Properties and propositions: the metaphysics of higher-order logic
This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysica...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Sydney
Cambridge University Press
2021
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 227 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781108840477 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Substitution in a sense -- The term/predicate distinction -- Ramsey's challenge -- Two types of reference -- The reference principle -- Fregean realism -- Fregean nominalism -- Some alternatives -- The concept horse paradox -- The metaphysics exam -- States of affairs -- The prenective view of propositional content -- On content and object -- The identity theory of truth | |
| 520 | 3 | |a This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Acknowledgements page x Introduction Lí 1.2 1.3 1.4 1 Substitution in a Sense 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2 3 4 i Properties as Second-Order Existents The Concept Horse Paradox Properties as Satisfaction Conditions Williamson on Absolute Generality i 3 5 6 8 Some Counterexamples to the Reference Principle Sense-Substitution A New Reference Principle The Sense in Sense-Substitution A Circularity Objection The Differences between Reference Principles 10 ո 14 18 20 22 The Term/Predicate Distinction 23 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 23 26 28 30 32 33 The Senses of Terms and the Senses of Predicates Substituting Predicates for Predicates Substituting Predicates for Terms Substituting Terms for Predicates Type-Shifting Principles An Assumed Distinction Ramsey’s Challenge 36 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 37 39 40 45 48 Socrates and Wisdom Complex Predicates Ramsey’s Alternative Scheme Subsentential Monism Back to the Term/Predicate Distinction Two Types of Reference 4.1 4.2 49 The Argument in Brief Preliminaries: Disquotation and Singular Terms vii 50 52
viii 5 Contents 4.3 The Disquotation Problem for Predicate-Reference 4.4 Disquotation and Sense-Substitution 4.5 A Different Type of Reference 4.6 No Co-reference between Terms and Predicates 4.7 Looking Ahead 55 57 58 59 60 The Reference Principle 62 63 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 6 7 8 9 Sense-Substitution Premise 0 Premise i Premise 2 Premise 3 The Proof 64 65 65 65 68 Fregean Realism 70 6.1 Predicate-Reference and Satisfaction 6.2 Properties Are Satisfaction Conditions 6.3 The Property/Object Distinction 71 75 79 Fregean Nominalism 8l 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.A 81 S3 85 87 91 92 94 Two Different Ways of Reading (S)? Against a Quinean Suggestion Non-Nominal Quantification Set-Theoretic Semantics Quantification over Satisfaction Conditions Beyond Nominalism and Realism Appendix: Second-Order Semantics Some Alternatives 98 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 98 100 102 107 Wright’s Ascription Hale’s Primary/Secondary Distinction MacBride’s Impure Reference Wiggins, Strawson and the Copula The Concept Horse Paradox 9.1 The Property Hone Is Not a Property? 9.2 Categorial Differences 9.3 Categorial Similarities 9.4 Saying and Showing ю The Metaphysics Exam юл 10.2 10.3 10.4 The Problem of Universals Bradley’s Regress Are Properties Immanent or Transcendent? Converse Relations III 1X2 114 117 119 123 123 129 137 141
Contents 11 States of Affairs 11.1 її.2 n. 3 11.4 ix 148 Fregean Realism about States of Affairs Negative and Disjunctive States of Affairs Faers as Obtaining States of Affairs The Structure of States of Affairs 148 152 153 155 12 The Prenective View of Propositional Content 159 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Propositional Content Two Views of Propositional Content Formalising Inferences The Prenective View versus Natural Language The Standard View versus Natural Language 13 On Content and Object 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.A The Limits of the Standard View A Truth Conditional Approach The Constituents of Propositions Propositions Are Propositional Contents Appendix: Contemporary Approaches to Structured Propositions 14 The Identity Theory of Truth 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 An Immodest Identity Theory The Core of the Identity Theory The Identity Theory as a Form of Direct Realism Falsehood and Unity The Individuation Problem Truths Unmade and Ungrounded Believing the Facts References Index 159 160 162 165 168 171 171 174 177 182 185 192 193 193 197 199 201 203 207 2II 223
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| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgements page x Introduction Lí 1.2 1.3 1.4 1 Substitution in a Sense 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2 3 4 i Properties as Second-Order Existents The Concept Horse Paradox Properties as Satisfaction Conditions Williamson on Absolute Generality i 3 5 6 8 Some Counterexamples to the Reference Principle Sense-Substitution A New Reference Principle The Sense in Sense-Substitution A Circularity Objection The Differences between Reference Principles 10 ո 14 18 20 22 The Term/Predicate Distinction 23 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 23 26 28 30 32 33 The Senses of Terms and the Senses of Predicates Substituting Predicates for Predicates Substituting Predicates for Terms Substituting Terms for Predicates Type-Shifting Principles An Assumed Distinction Ramsey’s Challenge 36 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 37 39 40 45 48 Socrates and Wisdom Complex Predicates Ramsey’s Alternative Scheme Subsentential Monism Back to the Term/Predicate Distinction Two Types of Reference 4.1 4.2 49 The Argument in Brief Preliminaries: Disquotation and Singular Terms vii 50 52
