Ethics through history: an introduction
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Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2020
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| Beschreibung: | xvi, 312 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780199603701 |
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Contents Abbreviations and Conventions 1. Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Ethics and Its History The Possibility of Philosophical Conversation What Is Ethics About? Socrates’ Question How to Answer Socrates’ Question The Right and the Good Conceptions of the Good My Good and the Good of Others: Duty and Interest Reason and Desire Meta-Ethical Questions Periods in the History of Ethics Aims of This Book 2. Socrates: The Choice of Lives 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Morality in Peace and War How Ought We to Live? Happiness and Virtue: Some Preliminaries Socrates’ Inquiries: The Examined Life Socrates’ Convictions Assumptions About the Virtues Virtue Is Necessary and Sufficient for Happiness Happiness is Maximum Pleasure Why Is Knowledge Sufficient for Virtue? An Argument against Hedonism An Adaptive Conception of Happiness The One-Sided Successors of Socrates The Cyrenaic Version of Hedonism The Cynic Defence of Socrates xvii 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 7 9 9 11 11 13 13 14 16 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 22 3. Plato 24 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 24 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 31 33 Plato and Socrates Definitions and the Metaphysics of Morals: Moral Objectivity Rational v. Non-Rational Desires Rational and Non-Rational Aspects of the Virtues An Unanswered Question: The Problem of Justice Why Justice Is Always Better than Injustice An Objection: Is Plato’s Argument Irrelevant to the Question? Plato’s Answer: A Diagnosis of Injustice The Outlook of Reason Requires Other-DirectedJustice Morality, Reason, and Self-Interest
X CONTENTS 4. Aristotle 36. Aristotle and Plato: What Is Happiness? 37. The Right Method Requires the Systematic Examination of Initially Plausible Beliefs 38. Since Happiness Is the Ultimate End, It Must Be the Complete Good 39. Happiness Has to Be Understood through the Human Function 40. This Conception Is Preferable to Other Conceptions of Happiness 41. Happiness Is Partly, But Not Wholly, Vulnerable to External Circumstances 42. Happiness Requires Virtue of the Rational and the Non-Rational Soul 43. A Virtue of Character Is a State That Elects 44. The Virtues Lie in a Mean State, in Actions and in Feelings 45. Pleasure in the Appropriate Objects Is Necessary for Virtue 46. Vice and Virtue Are Different from Incontinence and Continence 47. Virtue of Character Requires Practical Reason and Deliberation 48. Virtues of Character Include an Ought’ That Is Directed towards the Fine 49. Are Aristotelian Virtues Moral Virtues? 50. Are We Better Off if We Have the Virtues? 51. Friendship Connects One’s Own Good with the Good of Others 52. Two Conceptions of Happiness? 5. Scepticism 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. The ‘Hellenistic’ World and Later Antiquity Hellenistic Ethical Theories Are Systematic The Sceptics Describe a Route to Suspension of Judgment Aristotle Argues That Variation Does Not Support Scepticism Tranquillity: Does the Sceptic AchieveHappiness? If Sceptics Have No Beliefs, Are They Inactive? What Sort of Life Can Sceptics Live without Beliefs? 6. Epicurus: Happiness as Pleasure 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. A New Defence of Hedonism Pleasure Is the Ultimate End
Tranquillity Maximizes Pleasure: A Reply to Callicles Epicureans Achieve Tranquillity, and Overcome the Fear of Death What Should a Hedonist Choose? Epicurus, Aristippus, and Callicles Is Pleasure the Only Non-Instrumental Good? Epicurus and Aristotle An Enlightened Hedonist Chooses the Virtues Difficulties in a Hedonist Defence of the Virtues 7. The Stoics: Happiness as Virtue 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. Socrates, the Cynics, and the Stoics The Development of Virtue Only the Right Is Good Objections to the Stoic Account of Happiness Appropriate Actions Aim at Preferred Indifferents Indifferents Matter, Though They Are Neither Good Nor Bad Passions Are Mistaken Assents The Stoics Apply Their Ethics to Social Theory 34 34 34 35 36 38 39 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 48 48 49 51 51 52 53 54 55 55 56 58 58 58 59 60 60 61 62 63 64 64 64 65 66 67 67 68 69
