Federal antitrust policy: the law of competition and its practice
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
St. Paul, MN
West Academic Publishing
[2020]
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| Ausgabe: | Sixth edition |
| Schriftenreihe: | Hornbook series
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xxiv, 1029 Seiten 26 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781684674350 1684674352 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Hovenkamp, Herbert |d 1948- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)132809168 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Federal antitrust policy |b the law of competition and its practice |c Herbert Hovenkamp (James G. Dinan University professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton School) |
| 250 | |a Sixth edition | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a St. Paul, MN |b West Academic Publishing |c [2020] | |
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| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Hornbook series | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Antitrust law / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Antitrust law / Economic aspects / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Competition, Unfair / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Consolidation and merger of corporations / United States | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE V
PART 1. FOUNDATIONS: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT
CHAPTER 1. THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST 3
§1.1 PRICE THEORY: ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND PERFECT COMPETITION 3
1.1A. THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET 4
1.1B. BEHAVIOR OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM 9
§ 1.2 MONOPOLY 14
1.2A. PRICE AND OUTPUT OF THE PROTECTED MONOPOLIST 14
1.2B. MONOPSONY; OUTPUT EFFECTS; POLICY IMPLICATIONS 17
1.2C. DE FACTO MONOPOLIES IN REAL WORLD MARKETS 20
§ 1.3 ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY 21
1.3A. MONOPOLY AS A STATUS; MONOPOLIZATION AS A PROCESS 21
1.3B. THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS CAUSED BY MONOPOLY 24
1.3C. THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY: RENT-SEEKING 25
1.3D. THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY: LOST COMPETITOR INVESTMENT 29
§ 1.4 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE 32
1.4A. THE GENERAL CASE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE 33
1.4B. PERSISTENT SCALE ECONOMIES, NATURAL MONOPOLY, FRANCHISE
BIDDING AND CONTESTABILITY 38
§ 1.4C. TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 44
§ 1.5 LESS-THAN-PERFECT COMPETITION 46
1.5A. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 46
1.5B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 47
1.5C. OLIGOPOLY 48
1.5D. LESS-THAN-PERFECT COMPETITION AND "SECOND BEST" 48
§ 1.6 BARRIERS TO ENTRY 49
§ 1.7 THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE PARADIGM 53
§ 1.8 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 58
CHAPTER 2. HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY IN ANTITRUST POLICY 69
§ 2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST POLICY 69
2.1A. THE GOALS OF THE SHERMAN ACT: EFFICIENCY AND INTEREST GROUP
EXPLANATIONS 69
2.1B. THE COMMON LAW AND THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 73
2.1C. A THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 77
§ 2.2 ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST 82
2.2A. ANTITRUST AND ECONOMICS BEFORE 1960 82
2.2B. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND ITS AFTERMATH 84
2.2C. ERROR COST ANALYSIS; COMPETITOR V. CONSUMER SUITS; PRIVATE V.
PUBLIC SUITS 87
2.2D. POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC POLICY 92
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.2E. ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 93
§ 2.3 THE NECESSITY AND NATURE OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 95
2.3A. THE DOMAIN OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 95
2.3B. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 98
2.3C. THE MEANING OF "CONSUMER WELFARE" 99
CHAPTER 3. MARKET POWER AND MARKET DEFINITION . 103
§3.1 INTRODUCTION 103
3.1A. MARKET POWER TECHNICALLY DEFINED .104
3.1B. MARKET SHARE AS A SURROGATE FOR MARKET POWER ,.106
3.1C. MARKET SHARE AS MORE THAN A SURROGATE; INDEPENDENT RELEVANCE
OF MARKET SHARE 107
3.ID. THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST MARKET .107
§ 3.2 ESTIMATING THE RELEVANT MARKET; THE SSNIP AND THE "HYPOTHETICAL
MONOPOLIST" 108
3.2A. SIZE OF HYPOTHESIZED PRICE INCREASE ILL
3.2B. THE "PROFIT-MAXIMIZING" INCREASE; CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS 113
3.2C. BROADER AND NARROWER MARKETS; GENERAL IRRELEVANCE OF
SUBMARKETS 114
§ 3.3 THE PRODUCT MARKET; GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 118
3.3A. MARKETS AND BRANDS; "LOCK-IN" 121
3.3AL. SINGLE BRAND ORDINARILY NOT A RELEVANT MARKET;
KODAK; PATENTED PHARMACEUTICALS 121
3.3A2. LOWER COURT DECISIONS LIMITING KODAK 126
3.3A3. CONTRACT "LOCK-IN;" FRANCHISOR BRAND AS MARKET 127
3.3B. SUBSTITUTES V. COMPLEMENTS; CLUSTER MARKETS AND TWO-SIDED
PLATFORMS 129
3.3BL. RELEVANT MARKET CONSISTS OF SUBSTITUTES 129
3.3B2. THE LIMITED RATIONALE FOR FINDING "CLUSTER" MARKETS. 130
3.3B3. ASSESSING MARKET POWER ON TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 132
§ 3.4 PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND THE CELLOPHANE FALLACY 133
3.4A. CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES AND THEIR MEANING 133
3.4B. CROSS-ELASTICITY OF DEMAND IN DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS AND THE
DU PONT (CELLOPHANE) CASE 134
3.4C. CORRECTING FOR THE "CELLOPHANE" FALLACY 136
§ 3.5 SUPPLY ELASTICITIES; FOREIGN IMPORTS 138
3.5A. FOREIGN IMPORTS AND THE ALCOA CASE 139
3.5B. OTHER DECISIONS ADDRESSING (OR FAILING TO ADDRESS) SUPPLY
ISSUES 141
3.5C. ACCOUNTING FOR ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY: MARKET INCLUSION OR LOW
BARRIERS TO ENTRY? 143
§ 3.6 THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 144
3.6A. SHIPPED GOODS; MINIMUM GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 145
3.6B. STATIONARY GOODS AND SERVICES 146
3.6C. PRICE MOVEMENTS AND SHIPPING PATTERNS 149
3.6CL. PRICE MOVEMENTS GENERALLY; ASYMMETRY 149
3.6C2. THE ELZINGA-HOGARTY TEST 150
3.6D. TRADE AREA; NON-COMPETITION COVENANTS 151
3.6E. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 153
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 3.7 COMPUTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MARKET SHARES 154
3.7A. REVENUE V. UNITS 155
3.7B. OUTPUT V. CAPACITY 156
3.7C. PRODUCT DURABILITY AND POWER 157
3.7D. INTERPRETING MARKET SHARE DATA; QUESTIONS OF FACT OR LAW 159
§ 3.8 MARKET DEFINITION IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MERGER GUIDELINES 162
3.8A. PRODUCT MARKET DELINEATION IN THE 2010 GUIDELINES 163
3.8B. GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION UNDER THE 2010 GUIDELINES 165
3.8C. CALCULATION OF MARKET SHARES UNDER THE 2010 MERGER
GUIDELINES 166
3.8D. THE "CELLOPHANE" FALLACY AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKET
DELINEATION FOR MERGERS AND OTHER PRACTICES 168
3.8E. CONCLUSION; THE GUIDELINES AS A POLICY STATEMENT 169
§ 3.9 ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING MARKET POWER 169
3.9A. MEASURING RESIDUAL DEMAND DIRECTLY 170
3.9B. PERSISTENT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 172
3.9BL. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 174
3.9B2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND MARKET DEFINITION 175
3.9C. PERSISTENT MONOPOLY PROFITS; HIGH MARGINS; EXCLUSION
PAYMENTS 175
3.9CL. MONOPOLY PROFITS V. ACCOUNTING PROFITS 175
3.9C2. ABSENCE OF HIGH ACCOUNTING PROFITS 177
3.9C3. THE PROBLEM OF "RENTS" 177
3.9C4. POWER INFERRED FROM EXCLUSION PAYMENTS: ACTAVIS
DECISION 179
3.9D. MARKET POWER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 179
3.9E. ASSESSING MARKET POWER FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 181
PART 2. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST
CHAPTER 4. ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD COLLUSION AND
OLIGOPOLY 185
§ 4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF PRICE FIXING 185
4.1A. THE (VIRTUAL) UNIVERSALITY OF CARTEL CHEATING 188
4.1AL. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN CARTEL AND SINGLE FIRM PROFIT
MAXIMIZATION 189
4.1A2. CARTEL CHEATING STRATEGIES 190
4.1A3. DETECTING AND PUNISHING CHEATING; CARTEL "AMNESTY". 192
4.1B. COMPETITIVE FRINGE FIRMS 196
4.1C. INTERNAL EFFICIENCIES OF THE CARTEL 197
4.1D. CARTELS OF BUYERS; LABOR ANTI-POACHING AGREEMENTS 199
§ 4.2 IMPERFECT COMPETITION 201
4.2A. NON-COOPERATIVE COURNOT OLIGOPOLY 202
4.2B. OLIGOPOLY STRATEGIES 205
§ 4.3 THE SOCIAL COST OF COLLUSION 209
§ 4.4 ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD OLIGOPOLY AND TACIT COLLUSION 210
4.4A. ATTACKING OLIGOPOLY; THE TURNER-POSNER DEBATE 210
4.4B. IDENTIFYING TACIT COLLUSION AND FACILITATORS; POLICY OPTIONS 213
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 4.5 PROVING A PRICE OR OUTPUT "AGREEMENT" FROM INDIRECT OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE; HUB-AND-SPOKE CONSPIRACIES 217
§ 4.6 REACHING OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR ON LESS EXPLICIT EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT
223
4.6A. INTRODUCTION; INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS 224
4.6B. CHALLENGING FACILITATORS ESTABLISHED BY AGREEMENT 226
4.6C. "UNILATERAL" FACILITATORS; BASING-POINT PRICING SCHEMES 228
4.6D. OTHER FACILITATORS, INCLUDING ALGORITHMS; § 5 OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT 232
4.6E. MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CONSPIRACY
CASES; COURTS' GENERAL ADHERENCE TO TRADITIONAL CONSPIRACY
REQUIREMENTS 237
§ 4.7 INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY 239
CHAPTER 5. JOINT VENTURES OF COMPETITORS, CONCERTED
REFUSALS, PATENT LICENSING, AND THE RULE OF REASON 247
§ 5.1 INTRODUCTION: NAKED AND ANCILLARY AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS 247
5.1A. DISTINGUISHING NAKED FROM ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS; QUESTION OF
LAW 248
5.1B. WHY MULTILATERAL ACTIVITY DESERVES CLOSER ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 250
5.1C. PARTIAL CONDEMNATION; LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES 253
§ 5.2 JOINT VENTURES AS MARKET FACILITATORS 254
5.2A. JOINT VENTURES: AN OVERVIEW 255
5.2AL. POTENTIAL HARMS AND BENEFITS 255
5.2A2. THE TWO SIDES OF THE EXCLUSIVITY PROBLEM 258
5.2B. VENTURES FACILITATING R & D, ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION;
ANCILLARY MARKET DIVISIONS 260
5.2BL. JOINT VENTURES AND FREE RIDER PROBLEMS 260
5.2B2. NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH ACT 260
5.2B3. ANCILLARY AND NAKED AGREEMENTS PERTAINING TO
ADVERTISING 261
5.2B4. ANCILLARY MARKET DIVISIONS AND NONCOMPETITION
AGREEMENTS 263
5.2C. TRANSACTIONAL EFFICIENCIES JUSTIFYING JOINT VENTURE PRICE
SETTING 268
5.2D. THE RELATION BETWEEN JOINT VENTURE ANALYSIS AND MERGER
ANALYSIS 271
§ 5.3 COMPETITOR EXCHANGES OF PRICE OR OUTPUT INFORMATION; POSTING
AGREEMENTS 274
5.3A. INDUSTRY-WIDE DISSEMINATION OF PRICE AND OUTPUT INFORMATION.275
5.3B. DIRECT COMPETITOR EXCHANGE OF PRICE INFORMATION 277
