 123, 167, 169, 188 equality 38, 52, 57, 58, 86, 87, 88, 91, 98, 102, 140, 141, 142 eternity clauses 164, 192 EU law: acquis 1, 92; appUcation 83, 92, 94, 98, 105, 163,195; enforcement 98; violation 146, 185 European Arnest Warrant 152 European Commission 146, 185 European Convention on Human Rights 86 European Parliament 186 European Rule of Law 15, 83, 85, 86, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 105 Fidesz 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 34, 63, 66, 112, 122, 133, 138, 145, 153, 180 fight 4, 22, 58, 66, 69, 121, 145, 186, 187, 188 FL see Fundamental Law freedom: academic 134,137,139; assembly 128,134,136,137; association 79; expression 24, 75, 78, 79,102,128,130, 134,139,170,182; higher education 137; information 123,149; media 114, reUgion 156,187,193; speech see expression Freedom House 3,18, 74, 79, 82, 111, 135 Fundamental Law 12,34,38,48,52,65,67, 68,
89,90,99,100,101,102,103,115, 121,127,129,133,136,137,140,141, 148,149,151,152,153,154,155,156, 157,159,160,163,164,165,166,168, 169,170,173,181,186,187,188,192 fhndamental rights see human rights Gender: ideology 142, 143, 186 Gross, Tomasz 139 Habsburgs 50, 54 hierarchy 35, 59, 62, 63, 67, 92, 100, 116, 160, 171, 178
222 Index higher education: freedom see freedom; institutions 137; reform 117, 137 history: Hungarian 14, 46, 50, 54, 61; Polish 14, 46, 55, 57, 59 Holocaust 56, 59, 69 hollowed-out 97, 121, 170, 190 hollowing out 1 human rights: misuse of the language 2, 38 Hungarian Soviet Republic 52 identity: constitutional 2, 14, 25, 26, 30, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 49, 64, 65, 67, 69, 74, 131, 141, 146, 149, 152, 156, 157, 163, 165, 166, 170, 180, 188, 192, 193,197, 198, 199; national 47,48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 60, 105, 139; politics 39, 65, 67 illiberal: democracy 2, 15, 26, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 70, 96, 108, 109, 111, 113, 150, 185, 188, 191, 197, 198; human rights 133; judicialization of politics 16, 36, 102, 110, 150, 159, 171, 173, 175, 180, 181, 193; legality 2, 15, 38, 45, 70, 96, 97, 98, 103, 105, 113, 150, 173, 181, 186, 195, 197, 198; value orientation 36, 39, 64, 198 illiberalism 13,24, 38,40, 60, 63,170,173 illiberalization 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 15, 30, 44, 45, 96, 111, 114, 124, 127, 134, 147, 197, 198 impact assessment 101, 116,119, 138, 148 inclusion 5, 24, 38 inferiority 63 infringement procedure 99, 132, 188 ingroup 53, 58, 65, 68, 90, 145 internet 81, 82, 114, 120 Jagiellonian dynasty 55 Jogállam: demokratikus 90 judicial: independence 87, 102, 131, 189; power see power judicial; reform 7, 10, 161, 172, 181, 188 judicalization of politics: illiberal see illiberal juristocracy 16, 174, 175, 177, 178 Kaczyński: Jarosław 6, 12, 36, 171; Lech 59 Kúria 129 l’État de droit 86, 88 Law and Justice Party see PİS lawmaking 5, 7, 94, 106, 109, НО, 115, 117, 119, 120, 138, 147, 148, 178
leadership 40, 111, 114, 184, 198 legal: certainty 86, 87, 157, 182, 195; community 38 legalism: abusive 33; autocratic 33, 85 legality: formal 88, 91, 98, 102, 103 legislation: accelerated 117; quality 101, 115, 118, 120; symbolic 101, 119; per sonalized 120, 136 lex Gross 59 LGBTQIA+ 66, 132, 134, 140, 141, 157, 186 liberal thought 22 liberalism: classical 88; modern 23 licenses 147 local government 8, 63, 122, 140, 149, 155 majoritarianism 32, 35 master 132, 134, 161, 179, 182, 183 mentality 51, 64 Middle Ages 10, 49, 54 migration: migrants 66, 132, 145, 146, 186, 188; quota 165, 166; referendum 165, 166 militant democracy: “abusive neo-militant democracy” 191 Minister of Health 123, 167 Minister of Justice 103, 146, 172 misuse the language of fundamental rights 73 monthenaries 136 Motherland 58 multi-tiered amendment designs 192 mutual understanding 96 narrative psychology 47, 49, 53, 63 nation: homogeneous 32, 59, 62, 65, 120; Hungarian 53, 65, 139; Polish 55, 57, 58, 59,69, 120, 139 National Council of Judiciary 161 national courts 94, 99 National Judicial Office: President 156 Nazi Germany 54, 68, 69 neoliberalism 39, 41 NGO 12, 66, 68, 82, 103, 116, 117, 131, 132, 135, 143 non-discrimination 87, 98 oligarchy 134, 173 Orbán, Viktor 6, 12, 28, 36, 37, 42, 66, 69, 108, 123, 136, 140, 142, 157, 173 otherness 126, 132 outside group 145 oversight 108, 110, 115, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 169
Index 223 packing: constitutional courts 159, 180 państwo prawa: demokratyczne 90 PİS 2, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 34, 36, 42, 62, 63, 115, 117, 136, 144, 153, 172, 173, 180, 181, 183, 185, 190 pluralism 63, 79, 82, 110, 128 Polish Mother 142, 143 Polish nation: defamation 59, 69, 119, 120, 139 Polish positivism 57, 58 polity: illiberal 24, 30, 35, 45 populism 11, 12, 29, 31, 32, 39, 41, 64, 65, 67, 98, 99, 121, 126, 134,150 populist: agenda 31, 83, 99, 181; autocrats 2,15, 46, 65, 132; constitutionalism 17, 31, 32, 33; leader 1, 2, 7, 12, 32, 33, 44, 45, 46, 62, 64, 66, 73, 94, 98, 99, 173; nationalism 67, 92, 196 power: abuse and misuse 87, 98; executive 27, 33, 79, 101, 120, 121, 159, 160, 166, 167, 169, 171; judicial 194; legis lative 98, 101, 102, 128, 129, 159, 161, 166, 176, 183 predictability 88, 89, 91, 92, 195 preliminary ruling procedure 94,106, 139,140 prime minister: Hungarian see Orbán, Viktor; Polish 68, 123, 142, 168, 171 process: autocratisation 28; authoritarianisation 1; drafting 116,117,119; law-making 5,94,115,138; illiberalisation 9, 30; legislative 7,15,101,107,109, 111, 112,115,116,118,122,179 procurement 173 Professor Sadurski 139 Prosecutor: General 171, 172, 181 pushing the limits 16, 72, 150, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 recession see democratic Rechtsstaat 86, 88, 89 regime: anti-democratic 21, 30; authoritar ian see authoritarian regime; hybrid 18, 26, 79, 82, 111; totalitarian 130; transi tional 82 remodelling: constitutional 9, 22, 37, 38, 46, 72, 98, 198; constitutionalism 16, 62, 70, 100, 151, 163 replacement 67, 151 republican monarchy 55
research institutions 137 retirement: judges 131, 132, 189 right: access to justice 87; asylum seekers 66,132,134,144, 145, 147, 156; equal treatment 24; migrants 66, 132, 145, 146, 186, 188; minorities 126,141, 144; refugees 126, 156, 188 Rule of Law: conditionality 46, 69, 86, 87, 157, 173, 186; enforcement 92, 93; English 86; European see European Rule of Law; formal 24, 33, 85, 88, 89, 90, 101, 102; material 25, 85, 87, 89, 90, 93, 103; narrow see formal; substantial see material; thick see material; thin see formal Russia 18, 27, 60, 68, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 109, 129, 135 Sejm 5, 7, 9, 66, 100, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122,123, 124, 142, 144, 152, 161, 166, 179, 183 Senati, 5, 7, 8, 10, 62, 63, 109,116,117, 121, 124, 142, 152 separation of powers 75, 78, 151, 157, 161, 164, 178, 194 Singapore 23, 31, 33, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81, 82,109, 135 Smoleńsk plane crush 6 social contract 150 solidarity 138, 139, 177 Soros, George 68, 132, 186 sovereign 69, 111, 146 sovereignty: people 57, 108; state 55, 97, 185 stability 2, 4, 11, 15, 16, 39, 63, 66, 67, 88, 110, 120, 121, 132, 150, 182,184, 197, 199 Supreme Administrative Court 155, 178 Supreme Court: Disciplinary Chamber 87, 162; Hungary 120, 130; Poland 34, 189 super-majority 154, 164, 180, 187 SZFE 137, 138 Third Polish Republic 56 trajectory: emotional 2, 46, 47, 57; histor ical 2, 47, 48, 61 transformation: illiberal 63, !93 transition: democratic 2,11, 52, 58, 71,108 Transitory Provisions 151, 154, 155, 156, 163, 164, 165, 187 trust: mutual 93 transnational norms 192 Turkey 18, 27, 34, 73, 74, 75, 79, 82, 109, 135 Turks:
Ottoman 53, 57, 68 use of law: instrumental 98, 119; opportu nistic 98
224 Index value: common 97; European 94; illiberal see illiberal; legal 127; orientation 3, 4, 14, 35, 36, 39, 46, 49, 62, 64, 67, 90, 133; system 69, 92,138, 169, 198 V-dem 3, 74 Venice Commission: Rule ofLaw Checklist 86 Verfassungsstaat 89 vulnerable people 134 f war 14, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 68, 139, 140,142,157, 170 VVJP 3, 74, 75 womanhood 142 women 7, 8, 66, 126, 134, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 190 xenophobia 62, 126 Bayerische Staatøbibliothe į München .... .
|
| adam_txt |
Contents List of illustrations Foreword Acknowledgements I Introduction: Ambitions and comparison viii ix xii 1 I Amhitions 1 II Why Hungary and Poland? 4 1 Differences 5 2 Similarities 10 III Insight into the book 13 II Terms: Constitutionalism, ffliberal(ism), and constitutional democracy 17 I Constitutionalism in the term ailliberal constitutionalism” 17 1 The need for a new term 17 2 Entangling or disentangling 21 3 Words disentangled 23 4 Conceptual differences 25 II Illiberal(ism) 35 1 Illiberal polity and constitutionalism 35 2 Illiberal in the term “illiberal constitutionalism” 36 3 The term “illiberal(ism)” in the economic and social sphere 40 III Constitutional democracy 42 1 Substantive constitutional democracy 42 2 Formal constitutional democracy and illiberal constitutionalism 44 III Identity: Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and values I Historical and emotional trajectory 47 I Framework of investigation 47 46
vi Contents 2 Hungarian national identity - more than a stereotype 49 3 National identity and Poland 55 II Post-communist past and beyond 60 III Possible root cause: the combination of the above 64 1 Populism - playing with emotions 65 2 Collective narcissism and collective victimhood 68 IV Limits: Comparative perspective I The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism 71 II A comparative perspective - looking for constraints 73 III Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public power 83 1 Rule of Law as a context-related notion 83 2 “European” in the term “European Rule of Law” 85 3 “Rule of Law” in the term “European Rule of Law” 90 4 The European Rule of Law ֊ a rudimentary concept 94 V Limits: Constraints in constitutional design and identity I Illiberal legality 96 1 The term 96 2 Legal features of illiberal legality 98 II Illiberal democracy 108 1 The term 108 2 Electoral democracy - illiberalization 111 3 Procedure in parliament 115 III Illiberalization of human rights 124 1 Steps towards illiberalization and common challenges 124 2 Struggling with international and supranational obligations 127 3 The illiberal vision of human rights 132 4 Emerging new understanding of human rights (third phase of illiberalization) 148 VI Stability: How “illiberal limits” emerge and work I Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution 150 1 Bird’s-eye view of 1989-2020: dismemberments, replacements, formal, informal, and abusive amendments 151 2 Formal constitutional changes 153 3 Informal unconstitutional constitutional
changes 157
Contents vii 4 The paradox of unconstitutional formal and informal constitutional amendments 169 5 Capturing key positions 171 II Illiberal judicialization ofpolitics 173 1 Bird’s-eye view of legal constitutionalism and juristocracy, so . 175 2 . illiberal constitutionalism is not about political constitutionalism but. 179 3 . illiberal judicialization of politics 180 III Pushing the limits and bouncing back 184 1 Rules 184 2 Techniques 185 TV Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy 190 1 Militant democracy 190 2 The multi-tiered amendment designs and references to transnational norms 192 3 Application of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments - and a paradox 193 4 Empowering citizens 194 5 Emergency judicial power 194 6 Other . 195 VII Conclusions 197 1 Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal 197 2 Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet 197 3 In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail 198 4 Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner 198 5 Lessons learned, mostly, for others . 199 Bibliography Index ■ 200 220
Bibliography Part I Acunha, FJG and Benvindo, JZ, “Democratic Decay in Brazil and the New Global Popu lism”, INT’L ASS’N CONST. L. BLOG (6 June2017), https://blog-iaclaidc.org/ test-3/2018/5/26/democratic-decay-in-brazil-and-the-new-global-populism. Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25 (1173) (2018). Daly, TG, “Diagnosing Democratic Decay”, Conference paper, Comparative Constitu tional Law Round-table, Gilbert and Tobin Centre for Public Law, UNSW Law School (7 August 2017), www.academia.edu/34052302/Diagnosing_Democratic_Decay. Daly, TG, “Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field” (2019), https:// Unk.sprmger.com/article/10.1007/s40803-019֊00086-2. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A (eds), Rule of Law, Common Values and Illiberal Con stitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union (Routledge, 2020). Eichhorn, J, Kupsch, V, and Mohr, LMM, “How European Publics and Policy Actors Values an Open Society: Key Insight Across Countries” (Open Society European Policy Institute2019), http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org/images/finalreports/OST019-18-Key-Insights_v5.pdf. Frantz, E and Kendall-Taylor, A, “The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism is Becoming More Formidable” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (2017) 57. Fülöp, É, Csertő, I, lig, В, Szabó, Z, Slugoski, B, and László, J, “Emotional Elaboration of Collective Traumas in Historical Narratives” (2014) http://real.mtak.hu/20201/3/em otional_elaboration_of_collective_traumas.pdf. Ginsburg, T and Huq, AZ,
How to Save Constitutional Democracy? (University of Chicago Press, 2018). Granat, M and Granat, К, The Constitution of Poland: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Pubfishing, 2019) 32-33. Hajdú, T, “A magyar identitás szabadságharcos - interjú Szabó Zsolttal, az ELTE Szo ciálpszichológia tanszékének adjunktusával”, Mindset Pszichológia (18 November 2017), http://mindset.co.hu/a-magyar-identitas-szabadsagharcos-intei1u-szabo-zsolttal-az-elte-s zocialpszichologia-tanszekenek-adjunktusaval/. Hanley, S, “Understanding the Illiberal Tum: Democratic Backsliding in the Czech Republic”, www.tandfonlme.com/doi/fúll/lO.1080/21599165.2018.1493457. Humphrey, T, “Democracy and the Rule of Law: Founding Liberal Democracy in Post-Communist Europe”, Colum. J. E. Eur. L. 2 (2008) 94, 124. Huq, AZ and Ginsburg, T, “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy” UCLA Law Review65 (2018) 95.
