Conditionality and coercion: electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe
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Format: | Buch |
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Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2019
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Ausgabe: | First Edition |
Schriftenreihe: | Oxford studies in democratization
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Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext Literaturverzeichnis Register // Gemischte Register |
Beschreibung: | xii, 321 Seiten Diagramme, Karten |
ISBN: | 9780198832775 9780198832782 |
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Contents List of Figures List of Tables List of Abbreviations 1. Introduction 1.1 The Argument in Brief 1.2 Relationship to Existing Studies 1.3 Empirical Strategy 1.4 Looking Ahead 2. Disaggregating Clientelism: Resource Constraints and Informational Signals 2.1 Disaggregating ElectoralClientelism 2.1.1 Offers and threats 2.1.2 State and private resources 2.2 A Typology of Clientelistic Strategies 2.2.1 Policy favors 2.2.2 Vote buying 2.2.3 Policy coercion 2.2.4 Economic coercion 2.3 Explaining the Mix of Clientelism 2.3.1 Why do candidates use clientelism? Resource-based and informational explanations 2.3.2 Variation in the incidence of different forms of clientelism across localities 2.3.3 Informational costs and benefits 2.3.4 Clientelism and vote-choice: a new micro-level perspective on clientelism 2.4 Relationship to Previous Studies 2.5 Conclusion 3. Context and Research Design 3.1 Partisan Competition in Hungary and Romania during the Post-Communist Period 3.2 Research Design and Methodology 3.2.1 Integrating insights from three methodologies 3.2.1.1 Locality case studies 3.2.1.2 Representative surveys to measure locality-level dynamics 3.2.1.3 Survey experiments to test signaling value of clientelism xi xiii xv 1 5 8 12 14 17 19 20 22 23 25 26 27 28 30 30 33 36 39 43 45 48 49 59 60 60 63 65
viii CONTENTS 3.2.2 Using multiple methods to measure the incidence of clientelistic strategies 3.2.2.1 Establishing trust in qualitative interviews 3.2.2.2 Indirect methods of measuring clientelism in surveys 3.2.2.3 Framing and plausible deniability in survey experiments 3.3 Conclusion 4. Policy Favors: Building on the Status Quo 4.1 Mayors’ Pre-Electoral Strategies: Expectations of Scarcity and Norms of Reciprocity 4.2 State Employees as Electoral Brokers 4.3 How Do Voters Evaluate Welfare Favors? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment 4.4 Variation across Localities in the Use of Policy Favors 4.4.1 Research design 4.5 Results 4.6 Conclusion 67 69 70 71 72 74 76 84 88 100 100 105 110 5. Policy Coercion: Social Conflict and Control 5.1 Welfare Coercion in the Menu of Non-Programmatic Strategies 5.2 Welfare Coercion in Contemporary Elections 5.2.1 Pre-electoral strategies 5.2.1.1 Projecting external power 5.2.1.2 Monopsony power 5.2.1.3 Forbearance as the precondition of blackmail 5.2.2 Electoral strategies 5.3 The Programmatic Signals of Welfare Coercion 5.4 Variation across Localities in the Use of WelfareCoercion 5.4.1 Research design 5.4.2 Results 5.5 Conclusion 113 6. Economic Coercion: Conflict and Forbearance 6.1 Economic Coercion: Candidates, Brokers and their Strategies 6.1.1 Moneylenders as brokers 6.1.2 Social polarization and the use of economic coercion 6.1.3 Land and employment: Other forms of economic coercion in rural communities 6.2 Variation across Rural Localities in the Incidence of Economic Coercion 6.3 Conclusion 151 152 152 160 7. Vote Buying: Non-
Targeted and Unmonitored 7.1 Targeted and Non-Targeted Vote-Buying Strategies 7.1.1 Festivals, meals, and entertainment 173 174 174 115 117 119 120 121 122 123 128 140 141 144 148 163 165 171
CONTENTS ЇХ 7.1.2 Targeted vote buying: Offers of money and in-kind goods 7.1.3 Vote-buying brokers 7.1.4 Hidden transcripts 7.2 Vote Buying as a Selective Policy Signal 7.3 Variation across Localities in Vote Buying 7.3.1 Research design 7.3.2 Theoretical predictions 7.3.3 Results 7.4 Conclusion 178 183 187 188 200 201 204 205 208 8. Conclusion 8.1 Revisiting the Findings 8.2 Implications for Electoral Reform and Political Accountability 8.2.1 Designing policy interventions to limit clientelistic strategies 8.2.2 The limited role of informational campaigns 210 212 215 215 217 Appendices Appendix A: Qualitative Interviews Al: List of Expert Interviewees A2: List of Locality Interviewees in Romania A3: List of Locality Interviewees in Hungary A4: Interview Questions: Qualitative Interviews 219 219 219 225 230 Appendix B: Locality Surveys BÍ: Design and Fielding of Survey B2: Descriptive Statistics B3: Balance Tests B4: Tests of List Validity B5: Complete and Disaggregated Results B6: Hungarian Locality Questionnaire B7: Romania Locality Survey 234 234 235 237 238 239 249 254 Appendix C: Survey Experiments Cl: Balance Tests C2: Measuring Policy Preferences C3: Validation of Poverty as a Proxy for Preferences C4: Welfare Scenario Supplementary Results C5: Vote-Buying Scenario Supplementáry Results C6: Favor Conjoint Supplementary Results 265 265 266 267 269 273 274 Bibliography Index 297 307
ւ SAB E LA MARES is Professor of Political Science, Yale University LAUREN E. YOUNG is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California Davis In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to Influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offerto support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called cllentelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientellsm that Involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? This book uses a mixed method approach to understand how Illegal forms of campaigning Including vote buying and electoral coercion persist In two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate cllentelistlc strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they Involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. The book documents the types of clientellstlc strategies that candidates and brokers use, and shows that they vary systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. It also shows that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientellsm In different ways. Voters glean Information about politicians' personal characteristics and their
policy preferences from the cllentelistlc strategies these candidates deploy.
