Aggregation and Representation of Preferences: Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy
Aggregation is the conjunction of information, aimed at its compact represen tation. Any time when the totality of data is described in terms of general ized indicators, conventional counts, typical representatives and characteristic dependences, one directly or indirectly deals with aggregation....
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1991
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1991 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Aggregation is the conjunction of information, aimed at its compact represen tation. Any time when the totality of data is described in terms of general ized indicators, conventional counts, typical representatives and characteristic dependences, one directly or indirectly deals with aggregation. It includes revealing the most significant characteristics and distinctive features, quanti tative and qualitative analysis. As a result, the information becomes adaptable for further processing and convenient for human perception. Aggregation is widely used in economics, statistics, management, planning, system analysis, and many other fields. That is why aggregation is so important in data pro cessing. Aggregation of preferences is a particular case of the general problem of ag gregation. It arises in multicriteria decision-making and collective choice, when a set of alternatives has to be ordered with respect to contradicting criteria, or various individual opinions. However, in spite of apparent similarity the problems of multicriteria decision-making and collective choice are somewhat different. Indeed, an improvement in some specifications at the cost of worsen ing others is not the same as the satisfaction of interests of some individuals to the prejudice of the rest. In the former case the reciprocal compensations are considered within a certain entirety; in the latter we infringe upon the rights of independent individuals. Moreover, in multicriteria decision-making one usu ally takes into account objective factors, whereas in collective choice one has to compare subjective opinions which cannot be measured properly |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 331 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783642765162 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| author_facet | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046874375 |
| classification_rvk | ME 3100 MF 4100 QH 234 |
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| ctrlnum | (ZDB-2-SBE)978-3-642-76516-2 (OCoLC)903191306 (DE-599)BVBBV046874375 |
| dewey-full | 658.40301 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.40301 |
| dewey-search | 658.40301 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.40301 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2 |
| edition | 1st ed. 1991 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T15:15:41Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:56:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783642765162 |
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| publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Tanguiane, Andranick S. Verfasser aut Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy by Andranick S. Tanguiane 1st ed. 1991 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1991 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 331 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Aggregation is the conjunction of information, aimed at its compact represen tation. Any time when the totality of data is described in terms of general ized indicators, conventional counts, typical representatives and characteristic dependences, one directly or indirectly deals with aggregation. It includes revealing the most significant characteristics and distinctive features, quanti tative and qualitative analysis. As a result, the information becomes adaptable for further processing and convenient for human perception. Aggregation is widely used in economics, statistics, management, planning, system analysis, and many other fields. That is why aggregation is so important in data pro cessing. Aggregation of preferences is a particular case of the general problem of ag gregation. It arises in multicriteria decision-making and collective choice, when a set of alternatives has to be ordered with respect to contradicting criteria, or various individual opinions. However, in spite of apparent similarity the problems of multicriteria decision-making and collective choice are somewhat different. Indeed, an improvement in some specifications at the cost of worsen ing others is not the same as the satisfaction of interests of some individuals to the prejudice of the rest. In the former case the reciprocal compensations are considered within a certain entirety; in the latter we infringe upon the rights of independent individuals. Moreover, in multicriteria decision-making one usu ally takes into account objective factors, whereas in collective choice one has to compare subjective opinions which cannot be measured properly Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations research Decision making Economic theory Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 gnd rswk-swf Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd rswk-swf Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd rswk-swf Arrow-Paradoxon (DE-588)4143069-4 gnd rswk-swf Modell (DE-588)4039798-1 gnd rswk-swf Aggregation (DE-588)4000728-5 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Mathematische Methode (DE-588)4155620-3 gnd rswk-swf Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s Mathematische Methode (DE-588)4155620-3 s DE-604 Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 s Modell (DE-588)4039798-1 s Aggregation (DE-588)4000728-5 s Arrow-Paradoxon (DE-588)4143069-4 s Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642765186 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540538455 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642765179 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Tanguiane, Andranick S. Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations research Decision making Economic theory Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 gnd Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Arrow-Paradoxon (DE-588)4143069-4 gnd Modell (DE-588)4039798-1 gnd Aggregation (DE-588)4000728-5 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Mathematische Methode (DE-588)4155620-3 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4049535-8 (DE-588)4233109-2 (DE-588)4011413-2 (DE-588)4143069-4 (DE-588)4039798-1 (DE-588)4000728-5 (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4155620-3 (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4022393-0 |
| title | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy |
| title_auth | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy |
| title_exact_search | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy |
| title_full | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy by Andranick S. Tanguiane |
| title_fullStr | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy by Andranick S. Tanguiane |
| title_full_unstemmed | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy by Andranick S. Tanguiane |
| title_short | Aggregation and Representation of Preferences |
| title_sort | aggregation and representation of preferences introduction to mathematical theory of democracy |
| title_sub | Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy |
| topic | Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations research Decision making Economic theory Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 gnd Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Arrow-Paradoxon (DE-588)4143069-4 gnd Modell (DE-588)4039798-1 gnd Aggregation (DE-588)4000728-5 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Mathematische Methode (DE-588)4155620-3 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations research Decision making Economic theory Repräsentative Demokratie Public-Choice-Theorie Demokratie Arrow-Paradoxon Modell Aggregation Mathematisches Modell Mathematische Methode Theorie Kollektiventscheidung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tanguianeandranicks aggregationandrepresentationofpreferencesintroductiontomathematicaltheoryofdemocracy |