On justifying moral judgments:
Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparen...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
London ; New York
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
2014
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Schriftenreihe: | Routledge revivals
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Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the 'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument -- |
Beschreibung: | 199 Seiten |
ISBN: | 9781138016750 |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the 'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument -- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Becker, Lawrence C. 1939-2018 |
author_GND | (DE-588)170154963 |
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bvnumber | BV047031408 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1224488285 (DE-599)BVBBV047031408 |
format | Book |
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
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institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781138016750 |
language | English |
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owner_facet | DE-29 |
physical | 199 Seiten |
publishDate | 2014 |
publishDateSearch | 2014 |
publishDateSort | 2014 |
publisher | Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Routledge revivals |
spelling | Becker, Lawrence C. 1939-2018 Verfasser (DE-588)170154963 aut On justifying moral judgments Lawrence C. Becker London ; New York Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2014 199 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Routledge revivals Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the 'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument -- Moralisches Urteil (DE-588)4074970-8 gnd rswk-swf Judgment (Ethics) Values Moralisches Urteil (DE-588)4074970-8 s DE-604 |
spellingShingle | Becker, Lawrence C. 1939-2018 On justifying moral judgments Moralisches Urteil (DE-588)4074970-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4074970-8 |
title | On justifying moral judgments |
title_auth | On justifying moral judgments |
title_exact_search | On justifying moral judgments |
title_exact_search_txtP | On justifying moral judgments |
title_full | On justifying moral judgments Lawrence C. Becker |
title_fullStr | On justifying moral judgments Lawrence C. Becker |
title_full_unstemmed | On justifying moral judgments Lawrence C. Becker |
title_short | On justifying moral judgments |
title_sort | on justifying moral judgments |
topic | Moralisches Urteil (DE-588)4074970-8 gnd |
topic_facet | Moralisches Urteil |
work_keys_str_mv | AT beckerlawrencec onjustifyingmoraljudgments |