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Index Note: Tables and figures are indicated by an italic t and ƒ following the page number. abusive language by politicians and public authorities 120-1 accountability, political 215-18 accountants, incentivized to operate as brokers 84; see aho brokers, administrative favors 22-3, 45, 81 affiliation, party 91, 93, 98-9, 236 Africa, -n 26, 199 electoral dientelism in 5-6 politics 28 study of post-colonial states in 74 Ágh, Attila 59 Affiance of Free Democrats (Hungarian) 51-2, 55-6 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (Romanian) 89, 181-2, 185 Affiance of Young Democrats; see Fidesz Allina-Pisano, Jessica 13 America, Central 32 Anderson, Lavinia 28-9 anti-corruption agencies 216 anti-poverty policies, provide tools for coercive mobilization of voters 2-3 anti-poverty program, -s 36-7, 41, 110, 215 conditional on work requirements 114 controlled by mayors 75 anti-workfare attitudes 132-3 by question, distribution of 268ƒ anti-workfare ideology 131t-138f, 133, 192, 192t-198f, 194, 274t-287t anti-workfare preferences 131-3, 135, 140, 198, 269 correlates of 269f Argentina 8, 24, 26-7, 32, 40-1, 70 Asia, South, electoral dientelism in 5-6 austerity 41, 51-4 Austria, clientelistic practices documented in 8 Báj (Hungary) 161 Bajnai, Gordon, socialist government of 1 balance tests 266 ballot secrecy, violation of 211 Banfield, Edward 9 Baranya County (Hungary) 124,127-8,141, 234 “barons, local” 55, 123 Bāsescu, Traían 54, 182 benefits allocation of 45 anti-poverty, conditional on work requirements 114 blurring boundary between private and public 81 cash benefits scenario 190-1
conditioning of access on political support 211 conflict between those who are eligible and those who are not 114-15 connection to city hall required to access 80 designed to grant mayors important role over allocation 114 distributional conflicts over allocation of 144 eligibility threshold for 9-10 explicit biases in distribution of 80 personalization of 78 threat of removal 20, 115-16 withdrawal of, central to conceptualization of dientelism 20-1 workfare 2-3, 6, 10, 75, 77-9, 99-101, 119, 123-4, 144-5, 161, 167-9, 215 Benin 8, 32 Bensel, Richard 29 blackmail 2-3,15, 29-30,118-19, 122-3,126-7, 148-9,188 and theft 123 as electoral strategy 123 clientelistic strategies premised on 122 electoral strategies based on 118-19 electoral use of 119, 126-7 mobilizing voters through 29-30 workfare employees vulnerable to 122 Blaga, Vasile 182, 216 Blair, Graeme 71, 144, 166-7, 238 Blaydes, Lisa 214 Bolivia 199-200 Boone, Catherine 28 Borsod County (Hungary) 80-1, 120-2, 125-8, 139-41, 153-4, 156-7, 160-1, 176, 178, 181, 234 Brazil 24, 28, 40-1, 175 “bribing” and “treating”, distinction between 174-5
308 INDEX British electoral law 174, 208 brokers 116, 178-9 accompanied by state employees 186 accountants 84 administrators of social policy programs 75 and candidates, relationship between 153 and vote-buying 179, 183 at poffing stations 127 complement existing formal party organizations 48-9 condition access to resources on electoral support 151 control variety of economic resources 151, 153 deployment of state employees as 84 economic 5-6, 38, 152-3, 171-2, 213-14; see abo moneylenders, electoral 35, 48-9, 62, 84-8, 214 employees of local social pohcy administration 212 employers as 152, 163, 171, 212 gather information on voters’ preferences and voting intentions 86, 127, 186 heterogeneous in socio-economic background and connection to candidate 183 hierarchy among 185 hired to distribute goods or money to voters 184 importance of 24 incentives to exploit unfavorable economic conditions 100 interactions with voters 217 law enforcement officers as 75, 84 mailmen as 84 mayors act as 113-14 moneylenders 152, 171, 212 monitor turnout and electoral choices of voters 186 networks of 35-6 poor economic conditions give them leverage 152 secure support of workfare employees by making them swear on a Bible 127 state employees as 75, 86-7 supply of 204 tax assessors and collectors as 75, 84, 212 teachers as 75, 84, 212 tenant farmers as 152, 171 threaten access to pohcy benefits 118 types of 173-4, 185 welfare officers as 84 Brusco, Valeria 67 Bucharest 157-8 Bulgaria 52-3 Busse, Grzymała 74 Buzău County (Romania) 122, 141,177, 234 caciques 29 candidate, -s and brokers, factors
that affect cost-benefit calculations of 114 and brokers, relationship between 153 and voters, linkages between 213 at varying levels of anti-workfare ideology 133/ experience, gender, and party 66 negative effects of clientelism on perceptions of 132 profiles 66 voters’ evaluations of the policy positions of 140 voters’ perceptions of 65-6 cash and in-kind vote-buying 16,190,192t-198f, 282Í-290Í cash benefits scenario 190-1 cash handouts; see handouts, cash transfer programs 41 Central America 32 Central European University (Hungary) 69 Chandra, Ranchan 26 Chávez, Hugo 25 Chicago 26,29-30,85-6 political machines in 85-6 Chile, elections in 29 Christian Democratic Party (Italy) 31, 81 Chubb, Judith 9, 74, 77-8, 81 citizens “deserving” 18-19 “irresponsible” 57 city council, composition of 64-5 civil servants 68 clientelism and fraud, substitutions between 5 and poverty, relationship between 214 as indicator of low quality in a politician 40-1 attractiveness as electoral strategy decreases as middle class grows 32 clarifying definition of 19-20 coercive forms of 10-11, 37-8; see aho coercive strategies. costs and benefits of 30, 32, 38-9, 115, 140-1 effects on voter perceptions 65-6, 91, 114-15, 128, 139 electoral 5, 14, 16, 19-20, 48 exposure to 109-10 forms of state 99-100 Hicken’s definition of 19-20
INDEX how voters evaluate and sanction different forms of 212-13 informational signals of 32-3, 128-9 informational theories of 205 measurement of 67, 102 multidimensionality of 215-16 negative forms of 32-3, 39, 169 observable implications of 19 opportunities for use of 74-5 polarization of electorate 44 policy signals of 129 positive forms of 37-9 positive material incentives 32-3 public form of 91 resource-based explanations of 204-5 scholars of 26 shapes electoral costs of electoral corruption 39 signaling theories of 191 social, economic, and political factors 100 state-based forms of 20 supply side 39 targeted 200 variation in 59-60 violates important ethical principles 17 violence and programmatic politics, trade-off between 20-1 voters’ reactions to 91-2 clientelistic behavior, more likely in smaller welfare states 74-5 clientelistic favors, incidence of 101 clientelistic incentives 22 clientelistic inducements and coercion, electoral costs incurred by candidates who engage in 116 clientelistic linkages with voters, development of 72 clientelistic policies exploitative, use of 115 premised on positive policy inducements 114-15 clientelistic political systems, reports of policy coercion common in 28 clientelistic practices not election-day exchanges 217 socio-economic characteristics 61-2 undermine quality of representation 211-12 clientelistic strategies as signals of positive personal characteristics or policy positions 90-1 asymmetrical costs 116 based on positive inducements 19,37-8,88-9, 100, 213 conditional on policy preferences of voters 46 309 conditions
