Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita": a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology Volume 2
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| Schriftenreihe: | Heterodoxia Iberica
volume 3 |
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| Beschreibung: | Seite 766-1326 |
| ISBN: | 9789004401464 |
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| adam_text | Contents VOLUME 1 Preface vu Introduction і і Structure and Contents of the Antonima Margarita і շ Sources of the Antoniana Margarita 22 3 The Antoniana Margarita in the Debate over the Immortality of the Soul 35 4 The Fortunes of the Antoniana Margarita 55 5 Note on the Text 61 Bibliography 64 Antoniana Margarita: A Work on Natural Philosophy, Medicine and Theology 71 Prologues 72 Index, or Table of Things Contained in This Work 98 The Reason for the Title of This Work 180 A Forewarning Readers Should Heed before Starting to Read This Work 182 The Author’s Aim in Putting This Work Together 184 Part One: Antoniana Margarita 190 VOLUME 2 Part Two: a Paraphrase of the Third Book of Aristotle’s De anima Part Three: on the Immortality of Minds 918 764 Objections of Licentiate Miguel de Palacios, Professor of Sacred Theology in the University of Salamanca, to Several of the Many Paradoxes in Antoniona Margarita and in Their Defense 1155 Gomez Pereira’s Defense, in Reply to Certain Objections to Some of the Manifold Paradoxes of Antoniana Margarita 1205 English Index 1321 Index of Names 1323
Bl79 PARAPHRASIS IN TERTIUM LIBRUM DE ANIMA, ARISTOTELIS LONGE AB OMNIUM ALIORUM AUCTORUM EXPOSITIONE DISSIDENS. A497 A498 Quoniam universae substantiamm naturae hoc participant ас commune habent, ut earum aliquae materia ex qua alia fiant sint, et quodammodo in potentia illa quae fiitura sunt dican tur, ut cera certo modo homo, et equus, et 5 pianta ex ipsa fingenda nominatur, et elementa commista, ut misti formam decet, mistum etiam appellantur, et in omnibus naturiš causa efficiens, non materiae quae iam existit, sed formae quae induci debet genitrix dicatur, ut ars nornen efficientis causae figuratarum rerum sortitur, necesse est in animae natura proportionales assignaré differentias, non distinguendo has re, 10 ut efficientem causam a forma facta, et a materia in qua fit seiungimus, sed tantum ipsam certo modo contemplando appellemus materiam, et alio efficientem. Ac ut corporea materia noscitur prout suum es|se ab efficiente in se formam non recipit, sic ipsa anima ab intellectu agente minime fieri possibilis censeatur, quin ipsa effecta possibilis intellectus, et materiam in hoc 15 referens, cum intellectionem elicit, agens nominetur. [1. Text. comm. 18.1] A499 Ut habitus causa eorum quae fiunt ab habente ilium solet dici, et lumen colorum quodammodo effector, nam citra lumen colores, etsi certo modo sint, non cemerentur; ipsi enim sine lumine minime inducerent speciem 20 sufficientem immutare visum, quod in medium illustratum inducant eam. Quam enim in ullis tenebris gignunt (ut sunt illae quibus vespertiliones et noctuae conspiciunt) adeo remissae sunt, quod si
tenebrosius et omnino lumine expers medium reddetur, nequáquam producerent. Quo similatur lumen intellectui agenti, ac per hoc quod ut ea quae minime nosci pote- 25 rant ob tenebram lumen detegit et nota facit, sic intellectus agens quae ignota erant intellectui possibili ipse manifesta reddit; quantumvis enim anima afficiatur phan tas ļmatis quibusvis, non poterit aliam notionem asse qui, quam eorum quae genuere phantasmata si ipsa anima tantum possibilis 1 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.5,430814-17 (Aristoteles 1953, in, t/c 18, p. 437): Oportet igitur ut in ea sit intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intellígere omne, et intellectus secundum quod intelligit omne, quasi habitus, qui est quasi lux. Lux enim quoquo modo etiam facit colores qui sunt in potentia colores in actu.”
Part Two: a Paraphrase of the Third Book of Aristotle’s De Anima, Very Dif ferent from the Interpretation of All Other Authors All substances have something in common—that some of them are the mat- A497 ter out of which other things are made, and are said to be in some fashion potentially things which are going to exist, as a human being, a horse, and a plant which are to be fashioned from wax are called ‘wax’, and the ele ments, when intermingled the right way to form a compound, are also called a ‘compound’. In all objects, too, the efficient cause is called the ‘mother’, not of the matter, (which exists already), but of the form which is to be intro duced [into it], and as ‘art’ is the name one gives to the efficient cause of objects which have been given shape. One has to impute equivalent differ ences to the nature of the soul, [but] not in fact by differentiating them the way we separate the efficient cause from the form which has been given shape, and from the matter in which that shape appears. But let us call it ‘matter’ only when we look at it one way, and ‘efficient’ [when we look at it] in another; and just as it is known as ‘physical matter’ when it does not receive its exist| ence from something which causes form to appear in it, so A498 one should not think the soul is rendered potential by an active agent, but that the potential intellect, which in this case brings back these effects and matter, should be called ‘active’ when it draws forth understanding. [1. Text of comment 78.] Just as the cause of what is done by someone who disposes is usually called
a ‘disposition’, light, too, is in some way the producer of colours, because even if colours do exist in a certain fashion, they would not be seen without light, because without light they would not introduce a visual image sufficient to change one s vision. This is because they introduce that [image] into an illuminated medium and produce it in a darkness, (for example, the dark ness in which bats and night-owls see), which is so lacking in intensity that if the medium were rendered darker and completely free from light, [the darkness] would not produce [an image] at all. In this, the light is like the active intellect, and by these means, just as the light uncovers and makes known things which could not be recognised at all because of the dark ness, the active intellect makes clear to the potential intellect things which were unknown. However much the soul may be affected by any kind of mental I image, it will not be able to obtain an idea other than [that] of A499 things which mental images have produced, if the soul were simply given
766 B180 A500 ANTONIANA MARGARITA intellectus nomen sortiretur; quae tamen cum | vim agentis exercet, quae incognita erant, cognita reddit, sola affectione intellectus possibilis praecedente. Nam postquam anima intellectus possibilis effecta est, per affectionem factam ab obiecto vei phantasmate in organum animatum, ipsa dieta intellectus agens, affectionem in se factam in sensu supra relato contem- 5 plans et illustrans, ut lumen colores notionem scientiñcam elicit, ceu lumen species visivas. Interest tamen quod species distinctum quid realiter a coloribus sit; scientifica autem notio a possibili intellectu elicita, vi intellectus agentis, tantum formaliter distinguatur ab utroque, puta intellectu agente et possibili, etsi realiter distincta sit a re quae scitur si ipsa anima non noscitur. 1 о Ac hic intellectus a nobis agens dictas separabilis est a corpore quod infor mat; et tunc cum separatas fuerit, impassibilis fiiturus est, quod immixtus corpori passibili seiungentur ab invícem, ас per se subsistens, et actu et non potentia existens facultate passibilis privabitur. Ñeque mirum quod semper est honorabilius ļ agens patiente, et principium materia. 15 Verum decet solvere quomodo verum hoc esse possit, cum ego asseruerim animam ipsam identice esse agentem et possibilem intellectum, et tan tum per considerationem humanam distingui, et non re, unde sequi videbatar, si alterum separări a corpore posset, et aliud quoque simul sepa rări necessarium esse, cum uterque anima ipsa intellectiva sint. Sed hoc 20 dubium non magni momenti est, ñeque aliud, quam praeterita
contemplari, ut decenter solvatur exposcit. Si enim illa ratione colligeretur sufficienter, in innúmeros errores nos pellicerent similes collectiones. Liceret enim inferre quod cum homo sit idem suae sessioni, et suae elevationi, quod si sessio ablata esset, elatio auferenda foret. Et eum similitudo Socratis in Platonem 25 auferretar, quia Plato languit, etiam similitudo Socratis in Titium auferenda foret, quia Socrates utraeque suae similitadines erat, quod quantam falsitatem înciudat, qui logicam novere scíunt. Ut ergo Socrates potest amittere sitam ilium appellatum sessionem, manente ipso simili Ioanni, similitu dine et sessione non distinctis a Petro, sed idem cum eo existentibus, sic 30 anima potest perdere denominationem intellectus possibilis, cum corpore
PART TWO 767 the name ‘potential intellect’. But when [the soul] exercises the power of an [active] agent, (and only the influence of the potential intellect surpasses it), it makes known things which used to be unknown. After the soul of the potential intellect has been influenced by the effect made by an object or mental image upon a stimulated organ, the said active intellect, contemplat ing and illuminating the effect made upon it in the sense given above, draws forth, as light does colours, or as light does images which can be seen, an idea which can be known. It is important, however, that the visual image be something distinct from colours, and that the idea which can be known and which the power of the active intellect has drawn out of the potential intel lect, be distinguished from both, (that is, the active and potential intellects), even though it actually is distinct from the thing which is being known, if the soul is not known. This intellect, which I have called ‘active’, can also be separated from the body which gives it form and under those circumstances, because it has been separated, it is going to be incapable of emotion, since the uncompounded [intellect] and the body which is capable of emotion will be separated from one another, and the intellect, subsisting of itself and existing in actuality, not potentiality, will be deprived of the ability to feel emotion. So it is not surprising that it is more estimable | than a passive A500 agent, and that the basic principle [is more estimable] than matter. But one must explain how this can be true, since I
have maintained that the soul is identical with the active and potential agent, and that it is distin guished [from them] only in human consideration, not in reality; and from this, it seemed to follow that if one [of them] could be separated from the body, inevitably the other can be separated [from it] at the same time, too, because both are the intellective soul itself. But this undetermined [point] is of no great importance and, to be resolved adequately, demands nothing more than looking carefUlly at what has been said before, because if it were given enough consideration along those lines, similar inferences would lure us into [making] innumerable mistakes. One would be allowed to infer, you see, that since a human being is the same person when he is sitting down and standing up, if one removed his sitting down, his standing up would be taken away, [too]; and that when Socrates s resemblance to Plato was removed because Plato was ill, Socrates’s resemblance to Titius would be taken away because Socrates resembled both of them. [But] those who have learned logic know what a great fallacy is contained in that Therefore, just as Socrates can lose the situation called ‘sitting down’ while he continues to resemble John, and his resemblance and sitting down are no different from Peter whose resemblance and sitting down are just the same as his, so the soul can lose the denomination ‘potential intellect’ when it is separated from
