Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states:
Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, p...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA
RAND
2019
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2781 Literaturverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance |
| Beschreibung: | xvii, 133 Seiten Illustrationen, Karten |
| Format: | Mode of access: internet via WWW. |
| ISBN: | 9781977402158 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RR2781 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance | |
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Payne, Keith B., and John S. Foster, “Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict,” Comparative Strategy, Voi. 36, No. 1, May 2017 Pechatnov, Y. A., “Analiz otechestvennykh і zarubezhnykh podkhodov к formirovaniyu kontseptsii і mekhanizma sderzhivaniya ot razvyazyvaniya voennoi agressii [Analysis of the Domestic and Foreign Approaches to the Formation of the Concept and Mechanism of Deterrence against the Outbreak of Military Aggression],” Vooruzheniei Ekonomika, Vol. 3, No. 11, 2010, pp. 11-17. President of the Russian Federation, The Military Doctrine ofthe Russian Federation, Moscow, 2014. As of July 4, 2018: https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029
128 Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States ----------, “Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki v oblasti voenno-morskoi deiatel’nosti do 2030 goda [Basic Principles of State Naval Policy in the Period to 2030],” July 20, 2017. As of September 14 2018: http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42117 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, The Soviet “War Scare, ” Washington, D.C.: George Washington University National Security Archive, February 15,1990. Putin, Vladimir, “Poslanie Vladimira Putina Federalnomu sobraniiu 2018, Polnaia versila, [2018 Address of Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly, Full Version],” Pervyi Kanal, March 1, 2018. As of June 14, 2018: https://www.ltv.ru/shows/vystupleniyaprezidenta-rossii/poslanie-federalnomu-sobraniyu/ poslanie-vladimira-putina-federalnomu-sobraniyu-2018-polnaya-versiya RAND Corporation, “Robust Decision Making,” webpage, undated. As of November 12, 2018: https://www.rand.org/topics/robust-decision-making.html ----------, Fostering Innovation in the Defense Department: Examplesfrom RAND’s Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, Santa Monica, Calif., CP-852, 2016. As of November 12, 2018: https://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP852.html Reagan, Ronald, An American Life, New York: Simon Schuster, 1990. Roberts, Brad, The Casefor U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015. Savranskaya, Svetlana, and David A. Welch, eds., SALTIIand the Growth of Mistrust: Transcript ofthe Proceedings ofthe Musgrave Conference ofthe CarterBrezhnev Project,
St. Simon’s Island, Ga.: Musgrave Plantation, February 5, 1995. Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. ----------, “The Role of War Games and Exercises,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Stembruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987, pp. 426-444. Schlesinger, James, The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1975. Schneider, Mark B., “Escalate to De-Escalate,” Proceedings Magazine, Voi. 143, No. 2, 2017, p. 1368. Schulte, Paul, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland, eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 13-74.
References 129 Schwartz, Stephen I., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences ofU.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, June 1, 1998. Sengupta, Kim, “Russia’s Grip on Europe’s Oil Supply Threatens Ukraine’s Energy Independence,” Independent, May 2, 2017. As of November 7, 2018: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ russia-ukraine-gas-energy-supply-solution-putin-holds-key-a77l4l4l.html Shlapak, David A., and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense ofthe Baltics, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1253-A, 2016. As of August 18, 2018: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html Slocombe, Walter B., “The Countervailing Strategy,” International Security, Voi. 5, No. 4,1981, pp. 18-27. Sokolovsky, V. D., Soviet Military Strategy, New York: Taylor Francis Group, 1984. Sokov, Nikolai, Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine, Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004. --------- , “Russian Perspective on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” in Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland, eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 199-226. --------- , “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-Escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014. Taylor, Adam, and Michael Birnbaum, “NATO Allies Respond to Trump’s Suggestion That the U.S. Might Not Protect Them from Russia,” Washington Post, July 21, 2016. Tellis, Ashley J., C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby,
Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessonsfrom the Kärgil Crisis, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1450-USCA, 2001. As of November 7, 2018: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MRl450.html Tetrais, Bruno, “Russia’s Nuclear Policy: Worrying for the Wrong Reason,” Survival, Voi. 60, No. 2, 2018, pp. 33-44. “Text of Accounts by Lucas and Considine in Interviews with MacArthur in 1954,” New York Times, April 9, 1964. As of November 7, 2018: http://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/09/texts-of-accounts-by-lucas-and-considineon-interviews-with-macarthur-in-1954.html United States and Russia, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, Prague, April 8, 2010.
