United front: projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature
"Conventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or provid...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Stanford, California
Stanford University Press
[2021]
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Schriftenreihe: | Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
|
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | "Conventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or providing information about citizens. In "United Front," Paul Schuler challenges these views through his examination of the past and present functioning of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), arguing that the legislature's primary role is to signal strength to the public. When active, the critical behavior from delegates in the legislature represents crossfire within the regime rather than genuine citizen feedback. In making these arguments, Schuler counters a growing scholarly trend to see democratic institutions within single-party settings like China and Vietnam as useful for citizens or regime performance. His argument also suggests that there are limits to generating genuinely "consultative authoritarianism" through quasidemocratic institutions. Applying a diverse range of cutting edge social science methods on a wealth of original data such as legislative speeches, election returns, and surveys, Schuler shows that even in a seemingly vociferous legislature like the VNA, the ultimate purpose of the institution is to signal the regime's preferences while taking down rivals; not to reflect the views of citizens"-- |
Beschreibung: | xv, 247 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme |
ISBN: | 9781503614741 9781503614628 |
Internformat
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490 | 0 | |a Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center | |
505 | 8 | |a The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation? | |
520 | 3 | |a "Conventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or providing information about citizens. In "United Front," Paul Schuler challenges these views through his examination of the past and present functioning of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), arguing that the legislature's primary role is to signal strength to the public. When active, the critical behavior from delegates in the legislature represents crossfire within the regime rather than genuine citizen feedback. In making these arguments, Schuler counters a growing scholarly trend to see democratic institutions within single-party settings like China and Vietnam as useful for citizens or regime performance. His argument also suggests that there are limits to generating genuinely "consultative authoritarianism" through quasidemocratic institutions. Applying a diverse range of cutting edge social science methods on a wealth of original data such as legislative speeches, election returns, and surveys, Schuler shows that even in a seemingly vociferous legislature like the VNA, the ultimate purpose of the institution is to signal the regime's preferences while taking down rivals; not to reflect the views of citizens"-- | |
610 | 2 | 7 | |a Vietnam |b Quôc-hôi-nuóc-công-hòa-xã-hôi-chu-nghĩa |0 (DE-588)5029633-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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653 | 2 | |a Vietnam / Quốc hội | |
653 | 0 | |a Legislative bodies / Vietnam | |
653 | 0 | |a One-party systems / Vietnam | |
653 | 0 | |a Authoritarianism / Vietnam | |
653 | 2 | |a Vietnam / Politics and government / 1975- | |
653 | 2 | |a Vietnam / Quốc hội | |
653 | 0 | |a Authoritarianism | |
653 | 0 | |a Legislative bodies | |
653 | 0 | |a One-party systems | |
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653 | 2 | |a Vietnam | |
653 | 0 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / General | |
653 | 4 | |a Since 1975 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
any_adam_object_boolean | |
author | Schuler, Paul |
author_GND | (DE-588)1179235614 |
author_facet | Schuler, Paul |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Schuler, Paul |
author_variant | p s ps |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV047385988 |
contents | The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation? |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1268199336 (DE-599)BVBBV047385988 |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV047385988 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T17:48:59Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:10:41Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781503614741 9781503614628 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032787408 |
oclc_num | 1268199336 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | xv, 247 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme |
psigel | BSB_NED_20210924 |
publishDate | 2021 |
publishDateSearch | 2021 |
publishDateSort | 2021 |
publisher | Stanford University Press |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center |
spelling | Schuler, Paul Verfasser (DE-588)1179235614 aut United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature Paul Schuler Stanford, California Stanford University Press [2021] xv, 247 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation? "Conventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or providing information about citizens. In "United Front," Paul Schuler challenges these views through his examination of the past and present functioning of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), arguing that the legislature's primary role is to signal strength to the public. When active, the critical behavior from delegates in the legislature represents crossfire within the regime rather than genuine citizen feedback. In making these arguments, Schuler counters a growing scholarly trend to see democratic institutions within single-party settings like China and Vietnam as useful for citizens or regime performance. His argument also suggests that there are limits to generating genuinely "consultative authoritarianism" through quasidemocratic institutions. Applying a diverse range of cutting edge social science methods on a wealth of original data such as legislative speeches, election returns, and surveys, Schuler shows that even in a seemingly vociferous legislature like the VNA, the ultimate purpose of the institution is to signal the regime's preferences while taking down rivals; not to reflect the views of citizens"-- Vietnam Quôc-hôi-nuóc-công-hòa-xã-hôi-chu-nghĩa (DE-588)5029633-4 gnd rswk-swf Einparteiensystem (DE-588)4013915-3 gnd rswk-swf Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 gnd rswk-swf Vietnam / Quốc hội Legislative bodies / Vietnam One-party systems / Vietnam Authoritarianism / Vietnam Vietnam / Politics and government / 1975- Authoritarianism Legislative bodies One-party systems Politics and government Vietnam POLITICAL SCIENCE / General Since 1975 Vietnam Quôc-hôi-nuóc-công-hòa-xã-hôi-chu-nghĩa (DE-588)5029633-4 b Einparteiensystem (DE-588)4013915-3 s Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, epub 978-1-5036-1475-8 |
spellingShingle | Schuler, Paul United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation? Vietnam Quôc-hôi-nuóc-công-hòa-xã-hôi-chu-nghĩa (DE-588)5029633-4 gnd Einparteiensystem (DE-588)4013915-3 gnd Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)5029633-4 (DE-588)4013915-3 (DE-588)4256521-2 |
title | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature |
title_auth | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature |
title_exact_search | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature |
title_exact_search_txtP | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature |
title_full | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature Paul Schuler |
title_fullStr | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature Paul Schuler |
title_full_unstemmed | United front projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature Paul Schuler |
title_short | United front |
title_sort | united front projecting solidarity through deliberation in vietnam s single party legislature |
title_sub | projecting solidarity through deliberation in Vietnam's single-party legislature |
topic | Vietnam Quôc-hôi-nuóc-công-hòa-xã-hôi-chu-nghĩa (DE-588)5029633-4 gnd Einparteiensystem (DE-588)4013915-3 gnd Autoritärer Staat (DE-588)4256521-2 gnd |
topic_facet | Vietnam Quôc-hôi-nuóc-công-hòa-xã-hôi-chu-nghĩa Einparteiensystem Autoritärer Staat |
work_keys_str_mv | AT schulerpaul unitedfrontprojectingsolidaritythroughdeliberationinvietnamssinglepartylegislature |