The non-existence of the real world:
Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2020
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from the existence of a separate external and internal world (comprising various mental states congregated around a self), to the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world, and the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. As Westerhoff discusses the reasons for rejecting the postulation of an external world behind our representations, he asserts that the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and that there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence. Drawing on conclusions from the ancient Indian philosophical system of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Westerhoff defends his stance in a purely Western philosophical framework, and affirms that ontology, and philosophy more generally, need not be conceived as providing an ultimately true theory of the world |
| Beschreibung: | xxxiii, 341 Seiten 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198847915 |
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| adam_text | Summary Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface Introduction 1 The Non-existence of the External World 1.1 Arguing about the External World §1 Denying the Existence of an External World §2 The Example of Mathematical Platonism 1.2 Three Arguments in Support of an External World A The Appearance of Externality §3 There Appears to be an External World В Distinguishing Veridical and Illusory States §4 We Need to Explain the Difference between Veridical and Illusory states §5 (a) Coherence §6 (b) Intersubjectivity §7 (c) Efficacy §8 The Three Differences as an Argument for the External World §9 Difficulties with Coherence §10 Difficulties with Intersubjectivity §11 Difficulties with Efficacy §12 The Three Criteria as a Reflective Equilibrium §13 The Deception Hypothesis C Establishing a Plausible Epistemology §14 A Plausible Epistemology Requires Postulating an External World §15 Direct Realism §16 Immediacy §17 Simultaneity §18 Illusions §19 Hallucinations §20 Direct Realism and Representationalism §21 Representationalism §22 Hoffman’s Interface Theory §23 Hohwy’s Prediction Error Minimization Theory §24 The Evidentiary Circle and the Veil of Perception §25 Markov Blankets §26 Metzinger’s Representationalism and Simulation Theories §27 The World behind the Interface §28 Arguments for the Nature of the World behind the Veil §29 Two Ways of Developing Representationalism: Strong and Weak xxvii xxix xxxi 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 10 11 14 15 18 18 21 22 23 25 27 31 32 33 36 36 37 40 43 45 47
X SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS §30 Stepping Out of the Interface §31 Idealism and Dependence §32 The Story So Far 1.3 Irrealism A Preliminary Remarks about Irrealism §33 Introducing Irrealism §34 The Key Difference §35 Searle’s Objection §36 Distinguishing Irrealism from Scepticism and Nihilism В Three Reasons for Irrealism §37 (a) Parsimony §38 (b) The Concept-Dependence of the External World §39 (c) The Interdependence of Concepts C Further Dimensions of the Irrealist Position §40 Irrealism Is Fully Compatible with Naturalism §41 How Different Kinds of Naturalistic Representationalism Lead to Irrealism §42 Irrealism and Direct Realism §43 A Kantian Parallel §44 The Self-application Argument §45 Ethics and Irrealism: The Experience Machine §46 Ethical Consequences §47 Summing Up 2 The Non-existence of the Internal World 2.1 Realism about the Internal World? §48 The External and the Internal World 2.2 The Presumed Certainty of Introspection §49 How Unproblematic is Introspection? §50 Internal Illusions 2.3 Illusory Certainties §51 Two Key Features of the Internal World A The Apparent Stream of Consciousness §52 The River of Consciousness §53 Discontinuity of Visual Consciousness—SaccadicSuppression §54 Discontinuity of Visual Consciousness—the Wagon Wheel Illusion §55 Motion Perception and Brain Rhythm §56 Flash Perception and Brain Rhythm §57 Elementary Integration Units §58 The Discontinuity of Consciousness More Generally §59 Objections to the Discontinuity of Consciousness §60 Theories of Discontinuous Consciousness В The Existence of the Self §61 The Fictional Robert
Nozick §62 Believing in the Cartesian Cogito §63 Properties of the Self 49 50 51 52 52 52 53 54 55 57 57 62 64 65 65 66 68 70 71 73 76 79 81 81 81 82 82 82 84 84 85 85 86 87 89 90 90 92 92 95 99 99 100 102
SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS ХІ (a) The Substantial Self §64 Dennett: The Self as Fiction §65 Metzingen The Simulated Self §66 A Mereological Argument against the Self (b) The Unified Self §67 The Location of the Self (c) The Temporally Extended Self §68 Continuity and Discontinuity of the Self (d) The Self as an Agent §69 Selves Bring about Change §70 Original Intentionality §71 Memetic Arguments against the Self (e) The Self as the Subject of Prudential Concern §72 Could the Self Be a Transcendent Entity? 2.4 The Non-existence of the Internal World §73 No Retreat to an Inner Realm §74 Representationalism and the Internal World §75 The Unintuitive Idea of the Simulated Self §76 A Hidden Internal World? §77 Error and Realism 103 103 106 114 120 120 127 127 131 131 132 136 141 141 143 143 143 146 147 149 3 The Non-existence of Ontological Foundations 152 3.1 Some Preliminary Remarks about Foundationalism §78 Foundationalism and Grounding §79 Foundationalist Ontologies and the Existence of a Fundamental Level §80 Non-foundationalist Ontologies §81 Grounding and Meta-grounding 3.2 Arguments for Foundationalism A The Regress Argument §82 The Strangeness of Non-foundationalism §83 Infinite Regresses and Inheritance §84 Fundamental Levels Outside of Ontology §85 Epistemic and Ontological Infinitism В The Transcendental Argument §86 Constructions Require the Unconstructed C The Self-refutation Argument §87 Anti-foundationalism as Self-undermining §88 Maximizing: What about the Chain of Interdependence? §89 Does Semantics Necessitate a Foundation? §90 Does the Demand for Explanations
Necessitate a Foundation? D The Argument against the Symmetry of Grounding §91 Problems with Circular Grounding Structures 152 152 154 156 157 158 158 158 159 162 165 167 167 170 170 171 173 179 185 185
xii SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 Arguments for Non-foundationalism §92 Arguing for the Consistency of Non-foundationalism: The Possibility of Gunk §93 Direct Arguments for Non-foundationalism A The Argument from Inconsistent Versions §94 Mutually Inconsistent Theories or Versions of the World В The Argument against Intrinsic Properties §95 Intrinsic Properties §96 Examples of Intrinsic Properties §97 Non-foundationalism and the Rejection of IntrinsicProperties C Arguments from Specific Sciences §98 The Mathematical World §99 Ontic Structural Realism §100 Quantum Physics §101 Cognitive Science 3.4 A Potential Difficulty for Circular Non-foundationalism §102 Do All Truths Depend on Beliefs? 4 The Non-existence of Foundational Truths 4.1 Some Preliminary Remarks about Higher-Order Grounding §103 Fundamental Things, Fundamental Truths §104 Higher-Order Grounding §105 Is There a Problem of Higher-Order Foundationalism? §106 Four Possibilities §107 Higher-Order Foundationalism and the Extrinsicality of Fundamentally 4.2 Ultimately True Theories §108 Anti-foundationalism about Grounding Facts and Ultimately True Theories 4.3 Arguments against Ultimately True Theories A The Argument from Coherence §109 The Coherence Theory of Truth §110 Problems for Coherence Theory 1: The Coherence of the Coherence Theory §111 Problems for Coherence Theory 2: Coherence, Resistance, and Inertia §112 Problems for Coherence Theory 3: Coherence, Relativism, and the Principle of Charity §113 The Case for Coherentism В The Argument from Semantic Contextualism §114 Semantic Contextualism and Ontology C
The Argument from the Failure of Absolutely General Quantification §115 The Impossibility of Quantifying over Everything §116 Possible Responses to the Denial of Absolutely General Quantification 189 189 191 192 192 195 195 197 203 213 214 219 228 235 239 239 246 246 246 247 247 249 251 253 253 257 257 257 260 262 264 265 267 267 277 277 287
SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4 Final Remarks §117 Ultimately True Theories andFoundationalism §118 The Resulting Picture andFour Problems Bibliography Index ХІІІ 295 295 296 309 329
|
| adam_txt |
Summary Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface Introduction 1 The Non-existence of the External World 1.1 Arguing about the External World §1 Denying the Existence of an External World §2 The Example of Mathematical Platonism 1.2 Three Arguments in Support of an External World A The Appearance of Externality §3 There Appears to be an External World В Distinguishing Veridical and Illusory States §4 We Need to Explain the Difference between Veridical and Illusory states §5 (a) Coherence §6 (b) Intersubjectivity §7 (c) Efficacy §8 The Three Differences as an Argument for the External World §9 Difficulties with Coherence §10 Difficulties with Intersubjectivity §11 Difficulties with Efficacy §12 The Three Criteria as a Reflective Equilibrium §13 The Deception Hypothesis C Establishing a Plausible Epistemology §14 A Plausible Epistemology Requires Postulating an External World §15 Direct Realism §16 Immediacy §17 Simultaneity §18 Illusions §19 Hallucinations §20 Direct Realism and Representationalism §21 Representationalism §22 Hoffman’s Interface Theory §23 Hohwy’s Prediction Error Minimization Theory §24 The Evidentiary Circle and the Veil of Perception §25 Markov Blankets §26 Metzinger’s Representationalism and Simulation Theories §27 The World behind the Interface §28 Arguments for the Nature of the World behind the Veil §29 Two Ways of Developing Representationalism: Strong and Weak xxvii xxix xxxi 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 10 11 14 15 18 18 21 22 23 25 27 31 32 33 36 36 37 40 43 45 47
X SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS §30 Stepping Out of the Interface §31 Idealism and Dependence §32 The Story So Far 1.3 Irrealism A Preliminary Remarks about Irrealism §33 Introducing Irrealism §34 The Key Difference §35 Searle’s Objection §36 Distinguishing Irrealism from Scepticism and Nihilism В Three Reasons for Irrealism §37 (a) Parsimony §38 (b) The Concept-Dependence of the External World §39 (c) The Interdependence of Concepts C Further Dimensions of the Irrealist Position §40 Irrealism Is Fully Compatible with Naturalism §41 How Different Kinds of Naturalistic Representationalism Lead to Irrealism §42 Irrealism and Direct Realism §43 A Kantian Parallel §44 The Self-application Argument §45 Ethics and Irrealism: The Experience Machine §46 Ethical Consequences §47 Summing Up 2 The Non-existence of the Internal World 2.1 Realism about the Internal World? §48 The External and the Internal World 2.2 The Presumed Certainty of Introspection §49 How Unproblematic is Introspection? §50 Internal Illusions 2.3 Illusory Certainties §51 Two Key Features of the Internal World A The Apparent Stream of Consciousness §52 The River of Consciousness §53 Discontinuity of Visual Consciousness—SaccadicSuppression §54 Discontinuity of Visual Consciousness—the Wagon Wheel Illusion §55 Motion Perception and Brain Rhythm §56 Flash Perception and Brain Rhythm §57 Elementary Integration Units §58 The Discontinuity of Consciousness More Generally §59 Objections to the Discontinuity of Consciousness §60 Theories of Discontinuous Consciousness В The Existence of the Self §61 The Fictional Robert
Nozick §62 Believing in the Cartesian Cogito §63 Properties of the Self 49 50 51 52 52 52 53 54 55 57 57 62 64 65 65 66 68 70 71 73 76 79 81 81 81 82 82 82 84 84 85 85 86 87 89 90 90 92 92 95 99 99 100 102
SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS ХІ (a) The Substantial Self §64 Dennett: The Self as Fiction §65 Metzingen The Simulated Self §66 A Mereological Argument against the Self (b) The Unified Self §67 The Location of the Self (c) The Temporally Extended Self §68 Continuity and Discontinuity of the Self (d) The Self as an Agent §69 Selves Bring about Change §70 Original Intentionality §71 Memetic Arguments against the Self (e) The Self as the Subject of Prudential Concern §72 Could the Self Be a Transcendent Entity? 2.4 The Non-existence of the Internal World §73 No Retreat to an Inner Realm §74 Representationalism and the Internal World §75 The Unintuitive Idea of the Simulated Self §76 A Hidden Internal World? §77 Error and Realism 103 103 106 114 120 120 127 127 131 131 132 136 141 141 143 143 143 146 147 149 3 The Non-existence of Ontological Foundations 152 3.1 Some Preliminary Remarks about Foundationalism §78 Foundationalism and Grounding §79 Foundationalist Ontologies and the Existence of a Fundamental Level §80 Non-foundationalist Ontologies §81 Grounding and Meta-grounding 3.2 Arguments for Foundationalism A The Regress Argument §82 The Strangeness of Non-foundationalism §83 Infinite Regresses and Inheritance §84 Fundamental Levels Outside of Ontology §85 Epistemic and Ontological Infinitism В The Transcendental Argument §86 Constructions Require the Unconstructed C The Self-refutation Argument §87 Anti-foundationalism as Self-undermining §88 Maximizing: What about the Chain of Interdependence? §89 Does Semantics Necessitate a Foundation? §90 Does the Demand for Explanations
Necessitate a Foundation? D The Argument against the Symmetry of Grounding §91 Problems with Circular Grounding Structures 152 152 154 156 157 158 158 158 159 162 165 167 167 170 170 171 173 179 185 185
xii SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 Arguments for Non-foundationalism §92 Arguing for the Consistency of Non-foundationalism: The Possibility of Gunk §93 Direct Arguments for Non-foundationalism A The Argument from Inconsistent Versions §94 Mutually Inconsistent Theories or Versions of the World В The Argument against Intrinsic Properties §95 Intrinsic Properties §96 Examples of Intrinsic Properties §97 Non-foundationalism and the Rejection of IntrinsicProperties C Arguments from Specific Sciences §98 The Mathematical World §99 Ontic Structural Realism §100 Quantum Physics §101 Cognitive Science 3.4 A Potential Difficulty for Circular Non-foundationalism §102 Do All Truths Depend on Beliefs? 4 The Non-existence of Foundational Truths 4.1 Some Preliminary Remarks about Higher-Order Grounding §103 Fundamental Things, Fundamental Truths §104 Higher-Order Grounding §105 Is There a Problem of Higher-Order Foundationalism? §106 Four Possibilities §107 Higher-Order Foundationalism and the Extrinsicality of Fundamentally 4.2 Ultimately True Theories §108 Anti-foundationalism about Grounding Facts and Ultimately True Theories 4.3 Arguments against Ultimately True Theories A The Argument from Coherence §109 The Coherence Theory of Truth §110 Problems for Coherence Theory 1: The Coherence of the Coherence Theory §111 Problems for Coherence Theory 2: Coherence, Resistance, and Inertia §112 Problems for Coherence Theory 3: Coherence, Relativism, and the Principle of Charity §113 The Case for Coherentism В The Argument from Semantic Contextualism §114 Semantic Contextualism and Ontology C