Bibliography 201 Jacobsohn, GJ and Roznai, Y Constitutional Revolution (Yale University Press, 2020). Kurunmäki, J and Marjanen, J “Isms, Ideologies and Setting the Agenda for Public Debate”, Journal of Political Ideologies 23(3) (2018) 256-282. Laszlo, J, “Narratív pszichológia”, Pszichológia 28 (2008), http://real.mtak.hu/2385/l/ 49413_ZJl.pdf. Lijphart, A, Patterns of Democracy - Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale University Press, 2012) 192. Liihrmann A and Lindberg SI, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New about It?” Democratization 7 (2019) 1099. Midler, J-W, What is Populismi (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 16. Murray, M, “Narrative Psychology and Narrative Analysis” in P.M. Camie, J.E. Rhodes, and L. Yardley (eds), Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding Perspectives in Methodology and Design (2003), 95И112. American Psychological Association, https:// doi.org/10.1037/10595-006. Pinheiro, VM, Ilarraz, M, and Mestriner, MT, “The Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis on the Bra zilian Legal System - A Report on the Functioning of the Branches of the Government and on the Legal Scrutiny of Their Activities”, The Theory and Practice ofLegL·lation, 8:i-2,193-212. Popp-Baier, U, “Narrative Psychology”, in ALC Runehov and L Oviedo (eds), Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions (Springer, 2013). Sadłoń, W, “Differentiation, Polarization and Religious Change in Poland at the Turn of 20th and 21st century”, Przeglqd Religioznawczy -The Religious Studies Review 4(262) (2016) 33-35. Sadurski, W, “How Democracy Dies (in
Poland): Ą Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Popu list Backsliding”, Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 18/01 (2018) 4^8. Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 3-5. Sadurski, W, “Constitutional Democracy in the Time of Elected Authoritarians”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2(331) (2020) 324-333. Schwartz, SH and Bardi, A, “Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule On Value Priorities in Eastern Europe”, Political Psychology 2 (1997) 407-408. Tushnet, M, “The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism?”, Florida Law Review, 69 (2017) 1367-1384. Versteeg, M and Ginsburg, T, “Measuring the Rule of Law: A Comparison of Indicators”, Law and Social Inquiry 1 (2017) 101. Walker, G, “The Idea of Nonli beral Constitutionalism”, Ethnicity and Group Rights39 (1997). Partii Alviar, H and Frankenberg, G (eds), Authoritarian Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, 2019). Bellamy, R, “Constitutionalism”, www.britannica.com/topic/constitutionalism. Bernatt, M and Ziółkowski, M, “Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism”, Wash. Int’l L.J. 28 (487) (2019) 505-516. Blokker, P, New Democracies in Crisis? (Routledge, 2015). Blokker, P, “Populist Constitutionalism”, VerfBlog (4 May 2017), https://verfassungsblog. de/populist-constitutionalism/. Blokker, P, “Populist Constitutionalism, Popular Engagement, and Constitutional Resistance”, https://reconnect-europe.eu/blog/blokker-populist-constitutionalisrn/, 7 February 2019. Bogaards, M, “De-democratization in Hungary: Diffusely Defective Democracy”, Democratization 8 (2018) 1491.
202 Bibliography Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25(1173) (2018) 1175. Brownlee, J, “Authoritarianism after 1989”, Harvard International Review, 4(2010). Bugarić, B, “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: ‘Lands In-Between’ Democracy and Authoritarianism”, Inťl J. Const. L. 13(219) (2015). Buzogány, A and Varga, M, “The Ideational Foundations of the Illiberal Backlash in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary”, Review of International Political Economy 25 (6) (2018) 811-828. Castillo-Ortiz, Paolo, “The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe”, European Constitutional Law Review 15(1) (2019) 48-72. Chan, C, “Thirty Years from Tiananmen: China, Hong Kong, and the Ongoing Experi ment to Preserve Liberal Values in an Authoritarian State”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 17(2) (2019) 443. Cheung, A, ‘“For My Enemies, the Law’: Abusive Legalism”, Candidacy paper, JSD Pro gram, NYU School of Law, 15 January 2018. Corrales, J, “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela”, Journal of Democracy 26 (2015) 38-43. Csaba, L, “Unorthodoxy in Hungary: An Illiberal Success Story?”, Post Communist econo mies, DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2019.1641949. Csaky, ZS, Nations in Transition: Dropping the Democratic Façade (Freedom House, 2020), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democra tic-facade#Facade. Csink, L, “Rule of Law in Hungary. What Can Law and Politics Do?” in T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała (eds), Ruk of
Law, Common Values and Illiberal Constitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union (Routledge, 2021). Diamond, L, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”,/. Democracy 26(142) (2015). Dixon, R and Landau, D Abusive Constitutional Borrowing: Legal Globalization and the Subversion of Liberal Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2021). Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Politics in Contemporary Hungary”, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 1 (2016) 63-98. Elster, J, “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction”, The University of Chicago Law Review 58(2) (1991) 447-482. Fabry, A, The Political Economy of Hungary: Prom State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism (Springer, 2019). Farinacci-Femós, JM, “Post-Liberal Constitutionalism”, Tulsa L. Rev. 54(1) (2018). Fraenkel, E, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 1941) 3-7. Frankenberg, G, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Coming to Terms with Modernity’s Nightmares” in H Alviar and G Frankenberg (eds), Authoritarian Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, 2019) 18-24, 36. Frantz, E and Kendall-Taylor, A, “The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism is Becoming More Formidable?”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (2017) 57. Frohnen, BP, “Is Constitutionalism Liberal?”, Campbell L. Rev. 33(529) (2011). Gardbaum, S, “The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, German L.J. 14(2229) (2013). Gingsburg, T and Huq, AZ, How to Save Constitutional Democracy? (University of Chicago Press, 2018). Gyulai, A, “Reality Free of Ideology.
Viktor Orbán’s Realism and Illiberalism”, https://ecp r.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/41864.
Bibliography 203 Halmai, G, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and Constitutionalism”, German Law Journal 20 (2019). Halmai, G, “The Making of‘Illiberal Constitutionalism’ with or without a New Constitution: The Case of Hungary and Poland”, in D Landau and H Lemer (eds), Comparative Con stitution Making (Edward Elgar, 2019). Halmai, G, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe”, EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2019/05. Henkin, L, “Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs”, Indiana Law Journal 4 (1992) 885, 886. Howse, R, “Populism and its Enemies”, Workshop on Public Law and the New Populism, Jean Monnet Center, NYU Law School, 15-16 September 2017. Ip, EC, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Politics of Constitutional Review in the Chinese Special Administrative Region (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Keane, J, New Despotism (Harvard University Press, 2020). Kochenov, D and Jakab, A (eds), The Enforcement ofEU Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017). Körösényi, A, Illés, G, and Gyulai, A, The Orbán Regime: Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making (Roudedge, 2020). Landau, D, “Abusive Constitutionalism”, U.C. Davis L. Rev. 47(189) (2013). Landau, D, “Populist Constitutions”, The University of Chicago Law Review 85 (2018) 521. Law, DS, “Alternatives to Liberal Constitutional Democracy”, Md. L. Rev. 77(223) (2017). Levitsky, S and Way, LA, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democ racy 2 (2002). Levitsky, S and Way, LA, “The Myth of Democratic Recession”, Democracy26(45) (2015) 48. Ludwikowski, R, “Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the
Concept of Constitu tional Supremacy”, Cardozo Journal of International Comparative Law 9 (2001) 253-296. Lührmann, A and Lindberg, SI, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It?” Democratization 7 (2019) 1097, 1098. Magyar, B, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary (CEU Press, 2016). Merkel, W, Puhle, H-J, Croissant, A, and Thierry, P, Defekte Demokratk: Band 1; Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie: Band 2 (Verlag, 2006) Mészáros, G, “Carl Schmitt in Hungary: Constitutional Crisis in the Shadow of Covid-19”, MTA ĽWP 2020/17, https://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp/carl-schmitt-in-hungary-con stitutional-crisis-in-the-shadow-of-covid-19. Mudde, C and Rovira Kaltwasser, C, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2017) 34. Müller, J-W, “Populism and Constitutionalism ” in C Rovira Kaltwasser, P Taggart, P Ochoa Espejo, and P Ostiguy (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Populism (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2017). Müller, J-W, “The Problem with ‘Illiberal Democracy’”, Soc. Eur. (27 January 2016), www.socialeurope.eu/the-problem-with-illiberal-democracy. Müller, J-W, What is Populismi (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 3. Norris, P, “Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risk”, 28(2) Journal of Democracy (2017) 14-15. Norris, P, “Measuring Populism Worldwide”, Harvard Kennedy School, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP 20-002, 2.