CONTENTS 76. The Cosmos Displays Intelligent Design and Providence 77. A Question About Stoic Determinism: Aristotle’s Conditions for Responsibility 78. Epicurus: To Defend Responsibility, We Must Reject Determinism 79. The Stoics: Determinism Must Allow Co-determination 80. The Stoics: We Are Responsible for Our Co-determined Actions in a Deterministic Cosmos 8. Christian Belief and Moral Philosophy: Augustine 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. Connexions between Christian Doctrine and Moral Theory Divine Commands and Rational Morality The Letter and the Spirit of the Moral Law: Jesus and Paul The Moral Law and Sin Sin and Free Will Grace, Justification, and Free Will Christian Morality in the World 9. Aquinas 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. From Ancient to Mediaeval The Rediscovery of Aristotle Ancient and Mediaeval: Questions About Morality The Place of Ethics in Aquinas’Philosophy We Have both a Rational Will and Non-Rational Passions If We Have a Rational Will, We Pursue the Ultimate Good Human Happiness Is Imperfect in This Life, but Perfect in the Afterlife Rational Agency Is Free Agency Virtue of Character Is the Right Use of Free Will Practical Reason Is Concerned both with Means and with Ends How Can Natural Law Be a Law? Natural Law Consists of Rational Principles From Natural Law to the Virtues Natural Law Requires Social Virtues Why Does My Good Require the Good of Others? Sin and Grace Acquired and Infused Virtues 10. Seotus and Ockham 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. Critics of Aquinas The Will Is Free because It Is
Undetermined The Desire for Happiness Cannot Be the Basis of Morality Impartial Concern for the Just Is the Basis of Morality Can the Will Be both Rational and Free? A Difficulty for Seotus An Objection to Aquinas on Divine Freedom and the Natural Law The Natural Law Depends on God’s Free Choice God’s Freedom and God’s Justice: A Question About Voluntarism 11. Morality and Social Human Nature: Suarez and Grotius 113. The Reformation 114. The Renaissance Xl 70 71 72 73 74 76 76 76 77 78 78 79 81 83 83 84 85 86 87 89 89 90 92 93 94 94 95 96 97 98 99 101 101 101 103 104 105 105 106 107 109 109 HO
xii CONTENTS 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. The Scientific Revolution Modern States and Philosophical Traditions The Continuity between Modern and Mediaeval Moral Philosophy Suarez: A Middle Way Resolves the Dispute About Natural Law Suarez: This Middle Way Provides a Partial Defence of Voluntarism Suarez: The Middle Way Provides a Defence of Naturalism Suarez: Why Is the Middle Way Best? Should Suarez Have Accepted an Imperative Conception of Morality? Nature Is the Basis of the Human Good and of Human Goodness Grotius: Natural Law Is Relevant both in War and in Peace Grotius: Natural Law Rests on Facts About Human Nature Grotius: Scepticism About Morality Is Mistaken 12. Hobbes: Natural Law without Social Human Nature 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 110 110 112 113 113 114 115 116 117 117 118 119 120 Hobbes v. Grotius on Natural Law The Will Is Not Rational Desire In the State of Nature Practical Reason Does Not Recommend Morality Practical Reason Shows Us the Way Out of the State of Nature Some, but Not All, Obligations Rest on Commands Morality Can Be Defended by Its Consequences: Indirect Consequentialism and Indirect Egoism 133. Is Morality Justified Only by the Preservation of Peace? 134. The Fool Raises a Question about Indirect Egoism 125 126 127 13. Voluntarism, Naturalism, and Moral Realism: Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, and Clarke 130 135. Objections to Hobbes 136. Pufendorf: A Voluntarist Argument Refutes Hobbes 137. Pufendorf’s Arguments for Voluntarism: (1) Moral Properties Are Not Natural, but Are Imposed on Nature 138.
Pufendorf’s Arguments for Voluntarism: (2) Natural Goodness Is Insufficient for Morality 139. Pufendorf’s Arguments for Voluntarism: (3) Only Voluntarism Explains the Disinterested Character of Morality 140. Critics of Hobbes and Voluntarism 141. Shaftesbury: Moral Realism Opposes both Egoism andVoluntarism 142. Cudworth: Voluntarism Cannot Account for the Stability of Moral Principles 143. Hobbes and Pufendorf: A Defence of Voluntarism? 144. Clarke: Hobbes Has to Recognize Morality in the Stateof Nature 145. Clarke: Moral Facts Are About Fitness 146. Clarke: Basic Moral Principles Are Easily Recognized 147. Clarke: Morality Requires Benevolence, Regulated by Justice 14. Sentimentalism: A Non-Rational Ground for Morality—Hutcheson and Hume 148. Reason v. Sentiment: The Basic Division 149. The Basis of Moral Judgments 120 121 122 123 124 130 130 131 132 133 133 134 135 136 137 137 139 139 141 141 142
