"Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government across the globe, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Dahlström, Carl 1972- (VerfasserIn), Lapuente Giné, Víctor 1976- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge ; New York ; Melbourne ; Delhi ; Singapore Cambridge University Press 2017
Schlagworte:	Bureaucracy > Evaluation Administrative agencies > Evaluation Executive departments > Evaluation Civil service Government executives Government accountability Political corruption Comparative government Korruption Verwaltung Bürokratie
Zusammenfassung:	"Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government across the globe, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely"...
Beschreibung:	Includes bibliographical references and index
Beschreibung:	x, 262 Seiten Diagramme
ISBN:	9781316630655 9781107177598