Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy:
By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has...
Gespeichert in:
Weitere Verfasser: | , |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
1986
|
Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1986 |
Schriftenreihe: | Financial and Monetary Policy Studies
13 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BTU01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (XIV, 253 p) |
ISBN: | 9789400944329 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
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author2 | Froedge Toma, E. Toma, M. |
author2_role | edt edt |
author2_variant | t e f te tef m t mt |
author_facet | Froedge Toma, E. Toma, M. |
building | Verbundindex |
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classification_rvk | QK 900 |
collection | ZDB-2-SBE ZDB-2-BAE |
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discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9 |
edition | 1st ed. 1986 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T15:15:39Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:56:11Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9789400944329 |
language | English |
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publisher | Springer Netherlands |
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spelling | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy edited by E. Froedge Toma, M. Toma 1st ed. 1986 Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 1986 1 Online-Ressource (XIV, 253 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Financial and Monetary Policy Studies 13 By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Public Economics Macroeconomics Public finance Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd rswk-swf Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd rswk-swf Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 s Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 s Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s DE-604 Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 s Froedge Toma, E. edt Toma, M. edt Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9789401084734 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9789024733668 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9789400944336 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Public Economics Macroeconomics Public finance Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4043774-7 (DE-588)4019902-2 (DE-588)4130528-0 (DE-588)4042669-5 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
title | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy |
title_auth | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy |
title_exact_search | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy |
title_exact_search_txtP | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy |
title_full | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy edited by E. Froedge Toma, M. Toma |
title_fullStr | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy edited by E. Froedge Toma, M. Toma |
title_full_unstemmed | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy edited by E. Froedge Toma, M. Toma |
title_short | Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy |
title_sort | central bankers bureaucratic incentives and monetary policy |
topic | Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Public Economics Macroeconomics Public finance Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Public Economics Macroeconomics Public finance Organisation Geldpolitik Notenbankpolitik Notenbank USA Aufsatzsammlung |
url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT froedgetomae centralbankersbureaucraticincentivesandmonetarypolicy AT tomam centralbankersbureaucraticincentivesandmonetarypolicy |