Intuition as conscious experience:
"The nature of intuition and its relation to other mental faculties, particularly perception, is one of the most hotly contested debates in philosophy of mind and psychology. Do intuitions justify belief or merely dispositions to believe? Is intuition a mental state with distinctive phenomenal...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
London ; New York, NY
Routledge
2021
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The nature of intuition and its relation to other mental faculties, particularly perception, is one of the most hotly contested debates in philosophy of mind and psychology. Do intuitions justify belief or merely dispositions to believe? Is intuition a mental state with distinctive phenomenal qualities and if so, how do these differ from normal perceptual states? Drawing on the most recent philosophical research on intuition and perception, Ole Koksvik defends the idea that intuition not only justifies belief but can play a much wider role in our everyday epistemic lives than previously thought. Arguing that intuitional experience is similar to perceptual experience he develops a novel view of intuition as conscious experience. His argument involves both a close description of the kind of experience that intuition is and a defence of intuition against criticism from experimental philosophy. The picture that emerges defends intuitions not because they can be found to be true or false but because they permit us to consider the world as it is might otherwise be and are continuous with the rest of general human inquiry"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 164 Seiten Illustrationen 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781138629141 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "The nature of intuition and its relation to other mental faculties, particularly perception, is one of the most hotly contested debates in philosophy of mind and psychology. Do intuitions justify belief or merely dispositions to believe? Is intuition a mental state with distinctive phenomenal qualities and if so, how do these differ from normal perceptual states? Drawing on the most recent philosophical research on intuition and perception, Ole Koksvik defends the idea that intuition not only justifies belief but can play a much wider role in our everyday epistemic lives than previously thought. Arguing that intuitional experience is similar to perceptual experience he develops a novel view of intuition as conscious experience. His argument involves both a close description of the kind of experience that intuition is and a defence of intuition against criticism from experimental philosophy. The picture that emerges defends intuitions not because they can be found to be true or false but because they permit us to consider the world as it is might otherwise be and are continuous with the rest of general human inquiry"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents 1 Acknowledgements x Introduction 1 1. 1 First steps 1 1.2 More rigour 3 1.2.1 Representational content 3 1.2.2 Phenomenal character 6 1.2.3 Relation to belief 6 1.2.4 Degrees of belief 6 1.2.5 Justification 7 1.2.6 Not knowledge 9 1.2.7 . . . and not evidence lí 1.3 Aim and approach 11 1.4 Why this matters 13 1.5 A new view 15 2 Reduction? 2.1 Doxastic views 22 2.1.1 Motivation 23 2.1.2 Taxonomy 23 2.2 The standard case against doxastic views 24 2.3 The argument from rational criticisability 26 2.4 Partial belief 29 2.5 Doxastic attitudes with different content 31 2.6 Intuition as a disposition to believe 31 2.7 Rational criticisability returns 33 2.8 A lesson about the nature of intuition 35 22
viii 3 Contents The shape of the view 3.1 Intuition is a conscious experience 39 3.2 The Justification Hypothesis is true 40 3.2.1 A lower boundary 41 3.3 Liberalism 42 3.4 Phenomenalism 44 3.5 The absent-experience challenge and ‘overlookable’phenomenal character 46 3.6 No etiological restrictions 48 3.7 Intuition is wholly permissive with respect to content 51 4 Perceptual and intuitional experiences 4.1 Methodology 56 4.2 No content-specific phenomenology 58 4.3 Answering the absent-experience challenge 62 4.4 Phenomenology of objectivity 63 4.4.1 Recognising objectivity 64 4.4.2 Objectivity and the content ofperception and intuition 66 4.4.3 Objectivity explains transparency 68 4.5 Phenomenology ofpushiness 71 4.5.1 Recognising pushiness 71 4.6 Valence 75 4.7 Belief 75 4.8 Objectivity, pushiness, and ‘presentation’ 78 4.9 What intuition is 83 5 Phenomenalism 5.1 Perception singlehandedly justifies belief 91 5.1.1 Perceptual justification without induction 92 5.1.2 Incoherence 94 5.1.3 Taking stock 94 5.2 Perceptionjustifi.es belief in virtue of its phenomenal character 95 5.3 Two unsuccessful attempts 98 5.3.1 Seeming able to just tell’ 99 5.3.2 ‘Presentational’phenomenology 101 5.4 Pushiness and objectivity explain justification 105 5.5 In defence of the analogy 109 5.5.1 The disanalogy of content-specific phenomenology 110 5.5.2 The disanalogy of a known causal mechanism 111 5.5.3 The disanalogy of valence 113 5.6 Taking stock 113
Contents 6 The FIFO objection ix 120 6.1 The feeling-infeeling-out objection 120 6.2 What the objection is not 121 6.3 Significance 122 6.3.1 Core 122 6.3.2 Scope 123 6.3.3 Depth 123 6.4 Initial evaluation 124 6.5 A reply 125 6.6 Objections 128 6.7 A verbal dispute, epistemic pluralism, and justification 130 1 Too much justification? 134 7.1 Defeat 134 7.2 Cognitive penetration 138 7.3 Logical fallacies 140 7.4 Should’ve known 142 7.5 There’s (even) more to the full story, of course 143 7.6 Taking stock 145 8 Final thoughts 147 8.1 Two questions 147 8.2 The role of intuition in philosophy 149 8.3 The role of intuition in everyday life 152 Bibliography Index 154 163
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| adam_txt |