The Argument from the Failure of Absolutely General Quantification §115 The Impossibility of Quantifying over Everything §116 Possible Responses to the Denial of Absolutely General Quantification 189 189 191 192 192 195 195 197 203 213 214 219 228 235 239 239 246 246 246 247 247 249 251 253 253 257 257 257 260 262 264 265 267 267 277 277 287
SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4 Final Remarks §117 Ultimately True Theories andFoundationalism §118 The Resulting Picture andFour Problems Bibliography Index ХІІІ 295 295 296 309 329 |
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| id | DE-604.BV046801948 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T14:56:07Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:54:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780198847915 |
| language | English |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Westerhoff, Jan 1976- Verfasser (DE-588)1120341884 aut The non-existence of the real world Jan Westerhoff First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2020 xxxiii, 341 Seiten 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Does the real world, defined as a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities, really exist? Jan Westerhoff argues that we have good reason to believe it does not. His discussion considers four main facets of the idea of the real world, ranging from the existence of a separate external and internal world (comprising various mental states congregated around a self), to the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world, and the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. As Westerhoff discusses the reasons for rejecting the postulation of an external world behind our representations, he asserts that the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and that there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence. Drawing on conclusions from the ancient Indian philosophical system of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Westerhoff defends his stance in a purely Western philosophical framework, and affirms that ontology, and philosophy more generally, need not be conceived as providing an ultimately true theory of the world Wirklichkeit (DE-588)4066380-2 gnd rswk-swf Ontologie (DE-588)4075660-9 gnd rswk-swf Buddhistische Philosophie (DE-588)4332682-1 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Innenwelt (DE-588)4273806-4 gnd rswk-swf Ontology Reality Wirklichkeit (DE-588)4066380-2 s Innenwelt (DE-588)4273806-4 s Ontologie (DE-588)4075660-9 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Buddhistische Philosophie (DE-588)4332682-1 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032210694&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Westerhoff, Jan 1976- The non-existence of the real world Wirklichkeit (DE-588)4066380-2 gnd Ontologie (DE-588)4075660-9 gnd Buddhistische Philosophie (DE-588)4332682-1 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Innenwelt (DE-588)4273806-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4066380-2 (DE-588)4075660-9 (DE-588)4332682-1 (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4273806-4 |
| title | The non-existence of the real world |
| title_auth | The non-existence of the real world |
| title_exact_search | The non-existence of the real world |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The non-existence of the real world |
| title_full | The non-existence of the real world Jan Westerhoff |
| title_fullStr | The non-existence of the real world Jan Westerhoff |
| title_full_unstemmed | The non-existence of the real world Jan Westerhoff |
| title_short | The non-existence of the real world |
| title_sort | the non existence of the real world |
| topic | Wirklichkeit (DE-588)4066380-2 gnd Ontologie (DE-588)4075660-9 gnd Buddhistische Philosophie (DE-588)4332682-1 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Innenwelt (DE-588)4273806-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wirklichkeit Ontologie Buddhistische Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie Innenwelt |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032210694&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT westerhoffjan thenonexistenceoftherealworld |