5.3C. AGREEMENTS TO POST, OR TO POST AND ADHERE 279
5.3D. AGREEMENTS OF WAGE AND SALARY INFORMATION; "ANTI-POACHING"
AGREEMENTS 279
§ 5.4 CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL, JOINT VENTURE MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTIONS,
AND
STANDARD SETTING 280
5.4A. HARMS AND BENEFITS; APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST STANDARD 280
5.4AL. A RULE OF REASON, WITH EXCEPTIONS 281
5.4A2. SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS? 286
5.4B. EFFICIENT JOINT VENTURES AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 288
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5.4BL. CLOSED-MEMBERSHIP AND OTHER TRADITIONAL JOINT
VENTURES 288
5.4B2. OPEN-MEMBERSHIP VENTURES; POSITIVE NETWORK
EXTERNALITIES 289
5.4C. STANDARD SETTING AND RULE ENFORCEMENT IN PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEURIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 295
5.4D. AGREEMENTS INVOLVING NON-COMPETITORS 302
5.4E. EXPRESSIVE AND NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTS 303
§ 5.5 AGREEMENTS GOVERNING THE LICENSING AND USE OF PATENTS AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 304
5.5A. INTRODUCTION; BASIC ISSUES 304
5.5B. THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE, ANTITRUST AND
BEYOND 306
5.5C. PATENT LICENSING; THE "SCOPE OF THE PATENT" RULE 310
5.5CL. PRICE FIXING; OUTPUT RESTRICTIONS; ROYALTY RATES;
EXCLUSIVITY 312
5.5C2. HORIZONTAL TERRITORIAL AND OTHER MARKET DIVISION
AGREEMENTS 316
5.5C3. PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT
DISPUTES; ACTAVIS 317
5.5C4. PACKAGE LICENSES 320
5.5C5. PATENT POOLS 321
5.5C6. GRANTBACKS 322
5.5C7. FRAND: PATENT LICENSING AND STANDARD-ESSENTIAL
PATENTS 323
5.5D. AGREEMENTS CONCERNING NON-PATENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 326
§ 5.6 CHARACTERIZATION AND EVALUATION: THE PER SE RULE AND THE RULE OF
REASON 327
5.6A. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PER SE RULE 327
5.6B. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULE OF REASON AND PER SE TREATMENT.329
5.6C. IDENTIFYING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT: A TENTATIVE ROAD MAP 334
5.6D. THE TRUNCATED, OR "QUICK LOOK," RULE OF REASON 342
5.6E. REFORMING THE RULE OF REASON 345
CHAPTER 6. EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES AND THE DOMINANT FIRM:
THE BASIC DOCTRINE OF MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPT 349
§ 6.1 THE MONOPOLIZATION OFFENSE 349
§ 6.2 MONOPOLY POWER AND ILLEGAL MONOPOLIZATION 352
6.2A. MONOPOLIZATION'S MARKET POWER REQUIREMENT 352
6.2B. THE RELATION BETWEEN MARKET POWER AND MARKET SHARE; ENTRY
BARRIERS 354
§ 6.3 CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS*IS BAD CONDUCT NECESSARY? 356
§ 6.4 IDENTIFYING MONOPOLIZING CONDUCT 358
6.4A. EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT DEFINED 358
6.4B. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT SUITS DISTINGUISHED; EQUITY
REMEDIES 363
6.4C. INTENT 363
§ 6.5 THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE 364
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
6.5A. ATTEMPT LAW'S SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIREMENT 365
6.5B. "DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS" 368
6.5BL. THE "DANGEROUS PROBABILITY" REQUIREMENT AS A
SCREENING DEVICE 370
6.5B2. DANGEROUS PROBABILITY AND MARKET POWER .371
§ 6.6 CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE
;
^ 73
CHAPTER 7. EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES IN MONOPOLIZATION AND
ATTEMPT CASES 375
§ 7.1 INTRODUCTION 375
§ 7.2 MERGER AND MONOPOLY 376
§ 7.3 OUTPUT EXPANSION; STRATEGIC CAPACITY CONSTRUCTION ,378
§ 7.4 PRICE DISCRIMINATION; LEASING PRACTICES 379
§ 7.5 UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL I: GENERAL DOCTRINE 381
7.5A. PROTECTING THE INCENTIVE TO INVEST 382
7.5B. SCOPE OF DUTY TO DEAL 387
7.5C. REFUSALS TO DEAL IN COOPERATIVE NETWORKS 388
§ 7.6 UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL II: VERTICAL INTEGRATION, PRICE
SQUEEZES, TYING
AND EXCLUSIVE DEALING 389
7.6A. KODAK AND ITS AFTERMATH 390
7.6AL. "LOCK-IN" REQUIRES INITIAL PURCHASE AND SUBSEQUENT
CHANGE OF POLICY 392
7.6A2. "AVERAGE" CUSTOMER MUST BE POORLY INFORMED; OR PRICE
DISCRIMINATION MUST BE POSSIBLE 392
7.6A3. § 2 AND AFTERMARKET OPPORTUNISM 393
7.6B. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND REFUSALS TO DEAL; PRICE OR SUPPLY
"SQUEEZES" 393
7.6C. QUASI-TYING AND EXCLUSIVE DEALING*TECHNOLOGICAL TIES 397
7.6D. USE OF VERTICAL REFUSALS BY PRIVATE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFS 399
7.6E. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE 400
7.6F. UNILATERAL REFUSAL BY NONMONOPOLIST 400
§ 7.7 REFUSAL TO DEAL III: THE "ESSENTIAL FACILITY" DOCTRINE 401
7.7A. WHAT IS A QUALIFYING "ESSENTIAL FACILITY"? 402
7.7B. THE EXTENT OF THE DUTY TO DEAL 403
7.7C. REASONABLENESS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL 404
7.7D. ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE INCONSISTENT WITH GENERAL ANTITRUST
GOALS 405
7.7DL. FORCED SHARING REQUIRES PRICE ADMINISTRATION 405
7.7D2. FORCED SHARING UNDERCUTS INCENTIVES TO DEVELOP
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY; ASPEN CONTRASTED 406
§ 7.8 "PREDATORY" PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT; FAILURE TO
PREDISCLOSE;
ALTERED COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS 406
7.8A. PREDATORY PRODUCT OR PROCESS INNOVATION 407
7.8B. FAILURE TO PREDISCLOSE NEW TECHNOLOGY 410
7.8C. MICROSOFT: UNNECESSARILY HARMFUL REDESIGNS AND LICENSING
REQUIREMENTS 411
7.8D. STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE; PREDATORY ADVERTISING, EXCESSIVE
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 413
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 7.9 THE TROUBLESOME "LEVERAGE" THEORY; NONMONOPOLISTIC ADVANTAGE IN
SECOND MARKET 415
§ 7.10 RAISING RIVALS' COSTS (RRC) 416
7.10A. THE PEDIGREE AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RRC 418
7.10B. PRE-EMPTION OF MARKETS OR CUSTOMERS AS RRC 420
§ 7.11 UNREASONABLY EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES INVOLVING PATENTS OR OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 423
7.11A. WALKER PROCESS: IMPROPER INFRINGEMENT SUITS ON UNENFORCEABLE
PATENTS 424
7.11B. ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT KNOWN TO BE INVALID OR UNENFORCEABLE;
NOERR ISSUES 425
7.11C. ACCUMULATION; NONUSE 430
7.11D. UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO LICENSE, SIMPLE AND CONDITIONAL 432
7.11DL. ABSOLUTE REFUSAL TO LICENSE 432
7.11D2. CONDITIONAL REFUSALS TO LICENSE 435
7.LIE. PATENT "AMBUSH" AND FAILURE TO DISCLOSE, PARTICULARLY IN
STANDARD SETTING 436
§ 7.12 ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT PROCESS 438
§ 7.13 BUSINESS TORTS AS ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 439
§ 7.14 CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS IN ATTEMPT CASES 441
CHAPTER 8. PREDATORY AND OTHER EXCLUSIONARY PRICING 443
§ 8.1 INTRODUCTION 443
§ 8.2 WHEN IS A PRICE PREDATORY? THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST 444
§ 8.3 PREDATORY PRICING: APPLICATION AND CRITICISM OF THE AREEDA-TURNER
TEST 446
8.3A. THE AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) SURROGATE 446
8.3B. THE PROBLEM OF LONG-RUN, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; "PREDATORY"
PRICES ABOVE COST; MULTIPLE-BENEFIT PREDATION 448
8.3BL. LIMIT PRICING AND STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE 448
8.3B2. MULTIPLE-BENEFIT PREDATION 451
8.3C. AVC MEASURED AS AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COST; OPPORTUNITY COST 452
§ 8.4 STRUCTURAL ISSUES: WHEN IS PREDATORY PRICING PLAUSIBLE? RECOUPMENT
454
8.4A. THE PREDATOR'S MARKET POSITION; PREDATORY PRICING IN
OLIGOPOLY 455
8.4B. BARRIERS TO ENTRY 457
8.4C. EXCESS CAPACITY 458
8.4D. DISPOSITION OF PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 460
8.4E. SHOULD COMPETITOR PREDATORY PRICING SUITS BE ABOLISHED? 461
§ 8.5 JUDICIAL ADAPTION OF THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST: PRICE/COST
RELATIONSHIPS
AND INTENT 462
8.5A. PRICE/COST RELATIONSHIPS 462
8.5B. INTENT 463
§ 8.6 JUDICIAL ADAPTION OF AREEDA-TURNER: IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COSTS;
MULTI-
PRODUCT FIRMS; CUSTOMER-SPECIFIC PRICING 465
§ 8.7 JUDICIAL ADAPTION OF AREEDA-TURNER: STRUCTURAL ISSUES AND
RECOUPMENT .467
§ 8.8 PREDATORY PRICING AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 469
§ 8.9 MORE COMPLEX EXCLUSIONARY PRICING STRATEGIES, PARTICULARLY
DISCOUNTS 476
8.9A. QUANTITY AND LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 476
8.9B. PACKAGE PRICING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 479
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
8.9BL. THE VARIETIES OF BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 479
8.9B2. THE "ATTRIBUTION" TEST FOR BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 480
8.9B3. MORE COMPLEX BUNDLES 482
8.9C. SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND RELATED PRICING INCENTIVES PAID TO
RETAILERS 483
§ 8.10 PREDATORY BUYING AND MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSES IN PURCHASE
AGREEMENTS
4
^4
CHAPTER 9. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND VERTICAL MERGERS 489
§9.1 INTRODUCTION 489
§ 9.2 THE ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 491
9.2A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COASE'S WORK; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
.491
9.2B. COST SAVINGS, TECHNOLOGICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL 493
9.2C. EFFICIENT VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MULTI-STAGE MARKET POWER;
ELIMINATING DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION; TWO-PART TARIFFS 496
§ 9.3 PLAUSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 500
9.3A. STRATEGIC CONTROL OF INPUTS 500
9.3B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 501
9.3C. FORECLOSURE AND ENTRY BARRIERS 502
9.3D. VERTICAL INTEGRATION BY PRICE REGULATED FIRMS 503
9.3E. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CARTELS 504
§ 9.4 VERTICAL MERGERS AND ANTITRUST LAW 505
§ 9.5 VERTICAL MERGERS AND THE MERGER GUIDELINES 511
CHAPTER 10. TIE-INS, RECIPROCITY, EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND
MOST FAVORED NATION AGREEMENTS 517
§ 10.1 INTRODUCTION: THE JUDICIAL TEST FOR TIE-INS 517
§ 10.2 TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE 519
§ 10.3 MARKET POWER AND PER SE UNLAWFUL TIES; SHERMAN V. CLAYTON ACT
TESTS .520
10.3A. THE RATIONALE AND DEVELOPMENT OF TYING'S MARKET POWER
REQUIREMENT 520
10.3B. TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS;
LOCKED-IN CUSTOMERS 523
10.3C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER 526
10.3D. "UNIQUENESS" AND UBIQUITY AS MARKET POWER 527
10.3E. SEPARATE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACT TESTS? FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT 528
10.3F. THE RATIONALE FOR PER SE ILLEGAL TIE-INS 529
§ 10.4 WHEN ARE PRODUCTS TIED TOGETHER? 531
10.4A. COERCION BY CONTRACT, CONDITION, OR UNDERSTANDING 531
10.4B. PROOF OF A RELEVANT TYING "AGREEMENT;" UNCOMMUNICATED
CONDITIONS 534
10.4C. PACKAGE DISCOUNTS 534
10.4D. COERCION BY PACKAGE DESIGN; TECHNOLOGICAL TIES 535
§ 10.5 THE REQUIREMENT OF SEPARATE TYING AND TIED PRODUCTS 537
10.5A. INTRODUCTION; BASIC COMPETITIVE MARKET TEST 537
