Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives:
Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plica...
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1987
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1987 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (XVIII, 533 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783642750601 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| discipline | Allgemeines Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1 |
| edition | 1st ed. 1987 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:56:13Z |
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| publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives edited by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann 1st ed. 1987 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1987 1 Online-Ressource (XVIII, 533 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs Economics, general Organization Economics Management science Planning Unternehmensleitung (DE-588)4233771-9 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Anteilseigner (DE-588)4211515-2 gnd rswk-swf Rechnungslegung (DE-588)4128343-0 gnd rswk-swf Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd rswk-swf Risikoanalyse (DE-588)4137042-9 gnd rswk-swf Kapitalmarkt (DE-588)4029578-3 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Risikoanalyse (DE-588)4137042-9 s Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s DE-604 Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Rechnungslegung (DE-588)4128343-0 s Kapitalmarkt (DE-588)4029578-3 s Information (DE-588)4026899-8 s Anteilseigner (DE-588)4211515-2 s Unternehmensleitung (DE-588)4233771-9 s Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 s Bamberg, Günter edt Spremann, Klaus edt Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540184225 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540516750 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642750618 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives Economics, general Organization Economics Management science Planning Unternehmensleitung (DE-588)4233771-9 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Anteilseigner (DE-588)4211515-2 gnd Rechnungslegung (DE-588)4128343-0 gnd Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd Risikoanalyse (DE-588)4137042-9 gnd Kapitalmarkt (DE-588)4029578-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4233771-9 (DE-588)4039225-9 (DE-588)4211515-2 (DE-588)4128343-0 (DE-588)4032386-9 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4026899-8 (DE-588)4137042-9 (DE-588)4029578-3 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives |
| title_auth | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives |
| title_exact_search | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives |
| title_full | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives edited by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann |
| title_fullStr | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives edited by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann |
| title_full_unstemmed | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives edited by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann |
| title_short | Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives |
| title_sort | agency theory information and incentives |
| topic | Economics, general Organization Economics Management science Planning Unternehmensleitung (DE-588)4233771-9 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Anteilseigner (DE-588)4211515-2 gnd Rechnungslegung (DE-588)4128343-0 gnd Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd Risikoanalyse (DE-588)4137042-9 gnd Kapitalmarkt (DE-588)4029578-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economics, general Organization Economics Management science Planning Unternehmensleitung Mikroökonomie Anteilseigner Rechnungslegung Kooperation Agency-Theorie Information Risikoanalyse Kapitalmarkt Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bamberggunter agencytheoryinformationandincentives AT spremannklaus agencytheoryinformationandincentives |