Big tech and the digital economy: the moligopoly scenario
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
[2020]
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | xvi, 297 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780198837701 0198837704 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Table of Contents Table of Cases Table of Legislation Introduction I. Policy Conversation on Big Tech A. Neo-Structuralism і. Origins շ. Claims against Big Tech į. Policy Proposals 4. Summation B. Consumer Welfarism 1. Origins 2. Implications for Big Tech 3. A New Consensus? C. Neo-Structuralism or Consumer Welfarism? 1. Methodological Issues 2. Overcoming Bias H. The “Moligopoly” Hypothesis A. Study Design и Xу 1 6 7 7 IO 16 18 19 19 20 24 25 25 27 29 3. Test 29 29 33 35 4. Data and Observable Indicators ļ6 1. 2. Research Question Hypothesis B, SEC io-K Filings 36 1. Why lo-Ks are Helpful 36 2. Sample and Tests 38 43 51 3■ Descriptive Statistics and Discussion 4■ Summation
Vlil TABLE OF CONTENTS C. Market Research, Business Analysis, and Competitive Intelligence 1. Sample and Tests 2. Descriptive Statistics 3. Analysis D. Conclusion: Unaccounted Big Tech Competition? III. Economics of Big Tech: Monopoly v Uncertainty A. Introduction B. Big Tech and the Textbook Monopoly Model 1. Standard Monopoly Model 2. Are Big Tech Firms Decision-Making Monopolists? C. Increasing Returns to Adoption, Network Effects, and Uncertainty 1. Competition in Network Effects Markets 2. Uncertainty D. Conclusion IV. A Concrete Theory of Moligopoly A. Meet Big Tech 1. Beyond Airport Books 2. Facebook 3. Amazon 4. Apple 5. Netflix 6. Google 7. Microsoft B. Common Properties of Big Tech 1. Method 2. Diversification 3. Discontinuity 4. LongTermism į. Growth 6. Exploration and Discovery 7. Flexibility 8. Summation C. Moligopoly Competition 1. Oligopoly Competition with Monopoly Positions 2. Big Tech Cooperation or Competition? 3. Implications D. Conclusion: Voodoo Economics or Neoclassical Redux?
TABLE OF CONTENTS v Antitrust in Moligopoly Markets A Limits and Possibilities under Existing Antitrust Doctrine 1. Antitrust s Futtatott: Rivalry 2. Antitrust Flexibility? В Defining Antitrust Doctrine for Digital Markets C Essential Role ofAntitrust in Tipped Markets 1. Direct Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? І; 17 17 1717. 18՜ 2. Indirect Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? 191 191 19՛. j. Presumption against Horizontal Mergers 20 4. Beyond Antitrust? 20 D. Residual Role ofAntitrust in Untipped Markets 1. Elaboration 2. Example: Microsoft (US) Google Android (EU) 5. Counter-Example: 4. Applications to Contemporary Concerns in Digital Markets E. Market Definition and Market Power Analysis in Digital Markets 20c 20( 21 շր 22, 22՞ 1. Contemporary Antitrust: Inferring Rivalryfrom Struaure 22r- 2. Improvements to Antitrust: Assessing Tipping from Pressure 22( 5. Measurement of Competitive Pressure: Methods F. Conclusion VI. Big Tech’s Novel Harms: Antitrust or Regulation? 23; 23c 238 A. Preliminary Remarks 238 B. Privacy 24! C. Fake News 24^ D. Hate Speech 23 c E. Models of Regulation 232 F. Conclusion 23^ Conclusion 9 r- Appendix 1 Full List of Firms Covered in Dataset 239 Appendix 2 Firm Level Accounting Data: MB, MC, and MP 271 Appendix 3 Accounting Data: Alternative Allocation for Google Appendix 4 Discontinuous Demand Curve in NetworkEffects Market 273 275 Author Index շ,-jrj Subject Index о