10.5B. "NEW" PRODUCTS ZZZZZZZ.538
10.5C. COMPLETE AND PARTIAL SUBSTITUTES AS SEPARATE PRODUCTS 539
10.5D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LABOR AS SEPARATE PRODUCTS 540
TABLE OF CONTENTS
10.5E. EFFICIENCY*"ECONOMIES OF JOINT PROVISION" 541
§ 10.6 COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 543
10.6A. THE LEVERAGE THEORY: USING TIE-INS TO TURN ONE MONOPOLY INTO
TWO; TIPPING 543
10.6B. ENTRY BARRIERS, FORECLOSURE, AND COLLUSION 546
10.6BL. ENTRY BARRIERS AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS 546
10.6B2. FORECLOSURE; MARKET SHARE 547
10.6B3. TIE-INS AND COLLUSION 547
10.6C. EVASION OF RATE REGULATION 548
10.6D. PREDATORY PRICING AND OTHER ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE 550
10.6E. TIE-INS AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND METERING DEVICES;
FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 551
10.6F. TYING AND DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION; "REVERSE LEVERAGING" 555
§ 10.7 TIE-INS AND EFFICIENCY: TOWARD A GENERAL RULE OF REASON 557
10.7A. EFFICIENCIES AND TYING LAW'S IDIOSYNCRATIC PER SE RULE 557
10.7B. NONFORECLOSING TIES: FULL-LINE FORCING AND UNWANTED TIED
PRODUCTS; LACK OF CONSUMER INJURY 558
10.7C. CONCLUSION: MOVING TYING LAW TOWARD A RULE OF REASON 559
§ 10.8 RECIPROCITY 561
§ 10.9 EXCLUSIVE DEALING 563
10.9A. ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE AND ITS VARIATIONS 564
10.9AL. THE FORECLOSURE THEORY OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING 564
10.9A2. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 565
10.9A3. DEFINING MARKETS TO MEASURE VERTICAL FORECLOSURE 566
10.9B. EXCLUSIVE DEALING AS A CARTEL FACILITATOR 566
10.9C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND TYING 567
10.9D. EFFICIENCY EXPLANATIONS AND DEFENSES FOR EXCLUSIVE DEALING 568
10.9E. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS 571
§ 10.10 VERTICAL MOST-FAVORED NATION (MFN) AND "ANTI-STEERING" CLAUSES
575
CHAPTER 11. INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS ON DISTRIBUTION 579
§ 11.1 INTRODUCTION 579
§ 11.2 PERCEIVED COMPETITIVE THREATS OF MINIMUM RPM AND VERTICAL
TERRITORIAL
RESTRAINTS 580
11.2A. INTRODUCTION 580
11.2B. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AS COLLUSION FACILITATORS; POWERFUL
INDIVIDUAL DEALERS 581
11.2BL. DEALER POWER; POLICY IMPLICATIONS 584
11.2B2. MANUFACTURER COLLUSION AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 585
11.2C. FORECLOSURE EFFECTS 586
11.2D. THIRD DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION 587
11.2E. OTHER THEORIES 588
§ 11.3 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND EFFICIENCY 588
11.3A. THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 588
11.3AL. THE ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS TO COMBAT FREE
RIDING 590
11.3A2. THE DOMAIN AND EFFICIENCY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS TO
COMBAT FREE-RIDING 591
XVIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
11.3B. VARIATIONS ON THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATIONS 592
11.3BL. PURCHASE OF PREFERRED DISTRIBUTION SERVICES; SHELF
SPACE; QUALITY CERTIFICATION 592
11.3B2. FACILITATING RESALE DENSITY 593
11.3B3. FACILITATING SUPPLIER ENTRY 594
11.3B4. PROTECTION OF DEALER MARGINS; ENFORCEMENT OF
DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS 594
11.3C. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND EFFICIENCY RECONSIDERED 595
§ 11.4 THE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT IN VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES 596
11.4A. AGREEMENTS*HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL, PRICE AND NONPRICE 596
11.4B. THE COLGATE DOCTRINE 597
11.4C. DEALER TERMINATIONS 598
11.4D. THE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT AND ANTITRUST POLICY RESPECTING
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS; RESTRAINTS INITIATED BY POWERFUL DEALERS 601
§ 11.5 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE IN THE COURTS 602
11.5A. FROM DR. MILES TO LEEGIN 602
11.5B. THE MEANING OF "RESALE"*CONSIGNMENT EXCEPTION 605
11.5C. MAXIMUM RPM 609
11.5D. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRICE AND NON-PRICE AGREEMENTS 613
§ 11.6 VERTICAL NONPRICE RESTRAINTS UNDER THE RULE OF REASON 613
11.6A. BALANCING "INTRABRAND" AND "INTERBRAND" COMPETITION 615
11.6B. SYLVANIA'S IMPACT IN THE LOWER COURTS 618
11.6C. BOYCOTT CLAIMS 620
11.6D. EXCLUSIVE DEALERSHIPS, SOLE OUTLETS, AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 621
11.6E. DUAL DISTRIBUTION 622
§ 11.7 CONCLUSION: THE RULE OF REASON FOR DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS 623
11.7A. GENERAL POLICY CONCERNS 623
11.7B. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION NOT DECISIVE 624
11.7C. REJECTED APPROACHES 625
11.7D. RULE OF REASON INQUIRY SUMMARIZED 625
CHAPTER 12. MERGERS OF COMPETITORS 629
§ 12.1 INTRODUCTION: FEDERAL MERGER POLICY AND THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 629
12.1A. THE RELEVANCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE TO MERGER ANALYSIS 632
12.1B. THE BASIC CONCERNS OF MERGER POLICY: REDUCED MARKET OUTPUT
OR INNOVATION, HIGHER PRICES, AND OFFSETTING EFFICIENCIES 633
12.1C. MERGERS AND EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES; PREDATORY PRICING; PRIVATE
CHALLENGES 636
§ 12.2 EFFICIENCY AND MERGER POLICY 638
12.2A. THE DUBIOUS LEGACY OF THE WARREN ERA 638
12.2B. ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS 640
12.2BL. THE WELFARE "TRADEOFF MODEL 640
12.2B2. MUST EFFICIENCIES BE "PASSED ON"? 644
12.2B3. EFFICIENCIES MUST BE "MERGER-SPECIFIC" AND
"EXTRAORDINARY" 645
12.2B4. PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFICATION, MEASUREMENT, AND PROOF 646
12.2B5. BENEFIT AND THREAT IN DIFFERENT MARKETS 649
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 12.3 ESTIMATING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES I: MERGERS FACILITATING
UNILATERAL PRICE INCREASES 649
12.3A. INTRODUCTION 649
12.3B. MERGER TO MONOPOLY 649
12.3C. DOMINANT FIRM'S ACQUISITION OF NASCENT RIVAL; PLATFORM
ACQUISITIONS 650
12.3D. UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS 651
12.3E. MERGERS THAT THREATEN INNOVATION 657
§ 12.4 ESTIMATING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES II: MERGERS FACILITATING
COORDINATED INTERACTION 659
12.4A. MEASURING MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE CR4 AND THE
HERFINDAHL 660
12.4AL. THE FOUR-FIRM CONCENTRATION RATIO (CR4) 661
12.4A2. THE HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX (HHI) 662
12.4B. MARKET SHARE THRESHOLDS UNDER THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 667
12.4C. THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET SHARE
MEASURES 668
12.4D. HOW SHOULD CONCENTRATION COUNT? THE PHILADELPHIA BANK
PRESUMPTION 670
12.4E. MERGERS OF COMPETING BUYERS 673
§ 12.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 674
12.5A. GENERAL EFFECTS 674
12.5B. MORE EXTREME PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: WHEN IS A MERGER
HORIZONTAL? 675
§ 12.6 BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN MERGER CASES 677
12.6A. THE APPROPRIATE DEFINITION OF ENTRY BARRIERS FOR MERGER POLICY
.677
12.6B. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ENTRY BARRIER? 681
12.6BL. ECONOMIES OF SCALE 681
12.6B2. RISK AND SIZE OF INVESTMENT; SUNK COSTS 682
12.6B3. ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, AND CUSTOMER LOYALTY 683
12.6B4. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 684
12.6B5. GOVERNMENT ENTRY RESTRICTIONS, INCLUDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 685
12.6C. EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROVE ENTRY BARRIERS OR THEIR ABSENCE 687
12.6D. ENTRY BARRIER ANALYSIS UNDER THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 690
§ 12.7 OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE COMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF MERGERS
691
12.7A. SOPHISTICATION AND POWER OF TRADING PARTNERS 692
12.7B. ADEQUACY OF IRREPLACEABLE INPUTS 694
12.7C. EXCESS CAPACITY 695
12.7D. MARKETING AND SALES METHODS 696
12.7E. HISTORY OF COLLUSION OR FACILITATING PRACTICES 696
12.7F. "TRENDS" TOWARDS CONCENTRATION 697
12.7G. AGGRESSIVENESS OF ACQUIRED FIRM 698
§ 12.8 OBSERVED ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; POST-ACQUISITION REVIEW 698
§ 12.9 THE "FAILING COMPANY" DEFENSE AND RELATED FACTORS AFFECTING FIRM
VIABILITY 700
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 12.10 PARTIAL ACQUISITIONS AND ACQUISITIONS "SOLELY FOR INVESTMENT";
HORIZONTAL
SHAREHOLDING "03
§ 12.11 INTERLOCKING CORPORATE DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS "06
CHAPTER 13. CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 709
§ 13.1 INTRODUCTION: COMPETITION AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 709
§ 13.2 CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND EFFICIENCY 710
§ 13.3 PERCEIVED DANGERS TO COMPETITION 712
13.3A. RECIPROCITY 712
13.3B. LEVERAGE, TIE-INS, AND "PORTFOLIO" EFFECTS 715
13.3C. STRATEGIC PRICING AND ENTRY DETERRENCE 716
§ 13.4 MERGERS OF POTENTIAL COMPETITORS 717
13.4A. THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL ENTRANT DOCTRINE 718
13.4B. "ACTUAL" POTENTIAL ENTRANT DOCTRINE 721
§ 13.5 CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION GUIDELINES 722
CHAPTER 14. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 725
§ 14.1 INTRODUCTION: PRICE DISCRIMINATION 725
§ 14.2 PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND COMPETITION 726
§ 14.3 PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND MARKET POWER 727
§ 14.4 THREE DEGREES OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION; ARBITRAGE 729
§ 14.5 PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 732
14.5A. THE SOCIAL COST OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 732
14.5B. THE SOCIAL COST OF PREVENTING PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN
CONCENTRATED MARKETS 733
§ 14.6 THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION 734
14.6A. GENERAL INTERPRETATION 734
14.6AL. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN ACHIEVING
GOALS 734
14.6A2. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT'S THEORY OF COMPETITIVE
INJURY 735
14.6B. THE MEANING OF PRICE "DISCRIMINATION" UNDER THE ACT 737
14.6C. PRIMARY- AND SECONDARY-LINE VIOLATIONS 737
14.6D. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 739
14.6E. VIOLATIONS BY BUYERS 743
14.6F. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 743
14.6FL. "COST JUSTIFICATION" DEFENSE 744
14.6F2. "MEETING COMPETITION" DEFENSE 745
PART 3. ANTITRUST AS A REGULATORY INSTITUTION
CHAPTER 15. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS 749
§ 15.1 PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT GENERALLY; THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 749
15.1A. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 750
15.1B. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 752
§ 15.2 THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 754
§ 15.3 THE PROCESS OF PREMERGER NOTIFICATION 757
TABU: OF CONTKNTS
*: 15.4 "QUASI-PUBLIC" ENFORCEMENT: THE STATES' ATTORNEYS GENERAL 758
CHAPTER 16. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 761
§ 1(5.1 INTRODUCTION: § 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 761
§ 16.2 PERMISSIBLE PLAINTIFFS*WHO SHOULD ENFORCE THE ANTITRUST LAWS? 762
