A variety of causes:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2020
|
| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 574 Seiten Diagramme 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780199251469 0199251460 |
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| adam_text | Contents 1. The Analysis of Causation 1.1 From Regularities to Counterfactuals 1.2 Counterfactuals and Dependency 1.2.1 The sufficient condition and the possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals 1.2.2 Causal necessity and sufficiency 1.2.3 Indeterministic causation: preliminary characterization 1.2.4 Counterfactual versus conditional chance-raising 1.2.5 Causal necessity and sufficiency and the tie between events 1.3 Types of Counterfactual Theory 1.4 Causation as a Natural Relation and the Nature of Analysis 1.5 Alternative Accounts of Causation and the Discussion Ahead 2. Humean Supervenience and the Possibility of Necessitation 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Humean Supervenience and the Denial of Necessary Connections Experiences of Causation and Necessary Connection The Concept of Necessary Connection Distinct Existence 2.4.1 Modal characterization of distinct existence 2.4.2 Spatial characterization of distinct existence 2.4.3 The distinct arrangement characterization of distinct existence and distinct existence pluralism 2.5 Concluding Remarks 3. Counterfactuals and Closeness 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Lewis’ Similarity Weighting and the Status of the Perfect Match Condition The Future Similarity Objection under Indeterminism Antecedent-Relative Potential Chance-Raising The Approximate Match Condition and the Appeal to Causal Independence Match and the Causal Circumstances of the Antecedent: Issues with the Transition Period 3.5.1 Backtracking and the threat of circularity 3.5.2 A tendency to lateness? 3.5.3 Miracles against match 3.5.4 Similarity of causal circumstances 3.5.5 Closing
remarks 3.6 A General Defence of the Approach 4. A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation 4.1 Indeterministic Causation and Pre-emption: A Devastating Combination 4.2 Completed Causal Processes 4.2.1 Towards an alternative analysis of completeness 4.2.2 Problems with the‘absent event’account of in completeness 4.2.3 Indeterminism, chance-raising, and the ‘actual events’ account of completeness 4.2.4 Refinement of the ‘actual events’ clause 4.2.5 Late pre-emption and the ‘actual events’ clause і 5 8 8 13 15 17 19 20 22 33 41 43 48 61 68 69 70 71 73 75 77 87 92 96 99 100 101 102 103 105 106 108 110 114 114 117 120 122 124
XIV CONTENTS 4.2.6 Hasteners, delayers, and probabilistic dependence 4.2.7 Completeness at the right time 4.2.8 Competing signs of incompleteness 4.2.9 Absence of probabilities or probability raising 4.2.10 Causing effects and causing effects in certain timeperiods 4.2.11 Actually completing in time: catalysts and anti-catalysts 4.3 ^-Dependencies and the Context-Determined Contrastive Character of Causation 4.4 Concluding Remarks 5. The Non-Transitivity of Causation 5.1 The Problem Cases 5.2 The Distinct Property InstancesStrategy 5.2.1 Property instances 5.2.2 Efficacy implication 5.3 Undermining the Intuitions 5.4 Non-Transitive Analyses 5.4.1 Probabilistic ^-dependence 5.4.2 Fixing accounts 5.4.2.1 Hitchcock’s approach 54.2.2 Yablo’s approach 5.4.3 Sartorio’s constraints on causation 5.5 Concluding Remarks 6. Causal Circumstances 6.1 Causal Circumstances and the Status of Total Causes 6.2 Challenges to Egalitarianism 6.2.1 Cause as context-sensitive explanatory factor 6.2.2 Triggering versusenabling or pre-disposing conditions 6.2.3 Causes as contra-normal conditions 6.3 Concluding Remarks 7. The Ontological Categories of Causes 7.1 Continuants as Triggers? 7.2 Truth-Makers and Non-Truth-Makers 7.2.1 Facts, events, and property instances: narrowing down the options 7.2.2 Truth-maker necessitation 7.2.3 Disjunctive causes: the return of facts? 7.3 Towards a Theory of Events 7.3.1 Causation and the essential properties of events 7.3.2 An intermediate approach to eventindividuation 7.3.3 Emphasis and the relata of causation 7.4 Concluding Remarks 8. Negative Causation and
