Probabilistic knowledge:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2020
|
| Ausgabe: | First published in paperback |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Klappentext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 268 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198858096 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Traditional. phiLosophicaL discussions of knowledge have fixated on the epistemic status of fuLL betiefs. Sarah Moss argues that in addition to fuLL betiefs, credences can have the speciaL epistemic status of constituting knowtedge. For instance, your .3 credence that it is raining can be knowtedge, in just the same way that the futt betief that it is raining can be knowtedge. In addition to defending probabitistic knowtedge. Moss defends revisionary ctaims in the phitosophy of mind and Language—námety, that you can betieve and assert probabitistic contents. These ctaims have significant consequences for standing debates about epistemic modats, futt betief and credence, peer disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, and transformative experience. Accepting probabitistic knowtedge atso hetps exptain why statisticat evidence is insufficient for tegat proof and why raciat profiting viotates epistemic norms. Probabilistic Knowledge not onty hetps us understand the nature of our own mentát states, but atso hetps us better understand the nature of our responsibitities to each other.
Contents Preface ·χ 1. The case for probabilistic contents 1.1 Probabilistic beliefs 1.2 An argument for probabilistic contents of belief 1.3 The roles played by contents of belief 1.4 Full beliefs 1.5 Alternative roles for contents of belief r r 15 2. The case for probabilistic assertion 2.1 Familiar arguments against propositional contents of assertion 2.2 Foundational arguments for probabilistic contents of assertion 2.3 Modeling communication 2.4 Epistemic modals and indicative conditionals 2.5 A test battery for probabilistic content 20 20 25 29 31 33 3. Epistemic modals and probability operators 3.1 Motivations for my semantics 3.2 Embedded epistemic vocabulary 3.3 Challenges for other theories 3.4 A semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators 3.5 A semantics for simple sentences 3.6 The relationship between credence and full belief 38 38 41 45 50 53 58 4. Indicative conditionals 4.1 Probabilities of conditionals as conditional probabilities 4.2 A semantics for conditionals 4.3 Why probabilities of conditionals are not conditional probabilities 4.4 A semantics for other logical operators 4.5 The pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary 64 64 66 69 74 80 5. The case for probabilistic knowledge 5.1 The thesis that probabilistic beliefs can be knowledge 5.2 Testimony 5.3 Perception 5.4 Arguments for probabilistic contents of experience 5.5 Other sources of knowledge 5.6 Justified true belief without knowledge 5.7 Traditional theories of knowledge 5.8 An alternative mental state? 5.9 Applications 85 85 87 89 92 99 101 104 109 ա 3 ю 14
viii CONTENTS 6. Factivity 6.1 Alternatives to probabilistic knowledge? 6.2 The contents of knowledge ascriptions 6.3 Frequently asked questions 6.4 Relativism 6.5 Objective chance 117 7. Skepticism 7.1 A skeptical puzzle 7.2 The argument from inconsistency 7.3 The argument from closure 7.4 The argument from disjunction 7.5 The argument from safety іЗ1 8. Knowledge and belief 8.1 The knowledge norm of belief 8.2 Peer disagreement 8.3 Applying the knowledge norm of belief 8.4 Statistical inference 8.5 Responses to skepticism about perceptual knowledge i58 158 160 164 168 174 9. Knowledge and action 9.1 Knowledge norms of action 9.2 Addressing objections 9.3 Applying knowledge norms of action 9.4 Pragmatic encroachment 9.5 Transformative experience 181 181 184 188 192 194 n7 120 122 1շ6 129 іЗ1 131 t-33 140 146 10. Knowledge and persons 10. ւ Statistical evidence 10.2 An account of legal proof 10.3 Applying knowledge standards of proof 10.4 Racial and other profiling 10.5 Applying the rule of consideration 201 201 208 216 220 225 Appendix: A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary A.i Background A.2 Epistemic modals and probability operators A.3 Simplesentences A.4 Indicative conditionals A.5 Other logical operators 231 231 231 234 234 237 References 243 Index 261
|
| adam_txt |
Traditional. phiLosophicaL discussions of knowledge have fixated on the epistemic status of fuLL betiefs. Sarah Moss argues that in addition to fuLL betiefs, credences can have the speciaL epistemic status of constituting knowtedge. For instance, your .3 credence that it is raining can be knowtedge, in just the same way that the futt betief that it is raining can be knowtedge. In addition to defending probabitistic knowtedge. Moss defends revisionary ctaims in the phitosophy of mind and Language—námety, that you can betieve and assert probabitistic contents. These ctaims have significant consequences for standing debates about epistemic modats, futt betief and credence, peer disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, and transformative experience. Accepting probabitistic knowtedge atso hetps exptain why statisticat evidence is insufficient for tegat proof and why raciat profiting viotates epistemic norms. Probabilistic Knowledge not onty hetps us understand the nature of our own mentát states, but atso hetps us better understand the nature of our responsibitities to each other.