CONTENTS 150. Hobbes and Hutcheson: Practical Reason Is Subordinate to Non-Rational Desire 151. Hume: Reason Has Only Limited Functions in Action 152. Hume: We Tend to Confuse Passion and Reason 153. Hutcheson: Since We Have a Moral Sense, Hobbesian Egoism Is False 154. Hutcheson v. Shaftesbury: Objectivist v. Subjectivist Conceptions of the Moral Sense 155. Moral Judgments Include Emotions 156. How Are Moral Judgments Connected to Motivation? 157. Moral Facts Are Not Objective 158. We Cannot Derive Ought’ from Ts’ 159. The Moral Sense Takes the Viewpoint of an Impartial Observer 160. Correct Moral Judgments Are About Utility 161. Is Hume’s Position Consistent? 162. The Moral Sense Explains Rightness and Wrongness 163. A Utilitarian Conception of the Moral Sense 164. Is the Outlook of the Moral Sense Utilitarian? 165. Hume: The Moral Sense Approves of both Natural and Artificial Virtues 166. Justice Is Not Based on a Contract, but on a Convention for Mutual Advantage 167. Our Moral Sentiment Approves of Justice 168. Our Moral Sentiment Approves of Indirect Utilitarian Rules 169. The Sensible Knave Questions the Supremacy of Morality 170. Hume: A Sentimentalist Can Give Good Reasons to Care About Morality 171. Questions About Hume’s Reply to the Knave 15. Rationalism: A Rational Ground for Morality—Butler, Price, and Reid 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. Butler: Nature Is the Basis for Prudence andMorality Butler:‘Nature’and‘Natural’HaveThree Senses Butler: Some Choices Are Based on Superior Principles Butler: Reasonable Self-Love Is
a Superior Principle Reid: Sentimentalists Underestimate the Functions of Practical Reason Price and Reid: The Moral Sense Gives Us Knowledge of Objective Moral Properties Reid: Contrary to Hume, Moral Rightness Is Objective Price: Sentimentalists Do Not Understand Moral Properties Price: Contrary to Hume, We Can Derive Ought’ from Ts’ Balguy: Sentimentalists Cannot Explain the Correction of Moral Judgments Price: Sentimentalism, Scepticism, and Nihilism Butler: Conscience Is the Supreme Practical Principle Butler: The Utilitarian Elements of Morality Depend on the Rational Principle of Benevolence Butler: Since Conscience Is Different from Benevolence, Morality Is Different from Utility Reid: The Moral Goodness of Agents Is Distinct from the Mora! Goodness of Actions ХІІІ 142 144 145 146 147 148 149 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 155 157 158 159 160 161 161 163 164 164 165 166 167 168 169 169 171 172 173 174 175 177 178 179
XIV CONTENTS 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. Reid: Justice Does Not Depend on Utility Price: Indirect Utilitarianism Is No More Plausible than Indirect Egoism Price: Utilitarian Reasons Are Not the Only Moral Reasons Price: There Is No One Supreme Principle of Morality How Rationalism Casts Doubt on Utilitarianism Butler: We Have Good Reason to Care About Morality Butler: Not All Our Actions Aim at Our Own Pleasure Butler: Benevolence and Conscience Do Not Conflict with Self-Interest Butler: Self-Love and Conscience Agree 179 180 181 182 184 184 185 186 187 16. Kant and Some Critics 196. Critique, Enlightenment, Rousseau 197. From Enlightenment to Morality 198. Reactions to Kant 199. Intuitive Views About Morality 200. Is Morality Based on Preferences? 201. Some Reasons Do Not Depend on Preferences 202. Moral Reasons Do Not Depend on Preferences 203. Morality Requires both Rational and Non-Rational Motives 204. The Categorical Imperative Requires Universal Law 205. Does the Categorical Imperative Simply Require Consistency? 206. Consistency and Fairness Are Not Enough for the Categorical Imperative 207. The Categorical Imperative Requires Us to Treat Rational Nature as an End 208. We Treat Rational Nature as an End through Respect for Ourselves and Others 209. The Principle of Respect for Persons Supports Rationalism against Utilitarianism 210. Respect for Persons Underlies the Categorical Imperative 211. Autonomy and Freedom 212. The Importance of Freedom to Morality 213. The Freedom of Responsibility 214. The Freedom of Autonomy 215. Morality Reveals
Personality 216. A Further Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: Universally Legislating Agents 217. Morality and the Highest Good Are Necessarily Connected 218. Morality and Religion 219. The Final Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: The Community of Ends 188 188 189 191 192 193 194 195 197 198 199 200 17. Schopenhauer: Kant’s Insights and Errors 220. Schopenhauer and Kant 221. Self-Interest Conflicts with Morality 222. Pure Practical Reason Requires Consistency, but Nothing More 223. The Source of Egoism Is Failure to Recognize the Equal Reality of Others 214 214 214 215 216 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213
