Silverman’s Game: A Special Class of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games

The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede­ termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lowe...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Heuer, Gerald A. (VerfasserIn), Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1995
Ausgabe:1st ed. 1995
Schriftenreihe:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 424
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Zusammenfassung:The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede­ termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the­ orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re­ stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (X, 283 p)
ISBN:9783642468193
DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-46819-3

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