§ 10.3 ANTITRUST'S SPECIAL REQUIREMENT OF COMPETITIVE INJURY 763
16.,"3A. "ANTITRUST INJURY"; PRIVATE MERGER CHALLENGES 764
16.3AL. MERGERS ALLEGED TO FACILITATE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES 764
16.3A2. TAKEOVER TARGETS AS ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFS 766
16.3A3. CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS 767
16.3B. "ANTITRUST INJURY" BEYOND § 7; PER SE VIOLATIONS 768
16.3C. CAUSATION, INJURY-IN-FACT, ANTITRUST INJURY DISTINGUISHED 769
16.3D. ANTITRUST INJURY AND DAMAGES CLAIMS 771
16.3E. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 772
16.3F. PLAINTIFFS UNAFFECTED BY INJURY TO COMPETITION 772
§ 16.4 STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL RULES LIMITING ANTITRUST STANDING 774
16.4A. "BUSINESS OR PROPERTY" 774
16.4B. MARKET RELATIONSHIPS; "DIRECT INJURY" AND "TARGET AREA" TESTS
.775
16.41)1. "DIRECT INJURY" 775
16.4B2. "TARGET AREA" 776
16.4B3. SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS AT A MORE USEFUL
ALTERNATIVE 777
16.4C. THE PREFERRED POSITION OF CONSUMERS AND COMPETITORS 779
§ 16.5 SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF ANTITRUST STANDING 781
16.5A. THE UNESTABLISHED BUSINESS AS ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF 781
16.5B. EMPLOYEES 782
16.5C. DERIVATIVE INJURIES AND "DUPLICATIVE RECOVERY" 783
16.5D. SECOND BEST PLAINTIFFS 785
16.5E. PARI DELICTO; DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS 786
§ 16.6 THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE 787
16.6A. HANOVER SHOE, ILLINOIS BRICK, & APPLE V. PEPPER 787
16.6B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ILLINOIS BRICK RULE 791
16.6M. PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTS 791
16.6B2. INJUNCTION SUITS 793
16.6B3. CASES INVOLVING VERTICAL AGREEMENTS OR CONTROL 794
16.6C. MONOPSONY; BUYERS' CARTELS 795
16.6D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE; STATE
INDIRECT PURCHASER STATUTES 796
16.6E. THE UMBRELLA PLAINTIFF 798
§ 16.7 THE ANTITRUST STATUTE OF LIMITATION 800
§ 16.8 DISPOSITION OF ISSUES; PLEADINGS; SUMMARY JUDGMENT; EXPERT
TESTIMONY;
TAGALONG SUITS 802
16.8A. JURY TRIAL 802
16.8B. ANTITRUST PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 803
16.8BL. ANTITRUST MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND THE TWOMBLY CASE 803
16.8B2. MATSUSHITA AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST
CASES 805
16.8C. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 812
16.8D. TAGALONG SUITS; OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 816
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§16.9 EQUITABLE RELIEF 818
§ 16.10 COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 819
CHAPTER 17. DAMAGES 821
§ 17.1 ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 821
17.1A. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCY IN DAMAGES THEORY 821
17.1B. DETERRENCE AND DAMAGES .822
17.1C. USING DAMAGES TO MINIMIZE THE SOCIAL COST OF ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS "24
§ 17.2 THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE MODEL FOR ANTITRUST DAMAGES 326
17.2A. VICTIM'S LOSSES V. VIOLATOR'S GAINS 826
17.2B. OPTIMAL DAMAGES FOR OVERCHARGE INJURIES 827
17.2C. OPTIMAL DAMAGES FOR EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES 831
17.2D. THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE MODEL IN LITIGATION 834
§ 17.3 THE RATIONALE FOR TREBLE DAMAGES 836
§ 17.4 HOW ACCURATELY MUST DAMAGES BE MEASURED? P38
§ 17.5 MEASURING DAMAGES FOR OVERCHARGE INJURIES 841
17.5A. INTRODUCTION; BASIC CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS 841
17.5B. METHODS OF MEASUREMENT: "YARDSTICK" AND "BEFORE-AND-AFTER" 844
17.5BL. YARDSTICK METHOD 844
17.5B2. BEFORE-AND-AFTER METHOD 845
§ 17.6 DAMAGES FOR EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES 852
17.6A. WHEN ARE DAMAGES DUE? 852
17.6B. DAMAGES FOR LOST SALES AND MARKET SHARE 853
17.6BL. BEFORE-AND-AFTER METHOD 854
17.6B2. YARDSTICK METHOD 857
17.6B3. LOST MARKET SHARE 857
17.6C. DAMAGES AND DISAGGREGATION 860
17.6D. TERMINATED DEALERS AND FIRMS DRIVEN FROM BUSINESS 861
17.6E. DAMAGES FOR PRECLUDED ENTRY 863
§ 17.7 CONTRIBUTION; JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 865
CHAPTER 18. ANTITRUST AND THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT 869
§ 18.1 REGULATION, RENT-SEEKING AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 869
18.1A. INTRODUCTION 869
18.1B. REGULATORY INTERVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO SEEK IT 870
18.1C. THE GENERAL IRRELEVANCE OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 871
18.ID. NOERR PROTECTS THE PROCESS, NOT THE RESULT 873
§ 18.2 THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST'S PETITIONING IMMUNITY 873
18.2A. PETITIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE OR EXECUTIVE ACTION GENERALLY 873
18.2B. PETITIONS TO GOVERNMENTS ACTING AS MARKET PARTICIPANTS 874
18.2C. PETITIONS FOR ADJUDICATIVE ACTION 878
§ 18.3 THE "SHAM" EXCEPTION IN LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE CONTEXTS 879
18.3A. USE OF ABUSIVE METHODS; FALSE INFORMATION 881
18.3B. BASELESSNESS IN THE ADJUDICATIVE SETTING; SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS 883
18.3C. SINGLE OR REPETITIVE CLAIMS 888
18.3D. THREAT TO SUE; EX PARTE STATEMENTS 889
18.3E. PETITIONS FOR INVALID LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 890
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 18.4 THE RELATION BETWEEN UNPROTECTED PETITIONING AND THE SUBSTANTIVE
OFFENSE 891
§ 18.5 CORRUPTION OF PRIVATE DECISION MAKING BODIES 892
CHAPTER 19. ANTITRUST AND FEDERAL REGULATORY POLICY 895
§ 19.1 ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 895
§ 19.2 REGULATION, DEREGULATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 896
19.2A. THE SCOPE OF REGULATION AND THE DOMAIN OF ANTITRUST 896
19.2B. THE RATIONALES FOR DEREGULATION 896
19.2BL. EXPANDED CONFIDENCE IN COMPETITION AND MARKETS 896
19.2B2. PUBLIC CHOICE: DECREASED CONFIDENCE IN THE REGULATORY
PROCESS 898
§ 19.3 THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN THE REGULATED MARKET 899
19.3A. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED REPEAL 899
19.3B. THE RELATION BETWEEN FEDERAL REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION: TWO VIEWS 900
19.3C. REQUISITE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT; "STATE ACTION" COMPARED 905
§ 19.4 PROCEDURE IN AREAS OF DIVIDED AUTHORITY; PRIMARY JURISDICTION 906
§ 19.5 MARKET POWER OFFENSES IN REGULATED MARKETS 908
§ 19.6 ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS AND REGULATED RATES: THE KEOGH DOCTRINE
911
§ 19.7 PARTICULAR EXEMPTIONS 913
19.7A. MISCELLANEOUS EXPRESS EXEMPTIONS 913
19.7B. ANTITRUST AND FEDERAL LABOR POLICY 915
19.7C. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND THE INSURANCE EXEMPTION 918
19.7CL. "BUSINESS OF INSURANCE" 919
19.7C2. "REGULATED BY STATE LAW" 921
19.7C3. ACTS OF BOYCOTT, COERCION OR INTIMIDATION 922
19.7C4. CONTINUING VITALITY OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON 924
CHAPTER 20. ANTITRUST FEDERALISM AND THE "STATE ACTION"
DOCTRINE 927
§ 20.1 INTRODUCTION; PREEMPTION 927
§ 20.2 FEDERALISM AND THE POLICY OF THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE 931
20.2A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE 931
20.2B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL ANTITRUST AND STATE REGULATION;
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 933
§ 20.3 BASIC QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTION 935
§ 20.4 AUTHORIZATION 937
§ 20.5 ACTIVE SUPERVISION 942
20.5A. WHEN IS SUPERVISION REQUIRED? 942
20.5B. WHAT KIND OF SUPERVISION IS REQUIRED? 945
20.5C. WHO MUST SUPERVISE? 948
§ 20.6 THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY 949
§ 20.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
"STATE
ACTION" DOCTRINE 952
§ 20.8 THE RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 954
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 21. THE REACH OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 961
§ 21.1 LOCAL ACTIVITIES: FEDERAL ANTITRUST AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 961
21.1A. THE SHERMAN ACT'S JURISDICTIONAL REACH 961
21.1B. JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF OTHER ANTITRUST PROVISIONS 966
21.1C. "COMMERCE": ANTITRUST AND NONCOMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 967
§ 21.2 ANTITRUST'S GLOBAL REACH 968
21.2A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY. BASIC DOCTRINE AND THE FTAIA 969
21.2B. PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 974
21.2C. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 978
21.2D. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION; PETITIONS TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 980
21.2E. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 980
§ 21.3 JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND ANTITRUST 981
TABLE OF CASES 985
TABLE OF STATUTES 1007
TABLE OF REGULATIONS 1009
TABLE OF RULES ION
INDEX 1013 |
| adam_txt |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE V
PART 1. FOUNDATIONS: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT
CHAPTER 1. THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST 3
§1.1 PRICE THEORY: ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND PERFECT COMPETITION 3
1.1A. THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET 4
1.1B. BEHAVIOR OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM 9
§ 1.2 MONOPOLY 14
1.2A. PRICE AND OUTPUT OF THE PROTECTED MONOPOLIST 14
1.2B. MONOPSONY; OUTPUT EFFECTS; POLICY IMPLICATIONS 17
1.2C. DE FACTO MONOPOLIES IN REAL WORLD MARKETS 20
§ 1.3 ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY 21
1.3A. MONOPOLY AS A STATUS; MONOPOLIZATION AS A PROCESS 21
1.3B. THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS CAUSED BY MONOPOLY 24
1.3C. THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY: RENT-SEEKING 25
1.3D. THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY: LOST COMPETITOR INVESTMENT 29
§ 1.4 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE 32
1.4A. THE GENERAL CASE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE 33
1.4B. PERSISTENT SCALE ECONOMIES, NATURAL MONOPOLY, FRANCHISE
BIDDING AND CONTESTABILITY 38
§ 1.4C. TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 44
§ 1.5 LESS-THAN-PERFECT COMPETITION 46
1.5A. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 46
1.5B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 47
1.5C. OLIGOPOLY 48
1.5D. LESS-THAN-PERFECT COMPETITION AND "SECOND BEST" 48
§ 1.6 BARRIERS TO ENTRY 49
§ 1.7 THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE PARADIGM 53
§ 1.8 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 58
CHAPTER 2. HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY IN ANTITRUST POLICY 69
§ 2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST POLICY 69
2.1A. THE GOALS OF THE SHERMAN ACT: EFFICIENCY AND INTEREST GROUP
EXPLANATIONS 69
2.1B. THE COMMON LAW AND THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 73
2.1C. A THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 77
§ 2.2 ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST 82
2.2A. ANTITRUST AND ECONOMICS BEFORE 1960 82
2.2B. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND ITS AFTERMATH 84
2.2C. ERROR COST ANALYSIS; COMPETITOR V. CONSUMER SUITS; PRIVATE V.