CONTENTS 224. The Source of Compassion Is Recognition of the Unreality of the Distinction between Oneself and Others 225. Is Compassion a Sufficient Basis for Morality? 18. Hegel: Beyond Kantian Morality 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. Moral Philosophy Should Understand Social Actuality The Free and Rational Will Is the Starting Point of Morality Kant’s Insights and Errors About the Rational Will Ethical Life Corrects Kantian Morality Does Kantian Morality Correct Ethical Life? 19. Nietzsche: Against Kant and Morality 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. Objections to Morality We Can Learn About Morality by Examining Its Origins Why We Should Reject Morality Should We Reject Morality? Subjectivism and Self-Refutation 20. Utilitarianism: Mill and Sidgwick 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. Earlier and Later Utilitarians Varieties of Utilitarianism: Conservative, Progressive, and Radical Moral Theory and Empirical Argument Different Strategies of Argument for Utilitarianism Utilitarianism Needs Secondary Principles The Principle of Utility Systematizes Secondary Principles Some Secondary Principles Seem to Oppose Utilitarianism Justice and Other Secondary Principles Can Be Defended on Utilitarian Grounds Doubts About the Utilitarian Account of Justice Defences of Hedonism Sidgwick: Hedonism Offers the Only Plausible Account of the Good Objection to Sidgwick: The Relation between Pleasure and Belief Sidgwick: Foundationalist Epistemology Supports Hedonism Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism: Higher Pleasures Differ
in Quality from Lower Pleasures Can Qualitative Hedonism Explain Why Higher Pleasures Are Higher? Mill’s Holism: Happiness Has Parts That Are Chosen for Their Own Sakes Is Holism Consistent with Hedonism? Social and Political Consequences of Quantitative Hedonism An Axiomatic Argument Offers an Alternative to Common-Sense Morality Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism Sidgwick’s Axiomatic Argument for Utilitarianism The Relation between Impartiality and Maximization The Argument from Prudence to Utilitarianism Sidgwick: The Dualism of Practical Reason Questions About Morality and Self-Interest XV 216 217 220 220 221 221 222 223 226 226 227 228 229 230 232 232 234 235 236 237 238 239 239 240 242 242 243 244 245 245 246 247 248 248 249 250 251 252 252 254
xvi CONTENTS 21. Beyond Kantian and Utilitarian Morality: An Idealist Alternative—Green and Bradley 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. The Idealist Reply to Utilitarianism Self-Realization What Is Wrong with Utilitarian Morality? The False and the True Elements in Kantian Morality Self-Realization Requires Social Morality Self-Realization Requires Kantian Morality Practical Implications? 22. Meta-Ethics: Objectivity and Its Critics 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. Positivism and Meta-Ethics Moore: Not All Ethical Concepts Have Naturalistic Definitions How Non-Naturaiism Allows Moral Knowledge A Positivist Response to Moore: Non-Cognitivism The Significance of the Division between Facts and Values Do Emotivists Misunderstand the Meaning of Moral Judgments? Do Prescriptivists Also Misunderstand the Meaning of Moral Judgments? An Inconsistency in Non-Cognitivism? An Argument for Nihilism: Moral Properties Do Not Fit into a Scientific World-View Do Disagreement and Relativity Rule Out Objectivity? Why Does Moral Objectivity Matter? Back to Moore: Can Moral Concepts Be Defined? Can Moral Properties Be Defined? 23. Utilitarianism and Its Critics: Some Further Questions 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics Lewis: Utilitarianism Can Be Defended from an Impartial Point of View Hare: Utilitarianism Can Be Derived from Preferences Ross: Utility Is Not the Ground of Rightness Ross: Pluralist Intuiţionism Rawls: Considered Judgments Are a Suitable Starting Point for Moral Theory The Original
Position Underlies a Social Contract The Features of the Original Position In the Original Position Two Principles of Justice Are Chosen Utilitarians May Endorse the Two Principles Justice, Morality, and Utility The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness What Does the Kantian Interpretation Show? Bibliography Index 256 256 257 258 258 259 260 262 264 264 265 267 267 268 270 271 272 272 273 275 276 277 279 279 279 280 282 283 284 285 286 287 287 288 289 290 291 299
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Contents Abbreviations and Conventions 1. Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Ethics and Its History The Possibility of Philosophical Conversation What Is Ethics About? Socrates’ Question How to Answer Socrates’ Question The Right and the Good Conceptions of the Good My Good and the Good of Others: Duty and Interest Reason and Desire Meta-Ethical Questions Periods in the History of Ethics Aims of This Book 2. Socrates: The Choice of Lives 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Morality in Peace and War How Ought We to Live? Happiness and Virtue: Some Preliminaries Socrates’ Inquiries: The Examined Life Socrates’ Convictions Assumptions About the Virtues Virtue Is Necessary and Sufficient for Happiness Happiness is Maximum Pleasure Why Is Knowledge Sufficient for Virtue? An Argument against Hedonism An Adaptive Conception of Happiness The One-Sided Successors of Socrates The Cyrenaic Version of Hedonism The