favoring the use of different 34t consequences for voting behavior 42i convey information about a candidate 40 how voters interpret and judge 41, 89 importance of economic resources in explaining 31 menu of 3 normatively undesirable 212-13 positive versus negative inducements 149 premised on blackmail 122; see ako blackmail, premised on both favors and policy coercion 36, 75-6, 149, 213 premised on coercion 36, 38, 42, 45, 114-15, 142, 213; see ako coercive strategies, signaling role of 7, 88, 200-1 that use policy resources of the state 38 that use positive inducements 213 trade-offs 34 typology of 231 use of 30-1 violate fundamental democratic norms 75-6 willingness to reward or support shaped by demand for social policy programs 44 clientelistic transactions, material incentives of 140 coercion, economic 15-16, 23t-42t, 28-31, 38, 42-3, 117, 144, 151-72, 202, 213, 245 coercion, marginal effect on sub-indicators in the Help Deserving Poor Index 273ƒ coercive strategies 2-3, 7, 15-16, 18-19, 28, 36, 38, 41-2, 45, 114-17, 120, 126-7, 142, 151, 213 and policy favors 131t-138t, 133, 192t-198f, 274Í-287Í and positive inducements, trade-offs 24 blackmail 2-3, 123 central component of electoral dientelism 20 economic 15-16, 23t-42t, 28-31, 38, 42-3, 117, 144, 151-72, 202, 213, 245 effects on perceptions of management quality 135 electoral coercion 44, 115, 152 electoral costs incurred by candidates who engage in 116 extent to which perceived as violating norms 117 higher in localities where political constituency oppose current allocation of welfare benefits 115 incentives to
use 111 more strongly favoured by candidates than positive inducements 8-9
310 INDEX coercive strategies {cont.) negative effect of 133 remove choice to opt out of clientelism 17 reputational cost of 37-8 state 144-5 use of 124, 144, 215 used to signal disdain for current social policy beneficiaries 45 welfare 145, 147-8 Colombia 26 Columbia University (United States) 69 communism, fall of 10-11,74,210 Communist Party of Romania 11-12, 49-50, 53-4 communist period, nostalgia for 113 communist regimes, coercion and accommodation exhibited by 11 communist successor parties, more likely to use clientelistic strategies 11 Competitiveness Index 134-5 conditional cash transfer programs 41 conflict, -s economic 9-10, 161 distributional 9-10, 18-19, 36-7, 75, 144-5, 167, 172, 205, 213 inter-ethnic 9-10 Congress Party (Indian) 26 Conservative Party (Romanian) 49-50 Constanta County (Romania) 130, 189-90 Constituency Development Funds 26 co-partisanship 35, 76, 236-7 Cornelius, Wayne 29 corrupt political elites, perpetuation of 211 Corrupt Practices Prevention Act (1854) 174 corruption 98-9, 137-9 electoral 39, 44, 93, 199 index 134-5,271 perceived 194 reflects poorly on personal attributes of the candidate 135 scandals 210-11 Costa Rica, clientelistic practices documented in 8 Còte d’Ivoire 28 crime, organized 29-30 criminal economies, implicated in economic coercion 29 Czech Republic 52-3 death, threat of 20 debt 62, 101 burdens 171-2 control of, as lever to influence voters’ electoral choices 3 deindustrialization and de-agrarianization 1 demand-side conditions 33-4 demand-side theories 167 democracy, disaffection and disillusionment with 210-11
Democratic National Salvation Front (Romanian) 50 democratic norms avoiding punishment for subverting 75-6 post-electoral infringements of 211 violation of 75-6 democratic stabilization, promises of 210 demographic characteristics 101 conditions 144-5 groups 19 labor market characteristics 18-19 deniability, plausible 60, 66, 71-2 dependency, quasi-feudal relations of 119, 121 Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto 43-4 distributional conflicts 9-10, 18-19, 36-7, 75, 144-5, 167, 172, 205, 213 between groups of poor voters 19, 75 over allocation of benefits 144-5 Dragnea, Liviu 164, 182, 216 Eastern Europe clientelism and patronage in 10-11 gap between formal electoral rules and electoral practices in 59 party development in 59 party systems 11 post-communist transition of 10-11 quality of democracy in 4-5 study of electoral politics in 10-11 economic agents and political actors, relationship between 163 economic and inter-ethnic conflicts 9-10 economic brokers 5-6, 38, 152-3, 171-2, 213-14; see ako brokers and moneylenders, economic coercion 15-16, 23Í-42Í, 28-31, 38, 42-3, 117, 144, 151-72, 202, 213, 245; see ako coercive strategies, electoral strategies premised on 171 estimated incidence of 166t geographic distribution of 168/ higher in localities characterized by high levels of polarization 167-9 in Hungary, correlates of 170í, 245i used by employers 31 economic conditions 62 local 101 poor, give brokers leverage to use over voters 152
INDEX unfavorable, create favorable terrain for all dientelistic strategies 100 economic conflict, -s 9-Ю, 161 economic dependencies, transformed into political dependencies 217 economic intimidation 152 economic or physical sanctions, threat of 20, 115-16 economic pressure, use of, to incentivize voters 164 economic resources employment 151 important in explaining dientelistic strategies 31 land 151 loans 151 wages 151 economic vulnerabilities, exploitation of 152 Economist 53 electoral blackmail; see blackmail, electoral brokers; see brokers, electoral clientelism; see dientelism. electoral coercion, evidence on 44, 115,152; see aho coercive strategies, electoral competition 214 electoral corruption 93; see aho corruption, coercive forms of 44 disapproval of 199 electoral costs of 39 electoral handouts; see handouts, electoral intimidation of workers 151-2 electoral irregularities, types of 70-1 electoral malfeasance 9-10, 216-18 electoral materials, confiscation of 151-2 electoral mobilization efforts to persuade voters to support particular candidate 159 involves violent threats 158 of workers 164-5 electoral monitoring 185-6 electoral practices, experience of 211 electoral punishment 137 electoral reform, -s 16, 215-18 electoral rules and electoral practices, gap between 59 electoral strategies based on blackmail 118-19 illicit 205-7 premised on economic coercion 171 electorate, polarization of 46 employees of the local administration, politicization of 84 employment illegal 121 311 offers of 22-3 status 208 employment losses, threats of 127 employment opportunities
