Why fiscal stimulus programs fail: Volume 1 The limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Why fiscal stimulus programs fail |n Volume 1 |p The limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice |c John J. Heim |
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| adam_text | Contents Part I 1 Introductory Chapters Introduction 1.1 The Crowd Out Problem and Accommodative Monetary Policy 1.2 Individual Chapter Contents and Findings 1.3 Summary of Key Findings References Literature Review 2.1 Summary of Findings Stocks and Ponds 2.1.1 GDP 2.1.2 Inequality 2.1.3 2.2 Detailed Findings Assessment of Monetary Policy Effectiveness 2.2.1 in the Business Press Stock Market Effects Pond Market Effects GDP Effects Inequality Effects Assessment of Monetary Policy Effectiveness 2.2.2 in the Academic/Professional Literature Stock Market Effects 3 3 6 10 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 16 16 17 17 18 19 19 xi
ХІІ CONTENTS Bond Market Effects; Interest Rate Effects GDP Effects Effects on Inequality 2.2.3 Comparisons ofFindings of the Professional and Business Press 2.3 A Comparison of Cowles, DSGE, and VAR Methodologies Used in Literature Review References 21 23 32 Methodology 3.1 General Methodological Issues 3.1.1 The Importance of Replicating Results Before Publication 3.2 Other Methodological Issues Specific to This Study 3.2.1 GDP Deflator Methodological Adjustments 3.2.2 Reconciling Differences in Signs, Significance Levels of Tests in Different Time Periods 3.2.3 Mixing Periods of Budget Deficit (Crowd Out) Increase and Decrease 3.2.4 Statistical Insignificance Caused by Lack of Variation in the Data 3.2.5 Left-Out Variables 3.2.6 Multicollinearity 3.2.7 Insufficient Sample Size 3.2.8 Spurious Results Indicating Insignificance 3.3 How Should a Change in Loanable Funds Be Distributed to Tax and Spending Deficits References 41 44 Part II 4 33 34 37 50 51 53 53 55 69 72 73 74 75 75 77 Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 4.1 How, and Under What Conditions, Can Federal Reserve Purchases of Government Securities Stimulate the Economy 81 81
CONTENTS 4.1.1 4.1.2 Overview Detailed Analysis of the Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy Processes Accommodative Federal Reserve Purchases from Depository Institutions Federal Reserve Purchases from Non-depository Institutions 4.2 A Formal Model of the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus Programs, Their Crowd Out Effects, and Accommodative Monetary Policy 4.2.1 Crowd Out Effects of Deficit Financing 4.2.2 How Accommodating Monetary Policy Offsets Crowd Out Effects 4.2.3 Different Crowd Out Effects of Tax Cut and Spending Deficits Alternative Ways of Modeling Crowd Out Effects 4.2.4 Declining Deficits Create “Crowd in” Effects 4.2.5 Should We Use Accommodate Monetary Policy to Offset Crowd Outi References A Simplified Balance Sheet View of How Open Market Operations to Stimulate the Economy, When Dominated by Primary Dealers, Actually Stimulate Securities Markets, not the Real Economy 5.1 When the FR Goes into the Open Market and Buys $1000 in Treasuries (T) from a Dealer/Broker (Usually a aPrimary Dealer”), The Dealer May Be Paid by Check Drawn on the FR (FRck) (If Dealer Is Paid Electronically by Fed Transfer of Funds to Dealer’s Bank, Skip Steps 5.1-3 and Go to Step #5.4) 5.2 Dealer #lDeposits FR Check in Dealer’s Own Bank 5.3 Bond Dealer’s Bank Cashes in the FRck at the Fed. Assume Required Reserve Ratio (RR) = 10% and Let Excess Reserves = (ER) xiii 81 83 83 84 87 89 90 94 96 102 103 105 107 108 108 108
xiv CONTENTS 5.4 Bond Dealers Make Their Money Buying and Selling Bonds. Bond Dealers (Generally) Would Have no Incentive to Sell Treasuries to the FR, Except to Obtain the Funds Needed to Buy Another Security (Alt Sec) Expected to Pay a Higher Return. This Is Bought from Dealer #2 by Dealer #1 and Paid for with DD (Step Involving Check Payment, and Conversion to Reserves not Shown) 5.5 Bond Dealer #2 (Generally) Only Sold Alt Sec to the First Dealer Because Dealer #2 Needed the Liquidity to Buy Another Security (Alt Sec2) that Looked More Promising, Which Dealer #2 then Bought from Bond Dealer #3 Using the Proceeds of the Sale of Alt Sec to Dealer #1 to Finance the Purchase of Alt Sec2. the Cycle Continues in Perpetuity Until no Other Dealers Wish to Sell Securities at This Time. Results for Dealers #2 and #3 and #4 Are Shown Below (with Some Check Reserves Movement Intermediate Steps Missing) 5.6 The Final Result Is Shown Below, After ÁU Intermediate Steps Above Are Cancelled Out, and Assuming Bond Dealer #4 Cannot or Does not Want to Find Any Other Dealer/Broker with Desirable Securities to Buy References 6 A Money Multiplier Approach to How Open Market Operations Stimulate Securities Markets and the Real Economy 6.1 Simple Money Multiplier 6.2 A More Sophisticated Money Multiplier References Part III 7 109 109 110 113 115 115 116 122 The Effectiveness of Accommodating Monetary Policy Mechanics The Role of Primary Dealers in Federal Reserve Efforts to Change the Money Supply 7.1 Primary Dealers Dominate Auctions 125 126