the Relationality of Causation 8.1 Causation as Mutual Manifestation of Reciprocal Disposition Partners 8.2 Truth-Making and Negative Existential Propositions: Options and Alternatives 8.3 Negative Causation 8.3.1 Dependency on the corresponding positive events 8.3.2 Dependency on positive causal surrogates 8.4 Concluding Remarks 125 131 133 135 136 138 141 144 148 149 150 152 156 157 162 162 166 166 169 171 173 175 175 178 179 183 186 192 194 198 202 203 205 210 211 214 216 220 223 225 226 228 235 236 239 244
CONTENTS 9. Property Causation 9.x Property Instance Causation 9.1.1 Minimal metaphysical necessitation relations between property instances 9.1.2 The challenge from vertical necessitation relations 9.2 Avoidance and Head-On Strategies 9.2.1 Avoidance strategies 9.2.2 Head-on strategies 9.2.2.1 Particularity: characterization and defence 9.2.2.2 Causal completeness of physics and overdetermination 9.3 Property Causation Not Property Instance Causation 9.4 Contrastive Causation and Explanatory Virtues 9.5 Concluding Remarks 10. Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence and Intrinsicality 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 Distinct Existence and Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence Non-Causal Counterfactuals and the Similarity Weighting Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence and Causation Causal Properties Intrinsicality Concluding Remarks 11. Processes and Prevention 11.1 Process Theories 11.1.1 Types and motivation 11.1.2 Mark transmission theory 11.1.3 Transference theories 11.1.4 Conserved quantity theories 11.1.5 Moral 11.2 The Intuitive Difference, Action at a Distance, and Intrinsicality 11.2.1 The cases and the intuition of difference 11.2.2 Causes as producers and the disjunctive account of responsibility 11.2.3 Locality and intrinsicality 11.2.3.1 Locality 11.2.3.2 Intrinsicality 11.3 Bell Inequality and Relativity: The Options 11.4 Concluding Remarks 12. Causal Non-Symmetry 12.1 Causal Non-Symmetry Rather Than Asymmetry 12.2 Counterfactual Theories of Causal Non-Symmetry 12.3 Macro-Non-Symmetries 12.3.1 Asymmetry of overdetermination 12.3.2 Independence condition and the
transition period 12.4 A Case for Primitive Non-Symmetric Chance-Raising? 12.4.1 Local asymmetry reversal 12.4.2 Simple cases 12.4.3 Tooley’s inverse universes 12.5 Concluding Remarks XV 245 246 247 249 253 253 255 255 263 268 273 276 277 279 283 284 287 293 303 305 306 306 309 311 31Յ 317 318 318 326 330 330 333 335 342 344 346 348 352 352 361 371 371 373 377 380
xvi CONTENTS 13. Agency, Intervention, and the Past 13.1 The Role of Agency 13.1.1 Evidential decision theory and causal decision theory 13.1.2 Evidential decision theory and the need for causal information 13.1.3 Causal decision theory, ratification, and instability 13.1.4 Causal non-symmetry and agency 13.2 Agency-Motivated Account of Unity and Intervention 13.3 Causes Usually PrecedeTheir Effects 13.3.1 Causal theory of temporal precedence 13.3.2 Time direction as preponderant causal direction: causal perspectivalism and past perspectivalism 13.4 Concluding Remarks 14. Causation and Laws 14.1 Brute Singular Causation 14.2 Law-Based Accounts of Causation 14.3 Three Accounts of Laws 14.3.1 Regularity theory: the best system analysis 14.3.2 Independent necessitation accounts 382 382 386 388 4°° 4°5 408 410 411 417 422 4շ4 426 428 4Յ2 4Յ2 438 14.3.3 Dependent necessitation accounts: the powers ontology 44շ 14.3.4 Intrinsicality, generality, and induction 14.3.5 Counterfactual support 448 14.3.6 Quidditism 458 14.4 Laws as Variably Realized: Structuralism about Laws 14.5 Concluding Remarks 15. The Ontology of Chance 15.1 Undermining and Contradiction 15.2 Propensity Theories of Chance 15.3 Concluding Remarks 16. Humean Supervenience and Possible Worlds 16.1 Varieties of Humean Supervenience and the Reduction of Modality 16.2 Other Possible Concrete Worlds and Humeanism 16.3 Can Humeans Afford to Allow That the Denial of Necessary Connections Is Contingent? 16.3.1 Do intra-world necessities vitiate the analysis of necessity in terms of possible worlds? 16.3.2 Principle of
recombination 16.4 Wilson’s Argument against the Distinct Existences Principle 16.5 Physicalism and Humeanism 16.6 Varieties of Causation: Concluding Picture and Implications for Methodology of Metaphysics 16.7 Concluding Remarks Bibliography Index 454 460 463 466 468 478 49° 492 494 500 505 5°5 507 510 511 517 526 529 553
|
| adam_txt |
Contents 1. The Analysis of Causation 1.1 From Regularities to Counterfactuals 1.2 Counterfactuals and Dependency 1.2.1 The sufficient condition and the possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals 1.2.2 Causal necessity and sufficiency 1.2.3 Indeterministic causation: preliminary characterization 1.2.4 Counterfactual versus conditional chance-raising 1.2.5 Causal necessity and sufficiency and the tie between events 1.3 Types of Counterfactual Theory 1.4 Causation as a Natural Relation and the Nature of Analysis 1.5 Alternative Accounts of Causation and the Discussion Ahead 2. Humean Supervenience and the Possibility of Necessitation 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Humean Supervenience and the Denial of Necessary Connections Experiences of Causation and Necessary Connection The Concept of Necessary Connection Distinct Existence 2.4.1 Modal characterization of distinct existence 2.4.2 Spatial characterization of distinct existence 2.4.3 The distinct arrangement characterization of distinct existence and distinct existence pluralism 2.5 Concluding Remarks 3. Counterfactuals and Closeness 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Lewis’ Similarity Weighting and the Status of the Perfect Match Condition The Future Similarity Objection under Indeterminism Antecedent-Relative Potential Chance-Raising The Approximate Match Condition and the Appeal to Causal Independence Match and the Causal Circumstances of the Antecedent: Issues with the Transition Period 3.5.1 Backtracking and the threat of circularity 3.5.2 A tendency to lateness? 3.5.3 Miracles against match 3.5.4 Similarity of causal circumstances 3.5.5 Closing
remarks 3.6 A General Defence of the Approach 4. A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation 4.1 Indeterministic Causation and Pre-emption: A Devastating Combination 4.2 Completed Causal Processes 4.2.1 Towards an alternative analysis of completeness 4.2.2 Problems with the‘absent event’account of in completeness 4.2.3 Indeterminism, chance-raising, and the ‘actual events’ account of completeness 4.2.4 Refinement of the ‘actual events’ clause 4.2.5 Late pre-emption and the ‘actual events’ clause і 5 8 8 13 15 17 19 20 22 33 41 43 48 61 68 69 70 71 73 75 77 87 92 96 99 100 101 102 103 105 106 108 110 114 114 117 120 122 124
