The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons:
"This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology. In the first part of the book, the author...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY ; London
Routledge
2021
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in epistemology
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology. In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines how his theory of epistemic reasons influences perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions and motivational internalism. The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and metaethics"-- |
| Beschreibung: | ix, 231 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780367509866 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Acknowledgments Introduction PART I The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons 1 Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework ѴШ 1 11 13 1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An Opinionated Introduction 13 1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality 21 1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States to Competences 22 1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons to Possessed Justifying Reasons 25 2 A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification 35 2.1 The Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification 36 2.2 Analyzing Dispositions and Disposition Ascriptions 43 2.3 Propositional and Doxastic Justification: A Dispositional Analysis 45 3 Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation 3.1 The Problem of the Basing Relation 58 3.1.1 Acting for a Reason and the Problem of Causal Deviance 60 58
vi Contents 3.1.2 The Problem of Causal Deviance and the Epistemic Basing Relation 62 3.2 Dispositions and the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains 68 Appendix: Propositionalism: Normative and Motivating Reasons 78 PART II Perceptual Reasons 4 The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience 4.1 Nondoxastic Justification: A Rough Sketch of the Territory 83 4.2 Internalism and Externalism: The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience 86 4.2.1 Some Externalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Burge on Perceptual Entitlement 88 4.2.2 Some Internalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Dogmatism and Conservatism 98 5 Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification 5.1 Wright’s Conservative Account of the Value of Perceptual Experience 110 5.2 Deontological Justification and Conservatism 113 5.2.1 Deontological Conservatism 115 5.3 Deontological Conservatism vs. (Some) Other Conservative Views 118 5.3.1 Entitlement to Trust a Source of Information 119 5.3.2 Full-Blooded Entitlement 121 6 Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons 6.1 Challenging Dogmatism: Divorcing the Rational and the Justified 129 6.2 Defending Internalism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons 134 6.2.1 Belief: Accessing Reasons in Doxastic Terms 135 6.2.2 Experience: Accessing Reasons in Nondoxastic Terms 138 6.3 Dogmatism and the Challenge of Cognitive Penetration 144
Contents vii PART III Consequences 7 Higher-Order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat 155 157 7.1 Taxonomy of the Defeaters: Rebutters and Undercutters 157 7.2 The Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat 163 7.3 Higher-Order Evidence and State-Given Reasons 168 8 The Nature of Inference 173 8.1 The Nature of Inference: Problems and Proposals 174 8.2 The Dispositional Account of Reason-Possession and the Taking Condition 178 8.2.1 Logical Knowledge 181 8.2.2 Reasons and Reasoning 182 9 The Epistemic Value of Emotions 186 9.1 The Perceptual Model: The Epistemic Value of Emotions 186 9.2 Emotions as Reasons: For and Against 189 9.3 Emotions as Possessed Reasons 195 10 Motivational Internalism andMotivating Reasons 200 10.1 Motivational Internalism: The Debate 201 10.2 Motivational Internalism and the Dispositional View of Motivating Reasons 206 10.3 Applying the Framework 207 11 Self-Knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure 215 11.1 The Transparency Procedure and Self-Knowledge 215 11.2 The Treating Requirement: The Epistemic Relevance of the Transparency Procedure 222 Index 229
|
| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgments Introduction PART I The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons 1 Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework ѴШ 1 11 13 1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An Opinionated Introduction 13 1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality 21 1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States to Competences 22 1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons to Possessed Justifying Reasons 25 2 A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification 35 2.1 The Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification 36 2.2 Analyzing Dispositions and Disposition Ascriptions 43 2.3 Propositional and Doxastic Justification: A Dispositional Analysis 45 3 Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation 3.1 The Problem of the Basing Relation 58 3.1.1 Acting for a Reason and the Problem of Causal Deviance 60 58
vi Contents 3.1.2 The Problem of Causal Deviance and the Epistemic Basing Relation 62 3.2 Dispositions and the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains 68 Appendix: Propositionalism: Normative and Motivating Reasons 78 PART II Perceptual Reasons 4 The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience 4.1 Nondoxastic Justification: A Rough Sketch of the Territory 83 4.2 Internalism and Externalism: The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience 86 4.2.1 Some Externalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Burge on Perceptual Entitlement 88 4.2.2 Some Internalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Dogmatism and Conservatism 98 5 Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification 5.1 Wright’s Conservative Account of the Value of Perceptual Experience 110 5.2 Deontological Justification and Conservatism 113 5.2.1 Deontological Conservatism 115 5.3 Deontological Conservatism vs. (Some) Other Conservative Views 118 5.3.1 Entitlement to Trust a Source of Information 119 5.3.2 Full-Blooded Entitlement 121 6 Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons 6.1 Challenging Dogmatism: Divorcing the Rational and the Justified 129 6.2 Defending Internalism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons 134 6.2.1 Belief: Accessing Reasons in Doxastic Terms 135 6.2.2 Experience: Accessing Reasons in Nondoxastic Terms 138 6.3 Dogmatism and the Challenge of Cognitive Penetration 144
Contents vii PART III Consequences 7 Higher-Order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat 155 157 7.1 Taxonomy of the Defeaters: Rebutters and Undercutters 157 7.2 The Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat 163 7.3 Higher-Order Evidence and State-Given Reasons 168 8 The Nature of Inference 173 8.1 The Nature of Inference: Problems and Proposals 174 8.2 The Dispositional Account of Reason-Possession and the Taking Condition 178 8.2.1 Logical Knowledge 181 8.2.2 Reasons and Reasoning 182 9 The Epistemic Value of Emotions 186 9.1 The Perceptual Model: The Epistemic Value of Emotions 186 9.2 Emotions as Reasons: For and Against 189 9.3 Emotions as Possessed Reasons 195 10 Motivational Internalism andMotivating Reasons 200 10.1 Motivational Internalism: The Debate 201 10.2 Motivational Internalism and the Dispositional View of Motivating Reasons 206 10.3 Applying the Framework 207 11 Self-Knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure 215 11.1 The Transparency Procedure and Self-Knowledge 215 11.2 The Treating Requirement: The Epistemic Relevance of the Transparency Procedure 222 Index 229 |
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| spelling | Vahid, Hamid 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)1225749891 aut The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons Hamid Vahid New York, NY ; London Routledge 2021 ix, 231 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology "This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology. In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines how his theory of epistemic reasons influences perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions and motivational internalism. The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and metaethics"-- Begründung (DE-588)4005252-7 gnd rswk-swf Disposition (DE-588)4150212-7 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 gnd rswk-swf Knowledge, Theory of Justification (Theory of knowledge) Begründung (DE-588)4005252-7 s Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 s Disposition (DE-588)4150212-7 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Online version Vahid, Hamid The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons New York : Taylor & Francis, 2020 9781003052401 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032511702&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Vahid, Hamid 1959- The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons Begründung (DE-588)4005252-7 gnd Disposition (DE-588)4150212-7 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Rechtfertigung (DE-588)4048748-9 gnd |
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| title | The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons |
| title_auth | The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons |
| title_exact_search | The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons |
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| title_full | The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons Hamid Vahid |
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| title_short | The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons |
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