CONTENTS What Type of Bank Does the Federal Reserve Purchase Securities from: Investment or Depository ? 7.3 The Failure of Federal Reserve Securities Purchases During “QE” to Reduce Depository Institutions Holdings of Government Securities, Which Would Have Increased Their Loanable Funds 7.4 Primary Dealers and the Business They Are in: Selected Tears 1960-2014 7.5 Loss of Efficiency When Using Investment Banks and Brokerages to Implement Accommodative Monetary Policy 7.6 Primary Dealers Who Are Domestic Vs. Foreign Corporations References XV 7.2 8 9 The Failure of Accommodative Monetary Policy Before Quantitative Easing (QE) and Its Success After; the “Pushing on a String Problem” 8.1 Effectiveness of Accommodative Monetary Policy 1960-2007 8.2 Effectiveness of Accommodative Monetary Policy 2008-Present 8.3 Does aPushing on a String” During QE Apply to Ml as Well as Total Loanable Funds? 8.4 Conclusions References The Failure of U.S. Loanable Funds to Grow as Much as Federal Reserve Securities Purchases During QE: The Role of Foreign Banks 9.1 The Textbook Equivalence of Increases in FR Securities Purchases and Increases in Loanable Reserves 9.2 The Effects of Fed Purchases of Securities from Foreign Dealer/Brokers 9.3 Trends Since 1960 in Ml, Excess Reserves and Currency in Circulation References 126 131 134 140 141 145 147 147 153 157 159 161 163 164 165 166 174
xvi CONTENTS Part IV 10 11 12 Increases in Ml—Effects on Stock and Bond Markets and the GDP Effect of FR Purchases of Government Securities on Ml 10.1 Relationship of Ml Growth to Growth in Securities Purchased by the Fed 10.2 More Sophisticated Models of the Relationship Between FR Securities Purchases and Ml 10.3 Tests of the Relationship Between Ml and Excess Reserves and FR Securities Purchases 10.4 Relationship of Growth in Ml to Growth in the Monetary Base 10.5 The Most Theory Consistent Model of Ml’s Determinants 10.6 Summary of Results of Tests of Relationship of Changes in FR Purchases to Changes in Ml References Effect of Increases in Loanable Funds or Ml on the GDP 11.1 Simple Tests 11.2 More Sophisticated Tests of the Effects of FR Security Purchases on Real GDP 11.2.1 Summary of Table 11.1 Findings 11.3 Testing Housing and Consumer Services Demand for Sensitivity to FR Securities Purchases 11.3.1 Housing Investment Effects 11.3.2 Lagged Consumer Services Spending Effects 11.3.3 Total Consumer and Investment Spending Effects 11.3.4 Full GDP Effects 11.4 Summary of Results and Conclusions References Effect of FR Security Purchases and Ml on Stock, Bond, and Mortgage Markets 12.1 Effect of FR Open Market Operations on the Stock Market 177 177 187 191 196 198 199 205 207 207 212 217 220 221 222 222 224 226 232 233 234
CONTENTS Effect of FR Open Market Operations on Bond and Mortgage Markets 12.3 Do FR Open Market Operations also Affect GDP 12.4 Summary of Findings and Conclusions References Xvii 12.2 23 7 242 244 245 Part V Does Crowd Out Really Occur? 13 Does Crowd Out Really Occur? Initial Empirical Evidence: One Time Period 13.1 Consumption 13.2 Investment 13.3 Conclusion References 14 Does Crowd Out Really Occur? Empirical Evidence: Replication in Many Time Periods 14.1 The Heim (2017b) Study 14.2 The Heim (2017a) Study 14.3 Crowd Out Findings in This Study References 249 251 253 254 254 255 255 256 258 260 Part VI Increases in Total Loanable Funds (S+FB)—Do They Reduce Crowd Out? 15 Initial Tests of Whether Crowd Out Can Be Offset by Increases in Loanable Funds Methodology for Testing Increases in Loanable Funds as an Offset to Consumption CrowdOut 15.2 Taxes: Another Variable That Has Both Positive and Negative Effects on Consumption 15.3 Methodology for Testing Increases in Loanable Funds as an Offset to Investment Crowd Out 15.4 Conclusions References 263 15.1 16 Which Models Best Explain How Changes in Loanable Funds Offset Crowd Out? 16.1 Effects on the Consumption Function 16.2 Effects on the Investment Function References 264 269 270 273 273 275 278 285 290
