The value of many goods and many social and legal norms and institutions is correlated to the number of people who adopt them, in other words: They exhibit network effects. But while harmonization enhances network benefits, it also diminishes the benefits derived from variety. In the first part of h...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Simmering, Volker (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Wiesbaden Deutscher Universitätsverlag 2003
Ausgabe:	1st ed. 2003
Schriftenreihe:	Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
Schlagworte:	Industrial Organization Law and Economics Industrial organization Law and economics Regulierung Netzeffekt Technische Innovation Standardisierung Evolutionäre Spieltheorie Hochschulschrift
Online-Zugang:	BTU01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	The value of many goods and many social and legal norms and institutions is correlated to the number of people who adopt them, in other words: They exhibit network effects. But while harmonization enhances network benefits, it also diminishes the benefits derived from variety. In the first part of his study, Volker Simmering introduces an evolutionary game theoretic model in order to investigate how globalization influences the evolution of international standards and he compares the roles of mandatory and voluntary standards. The second part is devoted to the problem of technological progress in networks, and the third one analyzes the resolution of conflicts within international standardization bodies. As a result, he suggests that policy intervention and the presence of adjacent institutional arrangements are likely to improve the performance of network markets, e.g. those for information technology and telecommunication. Since standardization is difficult to enforce its design is, however, not a trivial challenge
Beschreibung:	1 Online-Ressource (XIII, 193 p)
ISBN:	9783322815149
DOI:	10.1007/978-3-322-81514-9