Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford ; New York
Oxford University Press
2021
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | X, 282 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780192898487 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Acknowledgments xi 1. Introduction 1. The Importance of Radical Skepticism 2. An Overview of the Book 3. Clarifications of Some Key Concepts 3.1 Skepticism 3.2 Justification 3.3 Evidence 1 2 4 6 7 8 10 PART I: UNDERDETERMINATION AND INFERENTIAL ANTI-SKEPTICISM 2. Underdetermination and Perceptual Skepticism 1. Arguments and Responses: Narrowing the Focus 1.1 Rightly Discerning Skepticisms Appeal 1.2 Arguments and Responses that Overestimate Skepticism’s Appeal 1.3 Responses that Underestimate Skepticism’s Appeal 2. An Underdetermination Argument against Perception 2.1 The Argument 2.2 The Appeal of Premise 1 2.3 The Appeal of Premise 5 2.4 A Misguided Response 15 16 16 17 22 26 27 30 33 34 3. Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception 1. Deductive Anti-skeptical Arguments 2. Some Not-so-popular Nondeductive Anti-skeptical Arguments 3. Anti-skeptical Arguments Relying on IBE 4. Is the Standard Hypothesis the Best Explanation? 5. Is the Standard Hypothesis Sufficiently Good? 35 36 38 42 47 54 4. Global and Memory Skepticism 57 1. The Direct Case for Global Skepticism 58 1.1 The Self-undermining Objection to Arguments for Global Skepticism 59 1.2 The Regress Argument 60 1.3 The Prior Verification Argument 62 2. The Piecemeal (Underdetermination-based) Case for Global Skepticism 64 2.1 The Aim of Discussing the Piecemeal Case 65 2.2 The Self-undermining Objection Again 65
viii CONTENTS 2.3 Responding to the Self-undermining Objection 2.4 Developing the Piecemeal Case in Light of the Self-undermining Objection ՛ 3. Underdetermination Worries about Memory 3.1 The Basis of and Evidence for Our Memory Beliefs 3.2 An Underdetermination Argument against Memory 3.3 Inferential Anti-skepticism about Memory 5. A Priori, Introspective, and Inferential Skepticism 1. Underdetermination Worries about A Priori Belief 1.1 The Basis of and Evidence for Our A Priori Beliefs 1.2 An Evidence-Truth Gap for A Priori Belief 1.3 An Underdetermination Argument against A Priori Intuition 1.4 Inferential Anti-skepticism about A Priori Belief 2. Underdetermination Worries about Introspection 3. Underdetermination Worries about Nondeductive Reasoning 68 72 73 75 77 79 83 84 84 86 90 93 95 103 PART II: PARTICULARIST NONINFERENTIAL ANTI-SKEPTICISM 6. Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction 1. Particularism Explained 2. Some Varieties of Particularism 3. Particularism and Epistemic Intuitions 4. Moderate Intuitionist Particularism 111 112 119 122 126 7. Intuitionist Particularism: Elucidations and Defenses 1. Seemings and Epistemic Intuitions 2. Concerns about Seemings 3. Two Ways of Addressing Radical Skepticism 4. The Respectability of Intuitionist Particularism 131 131 136 145 147 8. Ecumenical Noninferential Anti-skepticism 1. Noninferential Anti-skepticism 1.1 Responding to Perceptual Skepticism 1.2 Responding to Skepticism about our Core Faculties 1.3 Intuitionist Particularist Noninferential Anti-skepticism 2. Ecumenism 2.1 Internalism, Externalism, and
Intuitionist Particularism 2.2 Internalism, Externalism, and Noninferential Anti-skepticism 3. Were All “Externalists” Now 3.1 A Misguided “Internalist” Temptation 3.2 The Incoherence of “Internalism” 3.3 “Externalism” is the Only Escape from Skepticism 151 151 151 156 159 159 160 162 164 165 167 169
CONTENTS 9. Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity 1. The Problem Explained 2. Epistemic Circularity 3. Arguments in Defense of Epistemic Circularity 3.1 The “Bad Reason for Atheism” Argument 3.2 The “Disjunctive Skepticism” Argument 4. Intuitions in Defense of Epistemic Circularity 5. Responding to the Problem of Easy Knowledge (and Epistemic Circularity) 6. Why the Problem Seems Threatening Even Though it Isn’t 10. Ridiculous Beliefs, Irresponsible Beliefs, and Anti-skeptical Evidence 1. The Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs 1.1 The Problem Explained 1.2 Responding to the Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs 2. The Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs 2.1 The Problem Explained 2.2 Responding to the Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs 2.3 Worries about the Noninferential Anti-skeptic’s Response to this Problem 3. The Problem of Anti-skeptical Evidence 3.1 Rea’s Reason 3.2 Cohen’s Reason 4. Taking Stock ЇХ 171 171 173 176 177 178 182 186 190 191 191 192 193 196 196 197 199 202 203 206 208 PART III: SKEPTICISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC INTUITION 11. Epistemic Intuition and Underdetermination 1. Difficulties for Skepticism about Epistemic Intuition 2. Responding to Underdetermination Worries 3. Benign Epistemically Circular Epistemic Intuition 4. Epistemic Intuition and the Problems of the Demon-victim Twin 4.1 The Demon-victim Twin Example 4.2 The First Problem: Underdetermination Worries (Again) 4.3 The Second Problem: NED-intuition Worries 4.4 The Third Problem: Anti-disjunctivism Worries 213 214 220 222 226 226 227 229 230 12. Epistemic Intuition and Disagreement 1. Internal and External
Rationality 2. Disagreement in Epistemic Intuition 3. Disagreement as a Defeater 4. Responding to Disagreement about Epistemic Value 5. Disagreement about Disagreement 233 233 234 239 243 250
X CONTENTS 13. Epistemic Intuition and Experimental Philosophy 1. The Skeptical Objection from Experimental Philosophy 2. How Strong Must the Objection Be to be Successful? 3. Responding to the Skeptical Objection from Experimental Philosophy 4. Conclusion 254 254 258 References Index 267 279 260 264
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| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgments xi 1. Introduction 1. The Importance of Radical Skepticism 2. An Overview of the Book 3. Clarifications of Some Key Concepts 3.1 Skepticism 3.2 Justification 3.3 Evidence 1 2 4 6 7 8 10 PART I: UNDERDETERMINATION AND INFERENTIAL ANTI-SKEPTICISM 2. Underdetermination and Perceptual Skepticism 1. Arguments and Responses: Narrowing the Focus 1.1 Rightly Discerning Skepticisms Appeal 1.2 Arguments and Responses that Overestimate Skepticism’s Appeal 1.3 Responses that Underestimate Skepticism’s Appeal 2. An Underdetermination Argument against Perception 2.1 The Argument 2.2 The Appeal of Premise 1 2.3 The Appeal of Premise 5 2.4 A Misguided Response 15 16 16 17 22 26 27 30 33 34 3. Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception 1. Deductive Anti-skeptical Arguments 2. Some Not-so-popular Nondeductive Anti-skeptical Arguments 3. Anti-skeptical Arguments Relying on IBE 4. Is the Standard Hypothesis the Best Explanation? 5. Is the Standard Hypothesis Sufficiently Good? 35 36 38 42 47 54 4. Global and Memory Skepticism 57 1. The Direct Case for Global Skepticism 58 1.1 The Self-undermining Objection to Arguments for Global Skepticism 59 1.2 The Regress Argument 60 1.3 The Prior Verification Argument 62 2. The Piecemeal (Underdetermination-based) Case for Global Skepticism 64 2.1 The Aim of Discussing the Piecemeal Case 65 2.2 The Self-undermining Objection Again 65
viii CONTENTS 2.3 Responding to the Self-undermining Objection 2.4 Developing the Piecemeal Case in Light of the Self-undermining Objection ՛ 3. Underdetermination Worries about Memory 3.1 The Basis of and Evidence for Our Memory Beliefs 3.2 An Underdetermination Argument against Memory 3.3 Inferential Anti-skepticism about Memory 5. A Priori, Introspective, and Inferential Skepticism 1. Underdetermination Worries about A Priori Belief 1.1 The Basis of and Evidence for Our A Priori Beliefs 1.2 An Evidence-Truth Gap for A Priori Belief 1.3 An Underdetermination Argument against A Priori Intuition 1.4 Inferential Anti-skepticism about A Priori Belief 2. Underdetermination Worries about Introspection 3. Underdetermination Worries about Nondeductive Reasoning 68 72 73 75 77 79 83 84 84 86 90 93 95 103 PART II: PARTICULARIST NONINFERENTIAL ANTI-SKEPTICISM 6. Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction 1. Particularism Explained 2. Some Varieties of Particularism 3. Particularism and Epistemic Intuitions 4. Moderate Intuitionist Particularism 111 112 119 122 126 7. Intuitionist Particularism: Elucidations and Defenses 1. Seemings and Epistemic Intuitions 2. Concerns about Seemings 3. Two Ways of Addressing Radical Skepticism 4. The Respectability of Intuitionist Particularism 131 131 136 145 147 8. Ecumenical Noninferential Anti-skepticism 1. Noninferential Anti-skepticism 1.1 Responding to Perceptual Skepticism 1.2 Responding to Skepticism about our Core Faculties 1.3 Intuitionist Particularist Noninferential Anti-skepticism 2. Ecumenism 2.1 Internalism, Externalism, and