This book asks a simple question : are the tech giants monopolies? In the current environment of suspicion toward the major technology companies as a result of concerns about their power and influence, it has become commonplace to talk of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, or Netflix as the modern-day version of the nineteenth-century trusts. In turn, the tech giants would be guilty of a whole range of monopoly harms toward consumers, workers, and even the democratic process. In the US and the EU. antitrust, and regulatory reform is on the way. Using economics, business,. ■* Д* t i S^? М J fel S ■ *ЄЄ* Wlw If) ¿одр uncertainty and economic dynamism. Wîttt IţţIy dfftltrtfţt дшЈ counterproductive to pursue policies that seek to introduce more rivalry in moligopoly markets subject to technological discontinuities. Instead, antitrust should focus on limiting the tech giants monopoly ·*·*■»«* t·* »«yrp·ew * * *՝·■՛·“ Џ “V*, ep՝· »чі»։і ів^ужиїлі ·9 «w» *·■ · * *■՝*”* *** W®* ·*·®β· вие Я- V iep «PMI f. to non-econonwc harms like privacy violations, fake spee -
Table of Contents Table of Cases Table of Legislation Introduction I. Policy Conversation on Big Tech A. Neo-Structuralism і. Origins շ. Claims against Big Tech į. Policy Proposals 4. Summation B. Consumer Welfarism 1. Origins 2. Implications for Big Tech 3. A New Consensus? C. Neo-Structuralism or Consumer Welfarism? 1. Methodological Issues 2. Overcoming Bias H. The “Moligopoly” Hypothesis A. Study Design и Xу 1 6 7 7 IO 16 18 19 19 20 24 25 25 27 29 3. Test 29 29 33 35 4. Data and Observable Indicators ļ6 1. 2. Research Question Hypothesis B, SEC io-K Filings 36 1. Why lo-Ks are Helpful 36 2. Sample and Tests 38 43 51 3■ Descriptive Statistics and Discussion 4■ Summation
Vlil TABLE OF CONTENTS C. Market Research, Business Analysis, and Competitive Intelligence 1. Sample and Tests 2. Descriptive Statistics 3. Analysis D. Conclusion: Unaccounted Big Tech Competition? III. Economics of Big Tech: Monopoly v Uncertainty A. Introduction B. Big Tech and the Textbook Monopoly Model 1. Standard Monopoly Model 2. Are Big Tech Firms Decision-Making Monopolists? C. Increasing Returns to Adoption, Network Effects, and Uncertainty 1. Competition in Network Effects Markets 2. Uncertainty D. Conclusion IV. A Concrete Theory of Moligopoly A. Meet Big Tech 1. Beyond Airport Books 2. Facebook 3. Amazon 4. Apple 5. Netflix 6. Google 7. Microsoft B. Common Properties of Big Tech 1. Method 2. Diversification 3. Discontinuity 4. LongTermism į. Growth 6. Exploration and Discovery 7. Flexibility 8. Summation C. Moligopoly Competition 1. Oligopoly Competition with Monopoly Positions 2. Big Tech Cooperation or Competition? 3. Implications D. Conclusion: Voodoo Economics or Neoclassical Redux?
TABLE OF CONTENTS v Antitrust in Moligopoly Markets A Limits and Possibilities under Existing Antitrust Doctrine 1. Antitrust s Futtatott: Rivalry 2. Antitrust Flexibility? В Defining Antitrust Doctrine for Digital Markets C Essential Role ofAntitrust in Tipped Markets 1. Direct Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? І; 17 17 1717. 18՜ 2. Indirect Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? 191 191 19՛. j. Presumption against Horizontal Mergers 20 4. Beyond Antitrust? 20 D. Residual Role ofAntitrust in Untipped Markets 1. Elaboration 2. Example: Microsoft (US) Google Android (EU) 5. Counter-Example: 4. Applications to Contemporary Concerns in Digital Markets E. Market Definition and Market Power Analysis in Digital Markets 20c 20( 21 շր 22, 22՞ 1. Contemporary Antitrust: Inferring Rivalryfrom Struaure 22r- 2. Improvements to Antitrust: Assessing Tipping from Pressure 22( 5. Measurement of Competitive Pressure: Methods F. Conclusion VI. Big Tech’s Novel Harms: Antitrust or Regulation? 