204 Bibliography Nusserger, A, “The European Court of Human Rights and the Rule of Law - A Tale of Hopes and Disillusions” in M Zubrik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World. Essays in Honor of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2017). Pinelli, C, “Illiberal Regimes in the Perspective of Comparative Constimtionalism”, Revista di diritti comparati 1 (2017), 5, 6. Puddington, A, “Breaking Down Democracy: Global Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians”, https://freedomhouse.org/sitcs/default/fiJcs/June2017_FH_Rcport_ Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf, June 2017. Ruprik, J, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Surging Illiberalism in the East”, J. Democracy 27(77) (2016) 137. Sadurski, W, “How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding”, Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 18/01 (2018). Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 25, 243. Sanecka-Tyczyńska, J, “Prawa i Sprawiedliwości krytyka Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polaskiej z 1997 r.” [“Law and Justice Criticism of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997”], 4 (147) Przegląd Sejmowy (2018) 83-88. Scheppele, KL, “Autocratic Legalism”, U. Chi. L. Rev. 85(545) (2018). Sheiring, G, www.tni.org/en/article/hungarys-regime-is-proof-that-capitalism-can-be-deeplyauthoritarian. Somer, M, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown: Old vs. New and Indigenous vs. Global Authoritarianism”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2016). Son, BN, Confucian Constitutionalism in East Asia (Routledge, 2016) 174. Stopler, G,
“Semi-liberal Constitutionalism” 8Global Constitutionalism (2019), 94—122. Stubbs, P and Lendvai-Bainton, N, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism, Radical Conservativism and Social Policy Within the European Union: Croatia, Hungary and Poland” 51(2) Development and Change (2019) 554. Thio, L-А, “Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Online Publication Date: Nov 2012, doi.T0.1093/oxfordhb/ 9780199578610.013.0001. Tóth GA, “Authoritarianism” in R Grote, F Lachenmann, and R Wolfhim (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford Constitutional Law; online resource, 2017). Tóth, GA, “Illiberal Rule of Law? Changing Features of Hungarian Constitutionalism” in M Adams, A Meuwese, and EH Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017). Tushnet, M, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism”, Cornell Law Review 100 (2015). Tushnet, M, “The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism”, Fla L. Rev. 69 (2017). Tushnet, M and Bugaric, B, “Populism and Constitutionalism: An Essay on Definitions and Their Implications” (21 April 2020), http://nrs.harvard.edu/um-3:HUL.InstRepos: 42660123. Walker, G, “The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism”, Ethnicity and Group Rights 39 (1997). Waluchow, W, “Constitutionalism” in EN Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo sophy (Spring 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/con stitutionalism/. Zajadło, J, “Podwójne państwo”, http://konstytucyjny.pl/jerzy-zajadlo-podwojne-pa nstwo/ (20.10.2020). Zakaria, F, “The Rise
of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs 6 (1997) 22. Zakaria, F, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (W. W. Norton and Company, 2007).
Bibliography 205 Zgut, E, “Authoritarian Regime Durabili ty. The Bread and Butter of Hungarian and Polish Backsliding during COVID-19”, https://visegradinsight.eu/authoritarian-regime-dura bility-hungary-poland/. Part ПІ Ady, E, “Ismereden Korvin-kódex margójára” [“Side-note to the Unknown KorvinCodex”] Figyelő (1905). Augustyniak, P, Homo Polacas. Eseje o polskiej duszy [Homo Polacas. Essays about Polish soul] (Znak, Kraków 2015). Bar-Tal, D, Chernyak-Наі, L, Schori, N, and Gundar, A, “A Sense of Self-perceived Col lective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts”, 91 (874) International Review of the Red Cross (2009) 237. Bauman, Z, Etykaponowoczesna [The Late Modem Ethics] (Wydawnictwo Aletheia, Warszawa, 2012). Bibó, I, Válogatott tanulmányok I-IV, Második kötet: EÜorzult magyar alkat, zsákutcás magyar történelem [Selected papers I-IV, 2nd vol: Distorted Hungarian character, Hungarian history with a dead end] (1948), http://mek.oszk.hu/02000/02043/html/350.html. Bień-Kacała, A and Tarnowska, A, “Power of Authority: A Few Words About the Chief of State One Hundred Years Ago and the Present”, 6(46) Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (2018) 125-135. Bień-Kacała, A, “Informal Constitutional Change: The Case of Poland” 6(40) Przeglçtd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (2017), 199-218. Bień-Kacała, A, “Równość czy hierarchiczność? Kilka słów o wartościach w państwie, prawie i społeczeństwie” (“Equality or Hierarchy? A Few Words About Values in the State, Law and Society”), Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze XL(2018) 17-30. Bień-Kacała, A, “Polexit is Coming or is it Already Here? Comments on the Judicial
Inde pendence Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal”, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 28 April 2020, at www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/polexit-is-coming֊or-is-it-already-here-comm ents-on-the-judicial-independence-decisions֊of-the-poUsh-constitutional-tribunal. Bień-Kacała, A, Tarnowska, A, and Włoch, W, “The Nation, Delegation, and Constitu tional Change in Poland”, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2018) 355-377. Bień-Kacała, A, Tarnowska, A, and Wioch, W, “Nation - Delegation - Constitution: Reconsidering Role of Religion in Polish Identity Development”, Bratislava Law Review 1 (2019) 6-25. Bilewicz, M, Być gorszymi [To Be Worse] (Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2008) 43-47. Bilewicz, M, Miįdzy idealizacjg. a hiperkrytycyzmem. Pokka niepamiįc historyczna i jej źródła [Between Idealization and Hypercriticism: Poland Historical Oblivion and its Sources] (Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych, Warszawa, Seria ANALIZY) September 2018,1-8. Bíró-Nagy, A, “Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: The Social Background and Practical Steps of Building an Illiberal state”, www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/illiberals/ilU beral_democracy_in_hungary_the_social_background_and_practical_steps_of_building_a n_illiberal_state (2017) 35. Boyd, D and Salusmszky, I (eds), Re-reading Frye (University of Toronto Press, 1999). Cichocka, A and Cislak, A, “NationaUsm as Collective Narcissism” ScienceDirect Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 34 (2020) 69-74. Cieger, A, “Alkotmányosság és nemzeti identitás - a magyar történelem kontextusában. Vázlat” [“Constitutionaüsm and National Identity - In the
Context of Hungarian History. Draft”], http://ateUer.org.hu/upload/category/mta_elte_ateUer/kotoerokl.3_cieger_andras.pdf.
206 Bibliography Csordas, G, “A Farewell to Central Europe” (July 2016), www.literaturhauseuropa.eu/en/ observatory/blog/a-fàrewell-to-central-europe. Diamond, L, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”, Journal ofDemocracy 1 (2015) 149. Doliński, D and Grzyb, T, Posłuszni do bólu: O uległości wobec autorytetu w 50 lat po ehperymencie Milgrama [Painfully Obedient: On the Submission to Authority 50 Tears Afier Milgram’s Experiment] (Smak Słowa, 2017). Drezner, DW, “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy' Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air”, Eletcher F. World Affi 41 (2017) 23. Drinóczi, T, “Concept of Quality' in Legislation - Revisited: Matter of Perspective and a General Overview”, Statute Law Review 3 (2015). Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System” Wienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (2017) 139-151. Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Identity in Europe: The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach”, German Law Journal 21(2) (2020) 105-130. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “Extra-legal Particularities and Illiberal Constitutionalism: The Case of Hungary and Poland”, Hungarian Journal ofLegal Studies ‘1 (2018) 338-354. Drogosz, M (ed), Jak Polacy przegrywają, jak Polacy wygrywaję [How the Poles Lose, How the Poles Win] (Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, 2005). Feischmidt, M and Majtényi, В, The Rise of Populist Nationalism: Social Resentment and Capturing the Court in Hungary (Central European University Press, 2019). Forgas, JP and Lantos, D, “Understanding Populism: Collective Narcissism and the
Col lapse of Democracy' in Hungary”, www.sydneysymposium.unsw.edu.au/2019/chap ters/ForgasSSSP2019%20.pdf, 28. Fukuyama, F, “The Rise of Populist Nationalism”, www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/ en/articles/news-and-expertise/francis-fokuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801. html (2018). Fülöp, É, Péley, В and László, J, “A történelmi pályához kötött érzelmek magyar törté nelmi regényekben” [“History-related Emotions in Hungarian Historical Novels”J, http://real.mtak.hU/2385/l/49413_ZJl.pdf, 56-77. Fülöp, É, Csertő, I, lig, В, Szabó, Zs, Slugoski, В, and László, J, The Psychology of Nar ratives in JP Forgas, О Vincze, and J Laszlo (eds), Social Cognition and Communication (Psychology Press, 2014). Fülöp, É, Csertő, I, lig, В, Szabó, Zs, Slugoski, В, and László, J, “Emotional Elaboration of Collective Traumas in Historical Narratives”, http://real.mtak.hu/20201/3/em otional_elaboration_of_collective_traumas.pdf. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, A and Sledzinska-Simon, A, “Victimhood of the Nation as a Legally Protected Value in Transitional States - Poland as a Case Study”, https://ssrn.eom/a bstract=3120407, 5. Golec de Zavala, A, Dyduch-Hazar, K, and Lantos, D, “Collective Narcissism: Political Consequences of Investing Self-Worth in the Ingroup’s Image”, 40(1) Advances in Political Psychology (2019) 46. Granat, M and Granat, К, The Constitution ofPoland: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2019) 13-14. Gross, JT, Neighbors: The Destruction oftheJewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton University Press, 2001). Gross, JT, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After
Auschwitz (Random House, 2006). Gross, JT, Złote żniwa: Rzecz o tym, со siį działo na obrzeżach zagłady Żydów (Golden Harvest: What was happening on the outskirts of the extermination of the Jews) (Znak, 2011).
Bibliography 207 Humphrey T, “Democracy and the rule of law: founding Uberal democracy in post-Communist Europe”, Colum J. E Eur. L 2(94) (2008) 116. Jacobsohn, G, Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press, 2010). Koncewicz, TT, “Unconstitutional Capture and Constitutional Recapture: Of the Rule of Law, Separation of Powers and Judicial Promises”, Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l Regio nal Econ. L. Just., Working Paper 3/17. Krastev, I and Holmes, S, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and its Discontents”, Journal of Democracy 3 (2018) 118-122. Ladányi, J, Önpusztító nemzeti habitus [Self-destructive National Habitus] (L’Harmattan, 2015) 19-23. László, J, “Narratív pszichológia”, Pszichológia 4 (2008), http://real.mtak.hu/2385/l/ 49413_ZJl.pdf, 5. Lendvai, P, The Hungarians: A Thousand Tears of Victory in Defeat (Princeton University Press, 2004). Leszczyński, A, No dno po prostu jest Polska: Dlaczego Polacy tak bardzo nie lubig swojego kraju i innych Polaków [Poland Hits Rock Bottom: Why Poles Do Not Like Their Country and Other Poles] (W.A.B., 2017) 255-264. Michalik, E and Santorski, J, Polska na kozetce [Poland on the Couch] (Książki Burda, 2016). Miklóssy, K and Nyyssönen, H, “Defining the New Polity: Constitutional Memory in Hungary and Beyond”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies (2018), 5-9. Miller-Idriss, C (2019) “The Global Dimensions of Populist Nationalism”, The International Spectator, 54(2), 17-34, doi:10.1080/03932729.2019.1592870. Milosz, Czeslaw, Historia literatury polskiej [History of Polish Literature] (Znak, 1993) 263-264. Müller, J-W, What
is Populismi (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Murray, M, “Narrative Psychology and Narrative Analysis” in PM Camie, JE Rhodes, and L Yardly (eds), Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding Perspectives in Methodology and Design (American Psychological Association, 2003) 110. Novak, B, “Setback for Orbán as Opposition in Hungary Gains Ground in Elections”, (14 October 2019) www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/europe/hungary-elections-orban. html. Nyyssönen, H and Metsälä, J, “Highlights of National History? Constitutional Memory and the Preambles of Post-Communist Constitutions”, European Politics and Society 21(3) (2020), 323-340. Petőfi, S, “The Magyar Noble”, http://mek.oszk.hU/06500/06567/06567.htm#49. Plattner, J, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 1(21) (2010) 88. Pogány, I, “The Crisis of Democracy in East Central Europe: The ‘New Constitutionalism’ in Hungary”, European Public Law (2013) 341-367. Rajcsányi, G, “Viktor Orbán’s Hungary: Orbanist Politics and Philosophy from a Hungarian Perspective”, www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=8e914238-5bca-e235-el76f8d502f4a33f groupld=288143,123. Rosenfeld, M, “Constitutional Identity” in M. Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 756-776. Ruprik, J, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Surging Illiberalism in the East”, J. Democracy 27(77) (2016) 84. Sajó, A, “Militant Democracy and Transition Towards Democracy” in A Sajó (ed) Militant Democracy (2004) 217, 218.