Contents Preface ·χ 1. The case for probabilistic contents 1.1 Probabilistic beliefs 1.2 An argument for probabilistic contents of belief 1.3 The roles played by contents of belief 1.4 Full beliefs 1.5 Alternative roles for contents of belief r r 15 2. The case for probabilistic assertion 2.1 Familiar arguments against propositional contents of assertion 2.2 Foundational arguments for probabilistic contents of assertion 2.3 Modeling communication 2.4 Epistemic modals and indicative conditionals 2.5 A test battery for probabilistic content 20 20 25 29 31 33 3. Epistemic modals and probability operators 3.1 Motivations for my semantics 3.2 Embedded epistemic vocabulary 3.3 Challenges for other theories 3.4 A semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators 3.5 A semantics for simple sentences 3.6 The relationship between credence and full belief 38 38 41 45 50 53 58 4. Indicative conditionals 4.1 Probabilities of conditionals as conditional probabilities 4.2 A semantics for conditionals 4.3 Why probabilities of conditionals are not conditional probabilities 4.4 A semantics for other logical operators 4.5 The pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary 64 64 66 69 74 80 5. The case for probabilistic knowledge 5.1 The thesis that probabilistic beliefs can be knowledge 5.2 Testimony 5.3 Perception 5.4 Arguments for probabilistic contents of experience 5.5 Other sources of knowledge 5.6 Justified true belief without knowledge 5.7 Traditional theories of knowledge 5.8 An alternative mental state? 5.9 Applications 85 85 87 89 92 99 101 104 109 ա 3 ю 14
viii CONTENTS 6. Factivity 6.1 Alternatives to probabilistic knowledge? 6.2 The contents of knowledge ascriptions 6.3 Frequently asked questions 6.4 Relativism 6.5 Objective chance 117 7. Skepticism 7.1 A skeptical puzzle 7.2 The argument from inconsistency 7.3 The argument from closure 7.4 The argument from disjunction 7.5 The argument from safety іЗ1 8. Knowledge and belief 8.1 The knowledge norm of belief 8.2 Peer disagreement 8.3 Applying the knowledge norm of belief 8.4 Statistical inference 8.5 Responses to skepticism about perceptual knowledge i58 158 160 164 168 174 9. Knowledge and action 9.1 Knowledge norms of action 9.2 Addressing objections 9.3 Applying knowledge norms of action 9.4 Pragmatic encroachment 9.5 Transformative experience 181 181 184 188 192 194 n7 120 122 1շ6 129 іЗ1 131 t-33 140 146 10. Knowledge and persons 10. ւ Statistical evidence 10.2 An account of legal proof 10.3 Applying knowledge standards of proof 10.4 Racial and other profiling 10.5 Applying the rule of consideration 201 201 208 216 220 225 Appendix: A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary A.i Background A.2 Epistemic modals and probability operators A.3 Simplesentences A.4 Indicative conditionals A.5 Other logical operators 231 231 231 234 234 237 References 243 Index 261 |
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| spelling | Moss, Sarah Verfasser (DE-588)117245308X aut Probabilistic knowledge Sarah Moss First published in paperback Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2020 xi, 268 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd rswk-swf Gewissheit (DE-588)4129355-1 gnd rswk-swf Probabilismus Philosophie (DE-588)4175765-8 gnd rswk-swf Certainty Probabilities / Philosophy Gewissheit (DE-588)4129355-1 s Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 s DE-604 Probabilismus Philosophie (DE-588)4175765-8 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover 978-0-19-879215-4 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-186126-0 Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032034196&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032034196&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Moss, Sarah Probabilistic knowledge Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd Gewissheit (DE-588)4129355-1 gnd Probabilismus Philosophie (DE-588)4175765-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4137007-7 (DE-588)4129355-1 (DE-588)4175765-8 |
| title | Probabilistic knowledge |
| title_auth | Probabilistic knowledge |
| title_exact_search | Probabilistic knowledge |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Probabilistic knowledge |
| title_full | Probabilistic knowledge Sarah Moss |
| title_fullStr | Probabilistic knowledge Sarah Moss |
| title_full_unstemmed | Probabilistic knowledge Sarah Moss |
| title_short | Probabilistic knowledge |
| title_sort | probabilistic knowledge |
| topic | Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd Gewissheit (DE-588)4129355-1 gnd Probabilismus Philosophie (DE-588)4175765-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wahrscheinlichkeit Gewissheit Probabilismus Philosophie |
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