23; 23c 238 A. Preliminary Remarks 238 B. Privacy 24! C. Fake News 24^ D. Hate Speech 23 c E. Models of Regulation 232 F. Conclusion 23^ Conclusion 9 r- Appendix 1 Full List of Firms Covered in Dataset 239 Appendix 2 Firm Level Accounting Data: MB, MC, and MP 271 Appendix 3 Accounting Data: Alternative Allocation for Google Appendix 4 Discontinuous Demand Curve in NetworkEffects Market 273 275 Author Index շ,-jrj Subject Index о
This book asks a simple question : are the tech giants monopolies? In the current environment of suspicion toward the major technology companies as a result of concerns about their power and influence, it has become commonplace to talk of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, or Netflix as the modern-day version of the nineteenth-century trusts. In turn, the tech giants would be guilty of a whole range of monopoly harms toward consumers, workers, and even the democratic process. In the US and the EU. antitrust, and regulatory reform is on the way. Using economics, business,. ■* Д* t i S^? М J fel S ■ *ЄЄ* Wlw If) ¿одр uncertainty and economic dynamism. Wîttt IţţIy dfftltrtfţt дшЈ counterproductive to pursue policies that seek to introduce more rivalry in moligopoly markets subject to technological discontinuities. Instead, antitrust should focus on limiting the tech giants monopoly ·*·*■»«* t·* »«yrp·ew * * *՝·■՛·“ Џ “V*, ep՝· »чі»։і ів^ужиїлі ·9 «w» *·■ · * *■՝*”* *** W®* ·*·®β· вие Я- V iep «PMI f. to non-econonwc harms like privacy violations, fake spee -
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| adam_txt |
Table of Contents Table of Cases Table of Legislation Introduction I. Policy Conversation on Big Tech A. Neo-Structuralism і. Origins շ. Claims against Big Tech į. Policy Proposals 4. Summation B. Consumer Welfarism 1. Origins 2. Implications for Big Tech 3. A New Consensus? C. Neo-Structuralism or Consumer Welfarism? 1. Methodological Issues 2. Overcoming Bias H. The “Moligopoly” Hypothesis A. Study Design и Xу 1 6 7 7 IO 16 18 19 19 20 24 25 25 27 29 3. Test 29 29 33 35 4. Data and Observable Indicators ļ6 1. 2. Research Question Hypothesis B, SEC io-K Filings 36 1. Why lo-Ks are Helpful 36 2. Sample and Tests 38 43 51 3■ Descriptive Statistics and Discussion 4■ Summation
Vlil TABLE OF CONTENTS C. Market Research, Business Analysis, and Competitive Intelligence 1. Sample and Tests 2. Descriptive Statistics 3. Analysis D. Conclusion: Unaccounted Big Tech Competition? III. Economics of Big Tech: Monopoly v Uncertainty A. Introduction B. Big Tech and the Textbook Monopoly Model 1. Standard Monopoly Model 2. Are Big Tech Firms Decision-Making Monopolists? C. Increasing Returns to Adoption, Network Effects, and Uncertainty 1. Competition in Network Effects Markets 2. Uncertainty D. Conclusion IV. A Concrete Theory of Moligopoly A. Meet Big Tech 1. Beyond Airport Books 2. Facebook 3. Amazon 4. Apple 5. Netflix 6. Google 7. Microsoft B. Common Properties of Big Tech 1. Method 2. Diversification 3. Discontinuity 4. LongTermism į. Growth 6. Exploration and Discovery 7. Flexibility 8. Summation C. Moligopoly Competition 1. Oligopoly Competition with Monopoly Positions 2. Big Tech Cooperation or Competition? 3. Implications D. Conclusion: Voodoo Economics or Neoclassical Redux?
