Norms and necessity:
"This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: Modal Normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are tra...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2020]
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Summary: | "This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: Modal Normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The Normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the Normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules"-- |
| Item Description: | hier auch unveränderte Nachdrucke, first issued in paperback 2023 |
| Physical Description: | xi, 232 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780197747162 9780190098193 |
Staff View
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Contents Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Problems for the Descriptivist Assumption 2 The Attractions of the Normativist Approach 3 The Plan of This Book 1 7 15 18 1. The Rise and Fall of Early Non-Descriptive Approaches 1.1 The Pre-History: Challenges for Empiricism 1.2 Conventionalism and Its Motives 1.3 Criticisms of Conventionalism 1.4 Later Non-Descriptivism and the Normative Function of Modal Discourse 1.5 WhytheNon-Descriptivist Approach Was Lost 1.6 New Barriers to Modal Non-Descriptivism 1.7 A Non-Descriptivist Revival 1.8 Where Do We Go from Here? 20 21 24 27 2. The Function of Modal Discourse 2.1 Games, Necessities, and the Advantages of Modal Terminology 2.2 The Function of Metaphysical Modal Terminology 2.3 Uses of Metaphysical Modal Claims 2.4 How Should We Understand the Semantic Rules? 52 3. The Meaning of Modal Discourse 3.1 The Relation between Function and Use 3.2 The Content of Modal Terms 3.3 Modal Propositions and Modal Truth 3.4 Avoiding the Criticisms of Conventionalism 3.5 Conclusion 77 78 82 85 88 90 4. Handling De Re and A Posteriori Modal Claims 4.1 Rules for Names and Natural Kind Terms 4.2 De Re Modal Claims 31 36 44 48 51 59 63 68 71 92 95 105
viii CONTENTS 4.3 A Posteriori Modal Claims 4.4 The Contingent A Priori 4.5 Conclusion 108 111 112 5. Other Objections to Modal Normativism 5.1 Putative Counterexamples 5.1.1 Rules without Necessities? 5.1.2 Necessities without Rules? 5.1.3 Necessary Existents 5.1.4 Modal Demonstratives 5.2 Circularity Worries 5.3 Does It Rely on a Heavyweight Understanding of Logical Necessity? 5.4 Conclusion 113 114 114 115 115 117 118 124 128 6. Ontological Advantages 6.1 Modal Facts and Properties 6.2 Possible Worlds 6.3 What We Gain 6.4 Classificatory (and Other Forms of) Conventionalism 129 129 132 137 143 7. Epistemological Advantages 7.1 The Integration Challenge 7.2 The Reliability Challenge 7.3 Meeting the Integration Challenge 7.4 Meeting the Reliability Challenge 7.5 Does the Challenge Arise Again? 7.6 The Unexplained Coincidence Problem 7.7 Conclusion 147 150 157 161 165 170 175 182 8. Methodological Advantages 8.1 Justifying the Use of Intuition in Metaphysical Modal Debates 8.2 A Defense ofthe Relevance of Traditional Methods 8.3 Resolving Internal Metaphysical Modal Disputes 8.4 Objections to Conceptual Analysis 8.5 Limits to Detail and Precision 8.6 Understanding External Metaphysical Modal Disputes 8.7 Conclusion 185 187 189 191 196 198 200 206 Conclusion 209 Bibliography Index 217 229 |
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| spelling | Thomasson, Amie L. 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)136405169 aut Norms and necessity Amie L. Thomasson New York, NY Oxford University Press [2020] © 2020 xi, 232 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier hier auch unveränderte Nachdrucke, first issued in paperback 2023 "This book develops a new approach to understanding our claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible: Modal Normativism. While claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is necessary or possible? The Normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the Normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. For we are able to see that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules"-- Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd rswk-swf Notwendigkeit (DE-588)4139945-6 gnd rswk-swf Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd rswk-swf Modalität (DE-588)4039789-0 gnd rswk-swf Normativity (Ethics) Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 s Modalität (DE-588)4039789-0 s DE-604 Notwendigkeit (DE-588)4139945-6 s Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 s Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB 9780190098216 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9780190098223 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-0-19-774716-2 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment https://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:443/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032233029&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Thomasson, Amie L. 1968- Norms and necessity Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd Notwendigkeit (DE-588)4139945-6 gnd Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd Modalität (DE-588)4039789-0 gnd |
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| title | Norms and necessity |
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| title_full | Norms and necessity Amie L. Thomasson |
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