Leviathan on a Leash: a theory of state responsibility
"The practice of holding states responsible is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed, praised, punished, obligated, and held liable. On an almost-daily basis, one hears about the latest round of sanctions against the latest rogue state; about the lat...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Princeton, New Jersey ; Oxford
Princeton University Press
[2020]
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The practice of holding states responsible is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed, praised, punished, obligated, and held liable. On an almost-daily basis, one hears about the latest round of sanctions against the latest rogue state; about the latest treaty that states have signed or repudiated; about the latest heavily-indebted state that is on the brink of bankruptcy; or about what former colonial states owe to their former colonies. The assumption in each case is that the state-as distinct from its individual leaders, officials, or citizens-is the entity that bears the responsibility in question. This book examines the theoretical and normative underpinnings of state responsibility. Why, and under which conditions, should we assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to particular individuals? There are two prevailing theories of state responsibility. The first suggests that states can be held responsible because they are 'moral agents' like human beings, with similar capacities for deliberation and intentional action. A state is responsible in the same way in which an indivdiual is responsible. The second sthat states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through their officials; states are 'principals' rather than agents, and the model for state responsibility is a case of vicariously liability, such as when an employer is held financially liable for the actions of her employee. Sam Fleming reconstructs and develops a forgotten understanding of state responsibility from Thomas Hobbes' political thought. Like proponents of the two theories of state responsibility, Hobbes considered states to be 'persons', meaning that actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed to them. States can be said to wage war, possess sovereignty, and owe money. What makes Hobbes unique is that he does not consider states to be agents or principals. Unlike an agent, the state cannot will or act on its own; it needs representatives to will and act on its behalf. Unlike a principal, the state cannot authorize its own representatives. States are in some ways similar to "Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason", who are "Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors" Although the state is incapable of acting on its own, it can nevertheless exercise rights and incur responsibilities through the representatives that its subjects authorize to act in its name. Hobbes' "Artificiall Man" is conceptually more like an artificial child or "Foole""-- |
| Beschreibung: | xiii, 202 Seiten 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780691206462 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "The practice of holding states responsible is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed, praised, punished, obligated, and held liable. On an almost-daily basis, one hears about the latest round of sanctions against the latest rogue state; about the latest treaty that states have signed or repudiated; about the latest heavily-indebted state that is on the brink of bankruptcy; or about what former colonial states owe to their former colonies. The assumption in each case is that the state-as distinct from its individual leaders, officials, or citizens-is the entity that bears the responsibility in question. This book examines the theoretical and normative underpinnings of state responsibility. Why, and under which conditions, should we assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to particular individuals? There are two prevailing theories of state responsibility. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a The first suggests that states can be held responsible because they are 'moral agents' like human beings, with similar capacities for deliberation and intentional action. A state is responsible in the same way in which an indivdiual is responsible. The second sthat states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through their officials; states are 'principals' rather than agents, and the model for state responsibility is a case of vicariously liability, such as when an employer is held financially liable for the actions of her employee. Sam Fleming reconstructs and develops a forgotten understanding of state responsibility from Thomas Hobbes' political thought. Like proponents of the two theories of state responsibility, Hobbes considered states to be 'persons', meaning that actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed to them. States can be said to wage war, possess sovereignty, and owe money. | |