Contents 1 Acknowledgements x Introduction 1 1. 1 First steps 1 1.2 More rigour 3 1.2.1 Representational content 3 1.2.2 Phenomenal character 6 1.2.3 Relation to belief 6 1.2.4 Degrees of belief 6 1.2.5 Justification 7 1.2.6 Not knowledge 9 1.2.7 . . . and not evidence lí 1.3 Aim and approach 11 1.4 Why this matters 13 1.5 A new view 15 2 Reduction? 2.1 Doxastic views 22 2.1.1 Motivation 23 2.1.2 Taxonomy 23 2.2 The standard case against doxastic views 24 2.3 The argument from rational criticisability 26 2.4 Partial belief 29 2.5 Doxastic attitudes with different content 31 2.6 Intuition as a disposition to believe 31 2.7 Rational criticisability returns 33 2.8 A lesson about the nature of intuition 35 22
viii 3 Contents The shape of the view 3.1 Intuition is a conscious experience 39 3.2 The Justification Hypothesis is true 40 3.2.1 A lower boundary 41 3.3 Liberalism 42 3.4 Phenomenalism 44 3.5 The absent-experience challenge and ‘overlookable’phenomenal character 46 3.6 No etiological restrictions 48 3.7 Intuition is wholly permissive with respect to content 51 4 Perceptual and intuitional experiences 4.1 Methodology 56 4.2 No content-specific phenomenology 58 4.3 Answering the absent-experience challenge 62 4.4 Phenomenology of objectivity 63 4.4.1 Recognising objectivity 64 4.4.2 Objectivity and the content ofperception and intuition 66 4.4.3 Objectivity explains transparency 68 4.5 Phenomenology ofpushiness 71 4.5.1 Recognising pushiness 71 4.6 Valence 75 4.7 Belief 75 4.8 Objectivity, pushiness, and ‘presentation’ 78 4.9 What intuition is 83 5 Phenomenalism 5.1 Perception singlehandedly justifies belief 91 5.1.1 Perceptual justification without induction 92 5.1.2 Incoherence 94 5.1.3 Taking stock 94 5.2 Perceptionjustifi.es belief in virtue of its phenomenal character 95 5.3 Two unsuccessful attempts 98 5.3.1 Seeming able to just tell’ 99 5.3.2 ‘Presentational’phenomenology 101 5.4 Pushiness and objectivity explain justification 105 5.5 In defence of the analogy 109 5.5.1 The disanalogy of content-specific phenomenology 110 5.5.2 The disanalogy of a known causal mechanism 111 5.5.3 The disanalogy of valence 113 5.6 Taking stock 113
Contents 6 The FIFO objection ix 120 6.1 The feeling-infeeling-out objection 120 6.2 What the objection is not 121 6.3 Significance 122 6.3.1 Core 122 6.3.2 Scope 123 6.3.3 Depth 123 6.4 Initial evaluation 124 6.5 A reply 125 6.6 Objections 128 6.7 A verbal dispute, epistemic pluralism, and justification 130 1 Too much justification? 134 7.1 Defeat 134 7.2 Cognitive penetration 138 7.3 Logical fallacies 140 7.4 Should’ve known 142 7.5 There’s (even) more to the full story, of course 143 7.6 Taking stock 145 8 Final thoughts 147 8.1 Two questions 147 8.2 The role of intuition in philosophy 149 8.3 The role of intuition in everyday life 152 Bibliography Index 154 163 |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T16:24:27Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:02:44Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781138629141 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Koksvik, Ole Verfasser (DE-588)1225749433 aut Intuition as conscious experience Ole Koksvik London ; New York, NY Routledge 2021 xi, 164 Seiten Illustrationen 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "The nature of intuition and its relation to other mental faculties, particularly perception, is one of the most hotly contested debates in philosophy of mind and psychology. Do intuitions justify belief or merely dispositions to believe? Is intuition a mental state with distinctive phenomenal qualities and if so, how do these differ from normal perceptual states? Drawing on the most recent philosophical research on intuition and perception, Ole Koksvik defends the idea that intuition not only justifies belief but can play a much wider role in our everyday epistemic lives than previously thought. Arguing that intuitional experience is similar to perceptual experience he develops a novel view of intuition as conscious experience. His argument involves both a close description of the kind of experience that intuition is and a defence of intuition against criticism from experimental philosophy. The picture that emerges defends intuitions not because they can be found to be true or false but because they permit us to consider the world as it is might otherwise be and are continuous with the rest of general human inquiry"-- Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd rswk-swf Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd rswk-swf Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd rswk-swf Intuition Perception (Philosophy) Knowledge, Theory of Consciousness Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 s Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 s Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9781351809962 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032511672&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Koksvik, Ole Intuition as conscious experience Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4006349-5 (DE-588)4027532-2 (DE-588)4064317-7 |
| title | Intuition as conscious experience |
| title_auth | Intuition as conscious experience |
| title_exact_search | Intuition as conscious experience |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Intuition as conscious experience |
| title_full | Intuition as conscious experience Ole Koksvik |
| title_fullStr | Intuition as conscious experience Ole Koksvik |
| title_full_unstemmed | Intuition as conscious experience Ole Koksvik |
| title_short | Intuition as conscious experience |
| title_sort | intuition as conscious experience |
| topic | Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Intuition (DE-588)4027532-2 gnd Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Erkenntnistheorie Bewusstsein Intuition Wahrnehmung |
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