Cynic Defence of Socrates xvii 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 7 9 9 11 11 13 13 14 16 16 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 22 3. Plato 24 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 24 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 31 33 Plato and Socrates Definitions and the Metaphysics of Morals: Moral Objectivity Rational v. Non-Rational Desires Rational and Non-Rational Aspects of the Virtues An Unanswered Question: The Problem of Justice Why Justice Is Always Better than Injustice An Objection: Is Plato’s Argument Irrelevant to the Question? Plato’s Answer: A Diagnosis of Injustice The Outlook of Reason Requires Other-DirectedJustice Morality, Reason, and Self-Interest
X CONTENTS 4. Aristotle 36. Aristotle and Plato: What Is Happiness? 37. The Right Method Requires the Systematic Examination of Initially Plausible Beliefs 38. Since Happiness Is the Ultimate End, It Must Be the Complete Good 39. Happiness Has to Be Understood through the Human Function 40. This Conception Is Preferable to Other Conceptions of Happiness 41. Happiness Is Partly, But Not Wholly, Vulnerable to External Circumstances 42. Happiness Requires Virtue of the Rational and the Non-Rational Soul 43. A Virtue of Character Is a State That Elects 44. The Virtues Lie in a Mean State, in Actions and in Feelings 45. Pleasure in the Appropriate Objects Is Necessary for Virtue 46. Vice and Virtue Are Different from Incontinence and Continence 47. Virtue of Character Requires Practical Reason and Deliberation 48. Virtues of Character Include an Ought’ That Is Directed towards the Fine 49. Are Aristotelian Virtues Moral Virtues? 50. Are We Better Off if We Have the Virtues? 51. Friendship Connects One’s Own Good with the Good of Others 52. Two Conceptions of Happiness? 5. Scepticism 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. The ‘Hellenistic’ World and Later Antiquity Hellenistic Ethical Theories Are Systematic The Sceptics Describe a Route to Suspension of Judgment Aristotle Argues That Variation Does Not Support Scepticism Tranquillity: Does the Sceptic AchieveHappiness? If Sceptics Have No Beliefs, Are They Inactive? What Sort of Life Can Sceptics Live without Beliefs? 6. Epicurus: Happiness as Pleasure 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. A New Defence of Hedonism Pleasure Is the Ultimate End
Tranquillity Maximizes Pleasure: A Reply to Callicles Epicureans Achieve Tranquillity, and Overcome the Fear of Death What Should a Hedonist Choose? Epicurus, Aristippus, and Callicles Is Pleasure the Only Non-Instrumental Good? Epicurus and Aristotle An Enlightened Hedonist Chooses the Virtues Difficulties in a Hedonist Defence of the Virtues 7. The Stoics: Happiness as Virtue 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. Socrates, the Cynics, and the Stoics The Development of Virtue Only the Right Is Good Objections to the Stoic Account of Happiness Appropriate Actions Aim at Preferred Indifferents Indifferents Matter, Though They Are Neither Good Nor Bad Passions Are Mistaken Assents The Stoics Apply Their Ethics to Social Theory 34 34 34 35 36 38 39 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 48 48 49 51 51 52 53 54 55 55 56 58 58 58 59 60 60 61 62 63 64 64 64 65 66 67 67 68 69
CONTENTS 76. The Cosmos Displays Intelligent Design and Providence 77. A Question About Stoic Determinism: Aristotle’s Conditions for Responsibility 78. Epicurus: To Defend Responsibility, We Must Reject Determinism 79. The Stoics: Determinism Must Allow Co-determination 80. The Stoics: We Are Responsible for Our Co-determined Actions in a Deterministic Cosmos 8. Christian Belief and Moral Philosophy: Augustine 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. Connexions between Christian Doctrine and Moral Theory Divine Commands and Rational Morality The Letter and the Spirit of the Moral Law: Jesus and Paul The Moral Law and Sin Sin and Free Will Grace, Justification, and Free Will Christian Morality in the World 9. Aquinas 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. From Ancient to Mediaeval The Rediscovery of Aristotle Ancient and Mediaeval: Questions About Morality The Place of Ethics in Aquinas’Philosophy We Have both a Rational Will and Non-Rational Passions If We Have a Rational Will, We Pursue the Ultimate Good Human Happiness Is Imperfect in This Life, but Perfect in the Afterlife Rational Agency Is Free Agency Virtue of Character Is the Right Use of Free Will Practical Reason Is Concerned both with Means and with Ends How Can Natural Law Be a Law? Natural Law Consists of Rational Principles From Natural Law to the Virtues Natural Law Requires Social Virtues Why Does My Good Require the Good of Others? Sin and Grace Acquired and Infused Virtues 10. Seotus and Ockham 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. Critics of Aquinas The Will Is Free because It Is
