Auction theory: introductory exercises with answer keys
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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[2021]
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| Series: | Springer Texts in Business and Economics
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| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | xiv, 296 Seiten Illustrationen |
| ISBN: | 9783030695743 |
| ISSN: | 2192-4333 |
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| adam_text | Contents 1 2 Second-Price Auctions............................................................................... Introduction.................................................................................................. Exercise #1.1: Second-Price Auction with Complete Information/4 ........ Exercise #1.2: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information5.. Exercise #1.3: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information and Discrete Valuations5........................................................ Exercise #1.4: Robustness of Equilibrium Bidding in the Second-Price AuctionA................................................................................ Exercise #1.5: Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions 4................................ Exercise #1.6: Bidding Behavior in the English AuctionA ....................... Exercise #1.7: Expected Revenue in the Second-Price Auctionc............ Exercise #1.8: Second-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices 4 ............ Exercise #1.9: Second-Price Auctions with Entry Fees5.......................... Exercise #1.10: Asymmetric Bidding Equilibria in the Second-Price Auction5................................................................................ Exercise #1.11: Collusion in Second-Price Auctions, Based on Graham and Marshall (1987)A.................................................................... Exercise #1.12: Second-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on Che and Gale (1998)5 .................................................. First-Price
Auctions................................................................................... Exercise #2.1: First-Price Auction Under Complete InformationA ......... Exercise #2.2: First-Price Auction with Only Two Bidders and Uniformly Distributed Valuations 4............................................................. Exercise #2.3: First-Price Auction with N 2 Bidders and Uniformly Distributed Valuations 4............................................................. Exercise #2.4: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Direct Approach5.............................................................. Exercise #2.5: First-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed Values5.............................................................. Exercise #2.6: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Envelope Theorem Approachc......................................... Exercise #2.7 : Efficiency in First-Price Auctions 4.................................... Exercise #2.8: The First-Order Statistic5.................................................... 1 1 3 4 7 9 10 10 11 17 19 21 23 24 27 29 30 32 36 39 43 47 48 XI
XII 3 4 Contents Exercise #2.9: The Second-Order Statistic®............................................... Exercise #2.10: The kth-Order Statisticc................................................... Exercise #2.11: Bidding Behavior in the Dutch Auction A........................ 51 55 60 First-Price Auctions: Extensions.............................................................. Introduction................................................................................................. Exercise #3.1: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction—Direct Proof®............................................................................... Exercise #3.2: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction—Proof Using the First-Order Statisticc................................................................... Exercise #3.3: Expected Payment in the First-Price Auction®................. Exercise #3.4: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders—An Introduction^................................................................................................. Exercise #3.5: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders—General Setting®.......................................................................... Exercise #3.6: Efficiency with Risk AversionA........................................... Exercise #3.7: First-Price Auction with Asymmetrically Distributed Valuations® ............................................................................... Exercise #3.8: Sequential Version of the First-Price Auction*4................. Exercise #3.9: First-Price Auctions with Reservation
Prices—One BidderA.......................................................................................................... Exercise #3.10: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices—Several Bidders*՜ ............................................................................ Exercise #3.11: First-Price Auction with Entry Fees*՜.............................. Exercise #3.12: First-Price Auction with Discrete Valuations®................. Exercise #3.13: Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Based on McAfee and McMillan (1992)®..................................................................... Exercise #3.14: First-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on Che and Gale (1998)®.................................................... 63 63 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders............................................................................................................ Introduction.................................................................................................... Exercise #4.1: All-Pay Auction Under Compiete Information, Based on Baye et al. (1996)® ........................................................................ Exercise #4.2: Testing a Bidding Function in a First-Price, All-Pay AuctionA ......................................................................................................... Exercise #4.3: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Envelope Theorem Approach*՜ ... Exercise #4.4: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price
