Geometry of Voting:
Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select th...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1994
|
| Edition: | 1st ed. 1994 |
| Series: | Studies in Economic Theory
3 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support. A geometric theory is developed to remove much of the mystery of three-candidate voting procedures. In this manner, the spectrum of election outcomes from all positional methods can be compared, new flaws with widely accepted concepts (such as the "Condorcet winner") are identified, and extensions to standard results (e.g. Black's single-peakedness) are obtained. Many of these results are based on the "profile coordinates" introduced here, which makes it possible to "see" the set of all possible voters' preferences leading to specified election outcomes. Thus, it now is possible to visually compare the likelihood of various conclusions. Also, geometry is applied to apportionment methods to uncover new explanations why such methods can create troubling problems |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 372 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783642486449 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-48644-9 |
Staff View
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| 520 | |a Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support. A geometric theory is developed to remove much of the mystery of three-candidate voting procedures. In this manner, the spectrum of election outcomes from all positional methods can be compared, new flaws with widely accepted concepts (such as the "Condorcet winner") are identified, and extensions to standard results (e.g. Black's single-peakedness) are obtained. Many of these results are based on the "profile coordinates" introduced here, which makes it possible to "see" the set of all possible voters' preferences leading to specified election outcomes. Thus, it now is possible to visually compare the likelihood of various conclusions. Also, geometry is applied to apportionment methods to uncover new explanations why such methods can create troubling problems | ||
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:56:08Z |
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| isbn | 9783642486449 |
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| spelling | Saari, Donald G. Verfasser aut Geometry of Voting by Donald G. Saari 1st ed. 1994 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1994 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 372 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Studies in Economic Theory 3 Over two centuries of theory and practical experience have taught us that election and decision procedures do not behave as expected. Instead, we now know that when different tallying methods are applied to the same ballots, radically different outcomes can emerge, that most procedures can select the candidate, the voters view as being inferior, and that some commonly used methods have the disturbing anomaly that a winning candidate can lose after receiving added support. A geometric theory is developed to remove much of the mystery of three-candidate voting procedures. In this manner, the spectrum of election outcomes from all positional methods can be compared, new flaws with widely accepted concepts (such as the "Condorcet winner") are identified, and extensions to standard results (e.g. Black's single-peakedness) are obtained. Many of these results are based on the "profile coordinates" introduced here, which makes it possible to "see" the set of all possible voters' preferences leading to specified election outcomes. Thus, it now is possible to visually compare the likelihood of various conclusions. Also, geometry is applied to apportionment methods to uncover new explanations why such methods can create troubling problems Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic theory Operations research Decision making Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642486463 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540571995 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642486456 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48644-9 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Saari, Donald G. Geometry of Voting Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic theory Operations research Decision making Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4079009-5 (DE-588)4114528-8 |
| title | Geometry of Voting |
| title_auth | Geometry of Voting |
| title_exact_search | Geometry of Voting |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Geometry of Voting |
| title_full | Geometry of Voting by Donald G. Saari |
| title_fullStr | Geometry of Voting by Donald G. Saari |
| title_full_unstemmed | Geometry of Voting by Donald G. Saari |
| title_short | Geometry of Voting |
| title_sort | geometry of voting |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic theory Operations research Decision making Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Operations Research/Decision Theory Economic theory Operations research Decision making Wahlverhalten Mathematisches Modell |
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