Competing in the gray zone: Russian tactics and Western responses
Recent events in Crimea and the Donbass in eastern Ukraine have upended relations between Russia and the West, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Although Russia's actions in Ukraine were, for the most part, acts of outright aggression, Russi...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA
RAND
[2019]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2791 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Recent events in Crimea and the Donbass in eastern Ukraine have upended relations between Russia and the West, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Although Russia's actions in Ukraine were, for the most part, acts of outright aggression, Russia has been aiming to destabilize both its "near abroad"-the former Soviet states except for the Baltics-and wider Europe through the use of ambiguous "gray zone" tactics. These tactics include everything from propaganda and disinformation to election interference and the incitement of violence. To better understand where there are vulnerabilities to Russian gray zone tactics in Europe and how to effectively counter them, the RAND Corporation ran a series of war games. These games comprised a Russian (Red) team, which was tasked with expanding its influence and undermining NATO unity, competing against a European (Green) team and a U.S. (Blue) team, which were aiming to defend their allies from Red's gray zone activities without provoking an outright war. In these games, the authors of this report observed patterns of behavior from the three teams that are broadly consistent with what has been observed in the real world. This report presents key insights from these games and from the research effort that informed them |
| Beschreibung: | "RAND Arroyo Center." "Prepared for the United States Army." "This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program"--Preface (page iii) |
| Beschreibung: | xv, 66 Seiten Illustrationen, Karten |
| ISBN: | 9781977404022 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RR2791 |
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| 500 | |a "This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program"--Preface (page iii) | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Introduction -- Methodology -- The Gray Zone Is More Usefully Conceptualized as a Type of Tactic, Rather Than an Operational Environment -- "Everyday" Gray Zone Actions Must Be Differentiated from More Aggressive, Focused Gray Zone Actions -- NATO and the EU Are Unlikely to Be Able to Compel Russia to Stop Using Nonviolent, Everyday Russian Gray Zone Tactics, but They Might Be Able to Deter Higher-Order Aggression -- Vulnerability to Russian Gray Zone Tactics Varies Significantly Across Europe -- Civilian Organizations, Rather Than the Military, Might Be Best Positioned to Counter Most Russian Gray Zone Tactics -- The West Might Be Winning This Competition, but Does Not Recognize It -- Appendix: Wargaming the Gray Zone | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Recent events in Crimea and the Donbass in eastern Ukraine have upended relations between Russia and the West, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Although Russia's actions in Ukraine were, for the most part, acts of outright aggression, Russia has been aiming to destabilize both its "near abroad"-the former Soviet states except for the Baltics-and wider Europe through the use of ambiguous "gray zone" tactics. These tactics include everything from propaganda and disinformation to election interference and the incitement of violence. To better understand where there are vulnerabilities to Russian gray zone tactics in Europe and how to effectively counter them, the RAND Corporation ran a series of war games. These games comprised a Russian (Red) team, which was tasked with expanding its influence and undermining NATO unity, competing against a European (Green) team and a U.S. (Blue) team, which were aiming to defend their allies from Red's gray zone activities without provoking an outright war. In these games, the authors of this report observed patterns of behavior from the three teams that are broadly consistent with what has been observed in the real world. This report presents key insights from these games and from the research effort that informed them | |
| 653 | 0 | |a National security / Europe | |
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| 653 | 2 | |a Europe / Defenses | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Europe / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / Europe | |
| 653 | 2 | |a United States / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) | |
| 653 | 2 | |a Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / United States | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wasser, Becca |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)113825746X |4 oth | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Arroyo Center (Santa Monica. Calif.) |b Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program |0 (DE-588)1159537844 |4 isb | |
| 787 | 0 | |t Gaming gray zone tactics : design considerations for a structured strategic game |r RAND/RR-2915-A | |
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| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031988260 | |
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| author | Pettyjohn, Stacie L. |
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| author_facet | Pettyjohn, Stacie L. |
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| author_sort | Pettyjohn, Stacie L. |