Undetermined The Desire for Happiness Cannot Be the Basis of Morality Impartial Concern for the Just Is the Basis of Morality Can the Will Be both Rational and Free? A Difficulty for Seotus An Objection to Aquinas on Divine Freedom and the Natural Law The Natural Law Depends on God’s Free Choice God’s Freedom and God’s Justice: A Question About Voluntarism 11. Morality and Social Human Nature: Suarez and Grotius 113. The Reformation 114. The Renaissance Xl 70 71 72 73 74 76 76 76 77 78 78 79 81 83 83 84 85 86 87 89 89 90 92 93 94 94 95 96 97 98 99 101 101 101 103 104 105 105 106 107 109 109 HO
xii CONTENTS 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. The Scientific Revolution Modern States and Philosophical Traditions The Continuity between Modern and Mediaeval Moral Philosophy Suarez: A Middle Way Resolves the Dispute About Natural Law Suarez: This Middle Way Provides a Partial Defence of Voluntarism Suarez: The Middle Way Provides a Defence of Naturalism Suarez: Why Is the Middle Way Best? Should Suarez Have Accepted an Imperative Conception of Morality? Nature Is the Basis of the Human Good and of Human Goodness Grotius: Natural Law Is Relevant both in War and in Peace Grotius: Natural Law Rests on Facts About Human Nature Grotius: Scepticism About Morality Is Mistaken 12. Hobbes: Natural Law without Social Human Nature 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 110 110 112 113 113 114 115 116 117 117 118 119 120 Hobbes v. Grotius on Natural Law The Will Is Not Rational Desire In the State of Nature Practical Reason Does Not Recommend Morality Practical Reason Shows Us the Way Out of the State of Nature Some, but Not All, Obligations Rest on Commands Morality Can Be Defended by Its Consequences: Indirect Consequentialism and Indirect Egoism 133. Is Morality Justified Only by the Preservation of Peace? 134. The Fool Raises a Question about Indirect Egoism 125 126 127 13. Voluntarism, Naturalism, and Moral Realism: Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, and Clarke 130 135. Objections to Hobbes 136. Pufendorf: A Voluntarist Argument Refutes Hobbes 137. Pufendorf’s Arguments for Voluntarism: (1) Moral Properties Are Not Natural, but Are Imposed on Nature 138.
Pufendorf’s Arguments for Voluntarism: (2) Natural Goodness Is Insufficient for Morality 139. Pufendorf’s Arguments for Voluntarism: (3) Only Voluntarism Explains the Disinterested Character of Morality 140. Critics of Hobbes and Voluntarism 141. Shaftesbury: Moral Realism Opposes both Egoism andVoluntarism 142. Cudworth: Voluntarism Cannot Account for the Stability of Moral Principles 143. Hobbes and Pufendorf: A Defence of Voluntarism? 144. Clarke: Hobbes Has to Recognize Morality in the Stateof Nature 145. Clarke: Moral Facts Are About Fitness 146. Clarke: Basic Moral Principles Are Easily Recognized 147. Clarke: Morality Requires Benevolence, Regulated by Justice 14. Sentimentalism: A Non-Rational Ground for Morality—Hutcheson and Hume 148. Reason v. Sentiment: The Basic Division 149. The Basis of Moral Judgments 120 121 122 123 124 130 130 131 132 133 133 134 135 136 137 137 139 139 141 141 142
CONTENTS 150. Hobbes and Hutcheson: Practical Reason Is Subordinate to Non-Rational Desire 151. Hume: Reason Has Only Limited Functions in Action 152. Hume: We Tend to Confuse Passion and Reason 153. Hutcheson: Since We Have a Moral Sense, Hobbesian Egoism Is False 154. Hutcheson v. Shaftesbury: Objectivist v. Subjectivist Conceptions of the Moral Sense 155. Moral Judgments Include Emotions 156. How Are Moral Judgments Connected to Motivation? 157. Moral Facts Are Not Objective 158. We Cannot Derive Ought’ from Ts’ 159. The Moral Sense Takes the Viewpoint of an Impartial Observer 160. Correct Moral Judgments Are About Utility 161. Is Hume’s Position Consistent? 162. The Moral Sense Explains Rightness and Wrongness 163. A Utilitarian Conception of the Moral Sense 164. Is the Outlook of the Moral Sense Utilitarian? 165. Hume: The Moral Sense Approves of both Natural and Artificial Virtues 166. Justice Is Not Based on a Contract, but on a Convention for Mutual Advantage 167. Our Moral Sentiment Approves of Justice 168. Our Moral Sentiment Approves of Indirect Utilitarian Rules 169. The Sensible Knave Questions the Supremacy of Morality 170. Hume: A Sentimentalist Can Give Good Reasons to Care About Morality 171. Questions About Hume’s Reply to the Knave 15. Rationalism: A Rational Ground for Morality—Butler, Price, and Reid 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. Butler: Nature Is the Basis for Prudence andMorality Butler:‘Nature’and‘Natural’HaveThree Senses Butler: Some Choices Are Based on Superior Principles Butler: Reasonable Self-Love Is