xviii 17 18 CONTENTS Do Loanable Funds Modify the Crowd Out Effects of the One-Variable Deficit (T — G)? 17.1 Consumption Results When also Including (S 4~ FB) us a Separate Variable 17.2 Consumption Results When not Including (S + FB) as a Separate Variable 17.3 Investment Results When also Including (S 4- FB) as a Separate Variable 17.4 Investment Results When not Including (S + FB) as a Separate Variable 17.5 Comparing the Effects of Exogenous (FR Purchases Induced) and Endogenous (Economic Driven Change Induced) Loanable Funds Growth 17.5.1 Effects on Consumption 17.5.2 Effects on Investment 17.6 Conclusions Reference Do Loanable Funds Modify the Crowd Out Effects of the Two-Variable Deficit (T), (G)? 18.1 Testing the Two-Variable Deficit Consumption Model 18.1.1 Mixing Crowd Out and Crowd in Periods May Distort Results Adding a Separate, Stand Alone Loanable Funds Variable to a Crowd Out Model Can Table 18.1 Results Be Replicated in Other Samples? Heteroskedasticity (or Heteroscedasticity) and Autocorrelations 18.1.2 Comparing One-Variable and Two-Variable Deficit Results 18.2 Consumption Models Without Stand-Alone (S 4FB) 18.3 Crowd Out Effects on Investment Using Stand Alone Loanable Funds Variable 18.4 Crowd Out Effects in Investment ModelsWithout a Stand Alone Loanable Funds Variable 18.5 Chapter Summary 291 291 298 301 307 310 310 312 315 322 323 323 338 346 348 360 362 364 368 377 384
CONTENTS 19 xix References 389 Does Ml or Total Loanable Funds Better Measure Offset Effects to Crowd Out? 391 19.1 Comparing Unmodified, LF Modified, and Ml Modified Deficit Variables 19.2 Adding a Separate, Stand-Alone Ml Variable to the Model 19.3 A Note on the Relationship of National Savings to Ml 19.4 Summary of Results and Conclusions References 395 400 405 407 410 Part VII Determining Ml Effects on Crowd Out 20 Does Ml or Total Loanable Funds More Accurately Define the Extent to Which Crowd Out Can Be Modified? 20.1 20.2 Testing the Consumption Model Testing the Two—Variable Deficit Investment Model 20.2.1 Investment Models with a Stand-Alone Loanable Funds Modifier 20.2.2 Investment Models Without a Stand-Alone Loanable Funds Modifier 20.2.3 Investment Models Without a Stand-Alone Loanable Funds or Ml Modifier, but with a Business Cycle Control Variable 20.3 Comparing Model Results with (Table 20.5) and Without (Table 20.4) GDP Control 20.4 Summary of Chapter 20 Results Reference 413 414 424 424 431 433 437 438 446 Part VIII Non-Black Box Models: Structural Mechanisms Through Which Loanable Funds Affects Consumption and Investment 21 Do Consumer Borrowing, Inflation, and Prime Interest Rate Increase When Ml Is Increased? 21.1 The Consumer Borrowing Equation 449 450
XX CONTENTS The Inflation Equation 21.2 21.3 The Prime Interest Rate Determination Equation 21.4 Summary of Findings and Conclusions Reference 22 23 24 Effects on Consumer and Business Borrowing of Loanable Funds and Ml 22.1 Mechanisms Through Which Loanable Funds Changes Affect Business Borrowing, a Determinant of Investment Demand 22.2 Effect of Business Borrowing on Investment Demand 22.3 Mechanisms Through Which Loanable Funds Changes Affect Consumer Borrowing, and Through Which Consumer Borrowing Affects Consumer Demand 22.4 Effect of Consumer Borrowing on Consumer Demand 22.5 Summary of Chapter Results and Conclusions Reference Effects on Inflation of Loanable Funds and Ml 23.1 Testing for the Effects of Loanable Funds on Inflation 23.2 Loanable Funds Relationship to Ml Reference Effects on the Prime Interest Rate in Keynesian Models of Loanable Funds and Ml 24.1 In the Keynesian Interest Rate Model, Do Changes in Loanable Funds Explain Changes in the Prime Interest Rate as Well as Changes in Ml ? 24.2 Summary of Results and Conclusions Part IX 25 455 457 462 466 467 468 473 476 485 488 490 491 491 495 506 507 507 511 Summary Chapters Summary of Introductory, Literature Review, and Methodology Chapters (Chapters 1-3) 25.1 Chapter 1 Overview of Deficits, Their Crowd Out Effects, and Accommodative Monetary Theory 25.1.1 The Crowd Out Problem 517 517 517
