Efficient Rent-Seeking: Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire
Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Se...
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Springer US
2001
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 2001 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-634 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations. Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (X, 408 p. 1 illus) |
| ISBN: | 9781475750553 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV046872895 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20240508 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 200828s2001 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781475750553 |9 978-1-4757-5055-3 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-2-SBE)978-1-4757-5055-3 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1074780834 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV046872895 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-634 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 330.1509 |2 23 | |
| 084 | |a QC 210 |0 (DE-625)141260: |2 rvk | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Efficient Rent-Seeking |b Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire |c edited by Alan Lockard, G. Tullock |
| 250 | |a 1st ed. 2001 | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Springer US |c 2001 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (X, 408 p. 1 illus) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well. | ||
| 520 | |a Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations. | ||
| 520 | |a Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a History of Economic Thought/Methodology | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic history | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic theory | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Zinstheorie |0 (DE-588)4190933-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Zinstheorie |0 (DE-588)4190933-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Lockard, Alan |4 edt | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tullock, Gordon |d 1922-2014 |0 (DE-588)119373688 |4 edt | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781441948663 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9780792372424 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781475750560 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-2-SBE |a ZDB-2-BAE | ||
| 940 | 1 | |q ZDB-2-SBE_Archiv | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 |l DE-634 |p ZDB-2-SBE |q ZDB-2-SBE_Archiv |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1805066157230653440 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author2 | Lockard, Alan Tullock, Gordon 1922-2014 |
| author2_role | edt edt |
| author2_variant | a l al g t gt |
| author_GND | (DE-588)119373688 |
| author_facet | Lockard, Alan Tullock, Gordon 1922-2014 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046872895 |
| classification_rvk | QC 210 |
| collection | ZDB-2-SBE ZDB-2-BAE |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-2-SBE)978-1-4757-5055-3 (OCoLC)1074780834 (DE-599)BVBBV046872895 |
| dewey-full | 330.1509 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330.1509 |
| dewey-search | 330.1509 |
| dewey-sort | 3330.1509 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 |
| edition | 1st ed. 2001 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV046872895</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240508</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200828s2001 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781475750553</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4757-5055-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-2-SBE)978-1-4757-5055-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1074780834</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV046872895</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">330.1509</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QC 210</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141260:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Efficient Rent-Seeking</subfield><subfield code="b">Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by Alan Lockard, G. Tullock</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1st ed. 2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">New York, NY</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer US</subfield><subfield code="c">2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (X, 408 p. 1 illus)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">History of Economic Thought/Methodology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic history</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Zinstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4190933-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Zinstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4190933-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lockard, Alan</subfield><subfield code="4">edt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tullock, Gordon</subfield><subfield code="d">1922-2014</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)119373688</subfield><subfield code="4">edt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781441948663</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9780792372424</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781475750560</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-2-SBE</subfield><subfield code="a">ZDB-2-BAE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">ZDB-2-SBE_Archiv</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-634</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-2-SBE</subfield><subfield code="q">ZDB-2-SBE_Archiv</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV046872895 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T15:15:38Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-20T03:13:53Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781475750553 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032283027 |
| oclc_num | 1074780834 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-634 |
| owner_facet | DE-634 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (X, 408 p. 1 illus) |
| psigel | ZDB-2-SBE ZDB-2-BAE ZDB-2-SBE_Archiv ZDB-2-SBE ZDB-2-SBE_Archiv |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateSearch | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| publisher | Springer US |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire edited by Alan Lockard, G. Tullock 1st ed. 2001 New York, NY Springer US 2001 1 Online-Ressource (X, 408 p. 1 illus) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations. Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it History of Economic Thought/Methodology Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic history Economic theory Zinstheorie (DE-588)4190933-1 gnd rswk-swf Zinstheorie (DE-588)4190933-1 s DE-604 Lockard, Alan edt Tullock, Gordon 1922-2014 (DE-588)119373688 edt Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781441948663 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780792372424 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781475750560 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire History of Economic Thought/Methodology Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic history Economic theory Zinstheorie (DE-588)4190933-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4190933-1 |
| title | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire |
| title_auth | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire |
| title_exact_search | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire |
| title_full | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire edited by Alan Lockard, G. Tullock |
| title_fullStr | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire edited by Alan Lockard, G. Tullock |
| title_full_unstemmed | Efficient Rent-Seeking Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire edited by Alan Lockard, G. Tullock |
| title_short | Efficient Rent-Seeking |
| title_sort | efficient rent seeking chronicle of an intellectual quagmire |
| title_sub | Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire |
| topic | History of Economic Thought/Methodology Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic history Economic theory Zinstheorie (DE-588)4190933-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | History of Economic Thought/Methodology Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic history Economic theory Zinstheorie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lockardalan efficientrentseekingchronicleofanintellectualquagmire AT tullockgordon efficientrentseekingchronicleofanintellectualquagmire |