PUBLIC SUITS 87
2.2D. POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC POLICY 92
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.2E. ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 93
§ 2.3 THE NECESSITY AND NATURE OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 95
2.3A. THE DOMAIN OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 95
2.3B. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 98
2.3C. THE MEANING OF "CONSUMER WELFARE" 99
CHAPTER 3. MARKET POWER AND MARKET DEFINITION . 103
§3.1 INTRODUCTION 103
3.1A. MARKET POWER TECHNICALLY DEFINED .104
3.1B. MARKET SHARE AS A SURROGATE FOR MARKET POWER ,.106
3.1C. MARKET SHARE AS MORE THAN A SURROGATE; INDEPENDENT RELEVANCE
OF MARKET SHARE 107
3.ID. THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST MARKET .107
§ 3.2 ESTIMATING THE RELEVANT MARKET; THE SSNIP AND THE "HYPOTHETICAL
MONOPOLIST" 108
3.2A. SIZE OF HYPOTHESIZED PRICE INCREASE ILL
3.2B. THE "PROFIT-MAXIMIZING" INCREASE; CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS 113
3.2C. BROADER AND NARROWER MARKETS; GENERAL IRRELEVANCE OF
SUBMARKETS 114
§ 3.3 THE PRODUCT MARKET; GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 118
3.3A. MARKETS AND BRANDS; "LOCK-IN" 121
3.3AL. SINGLE BRAND ORDINARILY NOT A RELEVANT MARKET;
KODAK; PATENTED PHARMACEUTICALS 121
3.3A2. LOWER COURT DECISIONS LIMITING KODAK 126
3.3A3. CONTRACT "LOCK-IN;" FRANCHISOR BRAND AS MARKET 127
3.3B. SUBSTITUTES V. COMPLEMENTS; CLUSTER MARKETS AND TWO-SIDED
PLATFORMS 129
3.3BL. RELEVANT MARKET CONSISTS OF SUBSTITUTES 129
3.3B2. THE LIMITED RATIONALE FOR FINDING "CLUSTER" MARKETS. 130
3.3B3. ASSESSING MARKET POWER ON TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 132
§ 3.4 PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND THE CELLOPHANE FALLACY 133
3.4A. CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES AND THEIR MEANING 133
3.4B. CROSS-ELASTICITY OF DEMAND IN DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS AND THE
DU PONT (CELLOPHANE) CASE 134
3.4C. CORRECTING FOR THE "CELLOPHANE" FALLACY 136
§ 3.5 SUPPLY ELASTICITIES; FOREIGN IMPORTS 138
3.5A. FOREIGN IMPORTS AND THE ALCOA CASE 139
3.5B. OTHER DECISIONS ADDRESSING (OR FAILING TO ADDRESS) SUPPLY
ISSUES 141
3.5C. ACCOUNTING FOR ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY: MARKET INCLUSION OR LOW
BARRIERS TO ENTRY? 143
§ 3.6 THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 144
3.6A. SHIPPED GOODS; MINIMUM GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 145
3.6B. STATIONARY GOODS AND SERVICES 146
3.6C. PRICE MOVEMENTS AND SHIPPING PATTERNS 149
3.6CL. PRICE MOVEMENTS GENERALLY; ASYMMETRY 149
3.6C2. THE ELZINGA-HOGARTY TEST 150
3.6D. TRADE AREA; NON-COMPETITION COVENANTS 151
3.6E. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 153
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 3.7 COMPUTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MARKET SHARES 154
3.7A. REVENUE V. UNITS 155
3.7B. OUTPUT V. CAPACITY 156
3.7C. PRODUCT DURABILITY AND POWER 157
3.7D. INTERPRETING MARKET SHARE DATA; QUESTIONS OF FACT OR LAW 159
§ 3.8 MARKET DEFINITION IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MERGER GUIDELINES 162
3.8A. PRODUCT MARKET DELINEATION IN THE 2010 GUIDELINES 163
3.8B. GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION UNDER THE 2010 GUIDELINES 165
3.8C. CALCULATION OF MARKET SHARES UNDER THE 2010 MERGER
GUIDELINES 166
3.8D. THE "CELLOPHANE" FALLACY AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKET
DELINEATION FOR MERGERS AND OTHER PRACTICES 168
3.8E. CONCLUSION; THE GUIDELINES AS A POLICY STATEMENT 169
§ 3.9 ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING MARKET POWER 169
3.9A. MEASURING RESIDUAL DEMAND DIRECTLY 170
3.9B. PERSISTENT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 172
3.9BL. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 174
3.9B2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND MARKET DEFINITION 175
3.9C. PERSISTENT MONOPOLY PROFITS; HIGH MARGINS; EXCLUSION
PAYMENTS 175
3.9CL. MONOPOLY PROFITS V. ACCOUNTING PROFITS 175
3.9C2. ABSENCE OF HIGH ACCOUNTING PROFITS 177
3.9C3. THE PROBLEM OF "RENTS" 177
3.9C4. POWER INFERRED FROM EXCLUSION PAYMENTS: ACTAVIS
DECISION 179
3.9D. MARKET POWER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 179
3.9E. ASSESSING MARKET POWER FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 181
PART 2. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTITRUST
CHAPTER 4. ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD COLLUSION AND
OLIGOPOLY 185
§ 4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF PRICE FIXING 185
4.1A. THE (VIRTUAL) UNIVERSALITY OF CARTEL CHEATING 188
4.1AL. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN CARTEL AND SINGLE FIRM PROFIT
MAXIMIZATION 189
4.1A2. CARTEL CHEATING STRATEGIES 190
4.1A3. DETECTING AND PUNISHING CHEATING; CARTEL "AMNESTY". 192
4.1B. COMPETITIVE FRINGE FIRMS 196
4.1C. INTERNAL EFFICIENCIES OF THE CARTEL 197
4.1D. CARTELS OF BUYERS; LABOR ANTI-POACHING AGREEMENTS 199
§ 4.2 IMPERFECT COMPETITION 201
4.2A. NON-COOPERATIVE COURNOT OLIGOPOLY 202
4.2B. OLIGOPOLY STRATEGIES 205
§ 4.3 THE SOCIAL COST OF COLLUSION 209
§ 4.4 ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD OLIGOPOLY AND TACIT COLLUSION 210
4.4A. ATTACKING OLIGOPOLY; THE TURNER-POSNER DEBATE 210
4.4B. IDENTIFYING TACIT COLLUSION AND FACILITATORS; POLICY OPTIONS 213
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 4.5 PROVING A PRICE OR OUTPUT "AGREEMENT" FROM INDIRECT OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE; HUB-AND-SPOKE CONSPIRACIES 217
§ 4.6 REACHING OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR ON LESS EXPLICIT EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT
223
4.6A. INTRODUCTION; INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS 224
4.6B. CHALLENGING FACILITATORS ESTABLISHED BY AGREEMENT 226
4.6C. "UNILATERAL" FACILITATORS; BASING-POINT PRICING SCHEMES 228
4.6D. OTHER FACILITATORS, INCLUDING ALGORITHMS; § 5 OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT 232
4.6E. MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CONSPIRACY
CASES; COURTS' GENERAL ADHERENCE TO TRADITIONAL CONSPIRACY
REQUIREMENTS 237
§ 4.7 INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY 239
CHAPTER 5. JOINT VENTURES OF COMPETITORS, CONCERTED
REFUSALS, PATENT LICENSING, AND THE RULE OF REASON 247
§ 5.1 INTRODUCTION: NAKED AND ANCILLARY AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS 247
5.1A. DISTINGUISHING NAKED FROM ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS; QUESTION OF
LAW 248
5.1B. WHY MULTILATERAL ACTIVITY DESERVES CLOSER ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 250
5.1C. PARTIAL CONDEMNATION; LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES 253
§ 5.2 JOINT VENTURES AS MARKET FACILITATORS 254
5.2A. JOINT VENTURES: AN OVERVIEW 255
5.2AL. POTENTIAL HARMS AND BENEFITS 255
5.2A2. THE TWO SIDES OF THE EXCLUSIVITY PROBLEM 258
5.2B. VENTURES FACILITATING R & D, ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION;
ANCILLARY MARKET DIVISIONS 260
5.2BL. JOINT VENTURES AND FREE RIDER PROBLEMS 260
5.2B2. NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH ACT 260
5.2B3. ANCILLARY AND NAKED AGREEMENTS PERTAINING TO
ADVERTISING 261
5.2B4. ANCILLARY MARKET DIVISIONS AND NONCOMPETITION
AGREEMENTS 263
5.2C. TRANSACTIONAL EFFICIENCIES JUSTIFYING JOINT VENTURE PRICE
SETTING 268
5.2D. THE RELATION BETWEEN JOINT VENTURE ANALYSIS AND MERGER
ANALYSIS 271
§ 5.3 COMPETITOR EXCHANGES OF PRICE OR OUTPUT INFORMATION; POSTING
AGREEMENTS 274
5.3A. INDUSTRY-WIDE DISSEMINATION OF PRICE AND OUTPUT INFORMATION.275
5.3B. DIRECT COMPETITOR EXCHANGE OF PRICE INFORMATION 277
5.3C. AGREEMENTS TO POST, OR TO POST AND ADHERE 279
5.3D. AGREEMENTS OF WAGE AND SALARY INFORMATION; "ANTI-POACHING"
AGREEMENTS 279
§ 5.4 CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL, JOINT VENTURE MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTIONS,
AND
STANDARD SETTING 280
5.4A. HARMS AND BENEFITS; APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST STANDARD 280
5.4AL. A RULE OF REASON, WITH EXCEPTIONS 281
5.4A2. SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS? 286
5.4B. EFFICIENT JOINT VENTURES AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 288
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5.4BL. CLOSED-MEMBERSHIP AND OTHER TRADITIONAL JOINT
VENTURES 288
5.4B2. OPEN-MEMBERSHIP VENTURES; POSITIVE NETWORK
EXTERNALITIES 289
5.4C. STANDARD SETTING AND RULE ENFORCEMENT IN PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEURIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 295
5.4D. AGREEMENTS INVOLVING NON-COMPETITORS 302
5.4E. EXPRESSIVE AND NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTS 303
§ 5.5 AGREEMENTS GOVERNING THE LICENSING AND USE OF PATENTS AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 304
5.5A. INTRODUCTION; BASIC ISSUES 304
5.5B. THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE, ANTITRUST AND
BEYOND 306
5.5C. PATENT LICENSING; THE "SCOPE OF THE PATENT" RULE 310
5.5CL. PRICE FIXING; OUTPUT RESTRICTIONS; ROYALTY RATES;
EXCLUSIVITY 312
5.5C2. HORIZONTAL TERRITORIAL AND OTHER MARKET DIVISION
AGREEMENTS 316
5.5C3. PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT
DISPUTES; ACTAVIS 317
5.5C4. PACKAGE LICENSES 320
5.5C5. PATENT POOLS 321
5.5C6. GRANTBACKS 322
5.5C7. FRAND: PATENT LICENSING AND STANDARD-ESSENTIAL
PATENTS 323
5.5D. AGREEMENTS CONCERNING NON-PATENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 326
§ 5.6 CHARACTERIZATION AND EVALUATION: THE PER SE RULE AND THE RULE OF
REASON 327
5.6A. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PER SE RULE 327
5.6B. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULE OF REASON AND PER SE TREATMENT.329
5.6C. IDENTIFYING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT: A TENTATIVE ROAD MAP 334
5.6D. THE TRUNCATED, OR "QUICK LOOK," RULE OF REASON 342
5.6E. REFORMING THE RULE OF REASON 345
CHAPTER 6. EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES AND THE DOMINANT FIRM:
THE BASIC DOCTRINE OF MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPT 349
§ 6.1 THE MONOPOLIZATION OFFENSE 349
§ 6.2 MONOPOLY POWER AND ILLEGAL MONOPOLIZATION 352
6.2A. MONOPOLIZATION'S MARKET POWER REQUIREMENT 352
6.2B. THE RELATION BETWEEN MARKET POWER AND MARKET SHARE; ENTRY
BARRIERS 354
§ 6.3 CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS*IS BAD CONDUCT NECESSARY? 356
