Logic, language, and the liar paradox:
The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentenc...
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Format: | Abschlussarbeit Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
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mentis
[2018]
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Online-Zugang: | DE-B1533 DE-859 DE-860 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (651 Seiten) Diagramme |
ISBN: | 9783957438492 |
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spelling | Pleitz, Martin 1972- Verfasser (DE-588)1155984935 aut Logic, language, and the liar paradox Martin Pleitz Münster mentis [2018] 1 Online-Ressource (651 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Dissertation Universität Münster 2012 The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals Gödel Logik Lügner-Paradox semantische Paradoxien Sprachphilosophie Semantik (DE-588)4054490-4 gnd rswk-swf Selbstbezüglichkeit (DE-588)4138396-5 gnd rswk-swf Lüge (DE-588)4036510-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Lüge (DE-588)4036510-4 s Semantik (DE-588)4054490-4 s Selbstbezüglichkeit (DE-588)4138396-5 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-3-95743-034-2 https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/book/10.5555/9783957438492 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Pleitz, Martin 1972- Logic, language, and the liar paradox Gödel Logik Lügner-Paradox semantische Paradoxien Sprachphilosophie Semantik (DE-588)4054490-4 gnd Selbstbezüglichkeit (DE-588)4138396-5 gnd Lüge (DE-588)4036510-4 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4054490-4 (DE-588)4138396-5 (DE-588)4036510-4 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
title | Logic, language, and the liar paradox |
title_auth | Logic, language, and the liar paradox |
title_exact_search | Logic, language, and the liar paradox |
title_exact_search_txtP | Logic, language, and the liar paradox |
title_full | Logic, language, and the liar paradox Martin Pleitz |
title_fullStr | Logic, language, and the liar paradox Martin Pleitz |
title_full_unstemmed | Logic, language, and the liar paradox Martin Pleitz |
title_short | Logic, language, and the liar paradox |
title_sort | logic language and the liar paradox |
topic | Gödel Logik Lügner-Paradox semantische Paradoxien Sprachphilosophie Semantik (DE-588)4054490-4 gnd Selbstbezüglichkeit (DE-588)4138396-5 gnd Lüge (DE-588)4036510-4 gnd |
topic_facet | Gödel Logik Lügner-Paradox semantische Paradoxien Sprachphilosophie Semantik Selbstbezüglichkeit Lüge Hochschulschrift |
url | https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/book/10.5555/9783957438492 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pleitzmartin logiclanguageandtheliarparadox |