208 Bibliography Sajó, A, “Militant Democracy and Emotional Politics”, Constellations 19 (2012) 563.Sajó, A, “The Constitution of Illiberal Democracy as a Theory About Society” Polish Socio logical Review 4 (2018) 405MI0. Schmidt, A, “Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary. Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections”, Pokki Przegląd Politologiczny 6(2) (2018) 88. Schwartz, SH and Bardi, A, “Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule on Value Prio rities in Eastern Europe”, Political Psychology 2 (1997) 407-408. Skopska, G, “Law and Society in a Natural Laboratory: The Case of Poland in the Broader Context of East-Central Europe” in M Kaase, V Sparschuh, and A Wenninger (eds), Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe: Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociology (1989-2001) (Social Science Information Centre/Collegium Budapest, 2002) 597. Spirò, G, “Két középkeíet-európai mentalitás az államiság szempontjából” Irodalmi és Társadalmi havi lap 6(2000) (2007) 7. Stambulski, M, “Nostalgie Constitutional Identity”, Journal of the Polish Section of IR 3 (2019) 104. Tarnowska, A, “The Sovereignty Issue in the Public Discussion in the Era of the Polish 3rd May Constitution (1788-1792)” in U Müßig (ed), Reconsidering Constitutional For mation I, National Sovereignty, A Comparative Analysis of the Juridification by Con stitution (Springer International Publishing, 2016) 233. Toomey, M, “History, Nationalism, and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán’s Illiberal Hungary”, New Perspectives 26(1) (2018). Vincze, О and László, J, “A narratív
perspektíva szerepe a történelemkönyvekben” (“The Role of Narratives in History Textbooks”), http://real.mtak.hU/2385/l/49413_ZJl.pdf, 33. Waterbury, MA, “Populist Nationalism and the Challenges of Divided Nationhood: The Politics of Migration, Mobility, and Demography in Post 2010 Hungary”, East Eur opean Politics and Societies and Cultures 34(4) (2020) 962-983. doi:doi:10.1177/ 0888325419897772. Weber, M, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Routledge, 1930). Wojciechowski, Z, Nacjokratyzm, czyli rządy sejmikowe (Drukarnia Uniwersytetu Poznańs kiego Poznań, 1936) 20-21. Wojciszke, В (ed), Jacy są Polacy? Badania opinii społecznej jako źródło wiedzy psycholo gicznej [ What Are Poks Likel Social Feedback Survey as a Source of Psychological Knowl edge] (Wydawnictwo Instytutu Psychologii PAN, 1995). Wrzesiński, W, Charakter narodowy Polaków: Z rozważań historyka [National Character of Poles: From the Historian’s Reflections] (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004). Zajenkowska, A (ed), Pokka na kozetce: Sila obywatekkiej refleksyjności [Poland on the Couch: The Power of Civic Reflexivity] (Smak Słowa, 2016). Zamoyski, A, The Polish Way: A Thousand-Tear History of the Poks and Their Culture (Hippocrene Books, 2012). Zászkaliczky, M, “Eszmetörténeti szempontok a történeti alkotmányosság közép- és kora újkori magyarországi történetéhez” [“Some Considerations on the Hungarian Mediaeval and Modem History of the Historical Constitutionalism, from the Perspective of History of Ideas”] Közjogi Szemle 3 (2015) 14-25. Part IV Adams, M, Meuwese, A, and Ballin,
EH (eds), Constitutionalism and the Ruk of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Bibliography 209 Beatty, DM, “The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 49 (2001). Bień-Kacała, A, “Informal Constitutional Change”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 6(40) (2017) 199-218. Bogdandy von, A, MacGegor, EF, Antoniazzi, MM, Piovesan, F, and Soley, X (eds), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New lus Com֊ типе (Oxford University Press, 2017). Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25(7) (2018). Broberg, M, “Preliminary References as a Means for Enforcing EU Law” in Kochenov and Jakab (eds), 111. Closa, C and Kochenov, D (eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Corrales, J, “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela”, Journal of Democracy 26 (2015) 38. Daly, TG, “Diagnosing Democratic Decay”, www.academia.edu/34052302/Diagnosing_ DemocraticJDecay. Drinóczi, Tímea, “The Rule of Law: The Hungarian Perspective” in Drinóczi and BieńRacala (eds) 119-132. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and Illiberal Constitutionalism” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1-2) (2020) 171-192. Fallon, KM, Jr, “‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse”, Columbia Law Review 1 (1997) 7. Finek, DE, “Judicial Review: The United States Supreme Court Versus the German Con stitutional Court”, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 20(1) (1997) 123-157.
Fuller, L, The Morality of Law (Yale University Pressl969). Ginsburg, T, “Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law”, New York University Journal of International Law Politics 38 (2006) 757. Gosalbo-Bono, R, “The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the European Union and the United States”, University ofPittsburgh Law Review 72 (2010) 289. Groppi, T, “Constitutional Revision in Italy: A Marginal Instrument for Constitutional Change” in X Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2016) 218-220. Halmai, G, “Populism, Authoritarianism, and Constitutionalism”, German Law Journal 20 (2019). Henderson, L, “Authoritarianism and the Rule ofLaw”, Indiana Law Jotiniai66 (1991) 396. Hoflmann-Riem, W, “The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe - Standards and Impact”, European Journal of International Law 2 (2014) 595. https://europeanla wblog.eu/2019/12/02/the-independence-of-the-disciplinary-chamberofthe-polish֊sup reme-court-or-how-to-forget-about-discipline/. Jakab, A and Bodnár, E, “The Rule of Law, Democracy and Human Rights in Hungary: Tendencies from 1989 until 2019” in Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (eds) 105-118. Jakab, A and Kochenov, D, “Introductory remarks” in Kochenov and Jakab (eds), 2-3. Kochenov, D, “The EU and the Rule ofLaw - Naïveté or a Grand Design?”, University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper Series 2018, 510. Kochenov, D and Jakab, A (eds), The Enforcement ofEU Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017).
210 Bibliography Krieger, H, Nolte, G, and Zimmermann, A (eds), The International Ruk of Law: Rise or Declinei (Oxford University Press, 2019). Krygier, M, “The Rule of Law: Pasts, Presents, and Two Possible Futures,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 12 (2016). Lenaertes, K, “New Horizons for the Rule of Law Within the EU”, German Law Journal 21 (2020) 34. Levitsky, S and Way, LA, “The Myth of Democratic Recession”, Democracy 26(45) (2015) 46-48. Lührmann, A and Lindberg, SI, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It?” Democratization 7 (2019) 1103-1104. Madeja, A, “The European Values and the Rule of Law” in T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała (eds), Rule of Law, Common Values and IUiberal Constitutionalism. Poland and Hun gary within the European Union (Routledge, 2021) 45-76. May, C and Winchester, A (eds), Handbook of the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, 2018). McDonald, L, “Positivism and the Formal Rule of Law: Questioning the Connection”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 26 (2001) 93. Menocal, AR, Fritz, V and Rakner, L, “Hybrid Regimes and the Challenge of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries”, South African Journal of Inter national Affairs 1 (2008) 15-30. Moravcsik, A, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe”, International Organizations 54 (2000) 243-244. Nusserger, A, “The European Court of Human Rights and the Rule of Law - A Tale of Hopes and Disillusions” in Marek Zubrik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World. Essays in Honor of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Wydawnictwo Sejmove,
2017) 162-165. Palombella, G, “Beyond Legality - Before Democracy: Rule of Law in the EU Two Level System” in Closa and Kochenov (eds). Platiner, MF, “Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy”,/. Democracy 21(1) (2010) 81-92. Puddington, A, “Breaking Down Democracy: Global Strategies, and Methods of Modem Authoritarians”, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_ Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf, June 2017. Raz, J, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue”, Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977). Raz, J, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in J Raz (ed), The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979). Rosenfeld, M, “Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy”, Southern California Law Review 74 (2001) 1313, 1350. Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 211-213. Scheppele, KL, “Autocratic Legalism”, The University of Chicago Law Review 85 (2018). Sellers, M, “What is the Rule of Law and Why it is Important?” in JR Silkenat, JRE Hickey Jr, and PD Barenboim (eds), The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat) (Springer, 2014) 3-6 (the Rule of Law has a Western European origin). Simonelli, MA, “Thickening Up Judicial Independence: The ECJ Ruling in Commission v. Poland (C-619/18)”, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/07/08/thickening-up-judi cial-independence-the-ecj-ruling-in-commission-v-poland-c-619-18/. Tamanaha, BZ, “The History of the Rule of Law”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2012) 233. Tóth, GA, “Illiberal Rule of Law? Changing Features of Hungarian Constitutionalism” in M
Adams, A Meuwese, and EH Ballin, (eds), Constitutionalism and the Ruh of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Bibliography 211 Tushnet, M, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism”, Cornell Law Review 100 (2015) 72. Varju, M, “A magyar jogrendszer és az Európai Unió joga: tíz év tapasztalata” [“The Hungarian Legal System and the Law of the European Union: Experiences of Ten Years”] in A Jakab and G Gajduschek (eds), A magyar jogrendszer állapota (MTA Tár sadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, 2016) 143-171. Versteeg, M and Ginsburg, T, “Measuring the Rule of Law: A Comparison of Indicators”, Law and Social Inquiry 1 (2017) 100. Waldron, J, “The Concept of the Rule of Law”, Georgia Law Review 1 (2008) 59-60. Włoch, W, “‘Where the Laws Do Not Govern, There is No Constitution’: On the Rela tionship between the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism” in Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (eds), ո. 39, 77-101. Wróblewska, I, “The Rule of Law: The Polish Perspective” in Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (eds), 133-150. Zanghellini, A, “The Foundations of the Rule of Law”, Tale Journal of Law the Humanities 2 (2016) 216. Zimmermann, A, “Understanding the Rule of Law: Conceptions and Perspective”, http://alrf.msk.ru/understanding_the_rule_of_law_conceptions_and_perspectives. Zinonos, P, “The Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court or How to Forget About Discipline”, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/12/02/ the-independence-of-the-disciplinary-chamber-of-the-polish-supreme-court-or-how-toforget- about-discipline/. Part V Alberti, E, Czibik, A, Fazekas, M, Herczog, E, Ungar, К, Bálint, S, Tóth, W, and Johannes, IJ, “The Quality of Hungarian Legislation 2013-2014” (Budapest, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/hungary/sites/default/files/docs/body/legislation_eu_2014_rep ort_l50216_2100.pdf. Alberti, E, Czibik, A, Fazekas, M, Herczog, E, Ungar, К, Bálint, S, Tóth, W, and Johannes, IJ, “Impact Assessments Public Consultation and Legislation in Hungary 2011-2014” (Budapest, 2015) www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/legisla tion_2014_report_150630.pdf, 83. Arato, L, “Homophobia is on the Rise in Hungary”, www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/ News/Data-news/Homophobia-is֊on-the֊rise-in-Hungary (30 October 2019); https:// index.hu/kulfold/eurologus/2019/09/24/egyre_tobb_rnagyart_zavarnak_ajmelegek/. Arnold, R and Cerny, L, “The Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU by the German Federal Constitutional Court with References to the Other Federal Courts”, Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Iuridica 4 (2018), https://karolinum.cz/data/ clanek/6407/Iurid_64_4_0065.pdf, 65, 77. Bard, К and Bárd, Pa, “Összhang vagy kollízió? Hol tart Magyarország 25 évvel az EJEEhez való csadakozás után a strasbourgi elvárásoknak való megfelelésben?” [“Harmony or Collision? Where is Hungary 25 Years After Joining the ECHR in Terms of Compliance to Expectations of Strasbourg?”], Állam és Jogtudomány 4 (2017) https://jog.tk.mta. hu/uploads/fìles/2017-04֊BardK-BardP.pdf, 17-18. Bárd, P and Bárd, К, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Hungarian Legal System”, http://real.mtak.hu/65944/l/Bard_Bard_Comparative_study_on_ the_implementation_of_the_ECHR_at_the_national_level_ENG_149_168_u.pdf, 152. Bar-Siman-Tov, I, “Semiprocedural Judicial Review”, Legisprudence 3
(2012).