§ 6.4 IDENTIFYING MONOPOLIZING CONDUCT 358
6.4A. EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT DEFINED 358
6.4B. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT SUITS DISTINGUISHED; EQUITY
REMEDIES 363
6.4C. INTENT 363
§ 6.5 THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE 364
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
6.5A. ATTEMPT LAW'S SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIREMENT 365
6.5B. "DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS" 368
6.5BL. THE "DANGEROUS PROBABILITY" REQUIREMENT AS A
SCREENING DEVICE 370
6.5B2. DANGEROUS PROBABILITY AND MARKET POWER .371
§ 6.6 CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE
;
^ 73
CHAPTER 7. EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES IN MONOPOLIZATION AND
ATTEMPT CASES 375
§ 7.1 INTRODUCTION 375
§ 7.2 MERGER AND MONOPOLY 376
§ 7.3 OUTPUT EXPANSION; STRATEGIC CAPACITY CONSTRUCTION ,378
§ 7.4 PRICE DISCRIMINATION; LEASING PRACTICES 379
§ 7.5 UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL I: GENERAL DOCTRINE 381
7.5A. PROTECTING THE INCENTIVE TO INVEST 382
7.5B. SCOPE OF DUTY TO DEAL 387
7.5C. REFUSALS TO DEAL IN COOPERATIVE NETWORKS 388
§ 7.6 UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL II: VERTICAL INTEGRATION, PRICE
SQUEEZES, TYING
AND EXCLUSIVE DEALING 389
7.6A. KODAK AND ITS AFTERMATH 390
7.6AL. "LOCK-IN" REQUIRES INITIAL PURCHASE AND SUBSEQUENT
CHANGE OF POLICY 392
7.6A2. "AVERAGE" CUSTOMER MUST BE POORLY INFORMED; OR PRICE
DISCRIMINATION MUST BE POSSIBLE 392
7.6A3. § 2 AND AFTERMARKET OPPORTUNISM 393
7.6B. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND REFUSALS TO DEAL; PRICE OR SUPPLY
"SQUEEZES" 393
7.6C. QUASI-TYING AND EXCLUSIVE DEALING*TECHNOLOGICAL TIES 397
7.6D. USE OF VERTICAL REFUSALS BY PRIVATE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFS 399
7.6E. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE 400
7.6F. UNILATERAL REFUSAL BY NONMONOPOLIST 400
§ 7.7 REFUSAL TO DEAL III: THE "ESSENTIAL FACILITY" DOCTRINE 401
7.7A. WHAT IS A QUALIFYING "ESSENTIAL FACILITY"? 402
7.7B. THE EXTENT OF THE DUTY TO DEAL 403
7.7C. REASONABLENESS OF REFUSAL TO DEAL 404
7.7D. ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE INCONSISTENT WITH GENERAL ANTITRUST
GOALS 405
7.7DL. FORCED SHARING REQUIRES PRICE ADMINISTRATION 405
7.7D2. FORCED SHARING UNDERCUTS INCENTIVES TO DEVELOP
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY; ASPEN CONTRASTED 406
§ 7.8 "PREDATORY" PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT; FAILURE TO
PREDISCLOSE;
ALTERED COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS 406
7.8A. PREDATORY PRODUCT OR PROCESS INNOVATION 407
7.8B. FAILURE TO PREDISCLOSE NEW TECHNOLOGY 410
7.8C. MICROSOFT: UNNECESSARILY HARMFUL REDESIGNS AND LICENSING
REQUIREMENTS 411
7.8D. STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE; PREDATORY ADVERTISING, EXCESSIVE
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 413
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 7.9 THE TROUBLESOME "LEVERAGE" THEORY; NONMONOPOLISTIC ADVANTAGE IN
SECOND MARKET 415
§ 7.10 RAISING RIVALS' COSTS (RRC) 416
7.10A. THE PEDIGREE AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RRC 418
7.10B. PRE-EMPTION OF MARKETS OR CUSTOMERS AS RRC 420
§ 7.11 UNREASONABLY EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES INVOLVING PATENTS OR OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 423
7.11A. WALKER PROCESS: IMPROPER INFRINGEMENT SUITS ON UNENFORCEABLE
PATENTS 424
7.11B. ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT KNOWN TO BE INVALID OR UNENFORCEABLE;
NOERR ISSUES 425
7.11C. ACCUMULATION; NONUSE 430
7.11D. UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO LICENSE, SIMPLE AND CONDITIONAL 432
7.11DL. ABSOLUTE REFUSAL TO LICENSE 432
7.11D2. CONDITIONAL REFUSALS TO LICENSE 435
7.LIE. PATENT "AMBUSH" AND FAILURE TO DISCLOSE, PARTICULARLY IN
STANDARD SETTING 436
§ 7.12 ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT PROCESS 438
§ 7.13 BUSINESS TORTS AS ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 439
§ 7.14 CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS IN ATTEMPT CASES 441
CHAPTER 8. PREDATORY AND OTHER EXCLUSIONARY PRICING 443
§ 8.1 INTRODUCTION 443
§ 8.2 WHEN IS A PRICE PREDATORY? THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST 444
§ 8.3 PREDATORY PRICING: APPLICATION AND CRITICISM OF THE AREEDA-TURNER
TEST 446
8.3A. THE AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC) SURROGATE 446
8.3B. THE PROBLEM OF LONG-RUN, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; "PREDATORY"
PRICES ABOVE COST; MULTIPLE-BENEFIT PREDATION 448
8.3BL. LIMIT PRICING AND STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE 448
8.3B2. MULTIPLE-BENEFIT PREDATION 451
8.3C. AVC MEASURED AS AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COST; OPPORTUNITY COST 452
§ 8.4 STRUCTURAL ISSUES: WHEN IS PREDATORY PRICING PLAUSIBLE? RECOUPMENT
454
8.4A. THE PREDATOR'S MARKET POSITION; PREDATORY PRICING IN
OLIGOPOLY 455
8.4B. BARRIERS TO ENTRY 457
8.4C. EXCESS CAPACITY 458
8.4D. DISPOSITION OF PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 460
8.4E. SHOULD COMPETITOR PREDATORY PRICING SUITS BE ABOLISHED? 461
§ 8.5 JUDICIAL ADAPTION OF THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST: PRICE/COST
RELATIONSHIPS
AND INTENT 462
8.5A. PRICE/COST RELATIONSHIPS 462
8.5B. INTENT 463
§ 8.6 JUDICIAL ADAPTION OF AREEDA-TURNER: IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COSTS;
MULTI-
PRODUCT FIRMS; CUSTOMER-SPECIFIC PRICING 465
§ 8.7 JUDICIAL ADAPTION OF AREEDA-TURNER: STRUCTURAL ISSUES AND
RECOUPMENT .467
§ 8.8 PREDATORY PRICING AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 469
§ 8.9 MORE COMPLEX EXCLUSIONARY PRICING STRATEGIES, PARTICULARLY
DISCOUNTS 476
8.9A. QUANTITY AND LOYALTY DISCOUNTS 476
8.9B. PACKAGE PRICING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 479
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
8.9BL. THE VARIETIES OF BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 479
8.9B2. THE "ATTRIBUTION" TEST FOR BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 480
8.9B3. MORE COMPLEX BUNDLES 482
8.9C. SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND RELATED PRICING INCENTIVES PAID TO
RETAILERS 483
§ 8.10 PREDATORY BUYING AND MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSES IN PURCHASE
AGREEMENTS
4
^4
CHAPTER 9. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND VERTICAL MERGERS 489
§9.1 INTRODUCTION 489
§ 9.2 THE ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 491
9.2A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COASE'S WORK; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
.491
9.2B. COST SAVINGS, TECHNOLOGICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL 493
9.2C. EFFICIENT VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MULTI-STAGE MARKET POWER;
ELIMINATING DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION; TWO-PART TARIFFS 496
§ 9.3 PLAUSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 500
9.3A. STRATEGIC CONTROL OF INPUTS 500
9.3B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION 501
9.3C. FORECLOSURE AND ENTRY BARRIERS 502
9.3D. VERTICAL INTEGRATION BY PRICE REGULATED FIRMS 503
9.3E. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CARTELS 504
§ 9.4 VERTICAL MERGERS AND ANTITRUST LAW 505
§ 9.5 VERTICAL MERGERS AND THE MERGER GUIDELINES 511
CHAPTER 10. TIE-INS, RECIPROCITY, EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND
MOST FAVORED NATION AGREEMENTS 517
§ 10.1 INTRODUCTION: THE JUDICIAL TEST FOR TIE-INS 517
§ 10.2 TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE 519
§ 10.3 MARKET POWER AND PER SE UNLAWFUL TIES; SHERMAN V. CLAYTON ACT
TESTS .520
10.3A. THE RATIONALE AND DEVELOPMENT OF TYING'S MARKET POWER
REQUIREMENT 520
10.3B. TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS;
LOCKED-IN CUSTOMERS 523
10.3C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER 526
10.3D. "UNIQUENESS" AND UBIQUITY AS MARKET POWER 527
10.3E. SEPARATE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACT TESTS? FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT 528
10.3F. THE RATIONALE FOR PER SE ILLEGAL TIE-INS 529
§ 10.4 WHEN ARE PRODUCTS TIED TOGETHER? 531
10.4A. COERCION BY CONTRACT, CONDITION, OR UNDERSTANDING 531
10.4B. PROOF OF A RELEVANT TYING "AGREEMENT;" UNCOMMUNICATED
CONDITIONS 534
10.4C. PACKAGE DISCOUNTS 534
10.4D. COERCION BY PACKAGE DESIGN; TECHNOLOGICAL TIES 535
§ 10.5 THE REQUIREMENT OF SEPARATE TYING AND TIED PRODUCTS 537
10.5A. INTRODUCTION; BASIC COMPETITIVE MARKET TEST 537
10.5B. "NEW" PRODUCTS ZZZZZZZ.538
10.5C. COMPLETE AND PARTIAL SUBSTITUTES AS SEPARATE PRODUCTS 539
10.5D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LABOR AS SEPARATE PRODUCTS 540
TABLE OF CONTENTS
10.5E. EFFICIENCY*"ECONOMIES OF JOINT PROVISION" 541
§ 10.6 COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 543
10.6A. THE LEVERAGE THEORY: USING TIE-INS TO TURN ONE MONOPOLY INTO
TWO; TIPPING 543
10.6B. ENTRY BARRIERS, FORECLOSURE, AND COLLUSION 546
10.6BL. ENTRY BARRIERS AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS 546
10.6B2. FORECLOSURE; MARKET SHARE 547
10.6B3. TIE-INS AND COLLUSION 547
10.6C. EVASION OF RATE REGULATION 548
10.6D. PREDATORY PRICING AND OTHER ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE 550
10.6E. TIE-INS AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND METERING DEVICES;
FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 551
10.6F. TYING AND DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION; "REVERSE LEVERAGING" 555
§ 10.7 TIE-INS AND EFFICIENCY: TOWARD A GENERAL RULE OF REASON 557
10.7A. EFFICIENCIES AND TYING LAW'S IDIOSYNCRATIC PER SE RULE 557
10.7B. NONFORECLOSING TIES: FULL-LINE FORCING AND UNWANTED TIED
PRODUCTS; LACK OF CONSUMER INJURY 558
10.7C. CONCLUSION: MOVING TYING LAW TOWARD A RULE OF REASON 559
§ 10.8 RECIPROCITY 561
§ 10.9 EXCLUSIVE DEALING 563
10.9A. ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE AND ITS VARIATIONS 564
10.9AL. THE FORECLOSURE THEORY OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING 564
10.9A2. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS 565
10.9A3. DEFINING MARKETS TO MEASURE VERTICAL FORECLOSURE 566
10.9B. EXCLUSIVE DEALING AS A CARTEL FACILITATOR 566
10.9C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND TYING 567
10.9D. EFFICIENCY EXPLANATIONS AND DEFENSES FOR EXCLUSIVE DEALING 568