| 520 | 3 | |a What makes Hobbes unique is that he does not consider states to be agents or principals. Unlike an agent, the state cannot will or act on its own; it needs representatives to will and act on its behalf. Unlike a principal, the state cannot authorize its own representatives. States are in some ways similar to "Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason", who are "Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors" Although the state is incapable of acting on its own, it can nevertheless exercise rights and incur responsibilities through the representatives that its subjects authorize to act in its name. Hobbes' "Artificiall Man" is conceptually more like an artificial child or "Foole""-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS Preface xi Abbreviations ofHobbes Works xiii Introduction: State Responsibility and Corporate Personality і §1 The Idea of State Responsibility 3 S2 The Three Fundamental Questions 6 $3 Back to Hobbes 9 §4 The Structure of the Book 14 1 The Agential and Functional Theories of State Responsibility Ss States as Moral Agents: The Agential Theory 17 §5.1 The Agential Answer to the Question of Ownership 19 §5.2 The Agential Answer to the Question of Identity 24 §5.3 The Agential Answer to the Question of Fulfilment 28 §6 States as Legal Persons: The Functional Theory §7 16 32 §6.1 The Functional Answer to the Question of Ownership 35 §6.2 The Functional Answer to the Question of Identity 38 §6.3 The Functional Answer to the Question of Fulfilment 41 The Limitations of the Agential and Functional Theories 2 Hobbes and the Personality of the State 44 46 §8 The Skinner-Runciman Debate 47 §p The Two Faces ofPersonhood 51 S10 Hobbes’ Theory of the State 56 §n Artificial Men and Artificial Animals 61 vii
viii CONTENTS §11.1 Hobbes’ State as a Corporate Agent 61 §11.2 Hobbes’ State as an Organism 65 §12 The Hobbesian Theory of State Responsibility 68 3 Attribution: The Question of Ownership 72 §13 General and Personal Responsibilities 73 $14 The Conditions for Attribution 74 §14.1 Representation 75 §14.2 Authorization 77 §15 A Hobbesian Account ofAttribution 79 §15.1 The Background Conditions for Authorization 79 §15.2 The Form ofAuthorization 85 §15.3 The Content ofAuthorization 90 §15.4 Non-State Corporate Entities 94 §16 From Attribution to Responsibility §17 Impersonation of the State 99 105 4 Succession: The Question of Identity 110 $18 The Concept of Corporate Identity 111 §19 The Conditionsfor Corporate Identity 114 §19.1 Unity 118 §19.2 Continuity 120 §20 Changes in a Single State 125 §21 Relational Changes 132 §22 Non-Identity 138 5 Distribution: The Question of Fulfilment 144 §23 The Problem ofDistribution 145 §24 The Conditions for Distribution 150 §24.1 Intragenerational Distribution 150 §24.2 Intergenerational Distribution 156 §25 The Division ofLiability 160 §26 Non-Fulfilment 168
CONTENTS ІХ Conclusion: The Future of State Responsibility 175 §27 International Criminal Law 178 §28 The Proliferation of Treaties 179 §29 Cyborg States and Robotic Representatives 181 Bibliography Index 201 187
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| adam_txt |
CONTENTS Preface xi Abbreviations ofHobbes' Works xiii Introduction: State Responsibility and Corporate Personality і §1 The Idea of State Responsibility 3 S2 The Three Fundamental Questions 6 $3 Back to Hobbes 9 §4 The Structure of the Book 14 1 The Agential and Functional Theories of State Responsibility Ss States as Moral Agents: The Agential Theory 17 §5.1 The Agential Answer to the Question of Ownership 19 §5.2 The Agential Answer to the Question of Identity 24 §5.3 The Agential Answer to the Question of Fulfilment 28 §6 States as Legal Persons: The Functional Theory §7 16 32 §6.1 The Functional Answer to the Question of Ownership 35 §6.2 The Functional Answer to the Question of Identity 38 §6.3 The Functional Answer to the Question of Fulfilment 41 The Limitations of the Agential and Functional Theories 2 Hobbes and the Personality of the State 44 46 §8 The Skinner-Runciman Debate 47 §p The Two Faces ofPersonhood 51 S10 Hobbes’ Theory of the State 56 §n Artificial Men and Artificial Animals 61 vii
viii CONTENTS §11.1 Hobbes’ State as a Corporate Agent 61 §11.2 Hobbes’ State as an Organism 65 §12 The Hobbesian Theory of State Responsibility 68 3 Attribution: The Question of Ownership 72 §13 General and Personal Responsibilities 73 $14 The Conditions for Attribution 74 §14.1 Representation 75 §14.2 Authorization 77 §15 A Hobbesian Account ofAttribution 79 §15.1 The Background Conditions for Authorization 79 §15.2 The Form ofAuthorization 85 §15.3 The Content ofAuthorization 90 §15.4 Non-State Corporate Entities 94 §16 From Attribution to Responsibility §17 Impersonation of the State 99 105 4 Succession: The Question of Identity 110 $18 The Concept of Corporate Identity 111 §19 The Conditionsfor Corporate Identity 114 §19.1 Unity 118 §19.2 Continuity 120 §20 Changes in a Single State 125 §21 Relational Changes 132 §22 Non-Identity 138 5 Distribution: The Question of Fulfilment 144 §23 The Problem ofDistribution 145 §24 The Conditions for Distribution 150 §24.1 Intragenerational Distribution 150 §24.2 Intergenerational Distribution 156 §25 The Division ofLiability 160 §26 Non-Fulfilment 168
