Natural monopolies in digital platform markets:
Introduction -- Technological Change and Natural Monopolies in Digital Industries -- Horizontal Search -- E-Commerce Marketplaces -- Ride-Hailing PlatformsChapter -- The Institutional Dimension of Alternative Policy Options -- Conclusion
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY ; Port Melbourne, VIC ; New Delhi ; Singapore
Cambridge University Press
2020
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| Schriftenreihe: | Global competition law and economics policy
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Introduction -- Technological Change and Natural Monopolies in Digital Industries -- Horizontal Search -- E-Commerce Marketplaces -- Ride-Hailing PlatformsChapter -- The Institutional Dimension of Alternative Policy Options -- Conclusion "Multi-sided platform markets characterized by network externalities have always existed as an economic paradigm, but in different technological forms.1 The old village market place, physical shopping malls, or any traditional fair can be seen as multi-sided platform markets connecting buyers and sellers. They are all platform-meeting places where different agents that want to interact and transact with each other are brought together by an intermediary. The traditional printed ad-based newspaper is also a classic version of a platform connecting advertisers and eyeballs. More readers increase the value for advertisers that want to reach them, and readers generally are indifferent to or dislike ads. Due to these externalities across the different sides, newspapers can often be provided for free to create an audience for advertisers. Payment cards of various kind, the first twosided market closely studied in the industrial organization literature, are also a typical example of platforms, which connect merchant and cardholders concluding transactions." |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 167-182 Based on author's thesis (doctoral - University of Toronto, 2019) |
| Beschreibung: | x, 191 Seiten Illustrationen |
| ISBN: | 9781108491143 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Introduction -- Technological Change and Natural Monopolies in Digital Industries -- Horizontal Search -- E-Commerce Marketplaces -- Ride-Hailing PlatformsChapter -- The Institutional Dimension of Alternative Policy Options -- Conclusion | |
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| adam_text | Contents List of Figures page viii List of Tables ix Acknowledgments x і i Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 շ Three Case Studies: A Spectrum of Natural Concentration Rethinking the Interface Between Competition Policy and Regulation Outline Technological Change andNatural Monopoliesin Digital Industries 2.1 Technological and Economic Drivers of Increasing Concentration 2.1.1 Platform Intermediation and the Theory of the Firm 2.1.2 Data, Algorithmic Predictions, and Digital Matching 2.2 The Economics of Platforms: Are New Legal and Policy Tools Needed? 2.2.1 EconomicLiterature onMultisided Platforms 2.2.2 Identifying the Boundaries of Desirable Policy Changes 2.2.3 The Relevance of This Debate for Digital Platforms 2.3 Applying the Natural Monopoly Framework 2.3.1 The Standard Natural Monopoly Paradigm 2.3.2 Determinants of Natural Monopoly in Digital Platform Markets 2.3.3 Alternative Approaches forNaturally Monopolistic Markets 2.4 Conclusion 3 Horizontal Search 3.1 3.2 3.3 4 7 9 ю ю 18 20 23 24 29 35 36 37 4° 43 45 47 The Evolution of Online Search: From Neutral to UniversalResults Alternative Business Models Horizontal Search as a Naturally Monopolistic Market v 48 51 55
Conteurs Ví 3.3.1 Cost Structure with High Fixed Costs and Marginal Costs Close to Zero 57 3.3.2 Network Externalities and the Value of Data for Horizontal Search Predictions 57 3.3.3 The Consequences of Natural Concentration 59 3.4 Regulating Market Power of a Natural Monopolist in Search 62 3.4.1 Regulating the Price of Searches and Search Ads 66 3.4.2 Structural Remedies to Separate the Natural Monopoly Segment 67 3.4.3 Access to Horizontal Search as an Essential Facility 70 3.5 Conclusion 74 4 E-Commerce Marketplaces 76 4.1 5 The Evolution of Amazon: From Niche Entry to the Everything Store 4.2 Concerns About Amazon’s Market Power 4.2.1 Antitrust Investigations Regarding MFN Clauses 4.2.2 Predatory Pricing 4.2.3 Dominance in E-Commerce, Vertical Integration, and Discrimination 4.3 Why Amazon Marketplace Is Not a Natural Monopoly 4.3.1 Network Effects Between Buyers and Sellers 4.3.2 The Importance of Physical Infrastructure for Logistics, Storage, and Delivery 4.4 Venues for Stronger Competition Policy Intervention 4.5 Conclusion 90 91 95 Ride-Hailing Platforms 97 5.1 The Structure of Sharing Economy Transportation Platforms 5.1.1 The Pure Marketplace for Drivers and Passengers 5.1.2 One-Sided Models: Drivers vs. Automated Cars 5.1.3 Hybrid Models: The Current Structureof Ride-Hailing 5.2 Antitrust Concerns over Inter-Platform and Intra-Platform Competition 5.2.1 Predation 5.2.2 Exclusivity 5.2.3 Collusion Facilitated by the Platform 5.3 Is On-Demand Transportation and Ride-Hailing Naturally Monopolistic? 5.3.1 Network Externalities and Matching: Availability, Waiting
