Bargaining Theory and Fairness A Theoretical and Experimental Approach Considering Freedom of Choice and the Crowding-out of Intrinsic Motivation
Bargaining Theory and Fairness: A Theoretical and Experimental Approach Considering Freedom of Choice and the Crowding-out of Intrinsic Motivation

Two new bargaining games, called "Freedom to Punish (FTP)" and "Right and Choice to Punish (RAP)", are developed, analyzed and tested by means of an experimental implementation. Hypotheses about behavior are developed, discussed and tested. The central hypotheses are aimed at the...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Crüger, Arwed (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Berlin Duncker & Humblot GmbH 2002
Ausgabe:1. Auflage
Schriftenreihe:Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften 527
Schlagworte:
Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
Gerechtigkeit
Handlungstheorie
Fairness
Kooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Intrinsische Motivation
Hochschulschrift
Online-Zugang:DE-12
DE-634
DE-526
DE-521
DE-1043
DE-1102
DE-858
DE-Aug4
DE-1050
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DE-M347
DE-92
DE-1051
DE-898
DE-860
DE-1049
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DE-523
DE-2070s
DE-Re13
DE-91
DE-384
DE-473
DE-19
DE-355
DE-703
DE-20
DE-706
DE-824
DE-29
DE-739
DE-B768
DE-859
DE-1046
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Zusammenfassung:Two new bargaining games, called "Freedom to Punish (FTP)" and "Right and Choice to Punish (RAP)", are developed, analyzed and tested by means of an experimental implementation. Hypotheses about behavior are developed, discussed and tested. The central hypotheses are aimed at the importance of freedom of choice, on the difference between the FTP game and the RAP game, and on the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. As might have been expected, fairness plays a role in both games, represented by the frequent appearances of equal splits as well as by the frequent rejections of unfair offers. -- In addition to that, fairness was crowded out by the new Institution of a veto power decision, confirming the importance of the institutional setting for behavior. Contrary to the few veto power sales in the RAP game, an amazingly high number of receivers refrained from veto power in the FTP game. This significant difference has clearly been attributed to the different information conditions and the existence of a bonus. This bonus can be interpreted in terms of freedom of choice, and exploits a value for the freedom to choose for the first time in experimental economics
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (174 Seiten)
ISBN:9783428507412
DOI:10.3790/978-3-428-50741-2
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