CONTENTS Actual Accommodative Monetary Policy—Chapters 4—9 25.1.3 Accommodative Monetary Science Chapters 10-24 25.2 Chapter 2 Summary—Literature Review 25.3 Chapter 33: Methodology Reference ХХІ 25.1.2 26 27 Summary of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy Theory (Chapters 4-6) 26.1 Chapter 4: Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 26.2 Chapter 5: Balance Sheet Presentation of Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 26.3 Chapter 6: Money Multiplier Explanation of Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 26.4 Chapter 7: The Role of Primary Dealers in Open Market Attempts to Increase Loanable Funds and the Money Supply 26.5 Chapter 8: Negative Effects of Excess Reserves and Increased Cash Holdings on the QE Monetary Stimulus Program: The “Pushing on a String” Policy Problem 26.6 Chapter 9: Why Increases in Loanable Funds Are Less Than Increases in PR Security Purchases: The Role of Foreign Banks Summary of the Science Underlying the Conclusion that “Crowd Out” Is a Serious Problem and Accommodative Monetary Policy CanOffset It 27.1 Do Federal Reserve Security Purchases Change the Money Supply or the Monetary Basel (Chapter 10) 27.2 Do Changes in the Money Supply Affect the GDP or Its Components? (Chapters 11, 20-21) 27.3 Do Changes in the Money Supply or Monetary Base Affect Prices in the Stock or Credit Markets? (Chapter 12) 518 518 519 519 520 521 521 522 522 522 522 524 525 526 528 531
xxii CONTENTS Does Stimulative Fiscal Policy Create a “Crowd Out” Problem that Reduces Consumer and Investment Spending, Causing the Fiscal Policies to Be Ineffective? (Chapters 13, 14, 17, 18) Does Growth in Loanable Funds Offset Crowd Out 27.5 Better Than Growth in Ml ? (Chapters 20, 21) Do Increases in Total Loanable Funds Eliminate 27.6 the Crowd Out Effects Caused by Deficits? (Chapters 15-18) Which Part of Total Loanable Funds Growth, 27.7 the Endogenous (Economy Driven) or Exogenous (Federal Reserve Policy Driven) Part Most Effects the Real Economy and Financial Markets? (Chapters 17, 22-24) References 27.4 28 Summary of Engineering Equations in This Book 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 28.5 28.6 28.7 28.8 28.9 Effect of FR Securities Purchases on M1 Does Ml Affect GDP?—Simple Model (St. Louis Equation) Results Do Changes in Ml or Loanable Funds Affect the GDP More—Using Scientifically Valid Models (Table 20.5) Do Deficits Really Cause Crowd Out? Which Is a Retter Measure of Consumer Crowd Out? the Deficit, or the Deficit Reduced by Any Same-Period Growth in the Pool of Loanable Funds (1 and 2 Variable Deficit Model)? Which Is a Better Measure of Investment Crowd Out? the Deficit, or the Deficit Reduced by Any Same-Period Growth in the Pool of Loanable Funds (1 and 2 Variable Deficit Model)? Do Endogenous or Exogenous Increases in Loanable Funds Have the Most Success in Reducing Crowd Out? Do Increases in Loanable Funds Increase Consumer and Business Borrowing? Does Increased Business Borrowing Decrease Consumer Borrowing? Effects of Increases in Ml on Inflation 532 535 536 543
547 549 550 550 552 554 556 558 560 561 562
CONTENTS 29 ХХІІІ 28.10 Effect of Ml on Prime Interest Rate Reference 562 562 Definitions of Acronyms Used 563 Part X Overall Conclusions ЗО Overall Conclusions Index 569 573
This book offers a series of statistical tests to determine if the crowd out problem, known to hinder the effectiveness of Keynesian economic stimulus programs, can be overcome by monetary programs. It concludes there are programs that can do this, specifically accommodative monetary policy. They were not used to any great extent prior to the Quantitative Easing program in 2008, causing the failure of many fiscal stimulus programs through no fault of their own. The book includes exhaustive statistical tests to prove this point. There is also a policy analysis section of the book. It examines how effectively the Federal Reserve s anti-crowd out programs have actually worked, to the extent they were undertaken at all. It finds statistical evidence that using commercial and savings banks instead of investment banks when implementing accommodating monetary policy would have markedly improved their effectiveness. This volume, with its companion volume Why Fiscal Stimulus Programs Fail, Volume 2: Statistical Tests Comparing Monetary Policy to Growth, provides 1000 separate statistical tests on the US economy to prove these assertions. John J. Heim is Visiting Professor at University of Albany-SUNY, and retired Clinical Professor of Economics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, both in New York, USA. He has served in cabinet and subcabinet positions in NY State and Local Government. He is also an inventor of renewable energy devices ( wave energy converters ) and holds patents in this area.