10.9E. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS 571
§ 10.10 VERTICAL MOST-FAVORED NATION (MFN) AND "ANTI-STEERING" CLAUSES
575
CHAPTER 11. INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS ON DISTRIBUTION 579
§ 11.1 INTRODUCTION 579
§ 11.2 PERCEIVED COMPETITIVE THREATS OF MINIMUM RPM AND VERTICAL
TERRITORIAL
RESTRAINTS 580
11.2A. INTRODUCTION 580
11.2B. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AS COLLUSION FACILITATORS; POWERFUL
INDIVIDUAL DEALERS 581
11.2BL. DEALER POWER; POLICY IMPLICATIONS 584
11.2B2. MANUFACTURER COLLUSION AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 585
11.2C. FORECLOSURE EFFECTS 586
11.2D. THIRD DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION 587
11.2E. OTHER THEORIES 588
§ 11.3 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND EFFICIENCY 588
11.3A. THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 588
11.3AL. THE ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS TO COMBAT FREE
RIDING 590
11.3A2. THE DOMAIN AND EFFICIENCY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS TO
COMBAT FREE-RIDING 591
XVIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
11.3B. VARIATIONS ON THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATIONS 592
11.3BL. PURCHASE OF PREFERRED DISTRIBUTION SERVICES; SHELF
SPACE; QUALITY CERTIFICATION 592
11.3B2. FACILITATING RESALE DENSITY 593
11.3B3. FACILITATING SUPPLIER ENTRY 594
11.3B4. PROTECTION OF DEALER MARGINS; ENFORCEMENT OF
DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS 594
11.3C. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND EFFICIENCY RECONSIDERED 595
§ 11.4 THE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT IN VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES 596
11.4A. AGREEMENTS*HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL, PRICE AND NONPRICE 596
11.4B. THE COLGATE DOCTRINE 597
11.4C. DEALER TERMINATIONS 598
11.4D. THE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT AND ANTITRUST POLICY RESPECTING
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS; RESTRAINTS INITIATED BY POWERFUL DEALERS 601
§ 11.5 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE IN THE COURTS 602
11.5A. FROM DR. MILES TO LEEGIN 602
11.5B. THE MEANING OF "RESALE"*CONSIGNMENT EXCEPTION 605
11.5C. MAXIMUM RPM 609
11.5D. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRICE AND NON-PRICE AGREEMENTS 613
§ 11.6 VERTICAL NONPRICE RESTRAINTS UNDER THE RULE OF REASON 613
11.6A. BALANCING "INTRABRAND" AND "INTERBRAND" COMPETITION 615
11.6B. SYLVANIA'S IMPACT IN THE LOWER COURTS 618
11.6C. BOYCOTT CLAIMS 620
11.6D. EXCLUSIVE DEALERSHIPS, SOLE OUTLETS, AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 621
11.6E. DUAL DISTRIBUTION 622
§ 11.7 CONCLUSION: THE RULE OF REASON FOR DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS 623
11.7A. GENERAL POLICY CONCERNS 623
11.7B. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION NOT DECISIVE 624
11.7C. REJECTED APPROACHES 625
11.7D. RULE OF REASON INQUIRY SUMMARIZED 625
CHAPTER 12. MERGERS OF COMPETITORS 629
§ 12.1 INTRODUCTION: FEDERAL MERGER POLICY AND THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 629
12.1A. THE RELEVANCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE TO MERGER ANALYSIS 632
12.1B. THE BASIC CONCERNS OF MERGER POLICY: REDUCED MARKET OUTPUT
OR INNOVATION, HIGHER PRICES, AND OFFSETTING EFFICIENCIES 633
12.1C. MERGERS AND EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES; PREDATORY PRICING; PRIVATE
CHALLENGES 636
§ 12.2 EFFICIENCY AND MERGER POLICY 638
12.2A. THE DUBIOUS LEGACY OF THE WARREN ERA 638
12.2B. ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS 640
12.2BL. THE WELFARE "TRADEOFF MODEL 640
12.2B2. MUST EFFICIENCIES BE "PASSED ON"? 644
12.2B3. EFFICIENCIES MUST BE "MERGER-SPECIFIC" AND
"EXTRAORDINARY" 645
12.2B4. PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFICATION, MEASUREMENT, AND PROOF 646
12.2B5. BENEFIT AND THREAT IN DIFFERENT MARKETS 649
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 12.3 ESTIMATING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES I: MERGERS FACILITATING
UNILATERAL PRICE INCREASES 649
12.3A. INTRODUCTION 649
12.3B. MERGER TO MONOPOLY 649
12.3C. DOMINANT FIRM'S ACQUISITION OF NASCENT RIVAL; PLATFORM
ACQUISITIONS 650
12.3D. UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS 651
12.3E. MERGERS THAT THREATEN INNOVATION 657
§ 12.4 ESTIMATING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES II: MERGERS FACILITATING
COORDINATED INTERACTION 659
12.4A. MEASURING MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE CR4 AND THE
HERFINDAHL 660
12.4AL. THE FOUR-FIRM CONCENTRATION RATIO (CR4) 661
12.4A2. THE HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX (HHI) 662
12.4B. MARKET SHARE THRESHOLDS UNDER THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 667
12.4C. THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET SHARE
MEASURES 668
12.4D. HOW SHOULD CONCENTRATION COUNT? THE PHILADELPHIA BANK
PRESUMPTION 670
12.4E. MERGERS OF COMPETING BUYERS 673
§ 12.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 674
12.5A. GENERAL EFFECTS 674
12.5B. MORE EXTREME PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: WHEN IS A MERGER
HORIZONTAL? 675
§ 12.6 BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN MERGER CASES 677
12.6A. THE APPROPRIATE DEFINITION OF ENTRY BARRIERS FOR MERGER POLICY
.677
12.6B. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ENTRY BARRIER? 681
12.6BL. ECONOMIES OF SCALE 681
12.6B2. RISK AND SIZE OF INVESTMENT; SUNK COSTS 682
12.6B3. ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, AND CUSTOMER LOYALTY 683
12.6B4. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 684
12.6B5. GOVERNMENT ENTRY RESTRICTIONS, INCLUDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 685
12.6C. EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROVE ENTRY BARRIERS OR THEIR ABSENCE 687
12.6D. ENTRY BARRIER ANALYSIS UNDER THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 690
§ 12.7 OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE COMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF MERGERS
691
12.7A. SOPHISTICATION AND POWER OF TRADING PARTNERS 692
12.7B. ADEQUACY OF IRREPLACEABLE INPUTS 694
12.7C. EXCESS CAPACITY 695
12.7D. MARKETING AND SALES METHODS 696
12.7E. HISTORY OF COLLUSION OR FACILITATING PRACTICES 696
12.7F. "TRENDS" TOWARDS CONCENTRATION 697
12.7G. AGGRESSIVENESS OF ACQUIRED FIRM 698
§ 12.8 OBSERVED ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; POST-ACQUISITION REVIEW 698
§ 12.9 THE "FAILING COMPANY" DEFENSE AND RELATED FACTORS AFFECTING FIRM
VIABILITY 700
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 12.10 PARTIAL ACQUISITIONS AND ACQUISITIONS "SOLELY FOR INVESTMENT";
HORIZONTAL
SHAREHOLDING "03
§ 12.11 INTERLOCKING CORPORATE DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS "06
CHAPTER 13. CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 709
§ 13.1 INTRODUCTION: COMPETITION AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 709
§ 13.2 CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND EFFICIENCY 710
§ 13.3 PERCEIVED DANGERS TO COMPETITION 712
13.3A. RECIPROCITY 712
13.3B. LEVERAGE, TIE-INS, AND "PORTFOLIO" EFFECTS 715
13.3C. STRATEGIC PRICING AND ENTRY DETERRENCE 716
§ 13.4 MERGERS OF POTENTIAL COMPETITORS 717
13.4A. THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL ENTRANT DOCTRINE 718
13.4B. "ACTUAL" POTENTIAL ENTRANT DOCTRINE 721
§ 13.5 CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION GUIDELINES 722
CHAPTER 14. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 725
§ 14.1 INTRODUCTION: PRICE DISCRIMINATION 725
§ 14.2 PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND COMPETITION 726
§ 14.3 PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND MARKET POWER 727
§ 14.4 THREE DEGREES OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION; ARBITRAGE 729
§ 14.5 PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 732
14.5A. THE SOCIAL COST OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 732
14.5B. THE SOCIAL COST OF PREVENTING PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN
CONCENTRATED MARKETS 733
§ 14.6 THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION 734
14.6A. GENERAL INTERPRETATION 734
14.6AL. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN ACHIEVING
GOALS 734
14.6A2. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT'S THEORY OF COMPETITIVE
INJURY 735
14.6B. THE MEANING OF PRICE "DISCRIMINATION" UNDER THE ACT 737
14.6C. PRIMARY- AND SECONDARY-LINE VIOLATIONS 737
14.6D. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 739
14.6E. VIOLATIONS BY BUYERS 743
14.6F. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 743
14.6FL. "COST JUSTIFICATION" DEFENSE 744
14.6F2. "MEETING COMPETITION" DEFENSE 745
PART 3. ANTITRUST AS A REGULATORY INSTITUTION
CHAPTER 15. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS 749
§ 15.1 PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT GENERALLY; THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 749
15.1A. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 750
15.1B. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 752
§ 15.2 THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 754
§ 15.3 THE PROCESS OF PREMERGER NOTIFICATION 757
TABU: OF CONTKNTS
*: 15.4 "QUASI-PUBLIC" ENFORCEMENT: THE STATES' ATTORNEYS GENERAL 758
CHAPTER 16. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 761
§ 1(5.1 INTRODUCTION: § 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 761
§ 16.2 PERMISSIBLE PLAINTIFFS*WHO SHOULD ENFORCE THE ANTITRUST LAWS? 762
§ 10.3 ANTITRUST'S SPECIAL REQUIREMENT OF COMPETITIVE INJURY 763
16.,"3A. "ANTITRUST INJURY"; PRIVATE MERGER CHALLENGES 764
16.3AL. MERGERS ALLEGED TO FACILITATE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES 764
16.3A2. TAKEOVER TARGETS AS ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFS 766
16.3A3. CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS 767
16.3B. "ANTITRUST INJURY" BEYOND § 7; PER SE VIOLATIONS 768
16.3C. CAUSATION, INJURY-IN-FACT, ANTITRUST INJURY DISTINGUISHED 769
16.3D. ANTITRUST INJURY AND DAMAGES CLAIMS 771
16.3E. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 772
16.3F. PLAINTIFFS UNAFFECTED BY INJURY TO COMPETITION 772
§ 16.4 STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL RULES LIMITING ANTITRUST STANDING 774
16.4A. "BUSINESS OR PROPERTY" 774