All-Pay Auction Using the Direct Approach®.......................... Exercise #4.5: Efficiency in All-Pay Auctions 4........................................... Exercise #4.6: Finding the Expected Revenue in the First-Price All-Pay Auction®............................................................................................ 64 71 73 74 78 82 83 87 88 90 99 109 115 118 125 125 126 129 130 137 139 140
Contents xiii Exercise #4.7: Finding Equilibrium Bids in the Second-Price All-Pay Auction®......................................................................................... 142 Exercise #4.8: War of Attrition4................................................................. 146 Exercise #4.9: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Neutral Bidders, Based on Kim and Che (2014)® ................................................................. 150 Exercise #4.10: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Averse Bidders, Based on Orozco-Aleman and Munoz-Garcia (2011)® ............................. 156 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries.................... 165 Exercise #5.1: Third-Price Auction, A Numerical Example4.................. 166 Exercise #5.2: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auctionc................................................................................... 167 Exercise #5.3: Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed Values®............... 170 Exercise #5.4: kth-Price Auctionc.............................................................. 175 Exercise #5.5: Efficiency in kth-Price AuctionsA ..................................... 180 Exercise #5.6: Lottery Auction, An IntroductionA.................................... 180 Exercise #5.7: Lottery Auction, A More General Approach®.................. 181 Exercise #5.8: Efficiency in Lottery AuctionsA......................................... 185 6 The Revenue Equivalence
Principle........................................................ 187 Exercise #6.1: Revenue Comparison in Four Auction FormatsA.............. 188 Exercise #6.2: Revenue Comparison Between First- and Second-Price Auctions®.............................................................................. 192 Exercise #6.3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse Bidders4 .......................................................................................... 195 Exercise #6.4: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse Sellers® ............................................................................................ 196 Exercise #6.5: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Short Proof®................... 197 Exercise #6.6: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Longer Proof*՜............... 201 7 Common-Value Auctions .......................................................................... Exercise #7.1: The Winner’s Curse in Common-Value Auctions-Introduction4 .............................................................................. Exercise #7.2: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with Two Bidders® ...................................................................................... Exercise #7.3: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with N 2 Bidders0................................................................................... Exercise #7.4: First-Price Auction When Bidders Have Interdependent Values®................................................................................ Exercise #7.5: Second-Price Auction When Bidders have
Interdependent Values®................................................................................ Exercise #7.6: Revenue Comparison in Auctions When Bidders Have Interdependent Values®..................................................................... 8 205 206 207 209 215 218 221 Multi-Unit Auctions .................................................................................. 225 Introduction.................................... .............. ,............................................. 225
XIV Contents Exercise #8.1: First-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Discriminatory Auction)4.......................................................................... Exercise #8.2: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Uniform-Price Auction)4............................................................................ Exercise #8.3: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units, Allowing for Different Prices®.................................................................... Exercise #8.4: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a First-Price Auction® ... Exercise #8.5: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a Second-Price Auction4 9 226 226 227 234 235 Mechanism Design....................................................................................... Exercise #9.1: Incentives to Truthfully Reveal Valuations4..................... Exercise #9.2: First-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism®.. Exercise #9.3: Second-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism4................................................................................................. Exercise #9.4: VCG Mechanism Selling a Single Unit® .......................... Exercise #9.5: VCG Mechanism Selling Several Units®.......................... Exercise #9.6: VCG Mechanism and the Generalized Second-Price Auction® .................................. 237 238 239 Procurement Auctions................................................................................. Exercise #10.1: Procurement Auctions Under Complete Information4... Exercise #10.2: Procurement Auctions Under Incomplete Information® . Exercise