a Superior Principle Reid: Sentimentalists Underestimate the Functions of Practical Reason Price and Reid: The Moral Sense Gives Us Knowledge of Objective Moral Properties Reid: Contrary to Hume, Moral Rightness Is Objective Price: Sentimentalists Do Not Understand Moral Properties Price: Contrary to Hume, We Can Derive Ought’ from Ts’ Balguy: Sentimentalists Cannot Explain the Correction of Moral Judgments Price: Sentimentalism, Scepticism, and Nihilism Butler: Conscience Is the Supreme Practical Principle Butler: The Utilitarian Elements of Morality Depend on the Rational Principle of Benevolence Butler: Since Conscience Is Different from Benevolence, Morality Is Different from Utility Reid: The Moral Goodness of Agents Is Distinct from the Mora! Goodness of Actions ХІІІ 142 144 145 146 147 148 149 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 155 157 158 159 160 161 161 163 164 164 165 166 167 168 169 169 171 172 173 174 175 177 178 179
XIV CONTENTS 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. Reid: Justice Does Not Depend on Utility Price: Indirect Utilitarianism Is No More Plausible than Indirect Egoism Price: Utilitarian Reasons Are Not the Only Moral Reasons Price: There Is No One Supreme Principle of Morality How Rationalism Casts Doubt on Utilitarianism Butler: We Have Good Reason to Care About Morality Butler: Not All Our Actions Aim at Our Own Pleasure Butler: Benevolence and Conscience Do Not Conflict with Self-Interest Butler: Self-Love and Conscience Agree 179 180 181 182 184 184 185 186 187 16. Kant and Some Critics 196. Critique, Enlightenment, Rousseau 197. From Enlightenment to Morality 198. Reactions to Kant 199. Intuitive Views About Morality 200. Is Morality Based on Preferences? 201. Some Reasons Do Not Depend on Preferences 202. Moral Reasons Do Not Depend on Preferences 203. Morality Requires both Rational and Non-Rational Motives 204. The Categorical Imperative Requires Universal Law 205. Does the Categorical Imperative Simply Require Consistency? 206. Consistency and Fairness Are Not Enough for the Categorical Imperative 207. The Categorical Imperative Requires Us to Treat Rational Nature as an End 208. We Treat Rational Nature as an End through Respect for Ourselves and Others 209. The Principle of Respect for Persons Supports Rationalism against Utilitarianism 210. Respect for Persons Underlies the Categorical Imperative 211. Autonomy and Freedom 212. The Importance of Freedom to Morality 213. The Freedom of Responsibility 214. The Freedom of Autonomy 215. Morality Reveals
Personality 216. A Further Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: Universally Legislating Agents 217. Morality and the Highest Good Are Necessarily Connected 218. Morality and Religion 219. The Final Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: The Community of Ends 188 188 189 191 192 193 194 195 197 198 199 200 17. Schopenhauer: Kant’s Insights and Errors 220. Schopenhauer and Kant 221. Self-Interest Conflicts with Morality 222. Pure Practical Reason Requires Consistency, but Nothing More 223. The Source of Egoism Is Failure to Recognize the Equal Reality of Others 214 214 214 215 216 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213
CONTENTS 224. The Source of Compassion Is Recognition of the Unreality of the Distinction between Oneself and Others 225. Is Compassion a Sufficient Basis for Morality? 18. Hegel: Beyond Kantian Morality 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. Moral Philosophy Should Understand Social Actuality The Free and Rational Will Is the Starting Point of Morality Kant’s Insights and Errors About the Rational Will Ethical Life Corrects Kantian Morality Does Kantian Morality Correct Ethical Life? 19. Nietzsche: Against Kant and Morality 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. Objections to Morality We Can Learn About Morality by Examining Its Origins Why We Should Reject Morality Should We Reject Morality? Subjectivism and Self-Refutation 20. Utilitarianism: Mill and Sidgwick 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. Earlier and Later Utilitarians Varieties of Utilitarianism: Conservative, Progressive, and Radical Moral Theory and Empirical Argument Different Strategies of Argument for Utilitarianism Utilitarianism Needs Secondary Principles The Principle of Utility Systematizes Secondary Principles Some Secondary Principles Seem to Oppose Utilitarianism Justice and Other Secondary Principles Can Be Defended on Utilitarian Grounds Doubts About the Utilitarian Account of Justice Defences of Hedonism Sidgwick: Hedonism Offers the Only Plausible Account of the Good Objection to Sidgwick: The Relation between Pleasure and Belief Sidgwick: Foundationalist Epistemology Supports Hedonism Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism: Higher Pleasures Differ