16.4B. MARKET RELATIONSHIPS; "DIRECT INJURY" AND "TARGET AREA" TESTS
.775
16.41)1. "DIRECT INJURY" 775
16.4B2. "TARGET AREA" 776
16.4B3. SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS AT A MORE USEFUL
ALTERNATIVE 777
16.4C. THE PREFERRED POSITION OF CONSUMERS AND COMPETITORS 779
§ 16.5 SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF ANTITRUST STANDING 781
16.5A. THE UNESTABLISHED BUSINESS AS ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF 781
16.5B. EMPLOYEES 782
16.5C. DERIVATIVE INJURIES AND "DUPLICATIVE RECOVERY" 783
16.5D. SECOND BEST PLAINTIFFS 785
16.5E. PARI DELICTO; DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS 786
§ 16.6 THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE 787
16.6A. HANOVER SHOE, ILLINOIS BRICK, & APPLE V. PEPPER 787
16.6B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ILLINOIS BRICK RULE 791
16.6M. PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTS 791
16.6B2. INJUNCTION SUITS 793
16.6B3. CASES INVOLVING VERTICAL AGREEMENTS OR CONTROL 794
16.6C. MONOPSONY; BUYERS' CARTELS 795
16.6D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE; STATE
INDIRECT PURCHASER STATUTES 796
16.6E. THE UMBRELLA PLAINTIFF 798
§ 16.7 THE ANTITRUST STATUTE OF LIMITATION 800
§ 16.8 DISPOSITION OF ISSUES; PLEADINGS; SUMMARY JUDGMENT; EXPERT
TESTIMONY;
TAGALONG SUITS 802
16.8A. JURY TRIAL 802
16.8B. ANTITRUST PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 803
16.8BL. ANTITRUST MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND THE TWOMBLY CASE 803
16.8B2. MATSUSHITA AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST
CASES 805
16.8C. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 812
16.8D. TAGALONG SUITS; OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 816
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§16.9 EQUITABLE RELIEF 818
§ 16.10 COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 819
CHAPTER 17. DAMAGES 821
§ 17.1 ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 821
17.1A. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCY IN DAMAGES THEORY 821
17.1B. DETERRENCE AND DAMAGES .822
17.1C. USING DAMAGES TO MINIMIZE THE SOCIAL COST OF ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS "24
§ 17.2 THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE MODEL FOR ANTITRUST DAMAGES 326
17.2A. VICTIM'S LOSSES V. VIOLATOR'S GAINS 826
17.2B. OPTIMAL DAMAGES FOR OVERCHARGE INJURIES 827
17.2C. OPTIMAL DAMAGES FOR EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES 831
17.2D. THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE MODEL IN LITIGATION 834
§ 17.3 THE RATIONALE FOR TREBLE DAMAGES 836
§ 17.4 HOW ACCURATELY MUST DAMAGES BE MEASURED? P38
§ 17.5 MEASURING DAMAGES FOR OVERCHARGE INJURIES 841
17.5A. INTRODUCTION; BASIC CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS 841
17.5B. METHODS OF MEASUREMENT: "YARDSTICK" AND "BEFORE-AND-AFTER" 844
17.5BL. YARDSTICK METHOD 844
17.5B2. BEFORE-AND-AFTER METHOD 845
§ 17.6 DAMAGES FOR EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES 852
17.6A. WHEN ARE DAMAGES DUE? 852
17.6B. DAMAGES FOR LOST SALES AND MARKET SHARE 853
17.6BL. BEFORE-AND-AFTER METHOD 854
17.6B2. YARDSTICK METHOD 857
17.6B3. LOST MARKET SHARE 857
17.6C. DAMAGES AND DISAGGREGATION 860
17.6D. TERMINATED DEALERS AND FIRMS DRIVEN FROM BUSINESS 861
17.6E. DAMAGES FOR PRECLUDED ENTRY 863
§ 17.7 CONTRIBUTION; JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 865
CHAPTER 18. ANTITRUST AND THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT 869
§ 18.1 REGULATION, RENT-SEEKING AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 869
18.1A. INTRODUCTION 869
18.1B. REGULATORY INTERVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO SEEK IT 870
18.1C. THE GENERAL IRRELEVANCE OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 871
18.ID. NOERR PROTECTS THE PROCESS, NOT THE RESULT 873
§ 18.2 THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST'S PETITIONING IMMUNITY 873
18.2A. PETITIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE OR EXECUTIVE ACTION GENERALLY 873
18.2B. PETITIONS TO GOVERNMENTS ACTING AS MARKET PARTICIPANTS 874
18.2C. PETITIONS FOR ADJUDICATIVE ACTION 878
§ 18.3 THE "SHAM" EXCEPTION IN LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE CONTEXTS 879
18.3A. USE OF ABUSIVE METHODS; FALSE INFORMATION 881
18.3B. BASELESSNESS IN THE ADJUDICATIVE SETTING; SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS 883
18.3C. SINGLE OR REPETITIVE CLAIMS 888
18.3D. THREAT TO SUE; EX PARTE STATEMENTS 889
18.3E. PETITIONS FOR INVALID LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 890
TABLE OF CONTENTS
§ 18.4 THE RELATION BETWEEN UNPROTECTED PETITIONING AND THE SUBSTANTIVE
OFFENSE 891
§ 18.5 CORRUPTION OF PRIVATE DECISION MAKING BODIES 892
CHAPTER 19. ANTITRUST AND FEDERAL REGULATORY POLICY 895
§ 19.1 ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 895
§ 19.2 REGULATION, DEREGULATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 896
19.2A. THE SCOPE OF REGULATION AND THE DOMAIN OF ANTITRUST 896
19.2B. THE RATIONALES FOR DEREGULATION 896
19.2BL. EXPANDED CONFIDENCE IN COMPETITION AND MARKETS 896
19.2B2. PUBLIC CHOICE: DECREASED CONFIDENCE IN THE REGULATORY
PROCESS 898
§ 19.3 THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN THE REGULATED MARKET 899
19.3A. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED REPEAL 899
19.3B. THE RELATION BETWEEN FEDERAL REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION: TWO VIEWS 900
19.3C. REQUISITE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT; "STATE ACTION" COMPARED 905
§ 19.4 PROCEDURE IN AREAS OF DIVIDED AUTHORITY; PRIMARY JURISDICTION 906
§ 19.5 MARKET POWER OFFENSES IN REGULATED MARKETS 908
§ 19.6 ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS AND REGULATED RATES: THE KEOGH DOCTRINE
911
§ 19.7 PARTICULAR EXEMPTIONS 913
19.7A. MISCELLANEOUS EXPRESS EXEMPTIONS 913
19.7B. ANTITRUST AND FEDERAL LABOR POLICY 915
19.7C. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND THE INSURANCE EXEMPTION 918
19.7CL. "BUSINESS OF INSURANCE" 919
19.7C2. "REGULATED BY STATE LAW" 921
19.7C3. ACTS OF BOYCOTT, COERCION OR INTIMIDATION 922
19.7C4. CONTINUING VITALITY OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON 924
CHAPTER 20. ANTITRUST FEDERALISM AND THE "STATE ACTION"
DOCTRINE 927
§ 20.1 INTRODUCTION; PREEMPTION 927
§ 20.2 FEDERALISM AND THE POLICY OF THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE 931
20.2A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE 931
20.2B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL ANTITRUST AND STATE REGULATION;
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 933
§ 20.3 BASIC QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTION 935
§ 20.4 AUTHORIZATION 937
§ 20.5 ACTIVE SUPERVISION 942
20.5A. WHEN IS SUPERVISION REQUIRED? 942
20.5B. WHAT KIND OF SUPERVISION IS REQUIRED? 945
20.5C. WHO MUST SUPERVISE? 948
§ 20.6 THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY 949
§ 20.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
"STATE
ACTION" DOCTRINE 952
§ 20.8 THE RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 954
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 21. THE REACH OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 961
§ 21.1 LOCAL ACTIVITIES: FEDERAL ANTITRUST AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 961
21.1A. THE SHERMAN ACT'S JURISDICTIONAL REACH 961
21.1B. JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF OTHER ANTITRUST PROVISIONS 966
21.1C. "COMMERCE": ANTITRUST AND NONCOMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 967
§ 21.2 ANTITRUST'S GLOBAL REACH 968
21.2A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY. BASIC DOCTRINE AND THE FTAIA 969
21.2B. PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 974
21.2C. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 978
21.2D. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION; PETITIONS TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 980
21.2E. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 980
§ 21.3 JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND ANTITRUST 981
TABLE OF CASES 985
TABLE OF STATUTES 1007
TABLE OF REGULATIONS 1009
TABLE OF RULES ION
INDEX 1013 |
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| series2 | Hornbook series |
| spelling | Hovenkamp, Herbert 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)132809168 aut Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice Herbert Hovenkamp (James G. Dinan University professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton School) Sixth edition St. Paul, MN West Academic Publishing [2020] xxiv, 1029 Seiten 26 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hornbook series Antitrust law / United States Antitrust law / Economic aspects / United States Competition, Unfair / United States Consolidation and merger of corporations / United States Hornbooks (Law) V:DE-576;B:DE-B212 application/pdf http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz1727690702inh.htm 20201120153706 Inhaltsverzeichnis SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032505468&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Hovenkamp, Herbert 1948- Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_auth | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_exact_search | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_full | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice Herbert Hovenkamp (James G. Dinan University professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton School) |
| title_fullStr | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice Herbert Hovenkamp (James G. Dinan University professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton School) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice Herbert Hovenkamp (James G. Dinan University professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton School) |
| title_short | Federal antitrust policy |
| title_sort | federal antitrust policy the law of competition and its practice |
| title_sub | the law of competition and its practice |
| url | http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz1727690702inh.htm http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032505468&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hovenkampherbert federalantitrustpolicythelawofcompetitionanditspractice |
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Inhaltsverzeichnis