Social Choice Mechanisms:
The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2002
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 2002 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Studies in Economic Design
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals' interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in stitutions? These questions are not new. Philosophers, social scientists have indeed pondered upon them for years. And, in fact, the organizational struc tures of many social institutions -courts, parliaments, committees and reg ulatory boards -often lack a sound theoretical base. This is not surprising, as it is, indeed, difficult to provide for a comprehensive formalization of the activities of such organizations. Nevertheless, there has been a definite trend towards providing clear and unambiguous rules for collective decision mak ing. These very rules constitute the body of social choice theory and its main object. The basic problem of social choice We explain here more precisely what a problem of social choice is, what approaches might be used to tackle it, and what kind of solutions it leads to. We introduce a few basic notions in preliminarily fashion and, in doing so, we stress both motivations and explanations |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (VI, 191 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783540248057 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Danilov, Vladimir I. Sotskov, Alexander I. |
| author_facet | Danilov, Vladimir I. Sotskov, Alexander I. |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Danilov, Vladimir I. |
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| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7 |
| edition | 1st ed. 2002 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T15:15:37Z |
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| spelling | Danilov, Vladimir I. Verfasser aut Social Choice Mechanisms by Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov 1st ed. 2002 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2002 1 Online-Ressource (VI, 191 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Studies in Economic Design The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals' interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in stitutions? These questions are not new. Philosophers, social scientists have indeed pondered upon them for years. And, in fact, the organizational struc tures of many social institutions -courts, parliaments, committees and reg ulatory boards -often lack a sound theoretical base. This is not surprising, as it is, indeed, difficult to provide for a comprehensive formalization of the activities of such organizations. Nevertheless, there has been a definite trend towards providing clear and unambiguous rules for collective decision mak ing. These very rules constitute the body of social choice theory and its main object. The basic problem of social choice We explain here more precisely what a problem of social choice is, what approaches might be used to tackle it, and what kind of solutions it leads to. We introduce a few basic notions in preliminarily fashion and, in doing so, we stress both motivations and explanations Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic theory Game theory Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s DE-604 Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 s Sotskov, Alexander I. aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642077159 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540431053 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642534829 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Danilov, Vladimir I. Sotskov, Alexander I. Social Choice Mechanisms Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic theory Game theory Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4233109-2 |
| title | Social Choice Mechanisms |
| title_auth | Social Choice Mechanisms |
| title_exact_search | Social Choice Mechanisms |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Social Choice Mechanisms |
| title_full | Social Choice Mechanisms by Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov |
| title_fullStr | Social Choice Mechanisms by Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov |
| title_full_unstemmed | Social Choice Mechanisms by Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov |
| title_short | Social Choice Mechanisms |
| title_sort | social choice mechanisms |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic theory Game theory Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Public-Choice-Theorie (DE-588)4233109-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic theory Game theory Theorie Kollektiventscheidung Mathematisches Modell Public-Choice-Theorie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7 |
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