access to 36 conditional on mayoral discretion, belief that 126 lack of 125 employment or workfare benefits, allocation of 167 employment rights, threat to 115-16 employment, illegal 121 employment, public 45,67, 113-14 ethnic groups 9-10 ethnic relations 62 ethnicity 1-2, 131-2, 208 and extreme poverty, correlation between 1-2 ethnographic research 60-1 European accession, consequences of 210 European Union 210 eviction, threat of 20, 115-16 Expansion Coalition 147-8 experimental design: example of a pair of candidates 90i external power 120-1 factional politics and internal party conflicts, vulnerability to 50-1 favor, -s administrative 22-3, 45, 81 conjoint sample demographics and balance tests 267t marginal effect on sub-indicators in the Welfare Policy Index at varying levels of anti-workfare ideology 271/ scenario, marginal effects of 132-3 Fidesz (Hungary) 11-12, 54, 87-8, 124, 176-9, 181, 184-6, 204, 211-12, 234, 236 aligned with interests of rural and small urban localities 55 and Roma minority 57 attacked Brussels, banks and political ehte 57 captured Hungary’s democratic institutions 57-8 development of Civic Circles 56 effort to coordinate right-wing opposition 55 emphasized opposition to electoral alliances with Socialists 55 Hungary’s largest political party 56-7 invested in development of party organization 55-6 leaders began to co-opt right-wing societal organizations 56
312 INDEX Fidesz (Hungary) (cont.) marginalized opponents and appointed loyal partisans to state institutions 57-8 mayors 213-14 political development of 55 rise of 57 weakened institutional system of checks and balances 57-8 Focşani (Romania) 117 Foltz, BUI 31 food assistance 25 formal organizations, creation and development of 48 Fox, Jonathan 25 fragmentation, political 35 framing 71-2 France 28 Third Republic 26-7, 34, 151-2, 175 Friedrich, Paul 29 Friends, Followers and Factions (book by Steffen W. Schmidt et al.) 23-4 Front of Democratic National Salvation (FDSN), Romanian 49-50 Gbagbo, Laurent 28 Geddes, Barbara 59 gender 98-9, 131-2, 208 Germany 17, 103, 151-2, 234i, 255 Ghana 26-7, 32 gifts targeted to specific voters 3 Giurgiu County (Romania) 130,189-90, 266 Gonzalez-Ocantos 32 goods, targeted, offers of 208 GosneU, Harold F. 29-30, 85-6 Great Depression 26-7 Greater Romania Party (PRM) 50 Grzymala-Busse, Anna 10-11,58,67 Gyurcsány, Ferenc, “Őszöd Speech” 56-7 handouts cash 16, 32, 63, 179, 190, 194, 196-200, 208-9 electoral 19-20, 32-3, 40-1, 173, 175, 190, 200,208-9 harassment 6, 37, 117 Heves County (Hungary) 87-8, 120, 124-5,141, 175-6, 179, 234 Hiçken, Allen, definition of electoral clientelism 5,19-20 homemakers, prevalence of economic coercion among 171 Honduras 199-200 housing 25 humiliation of voters 120-1, 139-40 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 11-12, 51-4, 56-7, 178-9, 210-11 implosion of 11-12 made use of patronage and clientelistic strategies 52-3 political modernization of 51-2 relatively unsuccessful in recruiting new members 52 resource advantage
in use of patronage over parties on the right 52-3 scandal caused by “Őszöd Speech” 56-7 Hungary abusive language by local politicians in 120-1 Alliance of Free Democrats 51-2,55-6 and Romania, clientelistic strategies between 11-12 Báj 161 Baranya County 124, 127-8, 141, 234 Borsod County 80-1, 120-2, 125-8, 139-41, 153-4, 156-7, 160-1, 176, 178,181, 234 bureaucracy, porousness of 52-3 census(2011) 235 Central European University 69 Churches 55 clergy members 56 control list means and standard deviations in 239f controversial economic reforms 52 Democratic Forum (MDF) 51 descriptive statistics on locality-level variables in 236f Electoral Office (Nemzeti Választási Iroda) 100-1 ethnic Hungarians 160-2, 171, 176 ethnic voters 160-1 Fidesz 11-12, 54, 87-8, 124, 176-9,181, 184-6,204,211-12, 234, 236 “Gypsy threat” 57 Heves County 87-8, 120,124-5, 141, 175-6, 179, 234 Hungarian bureaucracy, porousness of 52-3 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 11-12, 51-4, 56-7, 178-9, 210-11 Hungarian Socialists 50 interviewees in, list of locality 219 Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) 1-2, 11-12, 56-7 Liberal Party 51-2 locality questionnaire 249 market-oriented reforms 75 military veterans 56 neoliberal reforms 51-2 Nograd County 122,176, 179 post-communist transition 11-12, 52, 55, 75
INDEX post-electoral surveys administered in 76 resource environment in 75 right-wing political mobilization in rural communities 120 Veszprém County 178 veterans of 1956 uprising 56 ideological positioning and differentiation 48, 72 Iliescu, Ion 50 illegal employment 121 illicit strategies influence voters’ electoral choices 212 voters’ attitudes toward 89 Imái, Kosuké 71, 144, 166-7, 238 incentives, clientelistic 22 income and the personal quality signals of policy favors 95f and the social policy signals of policy favors 92f policy favors, and vote choice 971 strong negative predictor of support for existing welfare programs 91-2 strongest relationship with anti-workfare preferences 268-9 incumbent and non-incumbent parties, resource asymmetry between 35 India 32 elections, unmonitored vote buying in 189 politics, studies of 26 inducement-based strategies 116 inducements and coercion, extent to which perceived as violating norms 117 negative 20,65, 115-16 in-kind and cash vote-buying 16, 190,192i-198t, 282t-290f in-kind goods, distribution of 183 institutions, dissatisfaction with democratic 211 international influences 67 International Monetary Fund 67 interviewees in Hungary, list of locality 219 interviewees in Romania, list of locality 219 interviewees, expert, list of 219 interviews, qualitative 231 intimidation 16, 117 and coercion of voters 211 economic 152 Iohannis, Klaus 109-10 iron curtain, the 210 Italy Christian Democracy party, clientelistic strategies pursued by 74 313 Christian Democratic politicians in southern 81 dientelism in 9 elections 29-30 Southern
24 study of dientelism in postwar 74 Japan 31 Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) 1-2, 11-12, 56-7 capitalized on dissatisfaction with elected politicians 57 exploited localized conflicts between ethnic Hungarian and Roma voters 57 “Gypsy threat” 57 Hungary’s right-wing party 1-2 rise of 57 journalists 60, 68 Kenya 26, 32, 40-1, 199, 208-9 clientelistic practices documented in 8 vote buying in 40 Kerkvliet, Ben 28 Kitschelt, Herbert 11, 51, 67-8 Kopecký, Petr 68 Kramon, Eric 32-3, 40-1,43,175,189,199-200, 208-9 Kriger, Norman 28 labor market exclusion 10-11, 75 land trafficking in permits for 29 rights, threat to 28, 36, 115-16 Landė, Carl 22 large-N surveys, use of 63-4 Latin America 5-6, 29, 32, 199 Lemarchand, René 115-16 Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 31 Lindberg, Staffan I. 32 local administration appointments 85 “local barons” 55, 123 locality characteristics 65 locality-level data 63-4 lots or permits for land, trafficking in 29 lbw-income voters 7,9-10,36-7,99-100,144,215 distributional conflicts among 9-10 elderly 215 eligibility criteria to receive social policy benefits 36-7 political conflict among 36-7 signaling policy concern for 99-100 mafia, implicated in threatening voters in Italian elections 29-30