212 Bibliography Bar-Siman-Tov, I, “Covid-19 meets politics: the novel coronavirus as a novel challenge for leg islatures”, The Theory and Practice ofLegislation 8(1-2) (2020) 11-48 (free online access). Bematt, M and Ziółkowski, M, “Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism”, Washington International Law Journal 28 (2019) 499-501. Bień-Kacała, A, “Gloss to the Judgement of Constitutional Tribunal of 16 March 2017 (Kp 1/17)”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 4 (2017) 255-262. Bień-Kacała, A, Tarnowska, A and Włoch, W, “The Nation, Delegation, and Constitutional Change in Poland”, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 59(4) (2018) 355-377. Bień-Kacała, A, “Illiberal Democracy in Action: Polish Kind of Symbolic Legislation”, Eur opean Studies. The Review ofEuropean Law, Economics and Politics 6 (2019) 268-278. Bíró-Nagy, A and Laid, G, Orbán 10. Az elmúlt évtized a Magyar társadalom szemével, (© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung - Policy Solutions, 2020), https://www.policysolutions.hu/ userfiles/Orbán 10jBnal .pdf, 78. Bodnar, A, “Strasbourg Steps ln”, VerfBlog, 2020/7/07, https://verfessungsblog.de/stra sbourg-steps-in/. Bozóki, A and Hegedűs, D, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union”, Democratization 25(7) (2018) . Bucholc, M, “Fencing Off the Difference: On ‘LGBT-Free Zones’ in Poland”, VerfBlog, 2020/8/26, https://verfassungsblog.de/fencing-off-the-difference/. Burea, G de and Morijn, J, “Repression of Freedom of Expression in Poland: Renewing support for Wojciech Sadurski”, VerfBlog, 2020/6/03, https://vcrfassungsblog.de/rep ression-of-freedom-of-
expression-in-poland-renewing-support-for-wojciech-sadurski/. Burea, G de, Morijn, J, and Steinbeis, M, “Stand with Wojciech Sadurski: his freedom of expression is (y)ours”, VerfBlog, 2019/11/18, https://verfassungsblog.de/sta nd-with-wojciech-sadurski-his-freedom-of-expression-is-yours/. Csaky, Z., Hâtions in Transition: Dropping the Democratic Eaçade (Freedom House, 2020), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade#Fa cade, 25. Csatlós, E, “The Application of International Law as an Instrument of Interpretation in Hungary - the Practice of the Constitutional Court and Ordinary Courts in a Com parative Approach”, http://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/7049/8/2961433.pdf, 137. Dojcsák, D, Farkas, E, Fazekas, T, Hegyi, A, Kádár, A, and Szabó, M, “The New Law on the Right to Assembly in Hungary as Applied in the Practice”, http://41iberty.eu/wp-con tent/uploads/2020/08/The-New-Law֊on֊the֊Right֊to-Assembly-in-Hungary-as-Applie d-in-Practice.pdf, 49. Drinóczi, T, “Dialogic Interaction and Legislation on Parliamentary Election in Hungary 2010-2014” Osteurope Recht 4 (2014) 452-467. Drinóczi, T, “Concept of Quality in Legislation - Revisited: Matter of Perspective and a General Overview” Statute Law Review 3 (2015) 225-227. Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Democratic Backsliding in Light of the Recent Emergency Cor onavirus Legislation” Public Jurist, Hong Kong University Political Science Magazine, June 2020, www.hkuglc.org/government-and-laws-committee-hku-public-jurist. Drinóczi, T, “Legislation in Hungary” in U Karpen and H Xanthaki (eds),
Legislation in Europe. A Country by Country Guide (Hart Publishing, 2020). Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and Illiberal Constitutionalism” The Themy and Practice ofLegislation 8(1-2) (2020) 171-192. Górski, M, “The Dialogue Between Selected CEE Courts and the ECtHR”, in A Wyrozumska (ed), TransnationalJudicial Dialogue on International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2017) 239-240.
Bibliography 213 Grácián, D and Mikut, G, “Requiem for a Dream: Academie Freedom Under Threat in Democracies”, International Higher Education Nr 90, Summer 2017. Griglio, E, “Parliamentary Oversight Under the Covid-19 Emergency: Striving Against Executive Dominance”, The Theory and, Practice of Legislation 8(1-2) (2020) 49-70 (free online access). Hamulak, О, Sulyok, M, and Kiss, LN, “Measuring the ‘EU’ clidean distance between EU law and the Hungarian Constitutional Court - focusing on the position of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, Czech Tearbook of Public Private International Law 10 (2019) 145-148. Kastelik-Smaza, A., “The Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in Poland”, Acta Universitatis Carolinat -TuridicaA (2018) https://karolinum.cz/data/ clanek/6410/Iurid_64_4_0101.pdf, 112. Kazai, V, “The Illiberal Challenge to the Rule of Law Principle: The Neglected Procedural Aspect (With Special Focus on Hungary)”, 2019 ESIL Annual Research Forum, Göt tingen (4-5 April 2019), available https://ssm.com/abstract=3513204. Klamert, M., “The Implementation and Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in Austria”, Acta Universitatis Carolinae - Iuridica 4 (2018), https://karoli num.cz/data/clanek/6409/Iurid_64_4_0089.pdf, 89, 99. Klink В van, Beers, В van, and Poort, L (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw (Springer International Publishing, 2016) 1-2. Kosar, D and Petrov, J, “The Architecture of the Strasbourg System of Human Rights: The Crucial Role of the Domestic Level and the Constitutional Courts in
Particular”, ZaöRV 77 (2017), https://www.zaoerv.de/77_2017/77_2017_3_a_585_621.pdf, 617. Kúria, A, “Az Alaptörvény követelményeinek érvényesülése a bírósági ítélkezésben’ Jog gyakorlat-elemző Csoportja2016.El.II.JGY.K.l” https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/defa ult/files/joggyak/alaptorveny_osszefoglalo_velemeny.pdf, 194. Kustra-Rogaska, A and Hamulak, O, “Keeping Distance: Chapters from Randomized (NonApplication of the European Court of Human Rights before the Polish Constitu tional Tribunal”, Baltic Journal of European Studies 4(9) (2019) 90. Łakomieć, К, “Academic Freedom(s) in the Drift Towards Authoritarianism (4/4) Poland”, https://ds.hypotheses.org/6391 (15 November 2019). Magyar, B., Post-Communist Mafia State 0 The Case of Hungary (Noran Libro, 2016). Nagy, ТА, “Parlamenti sebesség” [“Parliamentary speed”], http://meltanyossag.hu/ files/meltany/imce/kp_parlamenti_sebesseg_120228.pdf. Pech, Land Scheppele, KL, “Poland and the European Commission, Part III: Requiem for the Rule of Law”, VerfBlog, 2017/3/03, at http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-a nd֊the֊european֊commissionpart-iii֊requiem-for-the-rule-of-law/. Pinheiro, VM, Ilarraz, Mand Mestriner, MT, “The Impacts of the COVID -19 Crisis on the Brazilian Legal System - A Report on the Functioning of the Branches of the Govern ment and on the Legal Scrutiny of Their Activities”, The Theory and Practice of Legisla tion 8(1-2) (2020) 193-212 (free online access). Polgári, E, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Hungarian Judicial Practice”, Fundamentum 5
(2008) 74—80. Polgári, E, “Az Alkotmánybíróság esete az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezményével” [“The Constitutional Court and the European Convention of Human Rights”] Fundamentum 4 (2015) 6. Pólyák, G, “Media in Hungary: Three Pillars of an Illiberal Democracy” in E Polonska and E Beckett (eds), Public Service Broadcasting and Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies (Paigrave Macmillan) 284r֊285.
214 Bibliography Popelier, P, Maymanyan, M, and Vanderbrawaene, W, eds, The Kok of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia, 2013). Reichman, H, “Academic Freedom Threatened in Poland”, 19 February 2016, academe blog.org. Sadura, P and Sierakowski, S, “Political Cynicism: The Case of Poland”, http://politica lcritique.org/cee/poland/2019/poles-political-cynicism-research-report/, 15-16. Sadurski, W, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019) 139. Sárosi, P, “David Takes on Goliath: The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Hungary”, 11 October 2020, https://autocracyanalyst.net/david-takes-on-goliath-struggle-for-aca demic-freedom-in-hungary/. Schmidt, A, “Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections”, Polski Przeględ Politologiczny 2 (2018) 82. Schumpeter, J, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd edn (Allen Unwin, 1947), chs 21-23. Sçkowska-Kozlowska, К, “The Istanbul Convention in Poland” in J Niemi, L Peroni, and V Stoyanova, International Law and Violance against Women. Europe and the Istanbul Convention (Roudedge, 2020) 261. Skomerska-Muchowska, I, “The Dialogue of the CEE Constitutional Court in the Era of Constitutional Pluralism” in A Wyrozumska (ed), Transnational Judicial Dialogue on International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódz kiego, 2017) 118. Sokołowski, JK and Stolicki, D, “Przyczyny opóźnień w transpozycji dyrektyw europejskich do polskiego porządku prawnego w świetle analizy ilościowej krajowego procesu legis lacyjnego” [“Reasons for Delays in
the Transposition of European Directives into the Polish Legal Order in the Light of Quantitative Analysis of the National Legislative Process”], Przeględ Politologiczny 2 (2017) 39-54. Szabó Z, “Többpólusú alapjogvédelmi rendszer a gyakorlatban - a kormánytisztviselők indokolás nélküli felmentésének tükrében” [“Multilevel Protection of Human Rights in Practice - in the Light of Dismissal of Government Officials Without Justification”], Pro Futuro 1 (2015) 138. Szlachta, В, “Aksjologia Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku. Perspektywa badacza myśli politycznej” [“The Axiology of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997: The Perspective of the Researcher of Political Thought”] Przeględ Sejmowy 6(143) (2017) 125-150. Trócsányi, L, “New Challenges Facing Democracy and the Rule of Law”, Hungarian Review 3 (2017), http://hungarianreview.com/article/20171117_new_challenges_fa cmg_democracy_and_the_rule_of_law. Tushnet, M, “Authoritarian Constitutionalism”, Harvard Public Law Working PapersNol3—47 (2013), 72. Tushnet, M, “The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism”, Fla L. Rev. 69 (2017). Uhlmann, Fand Scheifele, E, “Legislative Response to Coronavirus (Switzerland)”, The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1-2) (2020) 115-130 (free online access). Uitz, R, “Nemzetközi emberi jogok és a maygar jogrend” [“International Human Rights and the Hungarian Legal Order”], https://jog.tk.hu/uploads/files/08_Uitz_Renata.pdf. Urbinati, N, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (University of Chicago Press, 2006) 43. Varju, M, “A magyar jogrendszer és az Európai Unió joga: tíz
év tapasztalata” [“The Hun garian Legal System and the law of the European Union: Experiences of Ten Years”]’, in A Jakab and G Gajduschek, eds, A magyar jogrendszer állapota (MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Jogtudományi Intézet, 2016) 142-164.
Bibliography 215 Vármy E, “Az Alkotmánybíróság és az Európai Bíróság. Együttműködő alkotmánybír áskodás?” [“The Constitutional Court and the Court of the EU. Coopareting Judicial Review?”] Állam és Jogtudomány 2 (2019) 66-70. Wikę, R, Stokes, В, and Simmons, К, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Job:. Sharp Ideological Divides Across EU on Views About Minorities, Diversity and National Identity (11 July 2016), www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/ 07/ll/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees֊will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/. Wróblewska, I, “The Rule of Law: The Polish Perspective” in T Drinóczi and A BieńKacala (eds), Rule of Law, Common Values and Illiberal Constitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union (Routledge, 2021) 133-150. Wyrozumska, A, “The Central and Eastern European Judiciary and Transnational Judicial Dialogue on International Law” in A Wyrozumska (ed), Transnational Judicial Dialo gue on International Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2017) 23. Wyrzykowski, M, “Bypassing the Constitution Or Changing the Constitutional Order Outside the Constitution” in A Szmyt and В Banaszak (eds), Transformation of Law Systems in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in 1989-2015, Liber Amicorum in Honorem Prof. Dr. Dres. H.C. Rainer Arnold (Gdańsk University Press, 2016). Wyrzykowski, M, “Wrogie przejęcie’ porządku konstytucyjnego” [“‘Hostile Takeover’ of the Constitutional Order”], http://konstytucyjny.pl/wrogie-przejecie-porzadku-kon stytucyjnego-miroslaw-wyrzykowski (9.10.2020). Xanthaki, H
and Karpen, U (eds), Legislation and Legisprudence in Europe: A Comprehen sive Guide for Scholars and Legislative Practitioners (Hart Publishing, 2017). Zakaria, F, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” Foreign Affaires 76 (1997) 22. Zakaria, F, The Future ofFreedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (W.W. Norton and Company, 2007). Part VI Albert, R, “How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions”, Dublin University Law Journal 38 (2015). Albert, R, “Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment”, Yale J. Inti L. 43 (2018). Albert, R, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (Oxford University Press, 2019). Antal A, “Politikai és jogi alkotmányosság Magyarországon” [“Political and Legal Con stitutionalism in Hungary”] Politikatudományi Szemle 3 (2013). Balicki, R, “Bezpośrednie stosowanie konstytucji” [“Direct Application of a Constitution”], Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa 4 (2016) 13-19. Bellamy, R, Political Constitutionalism: A Reptiblican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Bien-Kacala, A, “Polish Constitutional Tribunal: A Systemic Reform or a Hasty Political Change”, DPCE Online 1 (2016) 1-14. Bień-Kacała, A, “Poland Within the EU: Dealing with the Populist Agenda”, OsteuropaRecht 4(63) (2017) 428-443 and “Polish Constitutional Tribunal: A Systemic Reform or a Hasty Political Change”, DPCE Online 1 (2016) 1-14. Bień-Kacała, A and Jackiewicz, A, “Militant Democracy: Demokracja, która sama się broni(?)” [“Militant Democracy: A Democracy that Defends Itself]?)”], Państwo i Prawo 8
(2017) 25411.