Intuitionist Particularism 2.2 Internalism, Externalism, and Noninferential Anti-skepticism 3. Were All “Externalists” Now 3.1 A Misguided “Internalist” Temptation 3.2 The Incoherence of “Internalism” 3.3 “Externalism” is the Only Escape from Skepticism 151 151 151 156 159 159 160 162 164 165 167 169
CONTENTS 9. Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity 1. The Problem Explained 2. Epistemic Circularity 3. Arguments in Defense of Epistemic Circularity 3.1 The “Bad Reason for Atheism” Argument 3.2 The “Disjunctive Skepticism” Argument 4. Intuitions in Defense of Epistemic Circularity 5. Responding to the Problem of Easy Knowledge (and Epistemic Circularity) 6. Why the Problem Seems Threatening Even Though it Isn’t 10. Ridiculous Beliefs, Irresponsible Beliefs, and Anti-skeptical Evidence 1. The Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs 1.1 The Problem Explained 1.2 Responding to the Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs 2. The Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs 2.1 The Problem Explained 2.2 Responding to the Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs 2.3 Worries about the Noninferential Anti-skeptic’s Response to this Problem 3. The Problem of Anti-skeptical Evidence 3.1 Rea’s Reason 3.2 Cohen’s Reason 4. Taking Stock ЇХ 171 171 173 176 177 178 182 186 190 191 191 192 193 196 196 197 199 202 203 206 208 PART III: SKEPTICISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC INTUITION 11. Epistemic Intuition and Underdetermination 1. Difficulties for Skepticism about Epistemic Intuition 2. Responding to Underdetermination Worries 3. Benign Epistemically Circular Epistemic Intuition 4. Epistemic Intuition and the Problems of the Demon-victim Twin 4.1 The Demon-victim Twin Example 4.2 The First Problem: Underdetermination Worries (Again) 4.3 The Second Problem: NED-intuition Worries 4.4 The Third Problem: Anti-disjunctivism Worries 213 214 220 222 226 226 227 229 230 12. Epistemic Intuition and Disagreement 1. Internal and External
Rationality 2. Disagreement in Epistemic Intuition 3. Disagreement as a Defeater 4. Responding to Disagreement about Epistemic Value 5. Disagreement about Disagreement 233 233 234 239 243 250
X CONTENTS 13. Epistemic Intuition and Experimental Philosophy 1. The Skeptical Objection from Experimental Philosophy 2. How Strong Must the Objection Be to be Successful? 3. Responding to the Skeptical Objection from Experimental Philosophy 4. Conclusion 254 254 258 References Index 267 279 260 264 |
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| spelling | Bergmann, Michael 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)143363522 aut Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition Michael Bergmann First edition Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press 2021 X, 282 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd rswk-swf Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 s Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032741454&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Bergmann, Michael 1964- Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
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| title | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition |
| title_auth | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition |
| title_exact_search | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition |
| title_full | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition Michael Bergmann |
| title_fullStr | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition Michael Bergmann |
| title_full_unstemmed | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition Michael Bergmann |
| title_short | Radical skepticism and epistemic intuition |
| title_sort | radical skepticism and epistemic intuition |
| topic | Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Intuition Erkenntnistheorie Skeptizismus |
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