Descriptive Theories of Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining
The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data ob...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1990
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed. 1990 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
341 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 165 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783642456725 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5 |
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| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| edition | 1st ed. 1990 |
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| spelling | Uhlich, Gerald R. Verfasser aut Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining by Gerald R. Uhlich 1st ed. 1990 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1990 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 165 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 341 The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 gnd rswk-swf Dreipersonenspiel (DE-588)4150660-1 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungstechnik (DE-588)4134584-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 s Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 s Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 s Dreipersonenspiel (DE-588)4150660-1 s DE-604 Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Verhandlungstechnik (DE-588)4134584-8 s Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540524830 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642456732 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Uhlich, Gerald R. Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 gnd Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 gnd Dreipersonenspiel (DE-588)4150660-1 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd Verhandlungstechnik (DE-588)4134584-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4252658-9 (DE-588)4139583-9 (DE-588)4187779-2 (DE-588)4150660-1 (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4191247-0 (DE-588)4134584-8 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining |
| title_auth | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining |
| title_exact_search | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining |
| title_full | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining by Gerald R. Uhlich |
| title_fullStr | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining by Gerald R. Uhlich |
| title_full_unstemmed | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining by Gerald R. Uhlich |
| title_short | Descriptive Theories of Bargaining |
| title_sort | descriptive theories of bargaining an experimental analysis of two and three person characteristic function bargaining |
| title_sub | An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 gnd Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 gnd Dreipersonenspiel (DE-588)4150660-1 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd Verhandlungstechnik (DE-588)4134584-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Experimentelle Spieltheorie Verhandlungstheorie Verhandlungsspiel Dreipersonenspiel Mathematisches Modell Zweipersonenspiel Verhandlungstechnik Spieltheorie Hochschulschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT uhlichgeraldr descriptivetheoriesofbargaininganexperimentalanalysisoftwoandthreepersoncharacteristicfunctionbargaining |