216 Bibliography Bień-Kacała, A, “Informal Constitutional Change: The Case of Poland”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 6(40) (2017) 199-218. Bień-Kacała, A, “Równość czy hierarchiczność? Kilka słów o wartościach w państwie, prawie i społeczeństwie” [“Equality or Hierarchy? Few Words about Values of State, Law and Society”] Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze 40 (2018) 17-30. Bień-Kacała, A, “Polexit is Corning or is it Already Here? Comments on the Judicial Inde pendence Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal”, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 28 April 2020, at www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/polexit-is-coming-or-is-it-already-here֊comm ents-on-the-judicial-independence-decisions-of-the-pofish-constitutional-tribunal. Bień-Kacała, A, “Verfassungsdurchbrechung or Informal Constitutional Change. The Polish Experience”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 5(57) (2020) 29-47. Chronowski, N, Drinóczi, T, and Zeller, J, “Túl az Alkotmányon” [“Beyond the Constitution”], Közjogi Szemle 4 (2010). Closa, C., “Ran Hirschi, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press, 2004”, ICON4(3) (2006) 581-586. Colón-Ríos, JI, “A New Typology of Judicial Review of Legislation”, Global Con stitutionalism 3(2) (2014) 143-169. Colón-Ríos, JI, “Judge-made Constitutional Changes”, in X Contiades and A Fotiadou, eds, Routledge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Routledge 2021) 217-230. Contiades, X, ed, Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2012). Contiades, X and Fotiadou, A, “Introduction” in X Contiades and A Fotiado (eds), Rou tledge
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2021) 14. Csink, L and Fröhlich, J, “Az Alaptörvény és az Átmeneti rendelkezések viszonya” Páz mány Law Working Papers, No 2012/02, available at www.plwp.jak.ppke.hu/images/ files/2012/2012-2.pdf. Czarnota, A, “The Constitutional Tribunal”, VerfBlog, 2017/6/03, https//verfassungs blog.de/the-constitutional-tribunal/. Diamond, L, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”,/. Democracy 29(142) (2015) 149. Dixon, R and Landau, D, “Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy”, UC Davis Law Review 53 (2020) 1313. Dixon, R and Landau, D, “Tiered Constitutional Design”, 2018, at https://ssrn.eom/a bstract=2953755,l, 63. Dixon, R and Landau, D, “Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments”, ICON 3 (2015) 606, 629. Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Politics in Contemporary Hungary”, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 1 (2016), 63-98. Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System”, Vienna J. Inťl Const. L. 1(139) (2017). Drinóczi, T, “Constitutional Identity in Europe: The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach”, German Law Journal 21(2) (2020) 105-130. Drinóczi, T, “Hungarian Abuse of Constitutional Emergency Regimes - Also in the Light of the COVID-19 Crisis”. MTA LWP 13/2020, https://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp/hunga rian-abuse-of-constitutional-emergency-regimes-also-in-the-light-of-the-covid-19-crisis. Drinóczi, T and Bień-Kacała, A, “COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland: Extraordinary Situation and
Illiberal Constitutionalism”, Theory and Practice of Legislation 1-2 (2020). Eichhorn, J, Kupsch, V, and Mohr, LMM, “How European Publics and Policy Actors Values an Open Society Key Insight Across Countries” (Open Society European Policy Institute, 2019), http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org/images/finalreports/OSI-019T8Key-Insights_v5 .pdf.
Bibliography 217 Pesnic, FN, “Can Civic Education Make a Difference for Democracy? Hungary and Poland Compared”, Political Studies4 (2016) 966-978. Gardbaum, S., “The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, German Law Review 12(14) (2013) 2230-2248. Garlicki, L and Garlicka, ZA, “External Review of Constitutional Amendments? Interna tional Law as a Norm of Reference”, Israel Law Review 44 (2011) 343-368. Garlicki, L, “Sądy a Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej” [“Courts and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland”] Przegląd Sądowy 7-8 (2Ö16) 23-25. Garlicki, L, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne [Polish Constitutional Law] (Wolters Kluwer, 2016) 76-78. Ginsberg, T, “Arato on Constitution Making in Hungary and the 4/5 Rule”, I-CONnect Blog (6 April 2011), www.iconnectblog.com/2011/04/arato-on֊constitution-makingm-hungary-and-the-45-rule/. Ginsberg, T, “When Courts Compete: A Reputational Perspective” in M Zubik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World, Essays in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Kancelaria Sejmu Wydawnictwo Sejmowe Kancelaria Sejmu, 2017) 61-70. Górski, G and Górska-Szymczak, J, “Trybunał Konstytucyjny w Sporze z Prezydentem, Rządem i Parlamentem w 2015 r.” [“The Constitutional Tribunal in an Argument with the President, the Government and the Parliament in 2015”], Przegląd Sejmowy'S (2018) 39-57. Hale, HE, “25 Years After The USSR What’s Gone Wrong?”,/. Democracy 27(24) (2016). Halmai, G and Scheppele KL, “Orbán is Still the Sole Judge of his Own Law”, VerfBlog, 2020/4/30, https://verfassungsblog.de/orban-is-still-the-sole֊judge-of-
hís֊own-law/. Halmai, G, “Illiberal Constitutionalism in East-Central Europe”, EUI Working PaperLAW 2019/05.Ord Halmai, G, “How COVID-19 Unveils the True Autocrats: Viktor Orbán’s Ermächti gungsgesetz”, Inťl J. Const. L. Blog, Apr. 1, 2020, www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/ how-covid-19-unveils-the-true-autocrats-viktororbans-ermachtigungsgesetz/. Halmai, G, “The Decline of Liberal Democracy in Europe’s Midst”, 2016, www.eurozine. com/the-decline-of-liberal-democracy-in-europes-midst/. Halmai, G and Scheppele, KL, “Don’t Be Fooled by Autocrats!: Why Hungary’s Emer gency Violates Rule of Law”, VerfBlog, 2020/4/22, https://verfassungsblog.de/dont֊ be-fooled-by-autocrats. Hermann, M, Wyroki interpretacyjne Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z perspektywy teoretycznopmwnej [Interpretative Judgements of Constitutional Tribunal from a Theoretical Perspective] (Warszawa, 2015). Hirschi, R Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, 2004). Humphrey, T, “Democracy and the Rule of Law: Founding Liberal Democracy in PostCommunist Europe”, Colum J. E Eur. L 2(94) (2008). Kardas, P and Gutowski, M, “Konstytucja z 1997 r. a model kontroli konstytucyjności prawa” [“1997Constitution and a Model of Constitutional Review”], Palestra 4 (2017) 11-30. Kelemen, К, “The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Concept of National Con stitutional Identity”, IANUS - Diritto e finanza 23(15-16) (2017). Koncewicz, TT, “Constitutional Fidelity and the Polish Constitution”, Blog of the Inter national Journal of Constitutional Law, 11 August 2017,
tvww.iconnectblog.com/ 2017/08/constitutional-fidelity-and-the-polish-constitution. Koncewicz, TT, “On the Strategic Reading of the Constitutional Document. Mapping out Frontiers of New Constitutional Research”, Przegląd Konstytucyjny 2 (2018), 16-45.
218 Bibliography Kninke, H and Hellqvist Frey, S, “Social Rights in Denmark” in К Wojtyczek (ed), Social Rights as Fundamental Rights (Eleven International Publishing, 2016) 119. Landau, D, “Abusive Constitutionalism”, UC Davis Law Review 3 (2013). Lavapuro, J, Ojanen, T, and Scheinin, M, “Rights-based Constitutionalism in Finland and the Development of Pluralist Constitutional Review”, ICON 2 (2011). Law, DS and Whalen, R, “Comparing Amendment and Replacement” in X Contiades and A Fotiado (eds), Routkdge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change (Roudedge, 2021) 96. Maćkiem, P, “Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-determination”, I-CON 3 (2006) 494-495. Magyar B, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case ofHungary (CEU Press, 2016). Martin C, “The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the ‘Reinterpretation’ of Japan’s War Powers”, Fordham Inti L.J. 40(427) (2017). Masternak-Kubiak, M, “Dopuszczalność nieformalnej zmiany Konstytucji RP (uwagi w kontekście prawa wyborczego obywateli Unii Europejskiej)” [“Admissibility of informal amendment to the Constitution RP (comments in the context of the electoral law of EU citizens)”] in B. Banaszak, M. Jabłoński, and S. Jarosz-Żukowska (eds), Prawo w służbie państwu i społeczeństwu [Law in the Service of the State and Society] (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2012). Matczak, M, “How to Demolish an Independent Judiciary with the Help of a Constitutional Court”, VerfBlog, 2017/6/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-demoUsh-an-indep endent-judiciary-with-the-help-of-a-constitutional-court/,
doi:10.17176/20170623-1033 09 (31.10.2017). Mazmanyan, A, “Judicialization of Politics: The Post-Soviet Way”, I-CON 13(1) (2015) 200-218. Menocal, AR, Fritz, V, and Rakner, L, “Hybrid Regimes and the Challenge of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries”, S. Afr.J. InťLAff. 15(1) (2008), 29-40. DOI: doi:10.1080/10220460802217934. Młynarska-Sobaczewska, A, “Rytualne ofiary a moralność publiczna: Analiza argumentacji Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (K 52/13) i Sţidu Najwyższego USA (508 U.S. 520.1993)” [“Ritual Sacrifices and Public Morality: Analysis of Arguments of the Constitutional Tribu nal (K 52/13) and US Supreme Court (508 U.S. 520.1993)”], Państwo i Prawo 4 (2017). Młynarska-Sobaczewska, A, “Wybór sędziów konstytucyjnych jako element legitymizacji S£du konstytucyjnego” [“Election of the Constitutional Judges as an Element of Legiti macy of the Constitutional Court”], Państwo i Prawo 5 (2018) 43-62. Morawski, L, “A Critical Response”, VerfBlog, 2017/6/03. Muller, Jan-Wemer, “Militant Democracy” in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law {Oxford University Press, 2011) 1253-1268. Ojanen, T. “Constitutional Amendment in Finland” in X. Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge, 2016) 107-109. Ohver, D. and Fusaro, C. eds. How Constitutions Change? A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing, 2016). Pap, AL and Sledzińska-Simon, A, “Mandatory Voting as a Tool to Combat the ‘New Populism’”, TCONnect Blog (19 April 2017), iconnectblog.com/2017/04/mandator y-voting֊and֊the-new-populism/. Pasquino, P,
“Neutrality in Constitutional Conflicts Resolution: Preliminary Observations” in M Zubik (ed), Human Rights in Contemporary World, Essays in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2017).
Bibliography 219 Popelier, P, Verstraelen, S., Vanheule, D., and Vanlerberghe, B. (eds), The Effects ofJudi cial Decisions in Time (Intersentia, 2014). Puhl, J, “A Whiff of Corruption in Orbán’s Hungary”, Spiegel (17 January 2017), www.sp iegel.de/intemational/europe/a-whiff-of-corruption-in-orban-s-hungary-a-1129713.html. Roznai, Y, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits of Constitutional Amendment Powers, PhD thesis, 2014, The London School of Eco nomics and Political Science (LSE), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/915/l/Roznai_Uncon stitutional-constitutional-amendments.pdf, 158-160. Roznai, Y, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (Oxford University Press, 2017). Sajó, A, “Militant Democracy and Emotional Politics”, Constellations 4 (2012) 562-572. Sárkózy, T, “Magyarország kormányzása 2010-2014” [“Governance of Hungary 2010-2014”] Új Magyar Közigazgatás 2 (2015). Scheppele, KL, “Orbán’s Emergency”, https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/03/21/kim lane-scheppcle-orbans-emergency/,https://vcríassun gsblog.de/pandemic-as-con stitutional-moment/. Schiffer, A, “Különleges jogbizonytalanság” [“Extraordinary Legal Uncertainty”], http s://mandiner.hu/cikk/20200313_kulonleges_jogbizonytalansag (13 March 2020). Schwartz, SH and Bardi, A, “Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule on Value Prio rities in Eastern Europe”, Political Pscychology 2 (1997). Sejersted, F, “The Norwegian Parliament and European Integration - Reflections from Medium-Speed Europe” tn E Smitjh, ed, National Parliaments as Cornerstones of
the European Integration (Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1996). Siems, M., Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 78-79. Sokolewicz, W, “Komentarz do art. 235” [“Commentary to the Art. 235”] in L. Garlicki (ed), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Vol II [The Constitution of the Republic of Poland] (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2001) 4. Sólyom L, “Alkotmányértelmezés az új alkotmánybíróságok gyakorlatában” [“Constitutional interpretation in the practice of new constitutional courts”], Fundamentum 2 (2002) 18-20. Stumpf I, “A kormány alkotmányos jogállása” [“Constitutional Status of the Govern ment”], Új Magyar Közigazgatás 2 (2015). Szmulik, B, “Opinia w sprawie uwag do nowelizacji ustawy z dnia 25 czerwca 2015 r. о Trybunale Konstytucyjnym przygotowanych przez Komisję Wenecką” [“Opinion on the Comments to the Amendment of the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tri bunal by the Venice Commission”], Przegląd Sejmowy 5 (2016) 81-100. Tordai, C, “A közjog határai a járványveszély idején” [“Limits of Public Law during a Pandemic”], https://igyirnankmi.atlatszo.hu/2020/03/16/a-kozjog-hatarai-a-jarva nyveszely-idejen/ (16 March 2020). Uzelac, A, “Survival of the Third Legal Tradition”, Supreme Court Law Review 49 (2010), (2nd) 377-396. Available atSSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2498760. Wróblewska, I, Zasada państwa prawnego w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego RP [ The Rule of Democratic State Ruled by Law in Judgements of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal\ (TNOIK, 2010) 48-50.