in Quality from Lower Pleasures Can Qualitative Hedonism Explain Why Higher Pleasures Are Higher? Mill’s Holism: Happiness Has Parts That Are Chosen for Their Own Sakes Is Holism Consistent with Hedonism? Social and Political Consequences of Quantitative Hedonism An Axiomatic Argument Offers an Alternative to Common-Sense Morality Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism Sidgwick’s Axiomatic Argument for Utilitarianism The Relation between Impartiality and Maximization The Argument from Prudence to Utilitarianism Sidgwick: The Dualism of Practical Reason Questions About Morality and Self-Interest XV 216 217 220 220 221 221 222 223 226 226 227 228 229 230 232 232 234 235 236 237 238 239 239 240 242 242 243 244 245 245 246 247 248 248 249 250 251 252 252 254
xvi CONTENTS 21. Beyond Kantian and Utilitarian Morality: An Idealist Alternative—Green and Bradley 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. The Idealist Reply to Utilitarianism Self-Realization What Is Wrong with Utilitarian Morality? The False and the True Elements in Kantian Morality Self-Realization Requires Social Morality Self-Realization Requires Kantian Morality Practical Implications? 22. Meta-Ethics: Objectivity and Its Critics 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. Positivism and Meta-Ethics Moore: Not All Ethical Concepts Have Naturalistic Definitions How Non-Naturaiism Allows Moral Knowledge A Positivist Response to Moore: Non-Cognitivism The Significance of the Division between Facts and Values Do Emotivists Misunderstand the Meaning of Moral Judgments? Do Prescriptivists Also Misunderstand the Meaning of Moral Judgments? An Inconsistency in Non-Cognitivism? An Argument for Nihilism: Moral Properties Do Not Fit into a Scientific World-View Do Disagreement and Relativity Rule Out Objectivity? Why Does Moral Objectivity Matter? Back to Moore: Can Moral Concepts Be Defined? Can Moral Properties Be Defined? 23. Utilitarianism and Its Critics: Some Further Questions 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics Lewis: Utilitarianism Can Be Defended from an Impartial Point of View Hare: Utilitarianism Can Be Derived from Preferences Ross: Utility Is Not the Ground of Rightness Ross: Pluralist Intuiţionism Rawls: Considered Judgments Are a Suitable Starting Point for Moral Theory The Original
Position Underlies a Social Contract The Features of the Original Position In the Original Position Two Principles of Justice Are Chosen Utilitarians May Endorse the Two Principles Justice, Morality, and Utility The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness What Does the Kantian Interpretation Show? Bibliography Index 256 256 257 258 258 259 260 262 264 264 265 267 267 268 270 271 272 272 273 275 276 277 279 279 279 280 282 283 284 285 286 287 287 288 289 290 291 299
What is i he linnuin ¡լ»՚ու id? \\ l ml aiv tlu՝ pri шагу virt ik։s I hal niak(՝ a μ хні pers։ и ľ.' W hal makes an аеі inn ľiyhl? Musi wc 1 ry Io maximiza дчммі roi ise։ |i lences? I luw eau we know w hal is riţdil and учих|? ( 'iin muralii v Іи՝ ral innal lv just ilici I? In lùhics Through Ilisi ory. Terei кѵ Irw in a։ Id restes sneh ľni idan ս՛ու al |1Ա"Ո ¡un՝«, makin,ц՝ diese eeni ml dedales iniellijíihle lu readers without an eMensive harkiimiind in philo^nphv. I le I»rov i.les a historical and philosophical discussion of major (ļiieslions and kev phil »sı phers in lhe hi-ι nrv ftl'elhies. in die iradilioii dial helius wit It Socrates. Irwin rovers aneienl. medieval, and modern mur.il philosophers whose views have helped lo form (he agenda l’or eoiilemporarv ethical dieorv. paviu՛.: al I (‘Dl ion lo 1 he si renul I is and weaknesses of l heir respect i \ e posit ions. |
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| edition | First edition |
| era | Geschichte gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T14:09:34Z |
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| spelling | Irwin, Terence 1947- Verfasser (DE-588)138707820 aut Ethics through history an introduction Terence Irwin First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2020 xvi, 312 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s Geschichte z DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032038362&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032038362&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
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| title | Ethics through history an introduction |
| title_auth | Ethics through history an introduction |
| title_exact_search | Ethics through history an introduction |
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| title_full | Ethics through history an introduction Terence Irwin |
| title_fullStr | Ethics through history an introduction Terence Irwin |
| title_full_unstemmed | Ethics through history an introduction Terence Irwin |
| title_short | Ethics through history |
| title_sort | ethics through history an introduction |
| title_sub | an introduction |
| topic | Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ethik |
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