CONTENTS ІХ Conclusion: The Future of State Responsibility 175 §27 International Criminal Law 178 §28 The Proliferation of Treaties 179 §29 Cyborg States and Robotic Representatives 181 Bibliography Index 201 187 |
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| spelling | Fleming, Sean Verfasser (DE-588)1148153608 aut Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility Sean Fleming Princeton, New Jersey ; Oxford Princeton University Press [2020] © 2020 xiii, 202 Seiten 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "The practice of holding states responsible is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed, praised, punished, obligated, and held liable. On an almost-daily basis, one hears about the latest round of sanctions against the latest rogue state; about the latest treaty that states have signed or repudiated; about the latest heavily-indebted state that is on the brink of bankruptcy; or about what former colonial states owe to their former colonies. The assumption in each case is that the state-as distinct from its individual leaders, officials, or citizens-is the entity that bears the responsibility in question. This book examines the theoretical and normative underpinnings of state responsibility. Why, and under which conditions, should we assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to particular individuals? There are two prevailing theories of state responsibility. The first suggests that states can be held responsible because they are 'moral agents' like human beings, with similar capacities for deliberation and intentional action. A state is responsible in the same way in which an indivdiual is responsible. The second sthat states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through their officials; states are 'principals' rather than agents, and the model for state responsibility is a case of vicariously liability, such as when an employer is held financially liable for the actions of her employee. Sam Fleming reconstructs and develops a forgotten understanding of state responsibility from Thomas Hobbes' political thought. Like proponents of the two theories of state responsibility, Hobbes considered states to be 'persons', meaning that actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed to them. States can be said to wage war, possess sovereignty, and owe money. What makes Hobbes unique is that he does not consider states to be agents or principals. Unlike an agent, the state cannot will or act on its own; it needs representatives to will and act on its behalf. Unlike a principal, the state cannot authorize its own representatives. States are in some ways similar to "Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason", who are "Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors" Although the state is incapable of acting on its own, it can nevertheless exercise rights and incur responsibilities through the representatives that its subjects authorize to act in its name. Hobbes' "Artificiall Man" is conceptually more like an artificial child or "Foole""-- Hobbes, Thomas 1588-1679 Leviathan (DE-588)4231132-9 gnd rswk-swf Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd rswk-swf Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 gnd rswk-swf Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd rswk-swf Government liability Hobbes, Thomas 1588-1679 Leviathan (DE-588)4231132-9 u Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 s Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 s Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032489141&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Fleming, Sean Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility Hobbes, Thomas 1588-1679 Leviathan (DE-588)4231132-9 gnd Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 gnd Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4231132-9 (DE-588)4062547-3 (DE-588)4076226-9 (DE-588)4056618-3 |
| title | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility |
| title_auth | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility |
| title_exact_search | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility |
| title_full | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility Sean Fleming |
| title_fullStr | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility Sean Fleming |
| title_full_unstemmed | Leviathan on a Leash a theory of state responsibility Sean Fleming |
| title_short | Leviathan on a Leash |
| title_sort | leviathan on a leash a theory of state responsibility |
| title_sub | a theory of state responsibility |
| topic | Hobbes, Thomas 1588-1679 Leviathan (DE-588)4231132-9 gnd Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd Politische Philosophie (DE-588)4076226-9 gnd Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Hobbes, Thomas 1588-1679 Leviathan Verantwortung Politische Philosophie Staat |
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