130 Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States United States and Soviet Union, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their IntermediateRange and Shorter-Range Missiles, Washington, D.C., December 8, 1987. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report: ATACMS-BAT, Washington, D.C., December 2002. --------- , Selected Acquisition Report (SAR): B61 Mod 12 Life Extension Program (B61-12 LEP), Washington, D.C., June 2013a. --------- , Selected Acquisition Report (SAR): W76 Mod 1 Life Extension Program (W76-1 LEP), Washington, D.C., June 2013b. --------- , Selected Acquisition Report (SAR): B61 Mod 12 Life Extension Program Tailkit Assembly (B61-12 LEP TKA), Washington, D.C., December 2016. --------- , Selected Acquisition Report: Tactical Tomahawk RGM-109E/UGM-109E Missile (TACTOM), Washington, D.C., December 2017. ---------, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, D.C., 2018. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Evaluation ofthe European Reassurance Initiative (ERL), Washington, D.C., DÓDIG 2017-111, August 22, 2017. U.S. Department of Energy, Department ofEnergy FY2018 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapon Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, Washington, D.C., May 2017. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Nuclear Employment Strategy, Fact Sheet, October 6, 2016. U.S. General Accounting Office, INF Treaty: Cost of Weapon Systems to Be Destroyed and Possible
Savings, Washington, D.C., NSIAD-88-141FS, March 24, 1988. --------- , INF Treaty: Army and Air Force Personnel Reductions, Washington, D.C., NSIAD-89-173FS, 1989. U.S. Strategic Command, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2006. Velez-Green, Alexander, The Unsettling View from Moscow: Russia’s Strategic Debate on a Doctrine ofPre-Emption, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, April 2018. As of November 7, 2018: https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/ CNASReport-RussiaStrike-Finalb.pdf?mtime=20170428l43631 Wohlstetter, Albert, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, Voi. 37, No. 2,1959, pp. 211-234.
References 131 ----------, “The Political and Military Aims of Offense and Defense Innovation,” in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost, eds., Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. Woods, Kevin M., The Mother ofAll Battles: Saddam Husseins Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War, Newport, R.I.: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Woods, Kevin M., Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, and Ana M. Venegas, Saddam’s Generals: Perspectives ofthe Iran-Iraq War, Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011. Woodward, Robert, The Commanders, New York: Simon Sí Schuster, 1991. Work, Robert O., and James A. Winnefeld, “Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives,” Washington, D.C., June 25, 2015. Zysk, Katarzyna, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists, Voi. 73, No. 5, 2017, pp. 322-327. ----------, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” RUSI Journal, Voi. 163, No. 2, 2018. |
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Davis, J. Michael Gilmore [und fünf weitere]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Santa Monica, CA</subfield><subfield code="b">RAND</subfield><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xvii, 133 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen, Karten</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. 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| spelling | Davis, Paul K. 1952- Verfasser (DE-588)1044948205 aut Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore [und fünf weitere] Santa Monica, CA RAND 2019 xvii, 133 Seiten Illustrationen, Karten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance Mode of access: internet via WWW. NATO (DE-588)377-3 gnd rswk-swf Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 gnd rswk-swf Baltikum (DE-588)4004379-4 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear weapons / Baltic States Deterrence (Strategy) Baltic States / Defenses Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / Baltic States Baltic States / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) Diplomatic relations Military readiness Nuclear weapons Baltic States Russia (Federation) Baltikum (DE-588)4004379-4 g Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g NATO (DE-588)377-3 b Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 s DE-604 Gilmore, J. Michael Sonstige (DE-588)1201165342 oth https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2781 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031721945&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Davis, Paul K. 1952- Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states NATO (DE-588)377-3 gnd Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)377-3 (DE-588)7791249-4 (DE-588)4004379-4 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states |
| title_auth | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states |
| title_exact_search | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states |
| title_full | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore [und fünf weitere] |
| title_fullStr | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore [und fünf weitere] |
| title_full_unstemmed | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore [und fünf weitere] |
| title_short | Exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring Russian threats to the Baltics states |
| title_sort | exploring the role nuclear weapons could play in deterring russian threats to the baltics states |
| topic | NATO (DE-588)377-3 gnd Nukleare Abschreckung (DE-588)7791249-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | NATO Nukleare Abschreckung Baltikum Russland |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2781 http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031721945&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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