768 ANTONIANA MARGARITA seiungitur, manente appellatione intellectus agentis. Post obitum enim anima non poterit a sensibilibus rebus affici, quia corpus ad cuius affectionem afficiebatur deerit; et ita non omnia fieri vere dicetur per modum quo possibilis appellabatur. Superstes tamen ipsa nomen intellectus agentis eidem restabit, qua aliter, quam cum corpori inhaerebat, intellectiones in se formabit anima. Ex qua sententia non tantum elicitur, Aristoteli opinatum, animam post hominis interitum mansuram, verum et ipsam post etiam intellecturam, cum testetur relatis verbis agentem intellectum mansuram, qui si non intelligeret, sic nominari non posset. A501 B181 Idem porro intellectus efficiļens cum actualiter intelligit, est scientia rei sci՜ tae. Actu enim intelligens anima substantiam subditam accidentibus Soeratis, scientia substantiae Socratis est. Quia ille modus habendi animae actualiter animadvertentis se affectam ad affectionem proprii organi sensitivi in sensu prius dicto (indeque elicientis substantiam aliquam subdi illis accidentibus seipsam immutantibus, quod nonnumquam accidens unum, alias diversum, et quandoque contrarium omnino ab eadem sentiantur), scientia substantiae Socratis est. Et nihil praeter hoc fingendum est esse scientiam actualem substantiae Socratis, et haec scientia cum actualis sit, non aliquando intelligens, alias non, intelligens est, | quin quamdiu actualis appellatur, actu intelligens necessario est. 5 10 15 20 [2. Text. comm. 20.2] A502 Quo palam roboratur nostrum decretum quod intellectio non sit accidens ullum distinctum ab anima
intellectiva, ut hucusque creditum erat, sed ipsam animam certo modo se habentem dici intellectionem, nam scientia actualis et intellectio non différant, cum idem significent.3 Secus habitualis qua dormiens aut nihil cogitans dicitur homo seiens dialecticam, aut physicam, aut mathesin, nam haec potius quidam habitus corporis informati anima raţionali, ļ quam solius animae dispositio est. Organa enim interiora humani cerebri quibus absentia cognoscimus, et ubi a idem significent A ] idem priorem significent B. 2 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.5, 43°аго-25 (Aristoteles 1953, m, t/c 20, p. 443): “Et quod est in potentia prius est tempore in individuo; universaliter autem non est ñeque in tempore. Ñeque quandoque intelligit et quandoque non intelligit. Et cum fuerit abstractus, est illud quod est tantum, et iste tantum est immortalis semper. Et non rememoramur, quia iste est non passibilis, et intellectus passibilis est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligitur.” 25 30
PART TWO 769 the body, and can still be called ‘the active intellect’. The soul will not be able to be affected by sensibles after death because it will lack the body which served as a vehicle for such effects, and so one cannot say with any accuracy that it turns into everything in the way which [caused it] to be called ‘poten tial’. What survives will be called ‘the active intellect’, and by this mean, in a manner different from when it was attached to the body, the soul will give form to realisations in itself. From this opinion, one not only draws [the conclusion] that Aristotle thought the soul continues after a person’s death, but also that it will have an active understanding after [death] as well, since he attests, in the words I quoted, that the ‘active intellect’ will continue, and if this did not have this active understanding, it could not be given the name it has. Furthermore, when that same operative intellect is actually aware, its A501 knowledge is [ that] of a known thing, because when the soul actively under stands that there is a substance appended to Socrates’s accidentals, its knowledge is [that] of Socrates’s substance, the reason being that its knowl edge of Socrates s substance is the characteristic way in which the soul actu ally notices that its particular sensory organ has been affected in the sense I gave earlier, (and in consequence draws [the conclusion] that some sub stance is appended to the accidentals which are changing it, because there is neverjust one accidental, but one which is different on various occasions, and sometimes one
which is entirely opposite, and it is these [the soul] is perceiving sensorily). Nor should one pretend that anything other than this is active knowledge of Socrates’s substance and, since this knowledge is active, not comprehending on one occasion and not on others, as long as one calls it active, it is inevitably and actually comprehending. [2. Text of comment 20.] This clearly strengthens my pronouncement that the understanding is not an accidental distinct from the intellective soul, as had been believed up till now, but that the soul’s behaving in a certain way is called ‘understanding’ because active knowledge and understanding are not different, since they signify the same thing. This is not usually the case when someone who is asleep or whose mind is blank is said to know logic, or natural philosophy, or mathematics, because this constitutes a particular state of a body informed by a rational soul, | A502 rather than a disposition of the soul alone. The internal organs of the human
77 О ANTONIANA MARGARITA phantasmata asservantur et caetera quae mediant, ad assíduas meditatio nes requisita in quovis actu scientifico, quamdam promptitudinem, si saepius diversa meditamur, acquirunt, ac quemdam häbitum in se gignunt, quo prompţi ad iterum meditandum meditata vel similia reddimur, qui habitus scientia habitualis et in potentia nominatur. Et huiusmodi habitualis seientia certo modo prior actuali est. Nam qui hac seiens dicitur, promptissime in actualem considerationem actuum illius facultatis devenit, quo antece dens actus illos executes prompte et expedite ob habitam, prior tempore illis est. Omnino autem non prior. Nam si ad universos actus scientificos illius scientiae conferatur habitus ille, appellatus “habitualis scientia”, aliquibus posterior erit, puta illis qui habitam eumdem genuerunť, habitus enim scientificus ex pluribus actibus, ut praedixi, genitus est. Tandem intellectus agens separatas a corpore, est solum id quod infra concavum orbis Lunae vere est, nam aliae corporeae substantiae corruptioni et intentai sunt obnoA503 xiae, hic solus immortalis et perpeļtuus. Non reminiscitur autem rerum a se, dum corpus informabat, cognitarum, quia separatas impassibilis est, ut supra diximus, deficiente corpore, ad cuius affectionem erat afficiendus, et passibilis vocitandus, sine qua passibilitate anima intelligere reminiscendo non valet; ablate enim corpore, phantasmata ab obiectis rebus fingi nequiebunt. Et quamvis fieri ea concedamus, ubi asservarentur, asservataque quod cerebri ventriculum afficient, sine quibus reminisci, ut nunc solemus,
nequimus. Ñeque ob hoc privamus animam ab alio intellectionis et reminiscentiae modo quo utitur post obitum, sed tantum earn dicimus non intelligere ñeque reminisci, ut solita, cum corpus informabat, erat. Clara et pellucida versa Aristotelica sententia quae hucusque oppressa erroribus Simplicii, Themistii, Alexandri, Averrois, et, quod magis miror, Theophrasti Aristotelis discipuli, et post hos ас alios omnium recentiorum expositorum rubiginabatur. Superest decernere an paraphrasis haec cum subsequentibus, ac praecedentibus contextibus Aristotelis, ас cum dogmatibus nostris de anima agentibus conveniat, an minime. Quod non aliter melius, quam tam antecedentem expositum contextum, quam subsequentia eum dem etiam in paraphrasin vertendo assequemur, vestrumque quemlibet arbitrům constituam, non tantum de re hac, verum de collatione nostrae expositionis cum caeteris vetustis, quas facillime cassas, ас nullas, multoque 5 10 15 20 25 30
PART TWO 771 brain, whereby we recognise things which are not in front of us, and where mental images are preserved along with everything else which acts as an intermediary, and is needed for careftrl thought in any act one requires in order to get to know something, acquire certain readiness if we think quite often about different things, and produce a particular state in themselves in which we are made ready to think about things we have considered already, and similar things, a state which is called ‘acquired’ and ‘potential’ knowl edge. Acquired knowledge of this kind exists in a certain way prior to active [knowledge], because the person whom one calls ‘knowledgeable’ after this fashion very easily arrives at an active contemplation of the actions of that faculty, when the act preceding those which have been carried out readily and rapidly because of that disposition [of his], is earlier in time than they are. But not entirely earlier, because if that disposition is conferred upon every action intended to increase knowledge of the kind called ‘acquired knowledge’, it will be later than some of them, namely, those which produced that same disposition [in the first place]. The reason is that a disposition to increase knowledge is produced by several actions, as I said before. Finally, the active intellect separated from the body is one which exists only beneath the vault of the moon’s orbit, because other physical substances are liable to destruction and death, and it alone is immortal and everlasting. | But it has A503 no memory of things it recognised while it was
informing the body because, once it has been separated, it cannot experience emotion, as I said above, while it lacks the body on which it was meant to have an effect; and it ought to be called capable of experiencing emotion because, without the ability to experience emotion, the soul cannot understand by having a memory [of something], since once the body has been removed, physical objects will not be able to form mental images. I am not, because of this, depriving the soul of another method of understanding and remembering, which it uses after death, but say simply that [the soul] does not understand or remember the way it usually did when it was giving character to the body. Aristotle’s well-known and completely clear opinion, which until now has been overwhelmed by the errors of Simplicius, Themistius, Alexander, Averroes, and (which amazes me the more) by Theophrastus, who was Aris totle’s pupil, was buffed up in accordance with both these and other, modern interpreters. I still have to decide whether this paraphrase agrees with the following and preceding texts in Aristotle and those of my tenets which deal with the soul, or not, because otherwise I shall do no better by paraphrasing the texts which follow it than I did when I explained the text which pre cedes it. I shall also appoint any referee you like, not only of this subject, but [also] to compare my explanation with any of those of the ancients; and
772 A504 B182 ANTONIANA MARGARITA a littera, et mente Aristote|lis alienas monstrare indissolubilibus rationibus possem, nisi fastidiendos vos tam enormibus erroribus, qui lectione praeterita veritate imbuti estis, vereren Ut ergo noscatis verum vero consonare, universos locos eiusdem tertii De anima idem expresse pro |ferentes, quod a nobis doctum est attente audire, exordium quippe faciam, ut dixi, ab initio tertii De anima, usque in textům decimum septimum iam explicitům, hos et subsequentes omnes usque in finem iiiDe anima in paraphrasin vertendo. 5 [3. Text. comm. 1.3] A505 De ea parte animae qua ipsa anima cognoscit et sápit considerare opportunum est, non discutientes in praesentiarum, quod postea explicabitur, an 10 actu separabilis ipsa intellectiva anima sit a corpore divisibili, an solum per intellectus animadversionem seorsum et sine corpore intelligi valeat, quae tamen re sine ipso esse non possit, ac quomodo etiam intelligamus, scribere decens erit. Nam non ex infirmioribus dubiis est si intelligere sit sicut sentire, aut alio quovis modo pati, qualiter possibile sit, hoc fieri ab intel 15 ligibili, aut alio vicem intelligibilis supplente, cum nullum tale intelligibile actionem üllam in nos efficere experiamur. Sensibilia enim iam quod non sibi similibus nos afficiunt, aliquo illis in repraesentando aequipollente id faciunt, puta specie sensibili. Ergo si vera relata sunt, impassibilis intellectus erit, deficiente I qui affidai. Et cum conscii simus nos intelligere, susceptivus 20 intellectus speciei rei intelligendae, et potentia huiusmodi species, sed non
hane suscipiens, necessario est fatendus. Et similiter se habens ad intelligibilia, ut sensitivům ad sensibilia. Quae sententiae mutuo et inter se dimicare ac contrarrne esse videntur. 3 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,429310-13 (Aristoteles 1953, in, t/c 1, p. 379): “De parte autem animae per quam anima cognoscit et intelligit (utrum est differens aut non differens in magnitudine, sed in intentione) perscrutandum est de differentia quae sit, et quomodo sit formare per intellectum.”