314 INDEX mailmen, incentivized to operate as brokers 84; see also brokers. Malawi 26 malfeasance, electoral 9-10, 216-18 management abilities 140 Management Index 134-5 management quality, perceptions of 135 Mares, Isabela 66 market-oriented reforms 75 Marx, Karl 9-10 mass suffrage, adoption of 31 mayor, -s allowed workfare employees to draw benefits without performing work for community 126-7 and direction of state policy resources 82 as co-partisan of the national executive 207 as political brokers 113-14; see aho brokers, bias allocation of benefits by segmenting access to services 80-1 blur boundary between private and public benefits 81 can control allocation of responsibilities at the voting station 87-8 dientelistic ties to workfare beneficiaries 76-8 competed by enlisting moneylenders as brokers 162 co-partisan 236 cultivate expectations of reciprocity with voters 78-9 cultivate loyalties based on personalized favors 81-2 disapproved of workfare employees’ participation in the electoral events of opposition candidates 127 discretion of 126 economic dependence of workfare recipients on 119 electoral use of blackmail 126-7 exploit powerful economic situation 163-4 exploited that employment opportunities were conditional on mayoral discretion 126 expropriate votes of vulnerable voters 115 grant financial support from local budget churches 82-3 granted important role over allocation of benefits 114 ignore eligibility rules of social assistance legislation 122 implement electoral strategies based on blackmail 118-19 incentivize individual voting behavior 115 induce
local leaders to act as brokers and mobilize voters 82 instrumentalize employees for electoral purposes 84 leverage via distribution of administrative resources 80 micro-strategies used to create potential for electoral coercion 115 mobilize workfare employees to support their candidacy 123 offer promise of access to workfare program 181 only check on acts of theft that matter for the vote 123 overturn local-administration appointments 85 partisan orientation of 204 personalize distribution of administrative favors 81 political monopoly over allocation of policy benefits 75 power of 79 pre-electoral strategies 78-9 principle of reciprocity 80 project external power by inflicting arbitrary acts of punishment 120 project image of capriciousness, arbitrariness, and ruthlessness 120 pursue dientelistic strategies premised on blackmail 119,122 reap political benefits from illegally employing workfare employees 121 relatives employed as brokers 184; see abo brokers. rely on representatives at polling station to monitor voters’ choices 127-8 retain discretion over allocation of benefits 80 retain monopoly for distribution of administrative licenses 79 seek to establish norms of reciprocity that can be exploited electorally 75 send employees to collect information on voters’ choices 128 social policy beneficiaries dependent on goodwill of 119 strategies to cumulate obligations 78 strategy of blurring public-private boundary 81 strategy to continue dependence of workfare employees on city hall 119 strike political exchanges that with local priest 83 threaten access to policy
benefits 118 tolerate nonpayment of taxes 122-3 transformation into main gatekeepers of social policy programs 58-9
INDEX turn blind eye to illegal actions throughout their mandates 122 turn to vote buying 180 use control over allocation of policy benefits to modify program’s design 80 use state resources to make promises and threats 24-5 welfare coercion strategies 119 wield personal power over voters 120 Mexico 24-6, 28, 31 mineral rights, exploitation of local 29-30 Misiones program 25 monetary inducements 3, 5-6, 204-5; see aho handouts. money and in-kind goods, offers of 115-16, 208; see aho handouts. moneylenders 151-8, 160, 162-3, 171-2 and economic coercion 151-60, 167-72 and local elected officials, relationships between 155-6 as brokers 15-16, 29-30, 35-6, 38, 117, 153, 162-3, 212; see aho brokers, as intermediaries that mobilize voters 3 electoral influence of 159-60 illegal 29-30 illicit moneylending 156-7 moneylending families 153-4 thrive in localities characterized by poverty and unemployment 160 monopsony power 121-2 municipality, fragmentation of the 76 Nastase, Adrian 182, 216 National Liberal Party (Romania) 49-50, 179 national party, co-partisanship with 76 National School of Political Science and Public Administration (SNSPA) 64 National University of Political Studies 69 negative inducements 20, 65, 115-16 Nigerian 27, 32 Nograd County (Hungary) 122, 176, 179 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 60-2, 68, 182-3 non-programmatic strategies 114 classification of 14 distinction among 22 how voters evaluate 41 importance of coercion in the menu of 116 may carry information about candidates’ attributes and policy positions 90-1 use of 76 voters’ responses mediated by
policy preferences 7 voters’ responses to 49 315 non-targeted goods, offers of 208 nostalgia 51, 113 O’Dwyer, Conor 67 Oliveros, Virginia 26, 70 Olt County (Romania) 189-90,266 Oprisan, Marian 123-4 Orbán, Viktor 1, 57, 210-12 corruption continued in different forms under 210-11 first administration 1 organized crime 29-30 Pande, Rohini 217-18 Paraguay 27 party affiliation 91, 93, 98-9, 236 party development in Eastern Europe 59 Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) 50 Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) 49-50 party patronage 51 party structures, investments in 72 paternalism 7 patrimonial or neopatrimonial strategies 22 patronage allowed right-wing parties to gain increasing share of Romania’s rural vote 55 and clientelism, importance of 49 and clientelism, important role in toolkits of different parties 58 and clientelistic mobilization, use of 48-9 or clientelism, measuring 67 personal favors, importance of strategies premised on 82 Personal Qualities Index 134-5 personal quality signals 95f, 136t, 195f personalized favors, cultivation of loyalties based on 81-2 Peru 24 Philadelphia 26 Republican Party machine in 34 Philippines clientelism in the 82 electoral corruption in 24 plausible deniability 60, 66, 71-2 polarization, high levels of 144 policemen, incentivized to operate as brokers 84; see aho brokers. policy and administrative resources of the state, politicization of 84 policy benefits control over the allocation of 23, 114 distribution of 99-100 distributional conflict over allocation 111