XIV CONTENTS 4.2.6 Hasteners, delayers, and probabilistic dependence 4.2.7 Completeness at the right time 4.2.8 Competing signs of incompleteness 4.2.9 Absence of probabilities or probability raising 4.2.10 Causing effects and causing effects in certain timeperiods 4.2.11 Actually completing in time: catalysts and anti-catalysts 4.3 ^-Dependencies and the Context-Determined Contrastive Character of Causation 4.4 Concluding Remarks 5. The Non-Transitivity of Causation 5.1 The Problem Cases 5.2 The Distinct Property InstancesStrategy 5.2.1 Property instances 5.2.2 Efficacy implication 5.3 Undermining the Intuitions 5.4 Non-Transitive Analyses 5.4.1 Probabilistic ^-dependence 5.4.2 Fixing accounts 5.4.2.1 Hitchcock’s approach 54.2.2 Yablo’s approach 5.4.3 Sartorio’s constraints on causation 5.5 Concluding Remarks 6. Causal Circumstances 6.1 Causal Circumstances and the Status of Total Causes 6.2 Challenges to Egalitarianism 6.2.1 Cause as context-sensitive explanatory factor 6.2.2 Triggering versusenabling or pre-disposing conditions 6.2.3 Causes as contra-normal conditions 6.3 Concluding Remarks 7. The Ontological Categories of Causes 7.1 Continuants as Triggers? 7.2 Truth-Makers and Non-Truth-Makers 7.2.1 Facts, events, and property instances: narrowing down the options 7.2.2 Truth-maker necessitation 7.2.3 Disjunctive causes: the return of facts? 7.3 Towards a Theory of Events 7.3.1 Causation and the essential properties of events 7.3.2 An intermediate approach to eventindividuation 7.3.3 Emphasis and the relata of causation 7.4 Concluding Remarks 8. Negative Causation and
the Relationality of Causation 8.1 Causation as Mutual Manifestation of Reciprocal Disposition Partners 8.2 Truth-Making and Negative Existential Propositions: Options and Alternatives 8.3 Negative Causation 8.3.1 Dependency on the corresponding positive events 8.3.2 Dependency on positive causal surrogates 8.4 Concluding Remarks 125 131 133 135 136 138 141 144 148 149 150 152 156 157 162 162 166 166 169 171 173 175 175 178 179 183 186 192 194 198 202 203 205 210 211 214 216 220 223 225 226 228 235 236 239 244
CONTENTS 9. Property Causation 9.x Property Instance Causation 9.1.1 Minimal metaphysical necessitation relations between property instances 9.1.2 The challenge from vertical necessitation relations 9.2 Avoidance and Head-On Strategies 9.2.1 Avoidance strategies 9.2.2 Head-on strategies 9.2.2.1 Particularity: characterization and defence 9.2.2.2 Causal completeness of physics and overdetermination 9.3 Property Causation Not Property Instance Causation 9.4 Contrastive Causation and Explanatory Virtues 9.5 Concluding Remarks 10. Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence and Intrinsicality 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 Distinct Existence and Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence Non-Causal Counterfactuals and the Similarity Weighting Non-Causal Counterfactual Dependence and Causation Causal Properties Intrinsicality Concluding Remarks 11. Processes and Prevention 11.1 Process Theories 11.1.1 Types and motivation 11.1.2 Mark transmission theory 11.1.3 Transference theories 11.1.4 Conserved quantity theories 11.1.5 Moral 11.2 The Intuitive Difference, Action at a Distance, and Intrinsicality 11.2.1 The cases and the intuition of difference 11.2.2 Causes as producers and the disjunctive account of responsibility 11.2.3 Locality and intrinsicality 11.2.3.1 Locality 11.2.3.2 Intrinsicality 11.3 Bell Inequality and Relativity: The Options 11.4 Concluding Remarks 12. Causal Non-Symmetry 12.1 Causal Non-Symmetry Rather Than Asymmetry 12.2 Counterfactual Theories of Causal Non-Symmetry 12.3 Macro-Non-Symmetries 12.3.1 Asymmetry of overdetermination 12.3.2 Independence condition and the
transition period 12.4 A Case for Primitive Non-Symmetric Chance-Raising? 12.4.1 Local asymmetry reversal 12.4.2 Simple cases 12.4.3 Tooley’s inverse universes 12.5 Concluding Remarks XV 245 246 247 249 253 253 255 255 263 268 273 276 277 279 283 284 287 293 303 305 306 306 309 311 31Յ 317 318 318 326 330 330 333 335 342 344 346 348 352 352 361 371 371 373 377 380