PART TWO 773 using arguments no one could demolish, I could very easily demonstrate that these have nothing to them, and are a long way from Aristotle’s | mean- A504 ing and intention, only I should be afraid that you, who have soaked up the truth in what you have read earlier [in my treatise], would flinch from such enormous errors. Therefore, so that you may realise that what is true agrees with what is true, and that evejy passage in this third Book of De Anima says exactly the same as that which I have said one should pay carefhl attention to, I shall make a start by paraphrasing these and all the subsequent [pas sages] to the end of De Anima ա from the beginning of De Anima ա to the seventeenth text, which I have already explained. [3. Text of comment 7.] It is now time to give consideration to that part of the soul wherewith the soul recognises and knows, although for the moment I shall not discuss something I am going to explain later—whether the intellective soul can actually be separated from a body which is capable of being divided, or whether it can be understood all by itself without the body, simply via the attention [given to it] by the intellect, even though [the soul] cannot actu ally exist without [a body]. It will also be appropriate to write about the way we understand [things], because we have quite strong reasons [for think ing that], if understanding is just like sensory perception, however it may be possible, it is done by something which can be understood or by something else fulfilling the office of something which can be understood, although we
have no experience of any such understandable thing’s acting upon us. Even though things capable of being perceived sensorily do not affect us by means of things like themselves, they do so by displaying something which is equiv alent to them, namely, by means of a visual image which is capable of being perceived sensorily. Therefore, if what I have said is true, the intellect will be incapable of feeling emotion, because it lacks | [something capable of being A505 sensorily perceived] which can have an effect on it; and since we are aware that we possess understanding, we shall have to acknowledge that there is an intellect which is receptive to understanding the visual image of an object, and also potentially a visual image of this kind, but that [the intellect] does not actually take in the [visual image]. It has the same kind of relationship to things which can be understood as something concerned with sensation has towards things capable of being perceived sensorily. These opinions seem to run counter to one another and be mutually contradictory.
774 ANTONIANA MARGARITA [4. Text. comm. 4·4] Verum solvimus asseverantes necesse esse, quoniam omnia corpora in quovis tempore intelligit, immixtum illis esse. Sicut dixit Anaxagoras, ut impe rei, hoc autem est, ut cognoscat omnia. [5. Text. comm. 6.5] 6 A506 Quippe si intellectui inhaesisset aliquod corporeum, vel nonnullo corpore uteretur ut instrumento quo indiguisset ad opus intellectionis exequendum, ut faber serra aut malleo, vel ut facultas sensitiva calore, aut frigore utitur in sentiendo: nequáquam calorem aut frigus eius gradus cuius esset illud quod intellectui inesset, intelligere posset, ut ñeque tactiva vis calorem aut frigus paris gradus cum organo tactus minime percipit; illa enim accidentia quae afficerent intellectum vel eiusdem organum, si corporeo indiguisset instrumento, ut quo utatur ad intelligendum, prohibèrent | extrinsecum intelligendum afficere intellectum, quia habitibus praesentibus in materia, cessat motus, ac inde intellectio illorum cessasset, et ad illa noscenda obstructus intellectus esset. 5 IO 15 [6. Text. comm. 5.®] Cuius contrarium omnes seimus quin conscii oppositi sumus. Quare ñeque ipsius intellectus esse est possibile quod sit aliqua singularis et unica natura qua aptus sit fieri in repraesentando aliqua intelligenda, et non alia, ut sensus peculiares certa fieri possunt, et non alia. Visus enim colores et luces in repraesentando fit, et non odores, пес sapores, ut olfactus odores, et non colores, et sic singuli singula, et nullus omnia, ut intellectus, qui universalster 4 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4, 429316-20 (Aristoteles 1953,
III, t/c 4, p. 383): “Oportet igitur, si intelligit omnia, ut sit non mixtum, sicut dixit Anaxagoras, ut imperet, scilicet ut cogno scat. Si enim in eo apparuerit, apparens impedit alienum, quia est aliud.” 5 Aristoteles, De anima, 111,4,429324-29 (Aristoteles 1953, III, t/c 6, p. 413): “Et ideo necesse est ut non sit mixtus cum corpore. Quoniam, si esset mixtus cum corpore, tune esset in ali qua dispositione, aut calidus aut frigidus, aut haberet aliquod instrumentum sicut habet sentiens. Modo autem non est ita. Recte igitur dixerunt dicentes quod anima est locus for marum; sed non universa, sed intelligens; ñeque formae in endelechia, sed in potentia.” 6 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,429821-25 (Aristoteles 1953, in, t/c 5, p. 387): “Et sic non habe bit naturam nisi istam, scilicet quod est possibilis. Illud igitur de anima quod dicitur intellectus (et dico intellectum illud per quod distinguimus et cogitamus) non est in actu aliquod entium antequam intelligat.” 20
PART TWO 775 [4. Text of comment 4.] But I answer by maintaining that, since it has an understanding of all physi cal obj ects at any time, it must not be mingled with them so that, as Anaxago ras said, it may dominate [them], that is, gain knowledge of all of them. [5. Text of comment Ճ.] Now of course, if any physical object were to adhere to the intellect, or were to make use of some body as the instrument it needed in order to accom plish the task of understanding, the way a carpenter uses a saw or a hammer, or the sensory faculty uses heat or cold in its sensory perception [of them], there is no way it could understand the heat or cold to the extent the intellect could, since the power of touch does not perceive heat or cold to the same extent the organ of touch does. The reason is that if the accidentals which would be having an effect on the intellect, or its organ, were to lack a physi cal instrument as something which could be used to understand [what was happening], they would stop | the external intellect from having an effect on A506 the process of understanding, because movement ceases when [these] con ditions are present in matter, and therefore understanding of them would have ceased, and the intellect would be stopped from getting to know them. [6. Text of comment5.] We all know what is contrary to this and are aware of what is against it: that it is not possible for the intellect to have any singular and unique characteris tic which prepares it to display some things which are to be understood, and not others, the reason being that particular senses
can do some things, and not others. When sight displays, [it displays] colours and lights, not smells or tastes, just as the sense of smell [displays] smells, not colours. Thus, the individual [senses] display individual things, and none [of them displays] everything after the manner of the intellect which is said to be transformed
776 B183 A507 ANTONIANA MARGARITA in omnia intelligibilia verti dicitur, non vere et realiter, sed in repraesentando illa (supplet enim intellectus vicem intelligibilium, cum post affectionem factam a phantasmate in potentiam interiorem noscentem abstractive, intelligit anima intelligibilia, affecta ipsa, ad affectionem phantasmatum, ut supra diximus). Esse ergo illius in quantum omnia efficitur, vocitatur animae intellectus possibilis. De eo autem intellectu me nune agere scitote quo | opinatur et intelligit anima, et non | de divino, de quo duodecimo Metapkysicorum, aut de aliis de quibus in eisdem Metaphysicorum libris egimus. Et hic animae intellectus actu nihil est eorum quae sunt, antequam intelligat anima; potentia vero certo modo esse illa quae ab eo intelliguntur dicitur. 5 10 [7. Text. comm. 6.7] Unde colligitur vera dicere qui testantur animam esse locum specierum, si id limitaverint de anima intellectiva in quantum intellectiva, nam ut sensitivae vel vegetativae, aut secundum locum motivae, minime hoc convenit. Ac etiam dum non actu animam esse semper locum specierum asseverent, 15 sed potentia speciem esse crediderint. Porro, anima intellectiva non est sem per subiectum specierum, quod alio nomine locum specierum nominamus, sed tantum tunc, cum actu intelligit, et ad affectionem organi informati ab ipsa anima intellectiva afficitur illa, ut saepius diximus; alias autem dicitur in potentia ad formas intellectas esse. Qui modus affectionis diversus multo 20 est ab eo qui accidit, cum sentimus. [8. Text. comm. 7·8] A508 Nam ab accidente sensato necesse est
produci aliquid quod inducatur in organum sentiendi, quod non contingit rei intellectae: quapropter post excellens sensitivům ferme dissipans organi harmoļniam immodica qualitate 7 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,429024-29 (Aristoteles 1953, in, t/c 6, p. 413): “Et ideo necesse est ut non sit mixtos cum corpore. Quoniam, si esset mixtas cum corpore, tunc esset in aliqua disposinone, aut calidus aut fngídus, aut haberet aliquod instrumentum sicut habet sentiens. Modo autem non est ita. Recte igitur dixerunt dicentes quod anima est locus for maram; sed non universa, sed intelligens; ñeque formae in endelechia, sed in potentia.” 8 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4, 42ga29-42gb5 (Aristoteles 1953, ni, t/c 7, p. 417): “Quoniam autem privatio passionis in sentiente et in formatione per intellectum non est consimilis manifestum est in sensu. Sensus enim non potest sentire post forte sensatum, v.g. post sonos magnos aut post colores fortes aut post odores fortes; intellectus autem, cum intellexerit aliquod forte intelligibilium, tunc non minus intelliget illud quod est sub primo, immo magis. Sentiens enim non est extra corpus; iste autem est abstractos.” 25