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Contents Part I 1 Introductory Chapters Introduction 1.1 The Crowd Out Problem and Accommodative Monetary Policy 1.2 Individual Chapter Contents and Findings 1.3 Summary of Key Findings References Literature Review 2.1 Summary of Findings Stocks and Ponds 2.1.1 GDP 2.1.2 Inequality 2.1.3 2.2 Detailed Findings Assessment of Monetary Policy Effectiveness 2.2.1 in the Business Press Stock Market Effects Pond Market Effects GDP Effects Inequality Effects Assessment of Monetary Policy Effectiveness 2.2.2 in the Academic/Professional Literature Stock Market Effects 3 3 6 10 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 16 16 17 17 18 19 19 xi
ХІІ CONTENTS Bond Market Effects; Interest Rate Effects GDP Effects Effects on Inequality 2.2.3 Comparisons ofFindings of the Professional and Business Press 2.3 A Comparison of Cowles, DSGE, and VAR Methodologies Used in Literature Review References 21 23 32 Methodology 3.1 General Methodological Issues 3.1.1 The Importance of Replicating Results Before Publication 3.2 Other Methodological Issues Specific to This Study 3.2.1 GDP Deflator Methodological Adjustments 3.2.2 Reconciling Differences in Signs, Significance Levels of Tests in Different Time Periods 3.2.3 Mixing Periods of Budget Deficit (Crowd Out) Increase and Decrease 3.2.4 Statistical Insignificance Caused by Lack of Variation in the Data 3.2.5 Left-Out Variables 3.2.6 Multicollinearity 3.2.7 Insufficient Sample Size 3.2.8 Spurious Results Indicating Insignificance 3.3 How Should a Change in Loanable Funds Be Distributed to Tax and Spending Deficits References 41 44 Part II 4 33 34 37 50 51 53 53 55 69 72 73 74 75 75 77 Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 4.1 How, and Under What Conditions, Can Federal Reserve Purchases of Government Securities Stimulate the Economy 81 81
CONTENTS 4.1.1 4.1.2 Overview Detailed Analysis of the Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy Processes Accommodative Federal Reserve Purchases from Depository Institutions Federal Reserve Purchases from Non-depository Institutions 4.2 A Formal Model of the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus Programs, Their Crowd Out Effects, and Accommodative Monetary Policy 4.2.1 Crowd Out Effects of Deficit Financing 4.2.2 How Accommodating Monetary Policy Offsets Crowd Out Effects 4.2.3 Different Crowd Out Effects of Tax Cut and Spending Deficits Alternative Ways of Modeling Crowd Out Effects 4.2.4 Declining Deficits Create “Crowd in” Effects 4.2.5 Should We Use Accommodate Monetary Policy to Offset Crowd Outi References A Simplified Balance Sheet View of How Open Market Operations to Stimulate the Economy, When Dominated by Primary Dealers, Actually Stimulate Securities Markets, not the Real Economy 5.1 When the FR Goes into the Open Market and Buys $1000 in Treasuries (T) from a Dealer/Broker (Usually a aPrimary Dealer”), The Dealer May Be Paid by Check Drawn on the FR (FRck) (If Dealer Is Paid Electronically by Fed Transfer of Funds to Dealer’s Bank, Skip Steps 5.1-3 and Go to Step #5.4) 5.2 Dealer #lDeposits FR Check in Dealer’s Own Bank 5.3 Bond Dealer’s Bank Cashes in the FRck at the Fed. Assume Required Reserve Ratio (RR) = 10% and Let Excess Reserves = (ER) xiii 81 83 83 84 87 89 90 94 96 102 103 105 107 108 108 108
xiv CONTENTS 5.4 Bond Dealers Make Their Money Buying and Selling Bonds. Bond Dealers (Generally) Would Have no Incentive to Sell Treasuries to the FR, Except to Obtain the Funds Needed to Buy Another Security (Alt Sec) Expected to Pay a Higher Return. This Is Bought from Dealer #2 by Dealer #1 and Paid for with DD (Step Involving Check Payment, and Conversion to Reserves not Shown) 5.5 Bond Dealer #2 (Generally) Only Sold Alt Sec to the First Dealer Because Dealer #2 Needed the Liquidity to Buy Another Security (Alt Sec2) that Looked More Promising, Which Dealer #2 then Bought from Bond Dealer #3 Using the Proceeds of the Sale of Alt Sec to Dealer #1 to Finance the Purchase of Alt Sec2. the Cycle Continues in Perpetuity Until no Other Dealers Wish to Sell Securities at This Time. Results for Dealers #2 and #3 and #4 Are Shown Below (with Some Check Reserves Movement Intermediate Steps Missing) 5.6 The Final Result Is Shown Below, After ÁU Intermediate Steps Above Are Cancelled Out, and Assuming Bond Dealer #4 Cannot or Does not Want to Find Any Other Dealer/Broker with Desirable Securities to Buy References 6 A Money Multiplier Approach to How Open Market Operations Stimulate Securities Markets and the Real Economy 6.1 Simple Money Multiplier 6.2 A More Sophisticated Money Multiplier References Part III 7 109 109 110 113 115 115 116 122 The Effectiveness of Accommodating Monetary Policy Mechanics The Role of Primary Dealers in Federal Reserve Efforts to Change the Money Supply 7.1 Primary Dealers Dominate Auctions 125 126