#10.3: Procurement Auctions with External Effects, Based on Choi et al. (2018) c...................................................................... Exercise #10.4: Procurement Auctions with Perfect Monitoring®........... Exercise #10.5: Procurement Auctions with Imperfect Monitoring*՜ ...... 251 252 256 261 267 273 Game Theory Appendix............................................................................ Background................................................................................................... Dominated Strategies.................................................................................... Nash Equilibrium.......................................................................................... Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium..................................................... Subgame Perfect Equilibrium...................................................................... Bayesian Nash Equilibrium......................................................................... 283 283 284 285 286 288 289 References............................................................................................................. 291 Index...................................................................................................................... 293 10 A 241 243 245 247
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Contents 1 2 Second-Price Auctions. Introduction. Exercise #1.1: Second-Price Auction with Complete Information/4 . Exercise #1.2: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information5. Exercise #1.3: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information and Discrete Valuations5. Exercise #1.4: Robustness of Equilibrium Bidding in the Second-Price AuctionA. Exercise #1.5: Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions'4. Exercise #1.6: Bidding Behavior in the English AuctionA . Exercise #1.7: Expected Revenue in the Second-Price Auctionc. Exercise #1.8: Second-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices'4 . Exercise #1.9: Second-Price Auctions with Entry Fees5. Exercise #1.10: Asymmetric Bidding Equilibria in the Second-Price Auction5. Exercise #1.11: Collusion in Second-Price Auctions, Based on Graham and Marshall (1987)A. Exercise #1.12: Second-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on Che and Gale (1998)5 . First-Price
Auctions. Exercise #2.1: First-Price Auction Under Complete InformationA . Exercise #2.2: First-Price Auction with Only Two Bidders and Uniformly Distributed Valuations'4. Exercise #2.3: First-Price Auction with N 2 Bidders and Uniformly Distributed Valuations'4. Exercise #2.4: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Direct Approach5. Exercise #2.5: First-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed Values5. Exercise #2.6: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Envelope Theorem Approachc. Exercise #2.7 : Efficiency in First-Price Auctions'4. Exercise #2.8: The First-Order Statistic5. 1 1 3 4 7 9 10 10 11 17 19 21 23 24 27 29 30 32 36 39 43 47 48 XI
XII 3 4 Contents Exercise #2.9: The Second-Order Statistic®. Exercise #2.10: The kth-Order Statisticc. Exercise #2.11: Bidding Behavior in the Dutch Auction A. 51 55 60 First-Price Auctions: Extensions. Introduction. Exercise #3.1: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction—Direct Proof®. Exercise #3.2: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction—Proof Using the First-Order Statisticc. Exercise #3.3: Expected Payment in the First-Price Auction®. Exercise #3.4: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders—An Introduction^. Exercise #3.5: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders—General Setting®. Exercise #3.6: Efficiency with Risk AversionA. Exercise #3.7: First-Price Auction with Asymmetrically Distributed Valuations® . Exercise #3.8: Sequential Version of the First-Price Auction*4. Exercise #3.9: First-Price Auctions with Reservation
Prices—One BidderA. Exercise #3.10: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices—Several Bidders*՜ . Exercise #3.11: First-Price Auction with Entry Fees*՜. Exercise #3.12: First-Price Auction with Discrete Valuations®. Exercise #3.13: Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Based on McAfee and McMillan (1992)®. Exercise #3.14: First-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on Che and Gale (1998)®. 63 63 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders. Introduction. Exercise #4.1: All-Pay Auction Under Compiete Information, Based on Baye et al. (1996)® . Exercise #4.2: Testing a Bidding Function in a First-Price, All-Pay AuctionA . Exercise #4.3: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Envelope Theorem Approach*՜ . Exercise #4.4: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price
All-Pay Auction Using the Direct Approach®. Exercise #4.5: Efficiency in All-Pay Auctions'4. Exercise #4.6: Finding the Expected Revenue in the First-Price All-Pay Auction®. 64 71 73 74 78 82 83 87 88 90 99 109 115 118 125 125 126 129 130 137 139 140
