Rings in Auctions: An Experimental Approach
In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a ga...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1997
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1997 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
447 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BTU01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (X, 174 p. 8 illus) |
| ISBN: | 9783642591587 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7 |
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| 520 | |a In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2 | ||
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| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7 |
| edition | 1st ed. 1997 |
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| spelling | Artale, Angelo Verfasser aut Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach by Angelo Artale 1st ed. 1997 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1997 1 Online-Ressource (X, 174 p. 8 illus) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 447 In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2 Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540619307 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642591594 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Artale, Angelo Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4125859-9 |
| title | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach |
| title_auth | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach |
| title_exact_search | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach |
| title_full | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach by Angelo Artale |
| title_fullStr | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach by Angelo Artale |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rings in Auctions An Experimental Approach by Angelo Artale |
| title_short | Rings in Auctions |
| title_sort | rings in auctions an experimental approach |
| title_sub | An Experimental Approach |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Spieltheorie Auktion |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT artaleangelo ringsinauctionsanexperimentalapproach |