Cheating alone and in teams:

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Dilger, Alexander 1968- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Münster Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik Januar 2021
Schriftenreihe:Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik 2021, 1
Online-Zugang:10419/229960
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Zusammenfassung:There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (II, 6 Seiten)

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