Locke on persons and personal identity:
Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke's account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Emphasizing the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view, Boeker argue...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2021
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke's account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Emphasizing the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view, Boeker argues that, to take seriously Locke's general approach to questions of identity, we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In0contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke's account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into considerations not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke's view, but also0shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xxi, 303 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198846758 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke's account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Emphasizing the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view, Boeker argues that, to take seriously Locke's general approach to questions of identity, we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In0contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke's account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into considerations not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke's view, but also0shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface Abbreviations 1. Introduction 1.1 Locke’s Innovative Approach to Debates about Persons and Personal Identity 1.2 Aims and Scope of the Book 1.3 Summary of Chapters ix xiii xvii 1 1 7 8 2. Lockes Kind-dependent Approach to Identity 2.1 Doe Principium Individuationis 2.2 Identity 2.2.1 Names and Ideas of Kind F 2.2.2 Specifying Persistence Conditions for Members of Kind F 2.3 Identity and Individuation 13 14 18 22 25 28 3. Problems with Other Interpretations of Locke’s Account of Identity 3.1 Relative Identity, Coincidence, and AbsoluteIdentity 3.2 Human Beings, Persons, and Locke’s Metaphysical Agnosticism 3.3 Different Senses of Distinctness 3.4 Lessons from the Controversy 3.5 Other Interpretive Options 29 30 38 40 46 48 4. Moral Personhood and Personal Identity 4.1 Locke’s Moral Account of Personhood 4.2 From Personhood to Personal Identity 4.3 Further Reflections on the Moral Dimension 54 54 70 75 5. Consciousness and Same Consciousness 5.1 Locke on Consciousness 5.2 Locke on Sameness of Consciousness 5.2.1 Revival of Past Experiences through Memory 5.2.2 Mineness and Appropriation 5.2.3 Unity 5.2.4 Temporality 5.2.5 Locke’s Multiple Aspects Account of Same Consciousness 77 78 87 88 92 103 111 121 6. Circularity and Insufficiency Worries 6.1 Different Versions of Circularity 6.2 Butler’s Circularity Objection 6.3 Insufficiency Worries 124 124 126 128
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS 7. Lockes Response to the Problems of his Predecessors 7.1 Locke’s Predecessors 7.2 Epistemological Problems 7.3 Materialism and the Afterlife 7.4 Cartesian Views of the Soul 7.5 Non-Cartesian Immaterial Views of the Soul 7.6 Human Beings as Unions of Immaterial Souls and Material Bodies 7.7 Lockes Response 147 148 150 152 160 163 8. Personal Identity, Transitivity, and Divine Justice 8.1 The Traditional Transitivity Objection 8.2 Non-transitive Interpretations 8.3 The Religious Context 8.4 Consciousness and Transitivity 8.5 Divine Justice and Repentance 172 173 175 182 188 195 9. Locke’s Underlying Background Beliefs 201 10. Locke and his Early Critics and Defenders: Metaphysical and Epistemic Differences 10.1 Locke’s Early Critics and Defenders on Perpetually Thinking Souls 10.1.1 Disagreement about Innate Ideas 10.1.2 Different Accounts of Consciousness 10.1.3 Worry about Individuation 10.2 Locke’s Early Critics and Defenders on the Thinking Matter Hypothesis 10.2.1 Disagreement about Essences 10.2.2 Disagreement Whether Matter Can Be Active 10.2.3 Disagreement about Unity, Simplicity, and Composition 10.3 Final Reflections on Metaphysical and Epistemic Differences 11. Locke and his Early Critics and Defenders: Moral and Religious Differences 11.1 Criticism of Locke’s Psychological Approach to Personal Identity 11.1.1 Shaftesbury’s Criticism 11.1.2 Hume’s Criticism 11.2 Moral Personhood 11.2.1 Shaftesbury on Virtue and Character Development 11.2.2 Hume on Selves, Passions, and Sociability 11.2.3 Alternatives to Divine Law Concluding Remarks
Bibliography Index 165 167 207 211 215 217 221 224 226 231 235 244 246 249 249 253 259 259 268 277 279 281 297
|
| adam_txt |
Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface Abbreviations 1. Introduction 1.1 Locke’s Innovative Approach to Debates about Persons and Personal Identity 1.2 Aims and Scope of the Book 1.3 Summary of Chapters ix xiii xvii 1 1 7 8 2. Lockes Kind-dependent Approach to Identity 2.1 Doe Principium Individuationis 2.2 Identity 2.2.1 Names and Ideas of Kind F 2.2.2 Specifying Persistence Conditions for Members of Kind F 2.3 Identity and Individuation 13 14 18 22 25 28 3. Problems with Other Interpretations of Locke’s Account of Identity 3.1 Relative Identity, Coincidence, and AbsoluteIdentity 3.2 Human Beings, Persons, and Locke’s Metaphysical Agnosticism 3.3 Different Senses of Distinctness 3.4 Lessons from the Controversy 3.5 Other Interpretive Options 29 30 38 40 46 48 4. Moral Personhood and Personal Identity 4.1 Locke’s Moral Account of Personhood 4.2 From Personhood to Personal Identity 4.3 Further Reflections on the Moral Dimension 54 54 70 75 5. Consciousness and Same Consciousness 5.1 Locke on Consciousness 5.2 Locke on Sameness of Consciousness 5.2.1 Revival of Past Experiences through Memory 5.2.2 Mineness and Appropriation 5.2.3 Unity 5.2.4 Temporality 5.2.5 Locke’s Multiple Aspects Account of Same Consciousness 77 78 87 88 92 103 111 121 6. Circularity and Insufficiency Worries 6.1 Different Versions of Circularity 6.2 Butler’s Circularity Objection 6.3 Insufficiency Worries 124 124 126 128
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS 7. Lockes Response to the Problems of his Predecessors 7.1 Locke’s Predecessors 7.2 Epistemological Problems 7.3 Materialism and the Afterlife 7.4 Cartesian Views of the Soul 7.5 Non-Cartesian Immaterial Views of the Soul 7.6 Human Beings as Unions of Immaterial Souls and Material Bodies 7.7 Lockes Response 147 148 150 152 160 163 8. Personal Identity, Transitivity, and Divine Justice 8.1 The Traditional Transitivity Objection 8.2 Non-transitive Interpretations 8.3 The Religious Context 8.4 Consciousness and Transitivity 8.5 Divine Justice and Repentance 172 173 175 182 188 195 9. Locke’s Underlying Background Beliefs 201 10. Locke and his Early Critics and Defenders: Metaphysical and Epistemic Differences 10.1 Locke’s Early Critics and Defenders on Perpetually Thinking Souls 10.1.1 Disagreement about Innate Ideas 10.1.2 Different Accounts of Consciousness 10.1.3 Worry about Individuation 10.2 Locke’s Early Critics and Defenders on the Thinking Matter Hypothesis 10.2.1 Disagreement about Essences 10.2.2 Disagreement Whether Matter Can Be Active 10.2.3 Disagreement about Unity, Simplicity, and Composition 10.3 Final Reflections on Metaphysical and Epistemic Differences 11. Locke and his Early Critics and Defenders: Moral and Religious Differences 11.1 Criticism of Locke’s Psychological Approach to Personal Identity 11.1.1 Shaftesbury’s Criticism 11.1.2 Hume’s Criticism 11.2 Moral Personhood 11.2.1 Shaftesbury on Virtue and Character Development 11.2.2 Hume on Selves, Passions, and Sociability 11.2.3 Alternatives to Divine Law Concluding Remarks
Bibliography Index 165 167 207 211 215 217 221 224 226 231 235 244 246 249 249 253 259 259 268 277 279 281 297 |
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| spelling | Boeker, Ruth Verfasser (DE-588)1234173360 aut Locke on persons and personal identity Ruth Boeker (Assistant professor in Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland) First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2021 xxi, 303 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke's account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Emphasizing the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view, Boeker argues that, to take seriously Locke's general approach to questions of identity, we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In0contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke's account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into considerations not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke's view, but also0shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume"-- Locke, John 1632-1704 (DE-588)118573748 gnd rswk-swf Person (DE-588)4134819-9 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 gnd rswk-swf Locke, John / 1632-1704 Persons / Philosophy Identity (Psychology) Philosophy of mind Locke, John 1632-1704 (DE-588)118573748 p Person (DE-588)4134819-9 s Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 s Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032653248&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Boeker, Ruth Locke on persons and personal identity Locke, John 1632-1704 (DE-588)118573748 gnd Person (DE-588)4134819-9 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118573748 (DE-588)4134819-9 (DE-588)4248301-3 (DE-588)4026482-8 |
| title | Locke on persons and personal identity |
| title_auth | Locke on persons and personal identity |
| title_exact_search | Locke on persons and personal identity |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Locke on persons and personal identity |
| title_full | Locke on persons and personal identity Ruth Boeker (Assistant professor in Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland) |
| title_fullStr | Locke on persons and personal identity Ruth Boeker (Assistant professor in Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Locke on persons and personal identity Ruth Boeker (Assistant professor in Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland) |
| title_short | Locke on persons and personal identity |
| title_sort | locke on persons and personal identity |
| topic | Locke, John 1632-1704 (DE-588)118573748 gnd Person (DE-588)4134819-9 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Locke, John 1632-1704 Person Philosophy of Mind Identität |
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