Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives: organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Düren
Shaker Verlag
[2019]
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. Auflage |
| Schriftenreihe: | Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | 207 Seiten Diagramme 21 cm x 14.8 cm, 311 g |
| ISBN: | 9783844071160 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives |b organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom |c Patrick W. Schmitz |
| 250 | |a 1. Auflage | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Düren |b Shaker Verlag |c [2019] | |
| 300 | |a 207 Seiten |b Diagramme |c 21 cm x 14.8 cm, 311 g | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
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| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Agency-Theorie |0 (DE-588)4126353-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | |a Asymmetric information | ||
| 653 | |a Incomplete contracts | ||
| 653 | |a Mechanism design | ||
| 653 | |a Principal-agent theory | ||
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |a Aufsatzsammlung |2 gnd-content | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804180839384219648 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS
0
INTRODUCTION
7
I
ORGANIZATIONAL
DESIGN
15
1
CONTROL
AND
SEQUENTIAL
HIDDEN
ACTIONS
17
1.1
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
17
1.2
THE
BASIC
MODEL
...........................................................................
23
1.3
SEPARATION
VERSUS
INTEGRATION
...................................................
25
1.4
CONDITIONAL
CONTROL
.....................................................................
30
1.5
MODIFICATIONS
AND
EXTENSIONS
......................................................
32
1.5.1
DIFFERENT
COSTS
..................................................................
32
1.5.2
RENEGOTIATION
..................................................................
33
1.6
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.....................................................................
36
1.7
APPENDIX
....................................................................................
39
2
JOINT
PUBLIC-PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP
49
2.1
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
49
2.2
THE
BASIC
MODEL
...........................................................................
53
2.3
SCENARIO
I:
ONE-SIDED
INVESTMENT
.............................................
58
2.4
SCENARIO
II:
TWO-SIDED
INVESTMENT
.............................................
61
2.5
A
SIMPLE
EXAMPLE
........................................................................
65
2.6
CONCLUSION
....................................................................................
67
4
CONTENTS
II
ADVERSE
SELECTION
69
3
VERIFIABLE
EX
POST
INFORMATION
71
3.1
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
71
3.2
THE
MODEL
....................................................................................
77
3.3
OPTIMAL
CONTRACTS
WITH
A
VERIFIABLE
SIGNAL
.................................
80
3.4
CONCLUSION
....................................................................................
90
3.5
APPENDIX
....................................................................................
93
4
LICENSING
UNDER
ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
99
4.1
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
99
4.2
THE
MODEL
....................................................................................
103
4.3
PRIVATE
INFORMATION
.........................................................................
106
4.4
CONCLUSION
........................................................................................
110
4.5
APPENDIX
........................................................................................
112
5
AUCTIONS
AND
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION
113
5.1
INTRODUCTION
.....................................................................................
113
5.2
THE
MODEL
........................................................................................
115
5.3
AN
APPLICATION
...............................................................................
120
5.4
CONCLUSION
........................................................................................
122
5.5
APPENDIX
........................................................................................
123
III
CONTRACTUAL
FREEDOM
125
6
NON-RENEGOTIATION
CLAUSES
127
6.1
INTRODUCTION
.....................................................................................
127
6.2
THE
BASIC
MODEL
...............................................................................
130
6.3
SCENARIO
I:
COMMITMENT
................................................................
132
6.4
SCENARIO
II:
RENEGOTIATION
.............................................................
134
6.5
SHOULD
NON-RENEGOTIATION
TERMS
BE
ENFORCED?
...........................
137
CONTENTS
5
6.6
CONCLUSION
....................................................................................
139
6.7
APPENDIX
....................................................................................
141
7
WORKPLACE
PRIVACY
PROTECTION
147
7.1
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
147
7.2
THE
BASIC
MODEL
...........................................................................
150
7.3
SCENARIO
I:
NO
PRIVACY
PROTECTION
.................................................
152
7.4
SCENARIO
II:
PRIVACY
PROTECTION
.......................................................
154
7.5
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.....................................................................
155
8
JOB
PROTECTION
AND
AGENCY
PROBLEMS
157
8.1
INTRODUCTION
.................................................................................
157
8.2
JOB
PROTECTION:
STYLIZED
FACTS
AND
LITERATURE
...............................
160
8.3
THE
BASIC
MODEL
...........................................................................
163
8.4
SYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
...............................................................
165
8.5
ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
................................................................
166
8.6
DISCUSSION
....................................................................................
174
8.7
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
.....................................................................
180
8.8
APPENDIX
....................................................................................
182
REFERENCES
185
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
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| author_facet | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046341143 |
| classification_rvk | QC 131 QC 000 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1164641393 (DE-599)DNB1200493583 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. Auflage |
| format | Book |
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| isbn | 9783844071160 |
| language | English |
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| series2 | Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft |
| spelling | Schmitz, Patrick W. Verfasser (DE-588)121527328 aut Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom Patrick W. Schmitz 1. Auflage Düren Shaker Verlag [2019] 207 Seiten Diagramme 21 cm x 14.8 cm, 311 g txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd rswk-swf Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Asymmetric information Incomplete contracts Mechanism design Principal-agent theory (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 s Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 s DE-604 Shaker Verlag (DE-588)1064118135 pbl DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031717780&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Schmitz, Patrick W. Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4120934-5 (DE-588)4112532-0 (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom |
| title_auth | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom |
| title_exact_search | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom |
| title_full | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom Patrick W. Schmitz |
| title_fullStr | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom Patrick W. Schmitz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom Patrick W. Schmitz |
| title_short | Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives |
| title_sort | essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design adverse selection and contractual freedom |
| title_sub | organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom |
| topic | Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Anreizsystem (DE-588)4112532-0 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Asymmetrische Information Anreizsystem Kontrakttheorie Agency-Theorie Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031717780&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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