PART TWO 777 into everything which can be understood, without exception—not really and actually, [of course], but because it puts them on display. (The intellect, you see, performs the office of things understood by the mind because, after a mental image has had an effect on the internal potentiality which is getting to know [them] in the abstract, the soul understands things apprehended by the mind because it has been affected by the effect made by the mental images, as I said above.) Therefore its essence, in as much as everything has an effect on it, is usually called the soul’s potential understanding. But be aware that at the present moment I am dealing with the intellect whereby the soul thinks and understands, not | with the divine [mind], which I dealt with in Metaphysica xii, or the others [I dealt with] in the same Book. This understanding of the soul is not anything which actually exists, but is said to be in a certain fashion potentially those things which it understands. A507 [7. Text ofcommente.] From this, one infers that those who say the soul is where visual images are located are speaking the truth, provided they limit [what they are say ing] about the intellective soul to the intellective soul, (because this does not apply at all to the sensory or vegetative [soul], or (according to its loca tion) the motor [soul]), and also provided they do not claim that actually the soul is always the location of visual images, but believe it is potentially a visual image. Furthermore, the intellective soul is not always the subject of visual images, because we call
the location of visual images by another name, except when [the soul] actually understands and is affected in relation to the way in which the organ, (informed by the intellective soul itself), has been affected, as I have said quite often. Otherwise, it is said to be potential as far as the forms it has perceived or understood. This way of being affected is very different from the one which happens when we perceive [something] sensorily. [8. Text of comment 7.] An accidental which has been perceived sensorily must produce something which can be introduced into the organ of sensory perception, because this does not happen to something which has been perceived by the intellect. So, after an exceptional sensory [experience] almost dissipates the har|mony of A508
778 ANTONIANA MARGARITA genita a se in instrumentum sentiendi, infimiora minus bene percipimus, ut sonum exilem post magnos auditos sonos minime audimus; ñeque odo rata rebus valde redolentibus, aut visis coloribus, aut luce splendidissimis, videre aut odorare remissiora conceditur, nempe cum intelligimus oppo site semper accidente. Post enim ardua ac per quam diffidila intellecta non 5 hebetius intelliguntur infimiora, quin exactius ac magis dilucide cognoscuntur. Sensitiva enim vis non sine corpore recipiente affectíonem accidentis sentiendi fit; intellective autem non ab accidente quod sentitur afficitur, sed a phantasmate, etsi minime sine corpore per quod, ut medium, ipse animae intellectus possibilis afficitur, dum rationalis anima humánum corpus infor 10 mai; post tamen a corpore separata, intelligere alio modo quam nune valet. Ergo ad dubium quod sciscitabatur, an intellectus patiatur aliquid ab intelligibili, expedite respondendo dicimus quod nequáquam, sed quod tan tum imaginibus sensibilium afficientibus organa interiora in absentia vel praesentia obiectorum devenit anima, tune effecta intellectus possibilis in 15 A509 cognitionem I intelligibilis rei, ex quadam facultate sibi a sua origine indita, ut in antecedentibus docuimus. Intelligere enim colorem non est ilium intuitive sive abstractive sentire, sed naturam eius, hoc est quod natus sit substantiae inesse, et visum, et nullum alium sensum afficere percipere. Quae coloris facultates intellectum 20 non afficiunt, sed ipse8 certo modo aliterse habens cum intelligit, quam ante intelligere (non per ullum
accidens a se realiter distinctum, sed per alium modum se habendi) dicitur seiens, qui prius quam taliter se haberet, igna ras appellabatur. Ac illam accidentis scientiam, vel aliam quamvis postquam semel adeptus est intellectus, sine ullo doctore iteram et saepe seipso adipi- 25 scitur. Aliorumque scitoram eadem norma servatur. Et habitualis scientia huiusmodi promptitudo appellater, nam vacans homo ab intellectionis actu, B184 seiens per illam nominator. Nempe, quamquam sine ilio habitu | homo a ipse ] ipsae AB.
PART TWO 779 an organ by the excessive condition it produces in the instrument of sensory perception, we notice things which are rather slight less well. For example, we do not hear a faint sound at all after we have heard loud ones and, once we have smelled things with a strong scent, or seen very bright colours or light, we do not have the ability to see or smell things which are less intense, espe cially when we always perceive [them] under adverse circumstances. But of course, after one has understood things which are lofty and exceedingly dif ficult, one does not have a blunter understanding of things which are not as elevated. One knows them with greater exactitude and much greater lucid ity. The sensory power does not operate without a body which receives the effect of the accidental belonging to the process of sensory perception. The intellective [soul], however, is not affected by the accidental which is being perceived sensorily, but by a mental image, even if [this does not happen] at all without a body through which, as its medium, the potential understand ing of the soul is affected while the rational soul is informing the body. But once it has been separated from the body, it can understand in a way differ ent from the one [it is using] now. Therefore, to the question I was posing, whether the intellect is affected in any way by something apprehended only by the mind, I have no problem in saying that it is not [affected] at all, but that, in the absence or presence of objects, the soul reaches the internal organs only while images capable of being
perceived sensorily are affecting it. Under those circumstances, the potential intellect is influenced, by a particular property it has possessed from the start, to recognise ] an object comprehensible by the intellect, as A509 I pointed out in what I said earlier. Perceiving a colour does not mean one perceives it intuitively or in the abstract, but that one understands its natural character, that is, that it was created to belong to a substance, and to affect the sight and no other senseorgan. These things colour can do not affect the intellect, but when it does perceive them, it behaves in a way which is different from [the way it be haved] before it perceived them, (not because of an accidental distinct from itself, but because it is behaving in a different way); and [the person] who was called ‘unaware’ before [the intellect] began to behave itself like this, is [now] called ‘aware’. The intellect also attains that knowledge of the acciden tal, or any other it has attained at any time afterwards, over and over again without any kind of instructor. The same rule applies to the way other things which are known. This kind of dispositional knowledge is called ‘insight’, and when a person is not engaged in the act of understanding, he is said to know [things] by means of insight; and although of course a person may engage potentially in the
780 ANTONIANA MARGARITA in potentia sit ad eliciendum intellectionis actum, et post ilium quoque, non aequa promptitudo utraque est. Prior enim valde remota ab actu, et magna cum dificultate exercetur; posterior vero iam habitu acquisito, proA510 pinquissi|ma actui existit; quoties enim animae libet, in actum intellectionis promptissime exit. Aliudque etiam adipiscitur intellectus ex relato habitu, 5 vel actu scientifico, videlicet, seipsum iam tunc posse intelligere, conferendo sensationis operationes intellectionis actibus, quibus carebat ante exerci tam intellectum. Hanc collationem faciendo quae sciuntur, diversa vel re aut animadversione sunt ab iis quae sentiuntur, ergo vel diverso, vel si uno eodemque 10 utraque cognoscuntur, aliter se habens cum sentit, quam cum intelligit, illud quodcumque sit, fingendum est. Quod ergo sentit non omnino idem esse cum intelligente inferre licebit, ubi intellectus intelligitar. Antecedens probo, esse scilicet diversa sensata ab intellects. Quia consequentiae con gruencia nota est. Aliud est magnitudo a magnitudinis esse, id est, ab exi- 15 stentia eiusdem: lineae enim, quae magnitudo quaedam est, intellectio non aliter fit, quam mente concipiendo longum sine latitudine et profanditate, idque natura lineae vel magnitudo eius nominator, quam visu sentiendo nequáquam assequimur, quia superficiem, cuius ipsa est pars, et simul corA511 pus j sensibus percipimus. Etiam aliud est aquae esse, hoc est, aquea sub- 20 stantia, et accidentia inhaerentia illi quae sensibus percipiuntur a natura eiusdem, scilicet, a substantia quadam nata
frigiditate et humiditate asservari, cuius accidentia si refrangantur, fit apta esse elementam ex quo mista fiuta, et non quodvis, sed frigidum, et humidum, ac grave, et diaphanum, etc. Sed attente considerandum quod non omnia sic ut magnitudo et aqua 25 diverso modo cognosci possunt a sensu et intellectu. Simítás enim quae quidem nasi curvitas est, minime potest intelligi, si a subiecto, cui inest, seiuncta curvitas illa intelligatur: nam non quaevis curvitas, sed tantum cartilagineae carnis nasi curvitas simitas appellator, et est. Quod intelligendo
PART TWO 781 act of understanding, without that disposition, and after it has happened as well, the two kinds of insight are different from one another. The first is very remote from action, and one engages in it with great difficulty. But once the other has acquired the disposition, it is very | close to action, A510 because it moves into the action of understanding very quickly, as often as the soul wants [it to do so.] The intellect also acquires something else from the said disposition, or ‘act of gaining knowledge’, namely, that it can then understand itself by bringing the operations of sensory perception to the actions of understanding, [actions] the intellect was lacking before it was exercised. When one makes this comparison, things which are known are different either in fact or in intention from those which are perceived sensorily. There fore each is recognised either by means of different things, or, if [we are talking about] one of them, by the same thing; and whichever one it is, one should conceive it as behaving differendy when it is sensorily perceived from when it is understood [by the intellect]. Therefore, when one understands intellectually, one will be permitted to deduce that what perceives senso rily is not entirely the same as that which understands [intellectually]. I am proving the antecedent, namely, that various things have been perceived sensorily by things which have been understood intellectually, because the harmoniousness of that conclusion is clear. Size is different from the essence of size, that is, its existence, because one comes to
