Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition
Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism,"...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ
Princeton University Press
[2020]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAB01 FAW01 FCO01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UPA01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical sense-datum and reductionist form but empiricism generally. Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a "given" element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible. Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 25. Feb 2021) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9780691222028 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9780691222028 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Williams, Michael Williams, Michael |
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| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121 |
| dewey-search | 121 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:05:22Z |
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| spelling | Williams, Michael Verfasser aut Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition Michael Williams, Michael Williams Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2020] © 1999 1 online resource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 25. Feb 2021) Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical sense-datum and reductionist form but empiricism generally. Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a "given" element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible. Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views In English PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Knowledge, Theory of Williams, Michael aut https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691222028 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Williams, Michael Williams, Michael Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Knowledge, Theory of |
| title | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition |
| title_auth | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition |
| title_exact_search | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition |
| title_full | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition Michael Williams, Michael Williams |
| title_fullStr | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition Michael Williams, Michael Williams |
| title_full_unstemmed | Groundless Belief An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition Michael Williams, Michael Williams |
| title_short | Groundless Belief |
| title_sort | groundless belief an essay on the possibility of epistemology second edition |
| title_sub | An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition |
| topic | PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology bisacsh Knowledge, Theory of |
| topic_facet | PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology Knowledge, Theory of |
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