CONTENTS What Type of Bank Does the Federal Reserve Purchase Securities from: Investment or Depository ? 7.3 The Failure of Federal Reserve Securities Purchases During “QE” to Reduce Depository Institutions Holdings of Government Securities, Which Would Have Increased Their Loanable Funds 7.4 Primary Dealers and the Business They Are in: Selected Tears 1960-2014 7.5 Loss of Efficiency When Using Investment Banks and Brokerages to Implement Accommodative Monetary Policy 7.6 Primary Dealers Who Are Domestic Vs. Foreign Corporations References XV 7.2 8 9 The Failure of Accommodative Monetary Policy Before Quantitative Easing (QE) and Its Success After; the “Pushing on a String Problem” 8.1 Effectiveness of Accommodative Monetary Policy 1960-2007 8.2 Effectiveness of Accommodative Monetary Policy 2008-Present 8.3 Does aPushing on a String” During QE Apply to Ml as Well as Total Loanable Funds? 8.4 Conclusions References The Failure of U.S. Loanable Funds to Grow as Much as Federal Reserve Securities Purchases During QE: The Role of Foreign Banks 9.1 The Textbook Equivalence of Increases in FR Securities Purchases and Increases in Loanable Reserves 9.2 The Effects of Fed Purchases of Securities from Foreign Dealer/Brokers 9.3 Trends Since 1960 in Ml, Excess Reserves and Currency in Circulation References 126 131 134 140 141 145 147 147 153 157 159 161 163 164 165 166 174
xvi CONTENTS Part IV 10 11 12 Increases in Ml—Effects on Stock and Bond Markets and the GDP Effect of FR Purchases of Government Securities on Ml 10.1 Relationship of Ml Growth to Growth in Securities Purchased by the Fed 10.2 More Sophisticated Models of the Relationship Between FR Securities Purchases and Ml 10.3 Tests of the Relationship Between Ml and Excess Reserves and FR Securities Purchases 10.4 Relationship of Growth in Ml to Growth in the Monetary Base 10.5 The Most Theory Consistent Model of Ml’s Determinants 10.6 Summary of Results of Tests of Relationship of Changes in FR Purchases to Changes in Ml References Effect of Increases in Loanable Funds or Ml on the GDP 11.1 Simple Tests 11.2 More Sophisticated Tests of the Effects of FR Security Purchases on Real GDP 11.2.1 Summary of Table 11.1 Findings 11.3 Testing Housing and Consumer Services Demand for Sensitivity to FR Securities Purchases 11.3.1 Housing Investment Effects 11.3.2 Lagged Consumer Services Spending Effects 11.3.3 Total Consumer and Investment Spending Effects 11.3.4 Full GDP Effects 11.4 Summary of Results and Conclusions References Effect of FR Security Purchases and Ml on Stock, Bond, and Mortgage Markets 12.1 Effect of FR Open Market Operations on the Stock Market 177 177 187 191 196 198 199 205 207 207 212 217 220 221 222 222 224 226 232 233 234
CONTENTS Effect of FR Open Market Operations on Bond and Mortgage Markets 12.3 Do FR Open Market Operations also Affect GDP 12.4 Summary of Findings and Conclusions References Xvii 12.2 23 7 242 244 245 Part V Does Crowd Out Really Occur? 13 Does Crowd Out Really Occur? Initial Empirical Evidence: One Time Period 13.1 Consumption 13.2 Investment 13.3 Conclusion References 14 Does Crowd Out Really Occur? Empirical Evidence: Replication in Many Time Periods 14.1 The Heim (2017b) Study 14.2 The Heim (2017a) Study 14.3 Crowd Out Findings in This Study References 249 251 253 254 254 255 255 256 258 260 Part VI Increases in Total Loanable Funds (S+FB)—Do They Reduce Crowd Out? 15 Initial Tests of Whether Crowd Out Can Be Offset by Increases in Loanable Funds Methodology for Testing Increases in Loanable Funds as an Offset to Consumption CrowdOut 15.2 Taxes: Another Variable That Has Both Positive and Negative Effects on Consumption 15.3 Methodology for Testing Increases in Loanable Funds as an Offset to Investment Crowd Out 15.4 Conclusions References 263 15.1 16 Which Models Best Explain How Changes in Loanable Funds Offset Crowd Out? 16.1 Effects on the Consumption Function 16.2 Effects on the Investment Function References 264 269 270 273 273 275 278 285 290
xviii 17 18 CONTENTS Do Loanable Funds Modify the Crowd Out Effects of the One-Variable Deficit (T — G)? 17.1 Consumption Results When also Including (S 4~ FB) us a Separate Variable 17.2 Consumption Results When not Including (S + FB) as a Separate Variable 17.3 Investment Results When also Including (S 4- FB) as a Separate Variable 17.4 Investment Results When not Including (S + FB) as a Separate Variable 17.5 Comparing the Effects of Exogenous (FR Purchases Induced) and Endogenous (Economic Driven Change Induced) Loanable Funds Growth 17.5.1 Effects on Consumption 17.5.2 Effects on Investment 17.6 Conclusions Reference Do Loanable Funds Modify the Crowd Out Effects of the Two-Variable Deficit (T), (G)? 18.1 Testing the Two-Variable Deficit Consumption Model 18.1.1 Mixing Crowd Out and Crowd in Periods May Distort Results Adding a Separate, Stand Alone Loanable Funds Variable to a Crowd Out Model Can Table 18.1 Results Be Replicated in Other Samples? Heteroskedasticity (or Heteroscedasticity) and Autocorrelations 18.1.2 Comparing One-Variable and Two-Variable Deficit Results 18.2 Consumption Models Without Stand-Alone (S 4FB) 18.3 Crowd Out Effects on Investment Using Stand Alone Loanable Funds Variable 18.4 Crowd Out Effects in Investment ModelsWithout a Stand Alone Loanable Funds Variable 18.5 Chapter Summary 291 291 298 301 307 310 310 312 315 322 323 323 338 346 348 360 362 364 368 377 384