TABLE OF CONTENTS v Antitrust in Moligopoly Markets A Limits and Possibilities under Existing Antitrust Doctrine 1. Antitrust's Futtatott: Rivalry 2. Antitrust Flexibility? В Defining Antitrust Doctrine for Digital Markets C Essential Role ofAntitrust in Tipped Markets 1. Direct Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? І; 17 17' 1717. 18՜ 2. Indirect Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? 191 191 19՛. j. Presumption against Horizontal Mergers 20 4. Beyond Antitrust? 20 D. Residual Role ofAntitrust in Untipped Markets 1. Elaboration 2. Example: Microsoft (US) Google Android (EU) 5. Counter-Example: 4. Applications to Contemporary Concerns in Digital Markets E. Market Definition and Market Power Analysis in Digital Markets 20c 20( 21 շր 22, 22՞ 1. Contemporary Antitrust: Inferring Rivalryfrom Struaure 22r- 2. Improvements to Antitrust: Assessing Tipping from Pressure 22( 5. Measurement of Competitive Pressure: Methods F. Conclusion VI. Big Tech’s Novel Harms: Antitrust or Regulation? 23; 23c 238 A. Preliminary Remarks 238 B. Privacy 24! C. Fake News 24^ D. Hate Speech 23 c E. Models of Regulation 232 F. Conclusion 23^ Conclusion 9 r- Appendix 1 Full List of Firms Covered in Dataset 239 Appendix 2 Firm Level Accounting Data: MB, MC, and MP 271 Appendix 3 Accounting Data: Alternative Allocation for Google Appendix 4 Discontinuous Demand Curve in NetworkEffects Market 273 275 Author Index շ,-jrj Subject Index о
This book asks a simple question : are the tech giants monopolies? In the current environment of suspicion toward the major technology companies as a result of concerns about their power and influence, it has become commonplace to talk of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, or Netflix as the modern-day version of the nineteenth-century trusts. In turn, the tech giants would be guilty of a whole range of monopoly harms toward consumers, workers, and even the democratic process. In the US and the EU. antitrust, and regulatory reform is on the way. Using economics, business,. ■* Д* t i S^? М J fel S ■ *ЄЄ* Wlw If) ¿одр uncertainty and economic dynamism. Wîttt IţţIy dfftltrtfţt дшЈ counterproductive to pursue policies that seek to introduce more rivalry in moligopoly markets subject to technological discontinuities. Instead, antitrust should focus on limiting the tech giants' monopoly ·*·*■»«* t·* »«yrp·ew * * *՝·■՛·“ Џ “V*, ep՝· »чі»։і ів^ужиїлі ·9 «w» *·■ · "* *■՝*”*'*** W®* ·*·®β· вие Я-'V iep «PMI f. to non-econonwc harms like privacy violations, fake spee -
Table of Contents Table of Cases Table of Legislation Introduction I. Policy Conversation on Big Tech A. Neo-Structuralism і. Origins շ. Claims against Big Tech į. Policy Proposals 4. Summation B. Consumer Welfarism 1. Origins 2. Implications for Big Tech 3. A New Consensus? C. Neo-Structuralism or Consumer Welfarism? 1. Methodological Issues 2. Overcoming Bias H. The “Moligopoly” Hypothesis A. Study Design и Xу 1 6 7 7 IO 16 18 19 19 20 24 25 25 27 29 3. Test 29 29 33 35 4. Data and Observable Indicators ļ6 1. 2. Research Question Hypothesis B, SEC io-K Filings 36 1. Why lo-Ks are Helpful 36 2. Sample and Tests 38 43 51 3■ Descriptive Statistics and Discussion 4■ Summation
Vlil TABLE OF CONTENTS C. Market Research, Business Analysis, and Competitive Intelligence 1. Sample and Tests 2. Descriptive Statistics 3. Analysis D. Conclusion: Unaccounted Big Tech Competition? III. Economics of Big Tech: Monopoly v Uncertainty A. Introduction B. Big Tech and the Textbook Monopoly Model 1. Standard Monopoly Model 2. Are Big Tech Firms Decision-Making Monopolists? C. Increasing Returns to Adoption, Network Effects, and Uncertainty 1. Competition in Network Effects Markets 2. Uncertainty D. Conclusion IV. A Concrete Theory of Moligopoly A. Meet Big Tech 1. Beyond Airport Books 2. Facebook 3. Amazon 4. Apple 5. Netflix 6. Google 7. Microsoft B. Common Properties of Big Tech 1. Method 2. Diversification 3. Discontinuity 4. LongTermism į. Growth 6. Exploration and Discovery 7. Flexibility 8. Summation C. Moligopoly Competition 1. Oligopoly Competition with Monopoly Positions 2. Big Tech Cooperation or Competition? 3. Implications D. Conclusion: Voodoo Economics or Neoclassical Redux?