Times, and Ratings 5.3.2 Data and the Efficiency of Centralized Algorithmic Routing and Planning 5.3.3 Supply-Side Economies of Scale 77 81 81 83 84 87 88 99 101 103 105 108 108 109 no 113 114 115 116
6 Contents vii 5.4 A Range of Policies Between Competition and Natural Monopoly 5.4.1 Regulating Ride-Hailing Platforms 5.4.2 Auctioning the Market to a Single Network 5.4.3 Promoting Inter-Platform Competition 5.5 Conclusion 117 118 121 122 124 The Institutional Dimension of Alternative Policy Options 126 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7 Sector-Specific Regulation 126 6.1.1 Price and Entry Regulation 127 6.1.2 Vertical Integration and Leveraging 129 6.1.3 The Limits of Standard Regulatory Approaches 131 Franchise Bidding: Auctioning the Market to a Single Platform 132 Public Ownership 134 Reliance on Competition Policy and Schumpeterian Competition 136 6.4.1 Promoting Monopoly Displacement and Potential Competition: A Substantive Perspective 136 6.4.2 The Institutional Limits of Ex Post Enforcement 152 Rethinking the Interface Between Competition Policy and Regulation 154 Conclusion 155 Conclusion 157 7.1 158 158 161 7.2 Lessons and Open Questions 7.1.1 Natural Monopolies and Digital Platforms 7.1.2 Break-Up Policies 7.1.3 The Economics of Platforms and the Boundaries of Desirable Legal Changes 7.1.4 Institutional Refinements for a Schumpeterian Framework 7.1.5 Political Economy Considerations Conclusion 161 163 164 164 Bibliography 167 Index 183
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| adam_txt |
Contents List of Figures page viii List of Tables ix Acknowledgments x і i Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 շ Three Case Studies: A Spectrum of Natural Concentration Rethinking the Interface Between Competition Policy and Regulation Outline Technological Change andNatural Monopoliesin Digital Industries 2.1 Technological and Economic Drivers of Increasing Concentration 2.1.1 Platform Intermediation and the Theory of the Firm 2.1.2 Data, Algorithmic Predictions, and Digital Matching 2.2 The Economics of Platforms: Are New Legal and Policy Tools Needed? 2.2.1 EconomicLiterature onMultisided Platforms 2.2.2 Identifying the Boundaries of Desirable Policy Changes 2.2.3 The Relevance of This Debate for Digital Platforms 2.3 Applying the Natural Monopoly Framework 2.3.1 The Standard Natural Monopoly Paradigm 2.3.2 Determinants of Natural Monopoly in Digital Platform Markets 2.3.3 Alternative Approaches forNaturally Monopolistic Markets 2.4 Conclusion 3 Horizontal Search 3.1 3.2 3.3 4 7 9 ю ю 18 20 23 24 29 35 36 37 4° 43 45 47 The Evolution of Online Search: From Neutral to UniversalResults Alternative Business Models Horizontal Search as a Naturally Monopolistic Market v 48 51 55
Conteurs Ví 3.3.1 Cost Structure with High Fixed Costs and Marginal Costs Close to Zero 57 3.3.2 Network Externalities and the Value of Data for Horizontal Search Predictions 57 3.3.3 The Consequences of Natural Concentration 59 3.4 Regulating Market Power of a Natural Monopolist in Search 62 3.4.1 Regulating the Price of Searches and Search Ads 66 3.4.2 Structural Remedies to Separate the Natural Monopoly Segment 67 3.4.3 Access to Horizontal Search as an Essential Facility 70 3.5 Conclusion 74 4 E-Commerce Marketplaces 76 4.1 5 The Evolution of Amazon: From Niche Entry to the Everything Store 4.2 Concerns About Amazon’s Market Power 4.2.1 Antitrust Investigations Regarding MFN Clauses 4.2.2 Predatory Pricing 4.2.3 Dominance in E-Commerce, Vertical Integration, and Discrimination 4.3 Why Amazon Marketplace Is Not a Natural Monopoly 4.3.1 Network Effects Between Buyers and Sellers 4.3.2 The Importance of Physical Infrastructure for Logistics, Storage, and Delivery 4.4 Venues for Stronger Competition Policy Intervention 4.5 Conclusion 90 91 95 Ride-Hailing Platforms 97 5.1 The Structure of Sharing Economy Transportation Platforms 5.1.1 The Pure Marketplace for Drivers and Passengers 5.1.2 One-Sided Models: Drivers vs. Automated Cars 5.1.3 Hybrid Models: The Current Structureof Ride-Hailing 5.2 Antitrust Concerns over Inter-Platform and Intra-Platform Competition 5.2.1 Predation 5.2.2 Exclusivity 5.2.3 Collusion Facilitated by the Platform 5.3 Is On-Demand Transportation and Ride-Hailing Naturally Monopolistic? 5.3.1 Network Externalities and Matching: Availability, Waiting
Times, and Ratings 5.3.2 Data and the Efficiency of Centralized Algorithmic Routing and Planning 5.3.3 Supply-Side Economies of Scale 77 81 81 83 84 87 88 99 101 103 105 108 108 109 no 113 114 115 116