xvi CONTENTS 13. Agency, Intervention, and the Past 13.1 The Role of Agency 13.1.1 Evidential decision theory and causal decision theory 13.1.2 Evidential decision theory and the need for causal information 13.1.3 Causal decision theory, ratification, and instability 13.1.4 Causal non-symmetry and agency 13.2 Agency-Motivated Account of Unity and Intervention 13.3 Causes Usually PrecedeTheir Effects 13.3.1 Causal theory of temporal precedence 13.3.2 Time direction as preponderant causal direction: causal perspectivalism and past perspectivalism 13.4 Concluding Remarks 14. Causation and Laws 14.1 Brute Singular Causation 14.2 Law-Based Accounts of Causation 14.3 Three Accounts of Laws 14.3.1 Regularity theory: the best system analysis 14.3.2 Independent necessitation accounts 382 382 386 388 4°° 4°5 408 410 411 417 422 4շ4 426 428 4Յ2 4Յ2 438 14.3.3 Dependent necessitation accounts: the powers ontology 44շ 14.3.4 Intrinsicality, generality, and induction 14.3.5 Counterfactual support 448 14.3.6 Quidditism 458 14.4 Laws as Variably Realized: Structuralism about Laws 14.5 Concluding Remarks 15. The Ontology of Chance 15.1 Undermining and Contradiction 15.2 Propensity Theories of Chance 15.3 Concluding Remarks 16. Humean Supervenience and Possible Worlds 16.1 Varieties of Humean Supervenience and the Reduction of Modality 16.2 Other Possible Concrete Worlds and Humeanism 16.3 Can Humeans Afford to Allow That the Denial of Necessary Connections Is Contingent? 16.3.1 Do intra-world necessities vitiate the analysis of necessity in terms of possible worlds? 16.3.2 Principle of
recombination 16.4 Wilson’s Argument against the Distinct Existences Principle 16.5 Physicalism and Humeanism 16.6 Varieties of Causation: Concluding Picture and Implications for Methodology of Metaphysics 16.7 Concluding Remarks Bibliography Index 454 460 463 466 468 478 49° 492 494 500 505 5°5 507 510 511 517 526 529 553 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T15:03:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:54:56Z |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Noordhof, Paul 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)1189364263 aut A variety of causes Paul Noordhof First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2020 XVI, 574 Seiten Diagramme 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd rswk-swf Verursachung (DE-588)4374080-7 gnd rswk-swf Grund (DE-588)4022317-6 gnd rswk-swf Kontrafaktisches Denken (DE-588)4577003-7 gnd rswk-swf Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd rswk-swf Causation Grund (DE-588)4022317-6 s Verursachung (DE-588)4374080-7 s Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 s Kontrafaktisches Denken (DE-588)4577003-7 s Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032234863&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Noordhof, Paul 1965- A variety of causes Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd Verursachung (DE-588)4374080-7 gnd Grund (DE-588)4022317-6 gnd Kontrafaktisches Denken (DE-588)4577003-7 gnd Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4045791-6 (DE-588)4374080-7 (DE-588)4022317-6 (DE-588)4577003-7 (DE-588)4030102-3 |
| title | A variety of causes |
| title_auth | A variety of causes |
| title_exact_search | A variety of causes |
| title_exact_search_txtP | A variety of causes |
| title_full | A variety of causes Paul Noordhof |
| title_fullStr | A variety of causes Paul Noordhof |
| title_full_unstemmed | A variety of causes Paul Noordhof |
| title_short | A variety of causes |
| title_sort | a variety of causes |
| topic | Philosophie (DE-588)4045791-6 gnd Verursachung (DE-588)4374080-7 gnd Grund (DE-588)4022317-6 gnd Kontrafaktisches Denken (DE-588)4577003-7 gnd Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Philosophie Verursachung Grund Kontrafaktisches Denken Kausalität |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032234863&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT noordhofpaul avarietyofcauses |