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| contents | Introduction -- Methodology -- The Gray Zone Is More Usefully Conceptualized as a Type of Tactic, Rather Than an Operational Environment -- "Everyday" Gray Zone Actions Must Be Differentiated from More Aggressive, Focused Gray Zone Actions -- NATO and the EU Are Unlikely to Be Able to Compel Russia to Stop Using Nonviolent, Everyday Russian Gray Zone Tactics, but They Might Be Able to Deter Higher-Order Aggression -- Vulnerability to Russian Gray Zone Tactics Varies Significantly Across Europe -- Civilian Organizations, Rather Than the Military, Might Be Best Positioned to Counter Most Russian Gray Zone Tactics -- The West Might Be Winning This Competition, but Does Not Recognize It -- Appendix: Wargaming the Gray Zone |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1150867879 (DE-599)BVBBV046576401 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7249/RR2791 |
| format | Electronic Book |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
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| isbn | 9781977404022 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Pettyjohn, Stacie L. Verfasser (DE-588)1131750020 aut Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser Santa Monica, CA RAND [2019] xv, 66 Seiten Illustrationen, Karten txt rdacontent n rdamedia c rdamedia nc rdacarrier cr rdacarrier "RAND Arroyo Center." "Prepared for the United States Army." "This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program"--Preface (page iii) Introduction -- Methodology -- The Gray Zone Is More Usefully Conceptualized as a Type of Tactic, Rather Than an Operational Environment -- "Everyday" Gray Zone Actions Must Be Differentiated from More Aggressive, Focused Gray Zone Actions -- NATO and the EU Are Unlikely to Be Able to Compel Russia to Stop Using Nonviolent, Everyday Russian Gray Zone Tactics, but They Might Be Able to Deter Higher-Order Aggression -- Vulnerability to Russian Gray Zone Tactics Varies Significantly Across Europe -- Civilian Organizations, Rather Than the Military, Might Be Best Positioned to Counter Most Russian Gray Zone Tactics -- The West Might Be Winning This Competition, but Does Not Recognize It -- Appendix: Wargaming the Gray Zone Recent events in Crimea and the Donbass in eastern Ukraine have upended relations between Russia and the West, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Although Russia's actions in Ukraine were, for the most part, acts of outright aggression, Russia has been aiming to destabilize both its "near abroad"-the former Soviet states except for the Baltics-and wider Europe through the use of ambiguous "gray zone" tactics. These tactics include everything from propaganda and disinformation to election interference and the incitement of violence. To better understand where there are vulnerabilities to Russian gray zone tactics in Europe and how to effectively counter them, the RAND Corporation ran a series of war games. These games comprised a Russian (Red) team, which was tasked with expanding its influence and undermining NATO unity, competing against a European (Green) team and a U.S. (Blue) team, which were aiming to defend their allies from Red's gray zone activities without provoking an outright war. In these games, the authors of this report observed patterns of behavior from the three teams that are broadly consistent with what has been observed in the real world. This report presents key insights from these games and from the research effort that informed them National security / Europe War games Europe / Defenses Europe / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / Europe United States / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / United States Wasser, Becca Sonstige (DE-588)113825746X oth Arroyo Center (Santa Monica. Calif.) Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program (DE-588)1159537844 isb Gaming gray zone tactics : design considerations for a structured strategic game RAND/RR-2915-A https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2791 |
| spellingShingle | Pettyjohn, Stacie L. Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses Introduction -- Methodology -- The Gray Zone Is More Usefully Conceptualized as a Type of Tactic, Rather Than an Operational Environment -- "Everyday" Gray Zone Actions Must Be Differentiated from More Aggressive, Focused Gray Zone Actions -- NATO and the EU Are Unlikely to Be Able to Compel Russia to Stop Using Nonviolent, Everyday Russian Gray Zone Tactics, but They Might Be Able to Deter Higher-Order Aggression -- Vulnerability to Russian Gray Zone Tactics Varies Significantly Across Europe -- Civilian Organizations, Rather Than the Military, Might Be Best Positioned to Counter Most Russian Gray Zone Tactics -- The West Might Be Winning This Competition, but Does Not Recognize It -- Appendix: Wargaming the Gray Zone |
| title | Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses |
| title_auth | Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses |
| title_exact_search | Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses |
| title_full | Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser |
| title_fullStr | Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competing in the gray zone Russian tactics and Western responses Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser |
| title_short | Competing in the gray zone |
| title_sort | competing in the gray zone russian tactics and western responses |
| title_sub | Russian tactics and Western responses |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2791 |
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