Contents xiii Exercise #4.7: Finding Equilibrium Bids in the Second-Price All-Pay Auction®. 142 Exercise #4.8: War of Attrition4. 146 Exercise #4.9: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Neutral Bidders, Based on Kim and Che (2014)® . 150 Exercise #4.10: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Averse Bidders, Based on Orozco-Aleman and Munoz-Garcia (2011)® . 156 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries. 165 Exercise #5.1: Third-Price Auction, A Numerical Example4. 166 Exercise #5.2: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auctionc. 167 Exercise #5.3: Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed Values®. 170 Exercise #5.4: kth-Price Auctionc. 175 Exercise #5.5: Efficiency in kth-Price AuctionsA . 180 Exercise #5.6: Lottery Auction, An IntroductionA. 180 Exercise #5.7: Lottery Auction, A More General Approach®. 181 Exercise #5.8: Efficiency in Lottery AuctionsA. 185 6 The Revenue Equivalence
Principle. 187 Exercise #6.1: Revenue Comparison in Four Auction FormatsA. 188 Exercise #6.2: Revenue Comparison Between First- and Second-Price Auctions®. 192 Exercise #6.3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse Bidders4 . 195 Exercise #6.4: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse Sellers® . 196 Exercise #6.5: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Short Proof®. 197 Exercise #6.6: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Longer Proof*՜. 201 7 Common-Value Auctions . Exercise #7.1: The Winner’s Curse in Common-Value Auctions-Introduction4 . Exercise #7.2: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with Two Bidders® . Exercise #7.3: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with N 2 Bidders0. Exercise #7.4: First-Price Auction When Bidders Have Interdependent Values®. Exercise #7.5: Second-Price Auction When Bidders have
Interdependent Values®. Exercise #7.6: Revenue Comparison in Auctions When Bidders Have Interdependent Values®. 8 205 206 207 209 215 218 221 Multi-Unit Auctions . 225 Introduction. . ,. 225
XIV Contents Exercise #8.1: First-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Discriminatory Auction)4. Exercise #8.2: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Uniform-Price Auction)4. Exercise #8.3: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units, Allowing for Different Prices®. Exercise #8.4: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a First-Price Auction® . Exercise #8.5: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a Second-Price Auction4 9 226 226 227 234 235 Mechanism Design. Exercise #9.1: Incentives to Truthfully Reveal Valuations4. Exercise #9.2: First-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism®. Exercise #9.3: Second-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism4. Exercise #9.4: VCG Mechanism Selling a Single Unit® . Exercise #9.5: VCG Mechanism Selling Several Units®. Exercise #9.6: VCG Mechanism and the Generalized Second-Price Auction® . 237 238 239 Procurement Auctions. Exercise #10.1: Procurement Auctions Under Complete Information4. Exercise #10.2: Procurement Auctions Under Incomplete Information® . Exercise
#10.3: Procurement Auctions with External Effects, Based on Choi et al. (2018) c. Exercise #10.4: Procurement Auctions with Perfect Monitoring®. Exercise #10.5: Procurement Auctions with Imperfect Monitoring*՜ . 251 252 256 261 267 273 Game Theory Appendix. Background. Dominated Strategies. Nash Equilibrium. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. 283 283 284 285 286 288 289 References. 291 Index. 293 10 A 241 243 245 247 |
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| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T17:33:33Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:09:23Z |
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| series2 | Springer Texts in Business and Economics |
| spelling | Choi, Pak-Sing Verfasser aut Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia Cham Springer [2021] xiv, 296 Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Springer Texts in Business and Economics 2192-4333 Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Microeconomics Economic theory Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Muñoz-García, Félix Verfasser (DE-588)111361451X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-030-69575-0 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032740928&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Choi, Pak-Sing Muñoz-García, Félix Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Microeconomics Economic theory Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4125859-9 |
| title | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys |
| title_auth | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys |
| title_exact_search | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys |
| title_full | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia |
| title_fullStr | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia |
| title_short | Auction theory |
| title_sort | auction theory introductory exercises with answer keys |
| title_sub | introductory exercises with answer keys |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Microeconomics Economic theory Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Microeconomics Economic theory Game theory Spieltheorie Auktion |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032740928&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT choipaksing auctiontheoryintroductoryexerciseswithanswerkeys AT munozgarciafelix auctiontheoryintroductoryexerciseswithanswerkeys |