Well-founded belief: new essays on the epistemic basing relation
"Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is b...
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Routledge
2019
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in epistemology
Routledge studies in epistemology |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | URL des Erstveroeffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"-- |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (vi, 330 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781315145518 1315145510 9781351382441 1351382446 9781351382434 1351382438 9781351382427 135138242X |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV047011097 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 201118s2019 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781315145518 |9 978-1-315-14551-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 1315145510 |9 1-315-14551-0 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781351382441 |9 978-1-351-38244-1 | ||
| 020 | |a 1351382446 |9 1-351-38244-6 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781351382434 |9 978-1-351-38243-4 | ||
| 020 | |a 1351382438 |9 1-351-38243-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781351382427 |9 978-1-351-38242-7 | ||
| 020 | |a 135138242X |9 1-351-38242-X | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-7-TFC)9781315145518 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV047011097 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 121/.4 |2 23 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Well-founded belief |b new essays on the epistemic basing relation |c edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Routledge |c 2019 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (vi, 330 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Routledge studies in epistemology | |
| 490 | 0 | |a Routledge studies in epistemology | |
| 520 | |a "Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"-- | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Epistemics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Evidence | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Carter, J. Adam |d 1980- |4 edt | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Bondy, Patrick |4 edt | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315145518 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveroeffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-7-TFC | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032418634 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804181967614246912 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author2 | Carter, J. Adam 1980- Bondy, Patrick |
| author2_role | edt edt |
| author2_variant | j a c ja jac p b pb |
| author_facet | Carter, J. Adam 1980- Bondy, Patrick |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV047011097 |
| collection | ZDB-7-TFC |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-7-TFC)9781315145518 (DE-599)BVBBV047011097 |
| dewey-full | 121/.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121/.4 |
| dewey-search | 121/.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 14 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03067nmm a2200445zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV047011097</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201118s2019 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781315145518</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-315-14551-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1315145510</subfield><subfield code="9">1-315-14551-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781351382441</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-351-38244-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1351382446</subfield><subfield code="9">1-351-38244-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781351382434</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-351-38243-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1351382438</subfield><subfield code="9">1-351-38243-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781351382427</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-351-38242-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">135138242X</subfield><subfield code="9">1-351-38242-X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-7-TFC)9781315145518</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV047011097</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">121/.4</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Well-founded belief</subfield><subfield code="b">new essays on the epistemic basing relation</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">New York, NY</subfield><subfield code="b">Routledge</subfield><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (vi, 330 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Routledge studies in epistemology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Routledge studies in epistemology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"--</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Epistemics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evidence</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Knowledge, Theory of</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Carter, J. Adam</subfield><subfield code="d">1980-</subfield><subfield code="4">edt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bondy, Patrick</subfield><subfield code="4">edt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315145518</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveroeffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-7-TFC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032418634</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV047011097 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T15:58:10Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:00:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781315145518 1315145510 9781351382441 1351382446 9781351382434 1351382438 9781351382427 135138242X |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032418634 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| physical | 1 online resource (vi, 330 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-7-TFC |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSearch | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Routledge studies in epistemology |
| spelling | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy New York, NY Routledge 2019 1 online resource (vi, 330 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology "Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature-a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason-there is hardly any widely-accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together seventeen essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The collection is divided thematically to cover a wide range of issues related to the epistemic basic relation. The first section of essays covers the nature of the basing relation and attempts to articulate defensible accounts of what it takes to believe on the basis of a reason. Section II explores the kind of things that can be reasons on the basis of which we hold beliefs. Finally, the last section addresses the basing relation as it bears on particular problems in epistemology, such as skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, and the contingencies of our epistemic upbringing"-- Epistemics Evidence Knowledge, Theory of Carter, J. Adam 1980- edt Bondy, Patrick edt https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315145518 Verlag URL des Erstveroeffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation Epistemics Evidence Knowledge, Theory of |
| title | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
| title_auth | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
| title_exact_search | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
| title_full | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
| title_fullStr | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Well-founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation edited by J. Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy |
| title_short | Well-founded belief |
| title_sort | well founded belief new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
| title_sub | new essays on the epistemic basing relation |
| topic | Epistemics Evidence Knowledge, Theory of |
| topic_facet | Epistemics Evidence Knowledge, Theory of |
| url | https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315145518 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT carterjadam wellfoundedbeliefnewessaysontheepistemicbasingrelation AT bondypatrick wellfoundedbeliefnewessaysontheepistemicbasingrelation |