Essays on contract design and incentive provision:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiesbaden, Germany
Springer Gabler
[2019]
|
| Ausgabe: | Reprint |
| Schriftenreihe: | Edition KWV
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltstext http://www.springer.com/ Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 211 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm, 387 g |
| ISBN: | 9783658241322 3658241322 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804181362953945088 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION
1
1
CONTRACT
DESIGN
AND
INCENTIVE
PROVISION:
THEORETICAL
STUDIES
9
2
PUBLIC
VERSUS
PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP
11
2.1
INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................
11
2.2
THE
MODEL
.......................................................................
19
2.3
QUANTITY
CONTRACTS
AND
INVESTMENTS
............................................
23
2.3.1
ONLY
THE
MANAGER
HAS
INVESTMENT
TASKS
.........................
23
2.3.2
ONLY
THE
GOVERNMENT
HAS
INVESTMENT
TASKS
...................
27
2.3.3
BOTH
PARTIES
HAVE
INVESTMENT
TASKS
...............................
29
2.4
OPTIMAL
GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES
.....................................................
33
2.5
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
........................................................................
38
2.6
APPENDIX
.......................................................................................
40
3
PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS
45
3.1
INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................
45
3.2
THE
MODEL
.......................................................................................
53
3.3
PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP
...........................................................
57
3.3.1
NO
INNOVATION
AT
DATE
2
..................................................
57
3.3.2
AN
INNOVATION
AT
DATE
2
..................................................
58
3.3.3
THE
EFFORT
DECISION
AT
DATE
1
............................................
61
X
3.4
TRADITIONAL
PROCUREMENT
...............................................................
62
3.5
COMPARING
THE
MODES
OF
PROVISION
...............................................
63
3.6
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.........................................................................
69
3.7
APPENDIX
71
4
ENDOGENOUS
INFORMATION
STRUCTURES
79
4.1
INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................
79
4.2
THE
MODEL
.......................................................................................
81
4.3
SCENARIO
I
.......................................................................................
82
4.4
SCENARIO
II
........................................................................................
86
4.5
COMPARISON
OF
THE
SCENARIOS
88
II
CONTRACT
DESIGN
AND
INCENTIVE
PROVISION:
EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE
91
5
CAN
CONTRACTS
SOLVE
THE
HOLD-UP
PROBLEM?
93
5.1
INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................
93
5.2
CAN
CONTRACTS
SOLVE
THE
HOLD-UP
PROBLEM?
.................................
98
5.2.1
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
........................................................
98
5.2.2
PREDICTIONS
............................................................................
102
5.2.3
RESULTS
.................................................................................
105
5.3
CONTRACTS
AS
REFERENCE
POINTS
............................................................
ILL
5.3.1
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
AND
PREDICTIONS
..................................
ILL
5.3.2
RESULTS
.....................................................................................
114
5.4
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
........................................................................
119
5.5
APPENDIX
...........................................................................................
122
6
CONFLICTING
TASKS
AND
MORAL
HAZARD
129
6.1
INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................
129
6.2
THE
MODEL
.......................................................................................
133
6.3
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
.........................................................................
140
6.4
QUALITATIVE
HYPOTHESES
......................................................................
143
XI
6.5
DATA
ANALYSIS
.................................................................................
145
6.5.1
EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
........................................................
145
6.5.2
INDIVIDUAL
WAGE
OFFERS
AND
RESULTING
EFFORTS
.......................
149
6.6
DISCUSSION
.......................................................................................
155
6.7
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
........................................................................
158
6.8
APPENDIX
.......................................................................................
159
7
BEHAVIORAL
BIASES
AND
COGNITIVE
REFLECTION
185
7.1
INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................
185
7.2
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
.....................................................................
186
7.3
COGNITIVE
REFLECTION
TEST
............................................................
187
7.4
RESULTS
.............................................................................................
188
7.4.1
BASE
RATE
FALLACY
.
.
.............................................................
189
7.4.2
CONSERVATISM
BIAS
..............................................................
191
7.4.3
OVERWEIGHTING
AND
UNDERWEIGHTING
OF
BASE
RATES
....
192
7.4.4
OVERCONFIDENCE
.................................................................
193
7.4.5
ENDOWMENT
EFFECT
..............................................
194
REFERENCES
196
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION
1
1
CONTRACT
DESIGN
AND
INCENTIVE
PROVISION:
THEORETICAL
STUDIES
9
2
PUBLIC
VERSUS
PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP
11
2.1
INTRODUCTION
.
11
2.2
THE
MODEL
.
19
2.3
QUANTITY
CONTRACTS
AND
INVESTMENTS
.
23
2.3.1
ONLY
THE
MANAGER
HAS
INVESTMENT
TASKS
.
23
2.3.2
ONLY
THE
GOVERNMENT
HAS
INVESTMENT
TASKS
.
27
2.3.3
BOTH
PARTIES
HAVE
INVESTMENT
TASKS
.
29
2.4
OPTIMAL
GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES
.
33
2.5
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.
38
2.6
APPENDIX
.