6 Contents vii 5.4 A Range of Policies Between Competition and Natural Monopoly 5.4.1 Regulating Ride-Hailing Platforms 5.4.2 Auctioning the Market to a Single Network 5.4.3 Promoting Inter-Platform Competition 5.5 Conclusion 117 118 121 122 124 The Institutional Dimension of Alternative Policy Options 126 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7 Sector-Specific Regulation 126 6.1.1 Price and Entry Regulation 127 6.1.2 Vertical Integration and Leveraging 129 6.1.3 The Limits of Standard Regulatory Approaches 131 Franchise Bidding: Auctioning the Market to a Single Platform 132 Public Ownership 134 Reliance on Competition Policy and Schumpeterian Competition 136 6.4.1 Promoting Monopoly Displacement and Potential Competition: A Substantive Perspective 136 6.4.2 The Institutional Limits of Ex Post Enforcement 152 Rethinking the Interface Between Competition Policy and Regulation 154 Conclusion 155 Conclusion 157 7.1 158 158 161 7.2 Lessons and Open Questions 7.1.1 Natural Monopolies and Digital Platforms 7.1.2 Break-Up Policies 7.1.3 The Economics of Platforms and the Boundaries of Desirable Legal Changes 7.1.4 Institutional Refinements for a Schumpeterian Framework 7.1.5 Political Economy Considerations Conclusion 161 163 164 164 Bibliography 167 Index 183 |
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| spelling | Ducci, Francesco 1987- Verfasser (DE-588)1214308295 aut Natural monopolies in digital platform markets Francesco Ducci (University of Toronto Faculty of Law) Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY ; Port Melbourne, VIC ; New Delhi ; Singapore Cambridge University Press 2020 x, 191 Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Global competition law and economics policy Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 167-182 Based on author's thesis (doctoral - University of Toronto, 2019) Dissertation University of Toronto 2019 Introduction -- Technological Change and Natural Monopolies in Digital Industries -- Horizontal Search -- E-Commerce Marketplaces -- Ride-Hailing PlatformsChapter -- The Institutional Dimension of Alternative Policy Options -- Conclusion "Multi-sided platform markets characterized by network externalities have always existed as an economic paradigm, but in different technological forms.1 The old village market place, physical shopping malls, or any traditional fair can be seen as multi-sided platform markets connecting buyers and sellers. They are all platform-meeting places where different agents that want to interact and transact with each other are brought together by an intermediary. The traditional printed ad-based newspaper is also a classic version of a platform connecting advertisers and eyeballs. More readers increase the value for advertisers that want to reach them, and readers generally are indifferent to or dislike ads. Due to these externalities across the different sides, newspapers can often be provided for free to create an audience for advertisers. Payment cards of various kind, the first twosided market closely studied in the industrial organization literature, are also a typical example of platforms, which connect merchant and cardholders concluding transactions." Internet (DE-588)4308416-3 gnd rswk-swf Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd rswk-swf Electronic Commerce (DE-588)4592128-3 gnd rswk-swf Marktplatz (DE-588)4132394-4 gnd rswk-swf Electronic commerce / Law and legislation Internet industry / Law and legislation Antitrust law Monopolies (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Internet (DE-588)4308416-3 s Marktplatz (DE-588)4132394-4 s Electronic Commerce (DE-588)4592128-3 s Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032314777&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Ducci, Francesco 1987- Natural monopolies in digital platform markets Internet (DE-588)4308416-3 gnd Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd Electronic Commerce (DE-588)4592128-3 gnd Marktplatz (DE-588)4132394-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4308416-3 (DE-588)4121924-7 (DE-588)4592128-3 (DE-588)4132394-4 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets |
| title_auth | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets |
| title_exact_search | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets |
| title_full | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets Francesco Ducci (University of Toronto Faculty of Law) |
| title_fullStr | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets Francesco Ducci (University of Toronto Faculty of Law) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets Francesco Ducci (University of Toronto Faculty of Law) |
| title_short | Natural monopolies in digital platform markets |
| title_sort | natural monopolies in digital platform markets |
| topic | Internet (DE-588)4308416-3 gnd Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd Electronic Commerce (DE-588)4592128-3 gnd Marktplatz (DE-588)4132394-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Internet Wettbewerbsrecht Electronic Commerce Marktplatz Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032314777&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT duccifrancesco naturalmonopoliesindigitalplatformmarkets |