Index abortion 7, 8,126,134,137,139,141, 143,144,168,170,179,181,184,189, 190 abusive: constitutionalism see con stitutionalism; legalism see legalism; con stitutional review 160, 179 Amendment to the Fundamental Law: First 154,164; Third 154; Fourth 99,101, 151,152,155,156,164,170,187; Fifth 156,187; Sixth 155; Seventh 101,152, 155,156,157,166,188; Eighth 152, 156; Ninth 101,138,157,186,187 amendments: formal 12, 15, 152, 154, 163, 164, 166, 169,177; informal 15, 133, 151, 152, 154,160, 163, 165, 166, 169, 170, 176; unconstitutional constitutional 15, 33, 99, 153, 159, 170, 187, 193 arbitrary 72, 84, 94 Article 2 TEU 92 Article 4 TEU 67 Article 7 procedure 46, 96, 106 assembly: Act 136 asylum-seekers see migrants Austrian Habsburg Monarchy 55 authoritarian: constitutionalism 15, 18, 23, 28, 30, 31, 73, 74, 99; capitalism 41; regime 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 35, 45, 72, 79, 85, 100, 109, 197; state 72, 124; system see regime authoritarian authoritarianisation see process authoritarianism: competitive 18, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35; consolidated 82; modern 1, 15, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 45, 73, 83, 197, 198; populist 17, 30, 31 autocracy: electoral 79; hard-line 75; moderate 82; plebiscitary 17, 30 autocratic: legalism see legalism autocratisation see process autonomy 11, 61, 62, 63, 137, 199 BTI 3, 74, 75, 82 capitalism 40, 41 Catholic 4, 6, 9, 56, 57, 68, 69, 111, 132, 133, 140, 142 CEE 42, 43, 44, 67, 70, 71, 174, 175, 177, 178 CEU 131, 132, 138 Charter see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eur opean Union 90, 125
Christian: democracy 37; Europe 53, 57, 68, 187 CJEU 69, 87, 95, 103, 131, 132, 138, 140, 146, 162, 163, 185, 188, 189 collective: guilt 54; memory 48, 53, 56, 139; narcissism 14, 46, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 150, 198; victimhood 14, 46, 53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 65, 68, 198 common good 61 communism 14, 60, 61, 62 conservativism 39, 62, 63 constitution: capturing 15, 150; democratic 192; façade 27, 85; illiberal 9,12, 38, 133; invisible 12, 33, 38,100,150,158, 160,171,177,181,183; mixed 133; small 151; socialist 151; 3 May 55 1997 Constitution 5, 38, 100, 151,152, 159, 163, 166, 167, 172, 183, 192 constitutional: change 33,63,151,153,157, 158,160,161,162,163,166,167,168, 181; comparative law 3,22,30; culture 38, 151,157; design 5,6,7,9,13,14,15,24, 25,40,42,96,121,132,192,197,198, 199; dialogue 103; emergency see emer gency; law 32, 34, 37,94,146,154,175;
Index supremacy 87; system 4,9,10,15,30,31, 33,38,131,152,170,192,193 Constitutional Court: Germany 89; Hun gary 11, 89 constitutional change: informal 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 166, 167, 181 constitutional democracy: formal 44, 45; substantive 38, 42, 45, 64, 85, 159, 170, 171, 191, 194 Constitutional Tribunal: Poland 8, 59, 89 constitutionalism: abusive 18, 31, 33, 85; authoritarian 15, 18, 23, 28, 30, 31, 73, 74, 83, 99; capturing 15, 150; hybrid 30, 73; illiberalization 1, 45, 198; legal 173, 174, 175, 178, 180; liberal 3, 4, 10, 13, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 35, 36, 40, 43, 44, 45, 63, 72, 87, 108, 110, 124,151,170, 175,195, 197,198, 199; mixed 23, 24, 30; modern 100; multilevel 21, 72, 86; non-liberal 24,25; political 16, 39, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180; populist 17, 31, 32, 33 constitutionalist 15, 22, 25, 44, 74, 198 constraint 5, 13, 15, 21, 24, 31, 33, 34, 45, 74, 83, 98, 99, 100, 124, 197, 198 consultation 101, 116, 117, 119, 138, 148 cosmetic changes 154,156,184, 187, 188 Council of Europe 3 Court of Justice of the European Union see CJEU COVTD-19: emergency see emergency; management of the crisis 113, 120, 168; pandemic 8, 13, 69, 71, 79, 101, 111, 113, 159, 166, 167, 188 cyclical assemblies 136, 180 democracy: constitutional see constitutional democracy; diffusely defective 18; elec toral 15, 29, 79, 111; flawed 81; illiberal 2,15,26, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 70, 96, 108, 109, 111, 113, 150, 185, 188, 191, 197, 198; Uberal 25, 27, 38, 43, 63, 72, 79, 190,194; militant 190, 191, 195; plebiscitary leader 18; semi-consolidated 79, 111 democratic: development 37, 38;
dete rioration 110; state 78, 90; recession 30 demonstrations 56, 95, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 157 deterioration: Rule of Law 15; democratic see democratic disciplinary: chamber see Supreme Court: Disciplinary Chamber dismemberment 151 221 ECHR see European Convention on Human Rights ЕГО Democracy Index 3, 74, 79, 81 elections: general 13; local 2, 8, 62, 109, 112; parUamentary 2, 6; presidential 121, 167 emergency: constitutional 110, 113, 117, 122, 123, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 157, 159, 160, 167, 168, 169, 188; COVID-19 136, 145; crisis situation caused by mass migration 166; epidemic 167; judicial review 194, 195; measures 110,123, 181; Special Legal Order 166, 182; pandemic 117, 159, 168; statutebased 121, 122, 123, 167, 169, 188 equality 38, 52, 57, 58, 86, 87, 88, 91, 98, 102, 140, 141, 142 eternity clauses 164, 192 EU law: acquis 1, 92; appUcation 83, 92, 94, 98, 105, 163,195; enforcement 98; violation 146, 185 European Arnest Warrant 152 European Commission 146, 185 European Convention on Human Rights 86 European Parliament 186 European Rule of Law 15, 83, 85, 86, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 105 Fidesz 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 34, 63, 66, 112, 122, 133, 138, 145, 153, 180 fight 4, 22, 58, 66, 69, 121, 145, 186, 187, 188 FL see Fundamental Law freedom: academic 134,137,139; assembly 128,134,136,137; association 79; expression 24, 75, 78, 79,102,128,130, 134,139,170,182; higher education 137; information 123,149; media 114, reUgion 156,187,193; speech see expression Freedom House 3,18, 74, 79, 82, 111, 135 Fundamental Law 12,34,38,48,52,65,67, 68,
89,90,99,100,101,102,103,115, 121,127,129,133,136,137,140,141, 148,149,151,152,153,154,155,156, 157,159,160,163,164,165,166,168, 169,170,173,181,186,187,188,192 fhndamental rights see human rights Gender: ideology 142, 143, 186 Gross, Tomasz 139 Habsburgs 50, 54 hierarchy 35, 59, 62, 63, 67, 92, 100, 116, 160, 171, 178
222 Index higher education: freedom see freedom; institutions 137; reform 117, 137 history: Hungarian 14, 46, 50, 54, 61; Polish 14, 46, 55, 57, 59 Holocaust 56, 59, 69 hollowed-out 97, 121, 170, 190 hollowing out 1 human rights: misuse of the language 2, 38 Hungarian Soviet Republic 52 identity: constitutional 2, 14, 25, 26, 30, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 49, 64, 65, 67, 69, 74, 131, 141, 146, 149, 152, 156, 157, 163, 165, 166, 170, 180, 188, 192, 193,197, 198, 199; national 47,48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 60, 105, 139; politics 39, 65, 67 illiberal: democracy 2, 15, 26, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 70, 96, 108, 109, 111, 113, 150, 185, 188, 191, 197, 198; human rights 133; judicialization of politics 16, 36, 102, 110, 150, 159, 171, 173, 175, 180, 181, 193; legality 2, 15, 38, 45, 70, 96, 97, 98, 103, 105, 113, 150, 173, 181, 186, 195, 197, 198; value orientation 36, 39, 64, 198 illiberalism 13,24, 38,40, 60, 63,170,173 illiberalization 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 15, 30, 44, 45, 96, 111, 114, 124, 127, 134, 147, 197, 198 impact assessment 101, 116,119, 138, 148 inclusion 5, 24, 38 inferiority 63 infringement procedure 99, 132, 188 ingroup 53, 58, 65, 68, 90, 145 internet 81, 82, 114, 120 Jagiellonian dynasty 55 Jogállam: demokratikus 90 judicial: independence 87, 102, 131, 189; power see power judicial; reform 7, 10, 161, 172, 181, 188 judicalization of politics: illiberal see illiberal juristocracy 16, 174, 175, 177, 178 Kaczyński: Jarosław 6, 12, 36, 171; Lech 59 Kúria 129 l’État de droit 86, 88 Law and Justice Party see PİS lawmaking 5, 7, 94, 106, 109, НО, 115, 117, 119, 120, 138, 147, 148, 178
leadership 40, 111, 114, 184, 198 legal: certainty 86, 87, 157, 182, 195; community 38 legalism: abusive 33; autocratic 33, 85 legality: formal 88, 91, 98, 102, 103 legislation: accelerated 117; quality 101, 115, 118, 120; symbolic 101, 119; per sonalized 120, 136 lex Gross 59 LGBTQIA+ 66, 132, 134, 140, 141, 157, 186 liberal thought 22 liberalism: classical 88; modern 23 licenses 147 local government 8, 63, 122, 140, 149, 155 majoritarianism 32, 35 master 132, 134, 161, 179, 182, 183 mentality 51, 64 Middle Ages 10, 49, 54 migration: migrants 66, 132, 145, 146, 186, 188; quota 165, 166; referendum 165, 166 militant democracy: “abusive neo-militant democracy” 191 Minister of Health 123, 167 Minister of Justice 103, 146, 172 misuse the language of fundamental rights 73 monthenaries 136 Motherland 58 multi-tiered amendment designs 192 mutual understanding 96 narrative psychology 47, 49, 53, 63 nation: homogeneous 32, 59, 62, 65, 120; Hungarian 53, 65, 139; Polish 55, 57, 58, 59,69, 120, 139 National Council of Judiciary 161 national courts 94, 99 National Judicial Office: President 156 Nazi Germany 54, 68, 69 neoliberalism 39, 41 NGO 12, 66, 68, 82, 103, 116, 117, 131, 132, 135, 143 non-discrimination 87, 98 oligarchy 134, 173 Orbán, Viktor 6, 12, 28, 36, 37, 42, 66, 69, 108, 123, 136, 140, 142, 157, 173 otherness 126, 132 outside group 145 oversight 108, 110, 115, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 169
Index 223 packing: constitutional courts 159, 180 państwo prawa: demokratyczne 90 PİS 2, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 34, 36, 42, 62, 63, 115, 117, 136, 144, 153, 172, 173, 180, 181, 183, 185, 190 pluralism 63, 79, 82, 110, 128 Polish Mother 142, 143 Polish nation: defamation 59, 69, 119, 120, 139 Polish positivism 57, 58 polity: illiberal 24, 30, 35, 45 populism 11, 12, 29, 31, 32, 39, 41, 64, 65, 67, 98, 99, 121, 126, 134,150 populist: agenda 31, 83, 99, 181; autocrats 2,15, 46, 65, 132; constitutionalism 17, 31, 32, 33; leader 1, 2, 7, 12, 32, 33, 44, 45, 46, 62, 64, 66, 73, 94, 98, 99, 173; nationalism 67, 92, 196 power: abuse and misuse 87, 98; executive 27, 33, 79, 101, 120, 121, 159, 160, 166, 167, 169, 171; judicial 194; legis lative 98, 101, 102, 128, 129, 159, 161, 166, 176, 183 predictability 88, 89, 91, 92, 195 preliminary ruling procedure 94,106, 139,140 prime minister: Hungarian see Orbán, Viktor; Polish 68, 123, 142, 168, 171 process: autocratisation 28; authoritarianisation 1; drafting 116,117,119; law-making 5,94,115,138; illiberalisation 9, 30; legislative 7,15,101,107,109, 111, 112,115,116,118,122,179 procurement 173 Professor Sadurski 139 Prosecutor: General 171, 172, 181 pushing the limits 16, 72, 150, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 recession see democratic Rechtsstaat 86, 88, 89 regime: anti-democratic 21, 30; authoritar ian see authoritarian regime; hybrid 18, 26, 79, 82, 111; totalitarian 130; transi tional 82 remodelling: constitutional 9, 22, 37, 38, 46, 72, 98, 198; constitutionalism 16, 62, 70, 100, 151, 163 replacement 67, 151 republican monarchy 55
research institutions 137 retirement: judges 131, 132, 189 right: access to justice 87; asylum seekers 66,132,134,144, 145, 147, 156; equal treatment 24; migrants 66, 132, 145, 146, 186, 188; minorities 126,141, 144; refugees 126, 156, 188 Rule of Law: conditionality 46, 69, 86, 87, 157, 173, 186; enforcement 92, 93; English 86; European see European Rule of Law; formal 24, 33, 85, 88, 89, 90, 101, 102; material 25, 85, 87, 89, 90, 93, 103; narrow see formal; substantial see material; thick see material; thin see formal Russia 18, 27, 60, 68, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 109, 129, 135 Sejm 5, 7, 9, 66, 100, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122,123, 124, 142, 144, 152, 161, 166, 179, 183 Senati, 5, 7, 8, 10, 62, 63, 109,116,117, 121, 124, 142, 152 separation of powers 75, 78, 151, 157, 161, 164, 178, 194 Singapore 23, 31, 33, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81, 82,109, 135 Smoleńsk plane crush 6 social contract 150 solidarity 138, 139, 177 Soros, George 68, 132, 186 sovereign 69, 111, 146 sovereignty: people 57, 108; state 55, 97, 185 stability 2, 4, 11, 15, 16, 39, 63, 66, 67, 88, 110, 120, 121, 132, 150, 182,184, 197, 199 Supreme Administrative Court 155, 178 Supreme Court: Disciplinary Chamber 87, 162; Hungary 120, 130; Poland 34, 189 super-majority 154, 164, 180, 187 SZFE 137, 138 Third Polish Republic 56 trajectory: emotional 2, 46, 47, 57; histor ical 2, 47, 48, 61 transformation: illiberal 63, !93 transition: democratic 2,11, 52, 58, 71,108 Transitory Provisions 151, 154, 155, 156, 163, 164, 165, 187 trust: mutual 93 transnational norms 192 Turkey 18, 27, 34, 73, 74, 75, 79, 82, 109, 135 Turks:
Ottoman 53, 57, 68 use of law: instrumental 98, 119; opportu nistic 98
224 Index value: common 97; European 94; illiberal see illiberal; legal 127; orientation 3, 4, 14, 35, 36, 39, 46, 49, 62, 64, 67, 90, 133; system 69, 92,138, 169, 198 V-dem 3, 74 Venice Commission: Rule ofLaw Checklist 86 Verfassungsstaat 89 vulnerable people 134 f war 14, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 68, 139, 140,142,157, 170 VVJP 3, 74, 75 womanhood 142 women 7, 8, 66, 126, 134, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 190 xenophobia 62, 126 Bayerische Staatøbibliothe į München . . |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Drinóczi, Tímea 1978- Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1207345601 (DE-588)1041725183 |
| author_facet | Drinóczi, Tímea 1978- Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Drinóczi, Tímea 1978- |
| author_variant | t d td a b k abk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV047493612 |
| classification_rvk | MG 80065 MG 92065 MG 98065 MG 98060 MG 80060 MG 92060 |
| contents | Ambitions -- Why Hungary and Poland -- Insight into the book -- Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" -- Illiberal(ism) -- Constitutional democracy -- Historical and emotional trajectory -- Post-communist past and beyond -- Possible root cause : the combination of the above -- The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism -- A comparative perspective-looking for constraints -- Contextualization : the European rule of law as a constraint on public power -- Illiberal legality -- lliberal democracy -- lliberalization of human rights -- Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution -- lliberal judicialization of politics -- Pushing the limits and bouncing back -- Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy -- Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal -- Illiberal constitutionalismis a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet -- In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail -- Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner -- Lessons learned, mostly, for others |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1266188898 (DE-599)BVBBV047493612 |
| discipline | Politologie |
| discipline_str_mv | Politologie |