viii 5 Contents 4.3 The Disquotation Problem for Predicate-Reference 4.4 Disquotation and Sense-Substitution 4.5 A Different Type of Reference 4.6 No Co-reference between Terms and Predicates 4.7 Looking Ahead 55 57 58 59 60 The Reference Principle 62 63 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 6 7 8 9 Sense-Substitution Premise 0 Premise i Premise 2 Premise 3 The Proof 64 65 65 65 68 Fregean Realism 70 6.1 Predicate-Reference and Satisfaction 6.2 Properties Are Satisfaction Conditions 6.3 The Property/Object Distinction 71 75 79 Fregean Nominalism 8l 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.A 81 S3 85 87 91 92 94 Two Different Ways of Reading (S)? Against a Quinean Suggestion Non-Nominal Quantification Set-Theoretic Semantics Quantification over Satisfaction Conditions Beyond Nominalism and Realism Appendix: Second-Order Semantics Some Alternatives 98 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 98 100 102 107 Wright’s Ascription Hale’s Primary/Secondary Distinction MacBride’s Impure Reference Wiggins, Strawson and the Copula The Concept Horse Paradox 9.1 The Property Hone Is Not a Property? 9.2 Categorial Differences 9.3 Categorial Similarities 9.4 Saying and Showing ю The Metaphysics Exam юл 10.2 10.3 10.4 The Problem of Universals Bradley’s Regress Are Properties Immanent or Transcendent? Converse Relations III 1X2 114 117 119 123 123 129 137 141
Contents 11 States of Affairs 11.1 її.2 n. 3 11.4 ix 148 Fregean Realism about States of Affairs Negative and Disjunctive States of Affairs Faers as Obtaining States of Affairs The Structure of States of Affairs 148 152 153 155 12 The Prenective View of Propositional Content 159 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Propositional Content Two Views of Propositional Content Formalising Inferences The Prenective View versus Natural Language The Standard View versus Natural Language 13 On Content and Object 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.A The Limits of the Standard View A Truth Conditional Approach The Constituents of Propositions Propositions Are Propositional Contents Appendix: Contemporary Approaches to Structured Propositions 14 The Identity Theory of Truth 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 An Immodest Identity Theory The Core of the Identity Theory The Identity Theory as a Form of Direct Realism Falsehood and Unity The Individuation Problem Truths Unmade and Ungrounded Believing the Facts References Index 159 160 162 165 168 171 171 174 177 182 185 192 193 193 197 199 201 203 207 2II 223 |
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| spelling | Trueman, Robert Verfasser (DE-588)1225801362 aut Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic Robert Trueman (University of York) Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Sydney Cambridge University Press 2021 xi, 227 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Substitution in a sense -- The term/predicate distinction -- Ramsey's challenge -- Two types of reference -- The reference principle -- Fregean realism -- Fregean nominalism -- Some alternatives -- The concept horse paradox -- The metaphysics exam -- States of affairs -- The prenective view of propositional content -- On content and object -- The identity theory of truth This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind Tropus (DE-588)4186328-8 gnd rswk-swf Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd rswk-swf Prädikat Logik (DE-588)4389352-1 gnd rswk-swf Proposition (DE-588)4240283-9 gnd rswk-swf Predicate (Logic) Proposition (Logic) Tropes (Philosophy) Metaphysics Prädikat Logik (DE-588)4389352-1 s Proposition (DE-588)4240283-9 s Tropus (DE-588)4186328-8 s Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9781108886123 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032594591&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Trueman, Robert Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic Substitution in a sense -- The term/predicate distinction -- Ramsey's challenge -- Two types of reference -- The reference principle -- Fregean realism -- Fregean nominalism -- Some alternatives -- The concept horse paradox -- The metaphysics exam -- States of affairs -- The prenective view of propositional content -- On content and object -- The identity theory of truth Tropus (DE-588)4186328-8 gnd Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd Prädikat Logik (DE-588)4389352-1 gnd Proposition (DE-588)4240283-9 gnd |
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| title | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic |
| title_auth | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic |
| title_exact_search | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic |
| title_full | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic Robert Trueman (University of York) |
| title_fullStr | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic Robert Trueman (University of York) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher-order logic Robert Trueman (University of York) |
| title_short | Properties and propositions |
| title_sort | properties and propositions the metaphysics of higher order logic |
| title_sub | the metaphysics of higher-order logic |
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