CONTENTS 19 xix References 389 Does Ml or Total Loanable Funds Better Measure Offset Effects to Crowd Out? 391 19.1 Comparing Unmodified, LF Modified, and Ml Modified Deficit Variables 19.2 Adding a Separate, Stand-Alone Ml Variable to the Model 19.3 A Note on the Relationship of National Savings to Ml 19.4 Summary of Results and Conclusions References 395 400 405 407 410 Part VII Determining Ml Effects on Crowd Out 20 Does Ml or Total Loanable Funds More Accurately Define the Extent to Which Crowd Out Can Be Modified? 20.1 20.2 Testing the Consumption Model Testing the Two—Variable Deficit Investment Model 20.2.1 Investment Models with a Stand-Alone Loanable Funds Modifier 20.2.2 Investment Models Without a Stand-Alone Loanable Funds Modifier 20.2.3 Investment Models Without a Stand-Alone Loanable Funds or Ml Modifier, but with a Business Cycle Control Variable 20.3 Comparing Model Results with (Table 20.5) and Without (Table 20.4) GDP Control 20.4 Summary of Chapter 20 Results Reference 413 414 424 424 431 433 437 438 446 Part VIII Non-Black Box Models: Structural Mechanisms Through Which Loanable Funds Affects Consumption and Investment 21 Do Consumer Borrowing, Inflation, and Prime Interest Rate Increase When Ml Is Increased? 21.1 The Consumer Borrowing Equation 449 450
XX CONTENTS The Inflation Equation 21.2 21.3 The Prime Interest Rate Determination Equation 21.4 Summary of Findings and Conclusions Reference 22 23 24 Effects on Consumer and Business Borrowing of Loanable Funds and Ml 22.1 Mechanisms Through Which Loanable Funds Changes Affect Business Borrowing, a Determinant of Investment Demand 22.2 Effect of Business Borrowing on Investment Demand 22.3 Mechanisms Through Which Loanable Funds Changes Affect Consumer Borrowing, and Through Which Consumer Borrowing Affects Consumer Demand 22.4 Effect of Consumer Borrowing on Consumer Demand 22.5 Summary of Chapter Results and Conclusions Reference Effects on Inflation of Loanable Funds and Ml 23.1 Testing for the Effects of Loanable Funds on Inflation 23.2 Loanable Funds Relationship to Ml Reference Effects on the Prime Interest Rate in Keynesian Models of Loanable Funds and Ml 24.1 In the Keynesian Interest Rate Model, Do Changes in Loanable Funds Explain Changes in the Prime Interest Rate as Well as Changes in Ml ? 24.2 Summary of Results and Conclusions Part IX 25 455 457 462 466 467 468 473 476 485 488 490 491 491 495 506 507 507 511 Summary Chapters Summary of Introductory, Literature Review, and Methodology Chapters (Chapters 1-3) 25.1 Chapter 1 Overview of Deficits, Their Crowd Out Effects, and Accommodative Monetary Theory 25.1.1 The Crowd Out Problem 517 517 517
CONTENTS Actual Accommodative Monetary Policy—Chapters 4—9 25.1.3 Accommodative Monetary Science Chapters 10-24 25.2 Chapter 2 Summary—Literature Review 25.3 Chapter 33: Methodology Reference ХХІ 25.1.2 26 27 Summary of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy Theory (Chapters 4-6) 26.1 Chapter 4: Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 26.2 Chapter 5: Balance Sheet Presentation of Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 26.3 Chapter 6: Money Multiplier Explanation of Theory of Crowd Out and Accommodative Monetary Policy 26.4 Chapter 7: The Role of Primary Dealers in Open Market Attempts to Increase Loanable Funds and the Money Supply 26.5 Chapter 8: Negative Effects of Excess Reserves and Increased Cash Holdings on the QE Monetary Stimulus Program: The “Pushing on a String” Policy Problem 26.6 Chapter 9: Why Increases in Loanable Funds Are Less Than Increases in PR Security Purchases: The Role of Foreign Banks Summary of the Science Underlying the Conclusion that “Crowd Out” Is a Serious Problem and Accommodative Monetary Policy CanOffset It 27.1 Do Federal Reserve Security Purchases Change the Money Supply or the Monetary Basel (Chapter 10) 27.2 Do Changes in the Money Supply Affect the GDP or Its Components? (Chapters 11, 20-21) 27.3 Do Changes in the Money Supply or Monetary Base Affect Prices in the Stock or Credit Markets? (Chapter 12) 518 518 519 519 520 521 521 522 522 522 522 524 525 526 528 531