316 INDEX policy benefits (cont.) mayors and brokers threaten access to 118 political monopoly over allocation 75 politicization of 80,115 privileged access to 22-3 policy clientelism, marginal effect on perceptions of the management capacity of candidates at varying levels of anti-workfare ideology 137/ policy coercion 23, 23t-42t, 27-8, 42-3, 72, 113-50, 172, 174, 213, 243, 271 common in dientelistic political systems 28 definition 27-8 estimated incidence of 142f geographic distribution of 143/ in Hungary and Romania, correlates of 243í informational content compared to vote buying 174 negative effect of, attenuated for anti-workfare voters 133 scenario 72 policy favoritism 19-20 policy favors 23t-42t, 25-7, 39, 42-3, 45, 74-111, 113, 131i-138t, 132-4, 140-1, 174, 217, 239, 271 and coercion 131f-138f, 133, 167, 192f-198t, 270-1, 274f- 288f as signal of a more redistributive policy orientation 98 conjoint experiment 268-9 definition 19-20 differential propensity to punish candidates who offer policy favors 139 driven by size of the retired population 241-2 effect of 91 estimated incidence of 103 í heterogeneous effects of 93 in Hungary and Romania, correlates of 106r, 240Í-242Í informational content compared to vote buying 174 marginal effect on perceptions of social policy positions of candidates at varying levels of poverty 94/-96/ marginal effect on the intention to vote for a candidate at varying levels of poverty 98f may signal pro-redistributive social policy that cancels out negative signal sent by electoral corruption 93 modalities of 25 negative electoral effects
on 137 negative signals about candidate’s welfare policy platform 93 poor voters view candidates who offer policy favors as more likely to help the poor 75-6 strong differences in ways high- and lowincome voters evaluate candidates using 98 variation in the incidence of, across localities 140-1 policy positions 37, 91 perceived 132 signaling 213 policy preferences measuring 267 role of envy and relative deprivation in 44 shape how citizens interpret clientelism 267 policy signal, selective 188-200 political accountability 215-18 political actors and economic agents, relationship between 163 political control and private forms of clientelism, negative relationship between 35-6 local 100-1 political fragmentation 35 political machine, -s 9, 85-6 political micromechanisms 14 political resistance, weakening 119 political resources exploited for dientelistic purposes 10-11 polling stations 87-8, 127-8,173, 175-6, 186, 216 Ponta, Victor 185 poor communities 36 “deserving” 36-7, 115, 130-3, 139-40, 270, 272f, 282f poor-versus-poor conflicts 9-10, 114-15, 214-15 “undeserving” 114-15 voters 33-4, 38, 40-1, 75-6, 88-9, 91 working 215 Popescu-Tăriceanu, Călin 185 positive and negative inducements distinction between 6 theoretical distinctions between 20-2 positive inducements 115-16 and coercion, trade-offs 24 use of 100 post-communist governments 114 party systems, study of 51 period 48 transition 10-11,50,53,75,210
INDEX poverty 10-11,44 and clientelism, relationship between 9-10, 214 and high debt burdens 171-2 and labor market exclusion, levels of 75 and lower tolerance for vote buying, link between 40-1 and pro-workfare policy preferences, strongly correlated 268-9 candidate characteristics, and perceived personal characteristics 292f-295t candidate characteristics, and self-reported voting propensity 291r, 293t, 296f commonly used in literature on attitudes towards clientelism 268-9 conducive to higher levels of clientelism only in more competitive localities 214 importance as facilitating condition for electoral clientelism 9 large and significant effects on how voters evaluate policy favors 93 rates 64-5 relief 25 validation of, as a proxy for preferences 268 power, external 120-1 pre-electoral period 122, 126-7 pre-electoral strategies 76-84 Prisoner’s Dilemma 116 private gifts, use of 208-9 private sector experience 98-9 program, opposition to the workfare 162 programmatic and dientelistic strategies, distinction between 7 programmatic politics 20-1 property right, threat to rescind a 23 pro-workfare 133 preferences 198 voters 174 psychological intimidation 117 public employment 45, 67, 113-14 public favors 66 public ftmds 98-9 public resources politicization of 6 threat to withhold 23 public sector 25, 67 public services 25 public works program 180 public-private boundary, strategy of blurring 81 punishment, arbitrary acts of 120 p-values from test for design effects 239i quasi-feudal relations of dependency 119, 121 317 racist language used by welfare officials during
interactions with Roma voters 120 random-walk methodology 64 reciprocity, principle of 80 redistributive policy position 99-100 “regional barons” 55, 123 relationship between moneylenders and politicians 157 Remmer, Karen 67 repossession of land and household items 3 Republican Party machine 34 retaliation, fear of 70 retirees 171 retirement status 171 retrenchment coalition 147-8 Revolutionary Party (PRI) 25 right-wing political mobilization in rural Hungarian communities 120 right-wing voters 213 Roma 57, 64-5, 79, 82-3, 91-2, 108-9, 118, 121-2, 129, 147, 160-2, 171, 176-7, 199-200, 205, 234, 236, 269-70 and Hungarians, ethnic conflict between 161 correlation between ethnicity and extreme poverty 1-2 families 122-3 “Gypsy threat” 57 voters 61-2, 101, 141, 167-9, 172 Romania Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 89, 181-2, 185 and Hungary, post-electoral surveys administered in 76 Buzau County (Romania) 122, 141, 177, 234 Central Electoral Bureau (Biroul Electoral Central) 100-1 Communist Party of Romania 11-12, 49-50, 53-4 Conservative Party 49-50 Constanta County 130, 189-90 control list means and standard deviations in 239t Democratic National Salvation Front 50 Democratic Party 54 descriptive statistics on locality-level variables in 237t Focşani 117 Front of Democratic National Salvation (FDSN) 49-50 Front of National Salvation (FSN) 54 Giurgiu County 130, 189-90, 266 Greater Romania Party (PRM) 50
318 INDEX Romania (cont.) interviewees in Romania, list of locality 219 interviewees in, list of locality 219 National Liberal Party 49-50, 53-4, 86, 179, 185 National School of Political Science and Public Administration 64, 69 Olt County 189-90,266 Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) 50 Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) 49-50 party system 54 population, demographic characteristics of 66 post-communist election, first 53 post-communist transition 75 “regional barons” 55, 123 resource environment in 75 “Romanian values, return to” (PDSR) 50 Save Romania Union (USR) 89, 921, 95ŕ, 97f, 29It, 2921, 293í shock-therapy economic package 53 Social Democratic Party 49-51, 86, 123-4, 164, 185 Socialist Party 50-1, 55, 182, 216 Socialists 50-1 survey experiments in 91-2 Teleorman County 119, 130, 141, 164, 234, 266 Vrancea County 117, 123-4 Rome, ancient 24 Rouquié, Alan 175, 200 Rupnik, Jacques 59-61, 213-14 Russia and Ukraine, economic intimidation in 29 Save Romania Union (USR) 89, 92f, 951, 97t, 29It, 292f, 293t scarcity, manufacturing expectations of 77 Scheppele, Kim Lane 211-12 Schmidt, Steffen W. (Friends, Followers and Factions) 23-4 Schneider, Mark 189 Scott, James 22, 24, 28, 115-17, 120, 187, 208, 214 selective policy signal 188-200 Senegal, vote-buying practices in 31 services, segmenting access to 80-1 Shefter, Martin 31 signaling role of clientelistic strategies 200-1 argument 169,177-8, 198-9 benefits 133-4 effects 174, 200 signaling opportunities 7, 38 social conditions influencing 100 signaling strategies, use and consequences of 88 signaling theory