40
3
PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS
45
3.1
INTRODUCTION
.
45
3.2
THE
MODEL
.
53
3.3
PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP
.
57
3.3.1
NO
INNOVATION
AT
DATE
2
.
57
3.3.2
AN
INNOVATION
AT
DATE
2
.
58
3.3.3
THE
EFFORT
DECISION
AT
DATE
1
.
61
X
3.4
TRADITIONAL
PROCUREMENT
.
62
3.5
COMPARING
THE
MODES
OF
PROVISION
.
63
3.6
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.
69
3.7
APPENDIX
71
4
ENDOGENOUS
INFORMATION
STRUCTURES
79
4.1
INTRODUCTION
.
79
4.2
THE
MODEL
.
81
4.3
SCENARIO
I
.
82
4.4
SCENARIO
II
.
86
4.5
COMPARISON
OF
THE
SCENARIOS
88
II
CONTRACT
DESIGN
AND
INCENTIVE
PROVISION:
EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE
91
5
CAN
CONTRACTS
SOLVE
THE
HOLD-UP
PROBLEM?
93
5.1
INTRODUCTION
.
93
5.2
CAN
CONTRACTS
SOLVE
THE
HOLD-UP
PROBLEM?
.
98
5.2.1
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
.
98
5.2.2
PREDICTIONS
.
102
5.2.3
RESULTS
.
105
5.3
CONTRACTS
AS
REFERENCE
POINTS
.
ILL
5.3.1
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
AND
PREDICTIONS
.
ILL
5.3.2
RESULTS
.
114
5.4
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.
119
5.5
APPENDIX
.
122
6
CONFLICTING
TASKS
AND
MORAL
HAZARD
129
6.1
INTRODUCTION
.
129
6.2
THE
MODEL
.
133
6.3
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
.
140
6.4
QUALITATIVE
HYPOTHESES
.
143
XI
6.5
DATA
ANALYSIS
.
145
6.5.1
EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
.
145
6.5.2
INDIVIDUAL
WAGE
OFFERS
AND
RESULTING
EFFORTS
.
149
6.6
DISCUSSION
.
155
6.7
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.
158
6.8
APPENDIX
.
159
7
BEHAVIORAL
BIASES
AND
COGNITIVE
REFLECTION
185
7.1
INTRODUCTION
.
185
7.2
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
.
186
7.3
COGNITIVE
REFLECTION
TEST
.
187
7.4
RESULTS
.
188
7.4.1
BASE
RATE
FALLACY
.
.
.
189
7.4.2
CONSERVATISM
BIAS
.
191
7.4.3
OVERWEIGHTING
AND
UNDERWEIGHTING
OF
BASE
RATES
.
192
7.4.4
OVERCONFIDENCE
.
193
7.4.5
ENDOWMENT
EFFECT
.
194
REFERENCES
196 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Hoppe, Eva I. 1982- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1106405005 |
| author_facet | Hoppe, Eva I. 1982- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Hoppe, Eva I. 1982- |
| author_variant | e i h ei eih |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046657277 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1112783332 (DE-599)DNB1168129605 |
| dewey-full | 658.3142 330.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 658.3142 330.1 |
| dewey-search | 658.3142 330.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.3142 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | Reprint |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| id | DE-604.BV046657277 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T14:18:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:50:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)1043386068 |
| isbn | 9783658241322 3658241322 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032068419 |
| oclc_num | 1112783332 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xi, 211 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm, 387 g |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSearch | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Springer Gabler |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Edition KWV |
| spelling | Hoppe, Eva I. 1982- Verfasser (DE-588)1106405005 aut Essays on contract design and incentive provision Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer Reprint Wiesbaden, Germany Springer Gabler [2019] xi, 211 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm, 387 g txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Edition KWV Dissertation Universität zu Köln 2011 Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf Paperback / softback BUS058000 KJS behavioral biases contract design incentive provisions private ownership public ownership public-private partnerships C SC524000: Sales/Distribution SUCO41170: Economics and Finance 1784: Hardcover, Softcover / Wirtschaft/Management (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 s 1\p DE-604 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden (DE-588)1043386068 pbl Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-3-658-24133-9 X:MVB text/html http://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=95e7ab06fe79413194b5ef543c6ea651&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm Inhaltstext X:MVB http://www.springer.com/ B:DE-101 application/pdf http://d-nb.info/1168129605/04 Inhaltsverzeichnis DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032068419&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hoppe, Eva I. 1982- Essays on contract design and incentive provision Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4112532-0 (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Essays on contract design and incentive provision |
| title_auth | Essays on contract design and incentive provision |
| title_exact_search | Essays on contract design and incentive provision |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Essays on contract design and incentive provision |
| title_full | Essays on contract design and incentive provision Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer |
| title_fullStr | Essays on contract design and incentive provision Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Essays on contract design and incentive provision Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer |
| title_short | Essays on contract design and incentive provision |
| title_sort | essays on contract design and incentive provision |
| topic | Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Agency-Theorie Anreizsystem Kontrakttheorie Hochschulschrift |
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