| era | Geschichte 2010-2020 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 2010-2020 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>06850nam a22008538c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV047493612</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20221017 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">211004s2022 a||| b||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781032007304</subfield><subfield code="c">hardback</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-032-00730-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781032007366</subfield><subfield code="9">9781032007366</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1266188898</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV047493612</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">OST</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 80065</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122863:12041</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 92065</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122873:12041</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 98065</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122877:12041</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 98060</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122877:12040</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 80060</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122863:12040</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 92060</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122873:12040</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Drinóczi, Tímea</subfield><subfield code="d">1978-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1207345601</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary</subfield><subfield code="b">the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law</subfield><subfield code="c">Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">London ; New York</subfield><subfield code="b">Routledge</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xi, 224 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">3 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß)</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Comparative constitutional change</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ambitions -- Why Hungary and Poland -- Insight into the book -- Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" -- Illiberal(ism) -- Constitutional democracy -- Historical and emotional trajectory -- Post-communist past and beyond -- Possible root cause : the combination of the above -- The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism -- A comparative perspective-looking for constraints -- Contextualization : the European rule of law as a constraint on public power -- Illiberal legality -- lliberal democracy -- lliberalization of human rights -- Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution -- lliberal judicialization of politics -- Pushing the limits and bouncing back -- Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy -- Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal -- Illiberal constitutionalismis a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet -- In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail -- Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner -- Lessons learned, mostly, for others</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population. The work consists of seven Parts. Part I outlines the volume's ambitions and provides an introduction. Part II discusses the theoretical framework and clarifies the terminology adopted in the book. Part III provides an in-depth insight into the constitutional identity of Poles and Hungarians and argues that an unbalanced constitutional identity has been moulded throughout Polish and Hungarian history in which emotional traits of collective victimhood and collective narcissism, and a longing for a charismatic leader have been evident. Part IV focuses on the emergence of illiberal constitutionalism, and, based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses, argues that illiberal constitutionalism is neither modern authoritarianism nor authoritarian constitutionalism. This Part contextualizes the issue by putting the deterioration of the Rule of Law into a European perspective. Part V explores the legal nature of illiberal legality when it is at odds and in compliance with the European Rule of Law, illiberal democracy, focusing on electoral democracy and legislative processes, and illiberalization of human rights. Part VI investigates whether there is a clear pattern in the methods of remodeling, or distancing from constitutional democracy, how it started, consolidated, and how its results are maintained. The final part presents the author's conclusions and looks to the future"--</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 2010-2020</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Verfassungsrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4062801-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011413-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Autoritärer Staat</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4256521-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Menschenrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4074725-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Ungarn</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078541-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Polen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046496-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rule of law / Poland</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rule of law / Hungary</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Civil rights / Poland</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Civil rights / Hungary</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Populism / Poland</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Populism / Hungary</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Poland / Politics and government / 21st century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Hungary / Politics and government / 21st century</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Civil rights</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Politics and government</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Populism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rule of law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Hungary</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Poland</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">2000-2099</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Polen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046496-9</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ungarn</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078541-5</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Verfassungsrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4062801-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011413-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Menschenrecht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4074725-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="5"><subfield code="a">Autoritärer Staat</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4256521-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 2010-2020</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1041725183</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe, PDF</subfield><subfield code="z">978-1-003-17535-3</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV047452034</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Literaturverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Register // Gemischte Register</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_NED_20220110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032894834</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">340.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">437</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">437</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Ungarn (DE-588)4078541-5 gnd Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Ungarn Polen |
| id | DE-604.BV047493612 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T18:16:14Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:13:38Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781032007304 9781032007366 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032894834 |
| oclc_num | 1266188898 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-521 DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 DE-12 |
| physical | xi, 224 Seiten 3 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) 24 cm |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20220110 |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Comparative constitutional change |
| spelling | Drinóczi, Tímea 1978- Verfasser (DE-588)1207345601 aut Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała London ; New York Routledge 2022 xi, 224 Seiten 3 Illustrationen (schwarz-weiß) 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Comparative constitutional change Ambitions -- Why Hungary and Poland -- Insight into the book -- Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" -- Illiberal(ism) -- Constitutional democracy -- Historical and emotional trajectory -- Post-communist past and beyond -- Possible root cause : the combination of the above -- The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism -- A comparative perspective-looking for constraints -- Contextualization : the European rule of law as a constraint on public power -- Illiberal legality -- lliberal democracy -- lliberalization of human rights -- Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution -- lliberal judicialization of politics -- Pushing the limits and bouncing back -- Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy -- Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal -- Illiberal constitutionalismis a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet -- In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail -- Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner -- Lessons learned, mostly, for others "This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population. The work consists of seven Parts. Part I outlines the volume's ambitions and provides an introduction. Part II discusses the theoretical framework and clarifies the terminology adopted in the book. Part III provides an in-depth insight into the constitutional identity of Poles and Hungarians and argues that an unbalanced constitutional identity has been moulded throughout Polish and Hungarian history in which emotional traits of collective victimhood and collective narcissism, and a longing for a charismatic leader have been evident. Part IV focuses on the emergence of illiberal constitutionalism, and, based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses, argues that illiberal constitutionalism is neither modern authoritarianism nor authoritarian constitutionalism. This Part contextualizes the issue by putting the deterioration of the Rule of Law into a European perspective. Part V explores the legal nature of illiberal legality when it is at odds and in compliance with the European Rule of Law, illiberal democracy, focusing on electoral democracy and legislative processes, and illiberalization of human rights. Part VI investigates whether there is a clear pattern in the methods of remodeling, or distancing from constitutional democracy, how it started, consolidated, and how its results are maintained. The final part presents the author's conclusions and looks to the future"-- Geschichte 2010-2020 gnd rswk-swf Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 gnd rswk-swf Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd rswk-swf Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 gnd rswk-swf Menschenrecht (DE-588)4074725-6 gnd rswk-swf Ungarn (DE-588)4078541-5 gnd rswk-swf Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd rswk-swf Rule of law / Poland Rule of law / Hungary Civil rights / Poland Civil rights / Hungary Populism / Poland Populism / Hungary Poland / Politics and government / 21st century Hungary / Politics and government / 21st century Civil rights Politics and government Populism Rule of law Hungary Poland 2000-2099 Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 g Ungarn (DE-588)4078541-5 g Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 s Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 s Menschenrecht (DE-588)4074725-6 s Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 s Geschichte 2010-2020 z DE-604 Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka Verfasser (DE-588)1041725183 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF 978-1-003-17535-3 (DE-604)BV047452034 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register |
| spellingShingle | Drinóczi, Tímea 1978- Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law Ambitions -- Why Hungary and Poland -- Insight into the book -- Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" -- Illiberal(ism) -- Constitutional democracy -- Historical and emotional trajectory -- Post-communist past and beyond -- Possible root cause : the combination of the above -- The emergence of illiberal constitutionalism -- A comparative perspective-looking for constraints -- Contextualization : the European rule of law as a constraint on public power -- Illiberal legality -- lliberal democracy -- lliberalization of human rights -- Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution -- lliberal judicialization of politics -- Pushing the limits and bouncing back -- Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy -- Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal -- Illiberal constitutionalismis a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet -- In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail -- Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner -- Lessons learned, mostly, for others Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 gnd Menschenrecht (DE-588)4074725-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4062801-2 (DE-588)4011413-2 (DE-588)4256521-2 (DE-588)4074725-6 (DE-588)4078541-5 (DE-588)4046496-9 |
| title | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |
| title_auth | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |
| title_exact_search | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |
| title_full | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała |
| title_fullStr | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała |
| title_full_unstemmed | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała |
| title_short | Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary |
| title_sort | illiberal constitutionalism in poland and hungary the deterioration of democracy misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |
| title_sub | the deterioration of democracy, misuse of human rights and abuse of the rule of law |
| topic | Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 gnd Menschenrecht (DE-588)4074725-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Verfassungsrecht Demokratie Autoritärer Staat Menschenrecht Ungarn Polen |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032894834&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT drinoczitimea illiberalconstitutionalisminpolandandhungarythedeteriorationofdemocracymisuseofhumanrightsandabuseoftheruleoflaw AT bienkacałaagnieszka illiberalconstitutionalisminpolandandhungarythedeteriorationofdemocracymisuseofhumanrightsandabuseoftheruleoflaw |