8-9, 171-2, 191, 193, 199 smuggling, illegal 29-30 social assistance 1, 62, 72, 77, 81, 99, 113, 117-19, 122-4, 124/, 126-7, 129-31, 139-40, 142, 185-6, 192 social assistance benefits decision to grant 119 economic dependence on 113 use of 62 social conditions, polarized 152 social conflict 33-4, 36, 44, 76, 101-2, 105-8, 106f, 111, 113-50, 167-9, 170/, 205, 206/, 207-8, 237, 241-2 social desirability bias 60, 70-2 role of 48 strategy for reducing 71-2 social fragmentation 9 social polarization 160-3 social policy attitudes 135, 192 beneficiaries 39,120-1 control of local flows 14 distribution of 105-8 social policy benefits 37-8 access to 18-19, 121-2 allocation of 10-11, 100, 205 attitude of voters 130-1 clientelistic use of, distributionally divisive 100 coercion of beneficiaries to change voting behavior 113-14 distribution of 18-19, 149-50, 172 distributional conflict over 7, 45, 101 electoral use of 58 eligibility criteria for 15, 36-7 exploitation of eligibility conditions for 37 political conflicts over the allocation of 36 popular resentment of 7 reallocating 39 recipients of 36-7 threatening to reduce or eliminate 37-8 voters’ positions on current 133-4 social policy distribution 140 social policy entitlements, cutbacks in 41 social policy expansion 36-7 and retrenchment, coalitions favoring 101 coalition favoring 101 social policy preferences 41, 91-2, 137-9 social policy programs, mayors as gatekeepers of 58-9, 114
INDEX social policy redistribution, voters’ preferences for 42 social policy resources as favors or coercion, relative costs politicians face in using 117 distribution of 33-4 local political control over 19 social policy retrenchment 41,101 social policy signals 92f, 131í, 192í social policy transfers 42 social programs, changes in the design of 114 Socialists (Romanian), developed highly centralized organization 50-1 socially undesirable behavior, techniques for measuring 63-4 socially undesirable phenomena, attitudes towards and participation in 59 South Asia, electoral clientelism in 5-6 Southern Italy 24-6 Spain 29 state apparatus, politicization of 84 state employees as brokers 75, 86-7; see ako brokers, as observers in the voting station 87-8 electoral mobilization of voters 86-7 reallocate policy benefits based on electoral choices of voters 86 state enterprises, privatization of 51 state policy resources, access to 114 state resources access to 213 political control of 213 politicization of 199 strategies that politicize 75 used to incentivize brokers and influence electoral choice of voters 45 status quo 21-2, 36-7, 74-111 Stokes, Susan 8, 43-4, 214 supply-side conditions 33-4 supply-side or signaling theories 171-2 Szelenyi, Ivan 210-11 Szombati, Kristóf 120 Taiwan, study of clientelistic mobilization in 27 “Taktaharkány Proposal, the” 161 Taktakenéz 161 Taktaszada 161 Tanzania 26 Tarrow, Sidney 68-9 tax collectors, incentivized to operate as brokers 84; see also brokers, tax, flat, adoption of 54 taxation, reduction in 54 taxes, nonpayment of 122-3 319 teachers,
incentivized to operate as brokers 84; see ako brokers. Teleorman County (Romania) 119, 130, 141, 164, 234, 266 Thai pohtics 29-30 theft 123 timber, harvesting 29-30 “treating” 208 comes in many colorfhl forms 175-6 involving offers of money and food occupy 177-8 Treating Act 174 use of 175 Uganda 26 Uganda, clientelistic practices documented in 8 unemployed, the 1-2, 42-3, 61-2, 91-2, 106Í, 130-1, 144-5, 146í, 167-9, 170í, 206f, 240Í-247Í unemployment 10-11 assistance 25 benefits 25, 41 levels of 204-5 United States of America 26-7, 29, 44 studies of party machines in 26 Uruguay 199-200 usury 153 van de Walle, Nicholas 26, 32 Venezuela 25 verbal humiliation 120-1 Veszprém County (Hungary) 178 violence can be used as form of coercive clientelism 25 threats of 20-1, 158-9 Visconti, Giancarlo 66 vote buying 16, 35-6, 38-40, 42-3, 115-16, 173, 211,213, 247, 267 “gregarious” 200 alternative moderators and the electoral punishment of 290í alternative moderators and the personal quality signals of 289f alternative moderators and the policy signals of 288í and poverty, link between 40-1 as part of the mix of non-programmatic strategies 175 brokers, networks often bloated 27 brokers, strategy of obfuscation 183 brokers, types of 185 cash and in-kind 16, 190, 192Í-198Í, 282Í-290Í comes in two distinct forms 208
320 INDEX vote buying (cont.) commonly used strategy in Romanian elections 182 conditional and unconditional dramatically declined 216-17 effectiveness of 188 estimated incidence of 2021 exchanges 173-4 heavy-handed targeting of 216-17 in Hungary, correlates of 206t, 247t incidence of 207-8 informational content low compared to policy coercion or policy favors 174 largely untargeted compared to other forms of clientelism 208 little evidence of targeting at the individual level 209 local political control has no relationship overall to the incidence of 207 measuring 201, 237-8 money or gifts 173 no relationship between welfare expansion coalition and the incidence of 207-8 not carefully targeted compared to the other illicit electoral strategies 205-7 offers of non-targeted goods 173 relationship between measure of incumbency and the incidence of 207 targeted 178 variation in the incidence of 208-9 vote-buying strategies 26-7, 32, 173-201, 216 co-existence of targeted and nontargeted 173-4 heterogeneity in the use of 175 historical examples of 26-7 informational implications of 189-91 premised on offers of money or goods, distribution and incidence of 202-4 resource-based approach 200-1 type of 173 use of 189 used by both the incumbent and challenger 181 used to send voters signals about candidates’ attributes and policy position 188-9 vote-buying transactions 5-6 amount of stigma voters report against clients in 199-200 vote-buying vignette, sample demographics and balance tests 266t voters and candidates, linkages between 213 anti-workfare 137-9 attitude to social policy
benefits 130-1 attitude to workfare program 130-1 choices, mayors send employees to colled information on 128 choices, representatives at polling station to monitor 127-8 contrast between those targeted by vote-buying strategies and those who have experienced coercion 188 cultivating expectations of reciprocity with 78-9 draw inferences about personal attributes of candidates who engage in dientelistic transactions 134 ethnic Hungarian 160-1 exploiting vulnerabilities of 217 express skepticism about effectiveness of vote buying 188 humiliation of 120-1, 139-40 infringements on the autonomy of 211-12 interactions between brokers and voters 217 intimidation and coercion of 211 judge dientelistic candidates harshly 149-50 low-income 7, 9-10, 36-7, 99-100,144, 215 monitoring of 127-8 normative beliefs of 116 perception of policy positions and qualities of candidates 128 poor 33-4, 38, 40-1 positions on current social policy benefits 133-4 right-wing 213 Roma 61-2, 101, 141, 167-9, 172 social policy preferences 139 sophisticated 39 strengthening political loyalty of 80 threat of firing them from their jobs 115-16 threat of removing them from their land 115-16 view candidates who use clientelism as more corrupt 139 with anti-workfare preferences 198 with pro-workfare preferences 198 voting behavior 4, 20, 26-7,42f, 43, 62, 113-16, 135, 139, 194, 200 incentivizing 114 mechanism by which dientelism affects 43 voting stations; see polling stations. Vrancea County (Romania) 117, 123-4 Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca 32-3,40-1 welfare and vote buying, survey experiments 268-9 welfare benefits