an understanding of a line, which is a kind of size, only by mentally imagining [something which is] long without breadth and depth; and we do not comprehend what is called the essential character of a line, or its ‘size’, at all, because [what] we are looking at with our senses is simultaneously its surface, (which is a part of it), and | its physical substance. The essence of water, too, that is, its A511 watery substance, (and the accidentals inherent in it, which are perceived by the senses), is different from its basic character, namely, the particular substance naturally preserved by cold and moisture; and if its accidentals are broken down, it becomes ready to be the element from which they are compounded, and simply something which is cold, moist, heavy, transpar ent, etc. But one should take careffil note that not everything, such as size and water, can be recognised by some method other than sensorily or intellectu ally. Snub-nosedness, which is a curvature of the nose, cannot be understood intellectually at all if that curvature is considered separately from the sub ject to which it belongs, because only curvature of the cartilage of the nose, not just any curvature, is called, and actually is, snub-nosedness, and one cannot do this by understanding water intellectually. This did not happen
ANTONIANA MARGARITA 782 aquam non accidebat. Frigiditás enim, et humiditas, etiam diaphaneitasac gravitas, quae in aqua sentiuntur, seiuncta a substantia aquae considerări et intelligi valent. [9. Text. comm. ю.9] A512 Наес ergo aquae accidentia et consimilia, ut quae carni inessent, vel alūs substantiis corporeis sensitivo cognosci possunt, alio autem distincto re aut consideratione tantum (ut filum in globům redactum distinctum a seipso extenso dicitur) natura aquae et carnis intel|liguntur. 5 [10. Text. comm. 11.10] B185 Item cum noscimus rectum aut curvum, quae quantis continuïs et non 10 discretis conveniunt, etiam sensu rectum et curvum sentiuntur; natura vero recti aut curvi per quamdam abstractionem intellectus intelliguntur. Finge ergo quod natura recti, puta medium et extrema brevissima linea esse con tenta, in recto a recto, et natura curvi, quae opposita recto est, a curvo seiungantur, ergo altero vel aliter se habente hae distinctae dualitātes cognoscen- 15 dae sunt. Indeque ulterius procedendo inferes: ergo sensitivům realiter vel per alium modům habendi distat ab intellectivo. Tandem ut res separabiles sunt a materia, hoc est dietu, a conditionibus individuis provenientibus ab accidentibus rebus inhaerentibus illis, sic intelliguntur separatae per | actum intellectus, quod probare cupiebam. 20 Visum mihi est nonnulla commenticula huic nostrae paraphrasi in De anima inserere. Primo, ut paraphrasis clarior reddatur. Secundo, ut rationem reddam quorundam observátorům a me inter exponendum hune Aristote lis librum. Tertio, ut tam rationes Aristotelis huius
tertii De anima, quibus animae immortalitas probari eo censetur dissolvam, quam ut monstrem alia argumenta quibus nisus est suadere bestiis omnibus vim sentiendi, ad minus 9 10 Aristoteles, De anima, π 1.4,429ІН4-18 (Aristoteles 1953, III, է/c io, p. 423): “Ipsa igitur per sentiens experimentate calidum et frigidum. Et res quae sunt in carne assimilantur eis quae sunt illius. Et experimentatur per aliud, aut secundum dispositionem lineae spiralis, quamdiu durat, quid est esse camis.” Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4, 429Ы8-23 (Aristoteles 1953, ш, t/c u, pp. 424-425): Et etiam in rebus existentibus in Mathesi, rectum est sicut simítás; est enim cum quanto continuo. Secundum autem esse, esse recti aliud est ab eo. Si igitur experimentatur, tune igitur per aliud, et quia dispositio eius sit alia. Et universaliter dispositio rerum quae sunt in intellectu currit secundum quod res abstractae a materia.” 25
PART TWO 783 when one was considering water intellectually, because the cold and mois ture, transparency and heaviness which are sensorily perceived in water can be considered and understood intellectually when separated from the sub stance of water. [9. Text of comment ю.} Therefore, these accidentals, and things such as those which belong to flesh or other physical substances, can be recognised by means of something connected with sensation. But the basic characters of water and flesh are understood intellectually by [a mean] which is actually distinct, or simply by means of careful thought—just as one says a thread wound into a ball differs from itself when it has been stretched out. | [10. Text of comment 7?.] Likewise, when we recognise that something is straight or crooked, which are [properties] one meets in things which are continuous, not disjointed, it is one of the senses which tells us it is straight or crooked. But the basic character of ‘straight’ or ‘crooked’ is understood intellectually by consider ing it as a general, not a specific, quality or characteristic. Suppose, there fore, that the basic characteristic of something which is straight, (namely, that its middle and ends are joined together directly by a very short line), and that the basic characteristic of something which is crooked, (crooked being the opposite of straight), [is that the middle and ends] are separated from each other by a curve. These two things will have to be recognised by a different [method], or by something which is differently constituted. From that, you will make the
further inference that therefore the sensory [faculty] actually or behaviourally differs from the intellectual. Finally, objects can be separated from their matter, (that is to say, from the individual conditions stemming from the accidentals inherent in them), and are understood to be separate by an action of the intellect—which was what I was wanting to prove. I have decided to insert several short comments in this paraphrase I have made of De Anima пі, (і) to make the paraphrase clearer; (ii) to provide a reason for certain observations I made while I was explaining this Book by Aristotle; (iii) to demolish many of Aristotle’s reasons in his third Book of De Anima, whereby people think he proves the immortality of the soul, and also to point out other arguments with which he has tried hard to persuade A512
784 ANTONIANA MARGARITA tactivam inesse, nullius esse valoris, quin ex eiusdem Aristotelis assertis in hoc tertio De Атта inferendum contrarium illius quod ipse probare cona tos est. A513 Et quod in hoc primo commenticulo omnes non ignoretis volo, id est, non me immerito praepostero ordine textu Aristotelico usum fuisse in hac paraphrasi, cum aliquando textura commenti (verbi gratia) quarti, connecto textui commenti sexti, ut per me nuper factum est; et post, cum etiam alios con textos Aristotelis aliis praeter ordinem commentatoris adiunxero. Id enim factum est quod mihi non exiguo labore cupienti veritatem sententiae Ari stotelis adipisci, visum est textom sequentem annectendum esse antecedenti, quia nonnumquam intermedius contextos ut parenthesis quaedam insertos esset ab Aristotele; vel quod quandoque videbatur inepte interpretatus antiquus contextos, servato ordine litterae vetustae, qui si contemnatur, et alio ordine eadem ferme littera legeretur, pellucida et vera evaderei, quae prius obscura et potius mendax, quam verax, interpretis imperitia, erat. Aut fortassis citra interpretis culpam patratum hoc fuit erroribus librariomm vel aliquorum philosophorum, quíbus licere videbatur transferre verba aristotelica, cum sententiam assequi non valebant. Etiam scire expedit quod пес ob id quod dixerim text, comment, sexti11 sensum uti qualitàtibus primis in sentiendo, credendum esse sensum uti illis ut instrumento quo, nam id minime verum est, ut retulimus. Dictum enim illud tantum est ut omnes sciant quod cum intellectus intelligit, non afficitur a re scita, ut sensus a
re sensata alteratur, sed a phantasmate rei ducentis in cognitionem rei sciendae. Ulterius notandum nonnullam difficultatem habere illud quod text, comment. septimi legitur,12 puta post ardua intellecta promptiores reperiri intel ligentes ad hebetiora, et adversum contingere sentientibus, quo aliquo modo seiungi posse intellectom a corpore Aristoteles probare videtur. Nam eventos ostendunt accidere, ex arduis rebus conatis intelligi, aliquos in deliA514 rium ingens incidisse, alios morbis periculosissimis correptos fiiisse, | pluresque immature animam egisse, quae omnia ас singula multo deteriora esse, quam visum, vel aliquem ex sensibus exterioribus vitiari, cerium est: x1 12 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,429324-29 (Aristoteles 1953, ш, t/c 6, p. 413)· Aristoteles, De anima, ІП.4,429329-42^5 (Aristoteles 1953, ш, t/c 7, p. 417). 5 10 15 20 25 30
PART TWO 785 [people] that all brute beasts possess the power of sensory perception, at least, that of touch. But this [argument] is worthless and, from what Aristo tle is claiming in this third Book of De Anima, one must deduce the opposite of what he tried to prove. You will all not be unaware of what I mean in this first short comment, A513 namely, that in this paraphrase I have quite reasonably taken Aristotle’s text out of order when, for example, I sometimes connect the text of the fourth comment to that of the sixth, as I did just now, and later on, when I joined some of Aristotle’s passages to others in an order different from that of his translator. I did this because I wanted, with no small exertion, to get at the truth of Aristotle’s opinion, and I thought the text which followed should be connected to one which appeared earlier because sometimes Aristotle inserted a passage between them as a kind of interjection. Or sometimes I thought the ancient text had been badly translated and that if one refused to keep the order of the ancient text, and that generally, if one were to read it in a different order, what was obscure before and, because of the translator’s lack of skill, wrong rather than right, would turn out to be clear and correct. Or perhaps, regardless of [any] mistake on the translator’s part, the problem lay in the errors of copyists or some philosophers who thought it permissible to transcribe Aristotle’s words, even though they could not follow his train of thought. It is also useful to know that one should not believe that when I said in comment 6
