Epistemic duties: new arguments, new angles
"There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely re...
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Routledge
2021
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in epistemology
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology"-- |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on November 25, 2020) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online Ressource (ix, 301 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780429030215 0429030215 9780429638626 0429638620 9780429641794 0429641796 9780429635458 0429635451 |
| DOI: | 10.4324/9780429030215 |
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| spelling | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford New York, NY Routledge 2021 © 2021 1 Online Ressource (ix, 301 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on November 25, 2020) "There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology"-- Knowledge, Theory of Ethics Duty Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 McCain, Kevin 1980- edt Stapleford, Scott edt Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780367141103 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215 Verlag URL des Erstveroeffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles Knowledge, Theory of Ethics Duty Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles |
| title_auth | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles |
| title_exact_search | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles |
| title_full | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford |
| title_fullStr | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford |
| title_short | Epistemic duties |
| title_sort | epistemic duties new arguments new angles |
| title_sub | new arguments, new angles |
| topic | Knowledge, Theory of Ethics Duty Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Knowledge, Theory of Ethics Duty Erkenntnistheorie Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215 |
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