distribution of 267
INDEX intensity of social conflict over allocation of 101-2 social conflict over 147 welfare beneficiaries, verbal humiliation of 120-1 welfare coercion 15-16, 38, 41-2, 66, 115-19, 124-6, 128-51, 167, 199-200, 202, 213, 216-17, 267 geographic distribution of 142-4 incidence of 142,147 measuring 237-8 modal form of 118 non-programmatic strategies based on 15 strategies 119, 151 trends across counties in the incidence of 144 use of 115, 124, 140-1, 213 welfare conflict 144 welfare favors 38, 66, 88-101, 104/, 140 welfare officers, incentivized to operate as brokers 84; see aho brokers, welfare policy index 270 negative effect on perceptions of the candidate’s 133 positions 140 welfare preferences 268-9 and income, comparison of 272 welfare scenario supplementary results 270 welfare state, politicization of 113-14 welfare vignette, sample demographics and balance tests 266f welfare, threaten access to 23 Wilkinson, Steven 26 Wilson, James 9, 59 Wolfinger, Raymond 74-5 workers electoral intimidation of 151-2 electoral mobilization of 164-5 workfare anti-workfare preferences 128 economic dependence of recipients on local mayors 119 pro-workfare preferences 128 workfare beneficiaries 241-2 clientelistic ties to 76-7 workfare benefits 2-3, 6, 10, 75, 77-9, 99-101, 119, 123-4, 144-5, 161, 167-9, 215 access to 123, 215 allocation of 161, 167 distribution of 101, 144-5 workfare coercion or blackmail, as electoral strategies, use of 123 workfare employees can be mobilized during election campaigns 123 monitoring of 127 vulnerable to blackmail 122 workfare jobs, allocation of 76-7
workfare program, -s 6, 99, 134-5, 137-9, 149, 172, 267 accessing 77, 113-14 attitude of voters 130-1 coercion in localities with large constituencies of voters ineligible for 117 coercive use of 114 control of access to 2 controlled by mayors 75 economic and social consequences 1-2 expansion of 105-8 facilitating access to 79 only viable employment opportunity 124-5 opposition to 7 political use of 79 strategy to increase economic and political dependency on authorities 121 Workfare recipients economic dependence on local mayors 119 extortion of votes 10 Workfare Retrenchment Index 132 Workfare vignette 261 World Bank 67 Würfel, David 24, 82 Young Democrats, Alliance of; see Fidesz Zambia 26 Zielonka, Jan 59-61, 213-14 Zolberg, Aristide 25, 74 Zolnay, Janos 120 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek кіл .і_ 321 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Mares, Isabela Young, Lauren E. |
author_GND | (DE-588)114897204 (DE-588)1200366999 |
author_facet | Mares, Isabela Young, Lauren E. |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Mares, Isabela |
author_variant | i m im l e y le ley |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV046326743 |
classification_rvk | MG 80470 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1139568660 (DE-599)BVBBV046326743 |
discipline | Politologie |
edition | First Edition |
format | Book |
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geographic | Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd Ungarn (DE-588)4078541-5 gnd Rumänien (DE-588)4050939-4 gnd |
geographic_facet | Osteuropa Ungarn Rumänien |
id | DE-604.BV046326743 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-20T06:45:19Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780198832775 9780198832782 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031703677 |
oclc_num | 1139568660 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-824 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
owner_facet | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-12 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-824 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
physical | xii, 321 Seiten Diagramme, Karten |
psigel | BSB_NED_20200506 |
publishDate | 2019 |
publishDateSearch | 2019 |
publishDateSort | 2019 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Oxford studies in democratization |
spelling | Mares, Isabela Verfasser (DE-588)114897204 aut Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young Conditionality & coercion Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe First Edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2019 xii, 321 Seiten Diagramme, Karten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Oxford studies in democratization Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd rswk-swf Klientelismus (DE-588)4323377-6 gnd rswk-swf Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 gnd rswk-swf Ungarn (DE-588)4078541-5 gnd rswk-swf Rumänien (DE-588)4050939-4 gnd rswk-swf Elections / Corrupt practices / Europe, Eastern Hungary / Politics and government / 1989- Romania / Politics and government / 1989- Elections / Corrupt practices Politics and government Hungary Romania Since 1989 Ungarn (DE-588)4078541-5 g Rumänien (DE-588)4050939-4 g Klientelismus (DE-588)4323377-6 s Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s DE-604 Osteuropa (DE-588)4075739-0 g 1\p DE-604 Young, Lauren E. Verfasser (DE-588)1200366999 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-187129-0 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Mares, Isabela Young, Lauren E. Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Klientelismus (DE-588)4323377-6 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4064286-0 (DE-588)4323377-6 (DE-588)4075739-0 (DE-588)4078541-5 (DE-588)4050939-4 |
title | Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe |
title_alt | Conditionality & coercion Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe |
title_auth | Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe |
title_exact_search | Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe |
title_full | Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young |
title_fullStr | Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young |
title_full_unstemmed | Conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young |
title_short | Conditionality and coercion |
title_sort | conditionality and coercion electoral clientelism in eastern europe |
title_sub | electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe |
topic | Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Klientelismus (DE-588)4323377-6 gnd |
topic_facet | Korruption Wahl Klientelismus Osteuropa Ungarn Rumänien |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031703677&sequence=000007&line_number=0004&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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