that the sense-organ makes use of important qualities in the pro cess of perceiving sensorily, [this means] that the sense-organ uses them as an ‘instrument whereby’, because this is not true at all, as I have said before. What I said simply means that everyone knows that when the intel lect perceives [something], it is not affected by the thing known, the way a sense-organ is changed by the thing which is sensorily perceived, but that [it is affected] by a mental image of the thing, which results in its recognising the thing which was to be known. It should be noted fhrther that what one reads in comment 7 has a diffi culty [attached to it], namely, that one finds that after strenuous intellectual activity, those exercising their intellects quite readily turn to things which require less effort, and that the opposite happens to those who perceive things sensorily—by which Aristotle seems to prove that the intellect can be separated in some fashion from the body. Events show that when people have tried to understand difficult subjects, some of them have gone com pletely mad, others have been seized by very dangerous illnesses, | and sev- A514 eral have died before their time; and there is no doubt that each and every one of these things is much worse than injury to the sight or any of the
786 B186 A515 ANTONIANA MARGARITA indeque non ex illis expertis posse plus dici intellectum abiungibilem a cor pore, quam sensum, rationi consonum esse censendum et existimandum erat. Quod nempe Ulatum verum esse ratione praedicta patet. Ex his enim quae antecedunt, omnibus constat vim sentiendi conferri non posse nisi animae indivisibili, quam esse separabilem a corpore, post agentes de ani- 5 mae rationalis immortalitate ostendemus. Tamen etsi hoc verum sit, inficiari non potest multo aliter male affici intelligentem, quam sentientem. Sentientis enim organum vi proprii obiecti sensati dissipatur; intelligens autem homo non a phantasmate (cuius affectio in facultatem interiorem noscentem abstractive praecedit intellectionem) in delirium, aut mortem ducitur. 10 Sed per accidens relatos malos affectus patitur, cerebro ex assidua meditatione immodice exsiccato, propter continuam praesentiam spirituum calidorum exsiccatium, sine quibus phantasmata elici a parte posteriori non queunt; et extracta coram parte interiore cognoscente abstractive diutine persistere non valent. 15 Nam utraque ex relatis operationibus a quibusdam partibus cerebri fit, compressis occipitis partibus, ut ex se in synciput phantasmata pellant, et a syncipitis retinentibus phantasma coram alia parte eiusdem syncipitis, quae per illa cognoscit abstractive; quae corporeae operationes expellendi et retinendi sine spiritibus animalibus fieri non valent, quibus, ut dixi, diu- 20 tissime calefacientibus cerebrum id exsiccant. Ac hoc est in causa cur diu nullus potest attente aliquid meditari, quin in diversa
distrahatur, quod par tes cerebri mollissimae cum sint, nequeunt diu durare in eodem situ, quibus variantibus modum persistendi, statím phantasma quod retinebant dilabitur, et in posteriorem cellám trahitur, a partibus cerebri vim trahendi ipsum 25 habentibus, vel propria vi qua natum est in illam partem ire potius, quam in aliam in occiput adduļcitar. Ex quo etiam manifesta evadit causa cur multo libentius diversa, quam eadem meditamur. Nulla enim alia est, quam quod ex diversorum medita-
PART TWO 787 external senses. So those experiences should make us consider and think that it cannot be said it is in accord with reason that the intellect is no more capable of being separated from the body than [one of] the senses, because it is undoubtedly clear that the foresaid argument shows [my] deduction is true. From what I have just been saying, I shall demonstrate, after dealing with the immortality of the soul, that everyone agrees that the power to per ceive sensorily can be conferred only on the indivisible soul, and that [the soul] can be separated from the body. However, even if this is true, it cannot be denied that someone who is behaving intellectually is adversely affected in a way quite different from that of someone who is perceiving sensorily, because the organ of sensory perception is blown off course by the power of the particular object which it has perceived sensorily. But someone behaving intellectually is not brought to madness or death by a mental image whose effect precedes the understanding [of something] in the abstract. Once his brain has been dried out by excessive mental exertion, [the person] suffers the misfortunes I mentioned per accidens because of the continual presence of hot, drying spirits, without which mental images cannot be drawn out from the back [of the brain]; and after they have been drawn forth to the interior part [of the brain] which recognises [things] in the abstract, they cannot last long. Each of the operations I have mentioned is done by certain parts of the brain, once the occipital parts have been squeezed
together so that they thrust mental images out of themselves into the head, and [then thrust] the mental images from [those parts] of the head which retain them into another part of the head which recognises them in the abstract. These phys ical operations of expelling and retaining cannot happen without the ani mate spirits which, as I said, warm and dry the brain over a very long period of time. This is why no one can concentrate on anything for a long time without being distracted because, since the [various] parts of the brain are very soft, they cannot endure being in the same place for a long time. This is why no one can concentrate on anything for a long time without being dis tracted because, since the [various] parts of the brain are very susceptible, they cannot endure being in the same place for a long time; and while they are changing the way they continue in being, the mental image they were retaining immediately escapes and is drawn into a chamber at the back [of the brain] by those parts of the brain which are empowered to do that—or it is brought into the back of the head | by its own native power which [makes] A515 it go into that part rather than into another. This also explains why we think about different things much more will ingly than we do about the same. This is simply that, by thinking about
ANTONIANA MARGARITA 788 tione, diversos situs acquirunt partes, quae deserviunt delationi phantasmatum in partem anteriorem, et retentioni eorumdem coram parte syncipitis noscente abstractive. Quod magis multo gratum est, quam semper eumdem situm servare, ut brachium vel crus unicum locum diu occupare multo magis molestum est, quam diversos variare. 5 [u. Text. comm. 12.13] Dubitabit fortassis aliquis, si intellectus simplex est et impassibilis, et nulli nihil habet commune, sicut dicebat Anaxagoras, quomodo intelliget, si ut intelligat passibilis futurus est: maxime quod si detur ipsum pati, cum aliquid commune inter agens et passum semper versari debeat, quando cor pora intelliguntur, corpore et magnitudine participatums intellectus esset. Ac aliud non minus praeteritis dubium insurgit, an ipse intellectus intelligibilis sit a seipso, an ab aliis intellectibus tantum. 10 [12. Text. comm. 13.14] A516 Primům enim si verum est, puta quod Anaxagoras de simplicitate intellectus dixit, intelligibilis ipse erit, iam quod non alia de causa in quantum aliquid unum est, quia qui intelligit universa quae unitate sunt participia intellectum necessario est intellecturus, cum de numero vel specie unitatis sit | ille. Verum si non simplex, sed mistus sit, quia commune aliquid habet cum effi ciente se aliquid habebit, quod faciat ipsum intelligibilem, sicut alia mista intellecta etiam habent. 13 14 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,429022-26 (Aristoteles 1953, ա, t/c 12, p. 426): “Et dubita bit homo quod intellectus est simplex, non patiens, et quod impossibile est ut habeat aliquam
communicationem cum alia re, sicut dixit Anaxagoras. Quomodo igitur intelligitur quod formare per intellectum est aliqua passio? Quoniam, propter hoc quod aliquid est commune utrique, existimatur quod alterum eorum agit et alterum patitur.” Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4, 429Ե26-29 (Aristoteles 1953, in, t/c 13, p. 427): “Et etiam utrum est in se intelligibile? Quoniam aut intellectus erit aliaram rerum (si non est intellectum alio modo, sed illud formátum per intellectum fuerit unum in sua forma), aut erit in eo mixto ab aliquo quod fecit ipsum intellectum, sicut de aliis.” 15 20
PART TWO 789 different things, the parts [of the brain] which see to the dispersal of men tal images to the back [of the brain] and the retention of them in the front of that part of the head which recognises [things] in the abstract, acquire different locations, and this is much pleasanter than always staying in the same spot, just as it is much more tiresome for the arm or the leg to stay in one position for a long time than to change to different ones. [11. Text of comment 12.] Perhaps, if the intellect is unmixed and incapable of emotion and has noth ing in common with anything, as Anaxagoras used to say, someone will be uncertain how it can understand [anything] if it ought to be capable of emo tion in order to understand, especially because, if the intellect is allowed to experience itself, since there must always be something in common between its active and passive [states] when it is perceiving physical objects intellec tually, the intellect would use both [in respect of] the object and its size. An uncertainty no smaller than those I raised earlier arises: whether the intellect is capable of perceiving itself intellectually, or whether only other intellects [can do so]. [12. Text of comment 73.] If the first thing Anaxagoras said about the unmixed condition of the intel lect is true, the intellect will be capable of thought, for no other reason that in as much as anything is a unity, the intellect which understands all the things which are a part of that unity is inevitably going to understand itself, since it belongs to the unity I in terms of number or
