Credible Threats in Negotiations: A Game-theoretic Approach
The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with a...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Springer US
2002
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 2002 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization
32 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation’s announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (XXII, 320 p) |
| ISBN: | 9780306475399 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/b109097 |
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| spelling | Bolt, Wilko Verfasser aut Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach by Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba 1st ed. 2002 New York, NY Springer US 2002 1 Online-Ressource (XXII, 320 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization 32 The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation’s announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2 Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Microeconomics Labor Economics Environmental Economics Economic theory Macroeconomics Labor economics Environmental economics Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd rswk-swf Glaubwürdigkeit (DE-588)4157500-3 gnd rswk-swf Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 s Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 s Glaubwürdigkeit (DE-588)4157500-3 s DE-604 Houba, Harold aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781441953049 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781402071836 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781475776386 https://doi.org/10.1007/b109097 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bolt, Wilko Houba, Harold Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Microeconomics Labor Economics Environmental Economics Economic theory Macroeconomics Labor economics Environmental economics Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Glaubwürdigkeit (DE-588)4157500-3 gnd Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139583-9 (DE-588)4157500-3 (DE-588)4150704-6 |
| title | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach |
| title_auth | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach |
| title_exact_search | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach |
| title_full | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach by Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba |
| title_fullStr | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach by Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba |
| title_full_unstemmed | Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach by Wilko Bolt, Harold Houba |
| title_short | Credible Threats in Negotiations |
| title_sort | credible threats in negotiations a game theoretic approach |
| title_sub | A Game-theoretic Approach |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Microeconomics Labor Economics Environmental Economics Economic theory Macroeconomics Labor economics Environmental economics Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Glaubwürdigkeit (DE-588)4157500-3 gnd Drohung (DE-588)4150704-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Microeconomics Labor Economics Environmental Economics Economic theory Macroeconomics Labor economics Environmental economics Verhandlungstheorie Glaubwürdigkeit Drohung |
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