xxii CONTENTS Does Stimulative Fiscal Policy Create a “Crowd Out” Problem that Reduces Consumer and Investment Spending, Causing the Fiscal Policies to Be Ineffective? (Chapters 13, 14, 17, 18) Does Growth in Loanable Funds Offset Crowd Out 27.5 Better Than Growth in Ml ? (Chapters 20, 21) Do Increases in Total Loanable Funds Eliminate 27.6 the Crowd Out Effects Caused by Deficits? (Chapters 15-18) Which Part of Total Loanable Funds Growth, 27.7 the Endogenous (Economy Driven) or Exogenous (Federal Reserve Policy Driven) Part Most Effects the Real Economy and Financial Markets? (Chapters 17, 22-24) References 27.4 28 Summary of Engineering Equations in This Book 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 28.5 28.6 28.7 28.8 28.9 Effect of FR Securities Purchases on M1 Does Ml Affect GDP?—Simple Model (St. Louis Equation) Results Do Changes in Ml or Loanable Funds Affect the GDP More—Using Scientifically Valid Models (Table 20.5) Do Deficits Really Cause Crowd Out? Which Is a Retter Measure of Consumer Crowd Out? the Deficit, or the Deficit Reduced by Any Same-Period Growth in the Pool of Loanable Funds (1 and 2 Variable Deficit Model)? Which Is a Better Measure of Investment Crowd Out? the Deficit, or the Deficit Reduced by Any Same-Period Growth in the Pool of Loanable Funds (1 and 2 Variable Deficit Model)? Do Endogenous or Exogenous Increases in Loanable Funds Have the Most Success in Reducing Crowd Out? Do Increases in Loanable Funds Increase Consumer and Business Borrowing? Does Increased Business Borrowing Decrease Consumer Borrowing? Effects of Increases in Ml on Inflation 532 535 536 543
547 549 550 550 552 554 556 558 560 561 562
CONTENTS 29 ХХІІІ 28.10 Effect of Ml on Prime Interest Rate Reference 562 562 Definitions of Acronyms Used 563 Part X Overall Conclusions ЗО Overall Conclusions Index 569 573
This book offers a series of statistical tests to determine if the "crowd out" problem, known to hinder the effectiveness of Keynesian economic stimulus programs, can be overcome by monetary programs. It concludes there are programs that can do this, specifically "accommodative monetary policy." They were not used to any great extent prior to the Quantitative Easing program in 2008, causing the failure of many fiscal stimulus programs through no fault of their own. The book includes exhaustive statistical tests to prove this point. There is also a policy analysis section of the book. It examines how effectively the Federal Reserve's anti-crowd out programs have actually worked, to the extent they were undertaken at all. It finds statistical evidence that using commercial and savings banks instead of investment banks when implementing accommodating monetary policy would have markedly improved their effectiveness. This volume, with its companion volume Why Fiscal Stimulus Programs Fail, Volume 2: Statistical Tests Comparing Monetary Policy to Growth, provides 1000 separate statistical tests on the US economy to prove these assertions. John J. Heim is Visiting Professor at University of Albany-SUNY, and retired Clinical Professor of Economics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, both in New York, USA. He has served in cabinet and subcabinet positions in NY State and Local Government. He is also an inventor of renewable energy devices ("wave energy converters") and holds patents in this area. |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T17:12:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:07:14Z |
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| isbn | 9783030656744 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Heim, John J. Verfasser (DE-588)1124246592 aut Why fiscal stimulus programs fail Volume 1 The limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice John J. Heim Cham, Switzerland Palgrave Macmillan [2021] xxxiii, 577 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s DE-604 (DE-604)BV047265403 1 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-030-65675-1 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032669188&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032669188&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Heim, John J. Why fiscal stimulus programs fail Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd |
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| title | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail |
| title_auth | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail |
| title_exact_search | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail |
| title_full | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail Volume 1 The limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice John J. Heim |
| title_fullStr | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail Volume 1 The limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice John J. Heim |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail Volume 1 The limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice John J. Heim |
| title_short | Why fiscal stimulus programs fail |
| title_sort | why fiscal stimulus programs fail the limits of accommodative monetary policy in practice |
| topic | Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd |
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