type. If, however, it is not something unmixed, but a compound, because it has something in common with what is affecting it, it will have something which makes it intelligible, just as other compounds also have things which they have understood. A516
790 ANTONIANA MARGARITA [13. Text. comm. 14.15] A517 Primům dubium facile dissolvitur distinguendo passionem in propriam et communem. Pati proprie est corruptive a contrario affici, ut cum calidum a frigido, vel humidum a sicco, vel nigrum ab albfficante, aut album a nigrifaciente, vel dulce ab amaro faciente, aut amaram a dulzorante afficiuntur, vel 5 aliud simile patiuntur alia quae contrarium immediatum, ut primae qualitates, aut mediatum, ut secundae habent. Communis autem passio est tam relata, quam ea quae cum plus perficitur aliqua res iam integra, ас in totum perfecta, sine ullius rei propriae corraptione ulteriorem perfectionem acquirit, ut infra commento vigésimo octavo iterum dicemus. Intellectus ergo IO non priore passione, propria et corruptiva, sed posteriore, quae passio in communi et non proprie dicitur, afficitur ipse: habet enim se intellectus priusquam aliquid intelligit ad ea quae a se post intelliguntur, ut potentia quaedam susceptiva | intelligibilis, velut diaphanum antequam a luce illustretur, ac ut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum actu; postea autem cum aliter se 15 habens intelligit, quod nesciebat, perfectior accidentaliter redditur, ut dia phanum luce aut tabula scriptura. [14. Text. comm. 15.16] B187 Secundi autem dubii solutio haec est. Fatemur nempe quod ipse intelligi bilis sit ut caetera intelligibilia; a se enim ipso intelligitur intellectus noster ut omnia quae per se sine materia existunt, id est, ļ simplicíssima ac citra üllam quantitatem et miscellam constat, eadem dote participant quorum scientia speculativa et scibile dum se
noscunt, idem est ut nostri intellectus se noscentis scientia idem est cum eodem noto. 15 16 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,42дЬ2д-4зоаг (Aristoteles ig53, iii, t/c 14, p. 428): “Dīcamus igitur quod passio, secundum quod prius videbatur, est universalis, et quod intellectus est in potentia quoquo modo intellecta, in perfectione autem non, quousque intelligat. Et quod accidit in intellectu debet currere tali cursu, scilicet sicut tabula est aptata picture, non picta in actu omnino.” Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,43032-5 (Aristoteles ід53, ш, t/c 15, p. 434): “Et est etiam intelligibilis, sicut intellecta. Formare enim per intellectum et formátum per intellectum, in eis quae sunt extra materia, idem sunt. Scientia enim speculativa et scitum secundum hune modům idem sunt.” 20
PART TWO 791 [13. Text of comment 14.] The first uncertainty is easily resolved by dividing emotion into individual and general. Individual emotion involves being affected in a destructive way by an opposite, such as when hot is affected by cold, moist by dry, black by turning white, white by turning black, sweet by turning bitter, and bit ter by turning sweet, or other things which have no mediate opposite, such as the prime qualities, or a mediate [opposite], such as the secondary [qual ities], undergoing something similar. But I have talked about general emo tion before, as well as that which acquires fhrther completion without the destruction of anything belonging to it, when something already whole and entirely complete is completed further, as I shall say again later on in com ment 28. So the intellect is affected, not by the former [kind of] emotion, which is individual and destructive, but by the latter, which is called emo tion in a general, not a particular sense. Before the intellect understands anything relating to the things it understands later, it constitutes itself as a receptive potentiality | capable of understanding, like a transparency before A517 it is lit up by light, and a note-book in which nothing has actually been writ ten. But afterwards, when it reconstitutes itself, it understands what it did not know, and is rendered more complete in respect of its accidentals, as a transparency [is] by light, or a note-book by writing. [14. Text ofcomment 75.] The answer to the second uncertainty is this. I am saying, of course, that [the intellect] is
capable of understanding, just like anything else with similar abilities, because our intellect understands itself, as does everything which exists separately, without matter: that is, it is well-known that things which are entirely uncompounded, (and setting aside any quantity and mixture), share the property of things which are identical with speculative knowledge and what can be known while they get to know themselves, just as the knowl edge of our intellect while it is getting to know itself is identical with the thing which is known.
ANT О N IANA MARGARITA 792 [15. Text. comm. 16.17] A518 Cur autem hic non semper se intelligat ratio sive causa consideranda supe rest. Si enim verum est, ut fassi sumus, intellectus quosvis se intelligentes esse suam scientiam, ita ut triplex, cum hoc accidit, conveniat illis denomi nado, puta intelligentis, et intellecti, et scientiae qua se intellectus nőseit, cur non semper se noscunt ii intellectus, cum in aeternum non absit idem a seipso, ñeque quid quod obstet possit intervacare, cuius oppositum experimur. Nam nisi cum volumus, nos | ipsos non noscimus ac intelligimus. Porro, quanta entia quae ex conditionibus singularibus constant, intelligibilia in potentia dicuntur, quibus nequáquam inest intellectus, hoc est, haec vim intelligendi minime habere possuni. Nam vis quae ipsa potest intelligere, sine miscella res est, et illa quoque res intelligibilis a seipsa erit. 5 IO Expósita manet universa sententia ab exordio tertii De anima, usque in retro explicitům caput de distinctione intellectus in agentem et possibilem. Supe rest ergo et quae post caput expositum ab Aristotele tradita sunt, usque in 15 finem tertii huius planioribus sententiis quam possimus exprimere. Prius annotatis duobus erroribus insignibus interpretis contextuum relatorum. Et ultimum primo monstrabo ac postea quod antecedit. Illud erat quod cum Aristoteles in commento secundo, et tertio, et quarto, ac quinto huius tertii libri proponat,18 ut qui probaturas infra sit intellec 20 tual esse immistum, interpres conscius Graecanicae linguae, et eam non ignorans, ut reor, “hylen” Graecis esse non
tantum “materiam” Latinis, sed et quod nos “sylvam” dicimus, unde illud troianum Ilium quasi ex multis sylvis caesis constitutum fortassis appellatum fuit, in multis locis ubi Aristo teles loquens de intellectu vult per quamdam metaphoram dicendo ipsum 25 esse immistum, id est, sine sylva corporum et accidentium corporeorum. Tot enim haec sunt, ut non inconcinne dici possit quodlibet corpus affec tum accidentibus sylva quadam affici, loco illorum verborum “sine sylva et mistura” interpretatur sine materia. 17 18 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4, 43085-9 (Aristoteles 1953, ni, t/c 16, p. 434): “Et perscrutanda est causa propter quam non semper intelligit In eo autem quod habet materiam, quodlibet intellectomm est in potentia tantum; istis igitur non erit intellectus (intellectus enim ad ista non est nisi potentia istorum abstracta a materia), illi autem, quia est intellectum.” See Aristoteles, De anima, ПІ.4,429813-24.
PART TWO 793 [15. Text of comment 76.] But at this point I still have to consider the reason or motive for [the intel lect’s] not always being self-aware, because if what I have said is true—that any intellects which are self-aware constitute their own knowledge in such a way that, when this happens, three descriptive terms can be applied to them, namely, ‘the understander’, ‘the thing understood’, and ‘knowledge of how the intellect gets to know itself—why do those intellects not get to know themselves, when they always have the ability to do so, and we experience nothing which can get in the way and intervene? It is because we do not get to know ourselves and are not self-aware | except when we want to [be A518 so]. Furthermore, [there are] many things and particular conditions which are in accord with one another, and are said [to be] potentially capable of understanding, which have no understanding at all—that is, they are able to have absolutely no power of comprehension. This is because the power of comprehension is a thing unmixed with anything else and it, too, will be able to be self-aware. I have expounded the whole argument from the beginning of De Anima іи to the chapter (which I have just explained) on the difference between the active and passive intellect. So I still have to discuss, from the chapter I have just explained to the end of the third [Book], what Aristotle said in plainer terms than I can. But before that, I shall deal with the two remark able mistakes I mentioned, which were made by the translator of the said texts. I shall take the later one
first and then the one which precedes it. The [mistake] is that when, in comments two, three, four, and five of this third Book, Aristotle says he is going to prove later on that the intellect is not a compound, a translator who knows the Greek language and does not, in my opinion, misunderstand it, [knows] that the Greek [word] hyle means not only ‘matter’ in Latin, but also what we call ‘wood’—perhaps this is why Troy, which was built as it were from many pieces of hewn wood, was called ‘[H]ylium —and that in many passages where Aristotle speaks about the intellect, he means to say metaphorically that it is something uncom pounded, i.e. that it does not have the ‘wood/matter’ of physical objects and physical accidentals. There are so many of these [instances], that one can say, without being absurd, that any physical body affected by accidentals is affected by a kind of ‘wood/matter’, and instead of [translating] the words as ‘without wood/matter and mixture’, one can translate [them] as ‘without matter’.