TABLE OF CONTENTS v Antitrust in Moligopoly Markets A Limits and Possibilities under Existing Antitrust Doctrine 1. Antitrust's Futtatott: Rivalry 2. Antitrust Flexibility? В Defining Antitrust Doctrine for Digital Markets C Essential Role ofAntitrust in Tipped Markets 1. Direct Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? І; 17 17' 1717. 18՜ 2. Indirect Antitrust Control on Exercise of Monopoly Power? 191 191 19՛. j. Presumption against Horizontal Mergers 20 4. Beyond Antitrust? 20 D. Residual Role ofAntitrust in Untipped Markets 1. Elaboration 2. Example: Microsoft (US) Google Android (EU) 5. Counter-Example: 4. Applications to Contemporary Concerns in Digital Markets E. Market Definition and Market Power Analysis in Digital Markets 20c 20( 21 շր 22, 22՞ 1. Contemporary Antitrust: Inferring Rivalryfrom Struaure 22r- 2. Improvements to Antitrust: Assessing Tipping from Pressure 22( 5. Measurement of Competitive Pressure: Methods F. Conclusion VI. Big Tech’s Novel Harms: Antitrust or Regulation? 23; 23c 238 A. Preliminary Remarks 238 B. Privacy 24! C. Fake News 24^ D. Hate Speech 23 c E. Models of Regulation 232 F. Conclusion 23^ Conclusion 9 r- Appendix 1 Full List of Firms Covered in Dataset 239 Appendix 2 Firm Level Accounting Data: MB, MC, and MP 271 Appendix 3 Accounting Data: Alternative Allocation for Google Appendix 4 Discontinuous Demand Curve in NetworkEffects Market 273 275 Author Index շ,-jrj Subject Index о
This book asks a simple question : are the tech giants monopolies? In the current environment of suspicion toward the major technology companies as a result of concerns about their power and influence, it has become commonplace to talk of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, or Netflix as the modern-day version of the nineteenth-century trusts. In turn, the tech giants would be guilty of a whole range of monopoly harms toward consumers, workers, and even the democratic process. In the US and the EU. antitrust, and regulatory reform is on the way. Using economics, business,. ■* Д* t i S^? М J fel S ■ *ЄЄ* Wlw If) ¿одр uncertainty and economic dynamism. Wîttt IţţIy dfftltrtfţt дшЈ counterproductive to pursue policies that seek to introduce more rivalry in moligopoly markets subject to technological discontinuities. Instead, antitrust should focus on limiting the tech giants' monopoly ·*·*■»«* t·* »«yrp·ew * * *՝·■՛·“ Џ “V*, ep՝· »чі»։і ів^ужиїлі ·9 «w» *·■ · "* *■՝*”*'*** W®* ·*·®β· вие Я-'V iep «PMI f. to non-econonwc harms like privacy violations, fake spee - |
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| id | DE-604.BV046734689 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T14:37:29Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:52:22Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780198837701 0198837704 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032144709 |
| oclc_num | 1220885974 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-N2 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-N2 DE-188 |
| physical | xvi, 297 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Petit, Nicolas 1978- Verfasser (DE-588)137400675 aut Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario Nicholas Petit First edition Oxford Oxford University Press [2020] xvi, 297 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Internetökonomie (DE-588)7730524-3 gnd rswk-swf Monopoltheorie (DE-588)4279211-3 gnd rswk-swf Internetökonomie (DE-588)7730524-3 s Monopoltheorie (DE-588)4279211-3 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Petit, Nicolas 1978- Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario Internetökonomie (DE-588)7730524-3 gnd Monopoltheorie (DE-588)4279211-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)7730524-3 (DE-588)4279211-3 |
| title | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario |
| title_auth | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario |
| title_exact_search | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario |
| title_full | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario Nicholas Petit |
| title_fullStr | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario Nicholas Petit |
| title_full_unstemmed | Big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario Nicholas Petit |
| title_short | Big tech and the digital economy |
| title_sort | big tech and the digital economy the moligopoly scenario |
| title_sub | the moligopoly scenario |
| topic | Internetökonomie (DE-588)7730524-3 gnd Monopoltheorie (DE-588)4279211-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Internetökonomie Monopoltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032144709&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT petitnicolas bigtechandthedigitaleconomythemoligopolyscenario |
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