794 A519 B188 A520 ANTONIANA MARGARITA Primus ex his erroribus est qui textu commenti undecimi refertur: “Oļmnino ergo sicut res separabiles sunt a materia, sic et quae circa intellectum sunt.”19 Ubi non sic, sed: “Omnino ergo ut res separabiles sunt a sylva sive miscella, sic et intelliguntur.” Probat hoc ita esse, quod infra commento decimo tertio dicat de ipso intellectu: “Si autem mistus sit, aliquid habebit quod faciat intelligibile ipsum, sicut alia.”20 Ubi sylvam seu materiam supra traditam in textu undécimo a nobis citato hic mistionem appellat. Idem roborat textus commenti decimi quinti, qui sic habet: “In his quidem enim quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur.”21 Et consimile sententia duodecimi Metaphysicorum, textu commenti quinquagęsimi primi: “Non altero igitur existente eo quod intelligitur et intellectu, quaecumque non materiam habent idem erunt, et intellectiva eius et quod intelligitur una.”22 Ubi si loco materiae mistionem seu sylvam multarum rerum legeris, quanto planior sententia restabit, omnibus compertum est. Committitur et idem error textu commenti decimi sexti: “In habentibus autem materiam potentia unumquodque intelligibilium est. Quare qui dem illis non inerii intellectus. Sine materia enim potentia est intellectus talium.”23 Quae ultima materia in sylvam et mistionem interpretanda erat, ut sensus esset: sine miscella enim facultas intellectiva talium futura est. Multa alia sunt loca in hoc tertio, ubi nisi ego fallor, ut qui non valde peritus Graeci sermonis sim, melius quadrasset interpretatio materiae in sylvam
metaphoricam, quam in materiam ex qua res fiunt. Non enim | video quo modo impediat materia intellectioni nisi per quemdam circulum quod for máé quae materiae insunt et ab ea educuntur in sensu a nobis explícito, sine qualitatibus primis ñeque esse ñeque operari possint, quae qualitàtum miscella, seu sylva, impedimento intellectioni per modum a me relatum erunt. Si enim praedictam ambagem auferas, quae ratio reddi potest, ut propter materiae praesentiam non insit intellectus rebus, nobis ipsis experientibus, nostros intellectus, qui non diiferunt ab animabus nostris intelligentibus, materiam in | formare, et alios complures, si Deus vellet, posset ipse produ cere, materiam informantes et intelligentes. Omnia enim entium naturalium vitia in materiam ipsam ut in causam inferunt philosophi; hane enim 19 20 21 22 23 Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,42gb20֊-2i (Aristoteles 1953, ш, t/c 11, p. 425). Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,429I528-29 (Aristoteles 1953, m, t/c 13, p. 427). Aristoteles, De anima, ПІ.4,43032-5 (Aristoteles 1953, ui, t/c 15, p. 434). Aristoteles, Metaphysica, xii.g, 107532-5 (Aristoteles 1562, vin: Metaph., хп, t/c 51, f· 335tC)· Aristoteles, De anima, 111.4,43035-9 (Aristoteles 1953, in, t/c 16, p. 434). 5 1о 15 20 25 30
PART TWO 795 The first of these errors is the one which appears in the text of comment 11: ‘Therefore, just as things can be separated entirety from matter, so too A519 can things which concern the intellect’, which can be rendered, ‘Therefore, just as things can be separated entirely from wood/matter or mixture, so can [things] which are understood intellectually’. He proves that this is so because later, in the text of comment 13, he says of the intellect, But ifit is a compound, itwill have something which makes it capable ofbeing understood, just as other things [have]’. When he calls the wood/matter or ‘matter’ men tioned in the text of [comment] 11 which I cited earlier ‘a mixture’, the text of comment 15 corroborates it, saying as follows: ‘Among the things which have no matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same thing’. Simi lar [to this] is the opinion of Metaphysica xn, text of comment 51, ‘Therefore, since what is understood and the intellect are not two different things, what ever does not have matter, both what is capable of being understood and what is understood, will be the same thing [andform] a unity’. If you read ‘a mixture of matter’ or ‘wood/matter [consisting] of many things’ here, everyone will see how much clearer the sentence is. The same error is made in the text of comment 16. ‘But in things which have matter, every one of them which is capable of being understood exists potentially. This means they do not possess an intellect, and without matter, the intellect of such things exists [only] potentially’. This last ‘matter’
should be translated as ‘wood/matter and mixture’, which is what the sense requires, because the intellectual capability of such things is going to lack mixture. There are many other passages in this third [Book] in which, unless I am mistaken, (because I am someone who is not very skilled in the Greek lan guage), a translation of ‘matter’ would be better rendered as ‘wood/matter’ in a metaphorical sense, rather than ‘material from which things are made’. This is because I do not see how matter is a hindrance to understanding, except indirectly, because the forms which are in matter and are brought out from it in the sense I have explained cannot exist or be active without the prime qualities, and this mixture of qualities, or ‘wood/matter’, will be a hindrance to the understanding in the way I have described. If you remove the foresaid ambiguity, which can be attributed to the process of reasoning—that because of the presence of matter, objects do not possess the ability to think—our own experience is that our intellects, (which are not different from our intellective souls), give form to matter, | A520 and that if God wanted to, He could produce several other [intellects] to give matter form and understanding. Philosophers attribute all faults in things in Nature to matter itself as the cause [of them]. They also say that
ANTONIANA MARGARITA 796 A521 individuationis principium esse quoque dicunt Aristotelem testem duran tes primo Caeli et mundi, textu commenti 92,24 et ѵн Metaphysicorum, textu commenti 28,25 immemores sententiae eiusdem primo De generatione, text, comm. 54, ubi referí: “Quaecumque igitur actívorum non in materia habent formam, haec quidem impassibilia.”26 Unde talia agentia, ut sunt substantiae separatae, singulares sunt, et non diversarum specierum (si enim ita eredidisset Aristoteles, explicuisset), et citra materiam. Idem ilio testante vili Metaphysicorum, textu commenti 12, cum inquiť. “De naturalibus autem, sed perpetuïs substantiis alia ratio est, fortassis etenim quaedam non habent materiam, aut non talem.՞27 Sed hae quoque singulares substantiae sunt, et sine materia. Et viii Metaphysicorum, textu commenti 16, non solum mate riam non esse causam ut entia sint singularia videtur dicere, sed oppositum, cum refert: “Quaecumque vero ñeque intelligibilem, ñeque sensibilem materiam habent, statim unum quoddam esse unumquodque est.”28 Certe ultra relatas sententias, cum nos dilucide probaverimus nullam materiam primam in entibus reperiri (quod etiam idem Aristoteles non paucis locis, ubi sibi non constare censeri potest, sentire videtur, ut ix Metaphy sicorum, text, comment. 16,29 et multis alūs in locis; et satis expresse X Meta physicorum, text, comment. 24: “Materia namque negatione ostenditur.”30 Quod etiam privationibus omnibus convenit, quae nihil esse certum est), elementa, quae materia prima non tantum careni, sed et elementari sunt privata, qua fruuntur mista,
individua sunt et sine materia talia dicuntur. Ergo falsa est assertio attestans materiam esse principium individuationis. Vero enim similius esset dicere formam esse hoc principium, quam materiam quae suscipit esse | a forma, ut isti autumant. Etiam non est ut quid* a quid A ] qui B. 24 Aristoteles, De cáelo, 1.9,2771x30-278322 (Aristoteles 1562, v: De caeĹ, i, t/c 92, f. 6ovGL). 25 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, vii.8, іоззЬ2о-юз4а8 (Aristoteles 1562, vili: Metaph., vu, t/c 28, f. 177VH-M). 26 Aristoteles, De generatione et comiptione, 1.7, 32484-5 (Aristoteles 1562, v: De gen. et corrup., ì, t/c 54, f. 363VG). 27 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII1.4,1044330-31 (Aristoteles 1562, viii: Metaph., viii, t/c 12, f. 219VH). Aristoteles, Metaphysica, vni.6,1045835-36 (Aristoteles 1562, viii: Metaph., viii, t/c 16, f. 224VG). 28 29 30 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, ix.8,1050315-105081 (Aristoteles 1562, viii: Metaph., ix, t/c 16, f. 241VL—242ГС). Aristoteles, Metaphysica, x.8, 1058322 (Aristoteles 1562, viii: Metaph., x, t/c 24, f. 272VK). 5 xo 15 20 25
PART TWO 797 Aristotle maintains this is the origin of individuality, and they refer to De Cáelo et Mundo i, text of comment 92 and Metaphysica vi 1, text of comment 28, forgetting the opinion [he gives] in De Generatione [er Corruptione] 1, text of comment 54, which says, ‘Therefore, any of the active [agents] which do not have a form in [their] matter are not capable offeeling’. Consequently, when such agents are separate substances, they are individual things, not [parts] of different types, (because if Aristotle had believed this, he would have said so), and have no matter. [Aristotle] bears witness to the same thing in Metaphysica ѵш, in the text of comment 12, when he says, ‘ When it comes to natural, but everlasting substances, there is another explanation, because perhaps some do not have matter, or not this kind [of matter]’. But these sub stances are also individual things and have no matter. Metaphysica ѵш, in the text of comment 16, too, appears to say not only that matter is not a cause, (since the things are individual), but the opposite. ‘Butwhen it comes to any thing which has matter which is not capable ofbeing understood and sensorily perceived, each one of them automatically exists as a unity’. Undoubtedly, quite apart from the opinions I mentioned earlier when I offered clear proof that one does not find First Matter in anything,—and Aristotle appears to be of the same opinion in not a few passages where one might think he does not agree, such as Metaphysica ix, in the text of com ment 16, and many other passages, and quite distinctly in Metaphysica
x, in the text of comment 24, ‘Matter is indicated by negation’, which also applies to privations, (and it is not at all certain that these things exist)—the ele ments, which are not only devoid of First Matter, but also of the elemental [matter] compounds enjoy, are individual things and are called such [even though] they have no matter. Therefore, the claim which says that matter is the origin of individuality is not tme. It would be quite like saying that form is the origin [of individuality] rather than matter which, according to what those people say, derives its existence I from form. There is also no reason we should say that the horse Мулі
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| spelling | García Valverde, José Manuel Verfasser aut Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology Volume 2 by José Manuel García Valverde and Peter Maxwell-Stuart Leiden ; Boston Brill [2019] Seite 766-1326 txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Heterodoxia Iberica volume 3 Heterodoxia Iberica Maxwell-Stuart, Peter G. 1938- Verfasser (DE-588)1136139001 aut Pereira, Gometius 1500- Antoniana Margarita (DE-604)BV046246921 2 Heterodoxia Iberica volume 3 (DE-604)BV042244314 3,2 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031625242&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | García Valverde, José Manuel Maxwell-Stuart, Peter G. 1938- Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology Heterodoxia Iberica |
| title | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology |
| title_alt | Antoniana Margarita |
| title_auth | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology |
| title_exact_search | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology |
| title_full | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology Volume 2 by José Manuel García Valverde and Peter Maxwell-Stuart |
| title_fullStr | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology Volume 2 by José Manuel García Valverde and Peter Maxwell-Stuart |
| title_full_unstemmed | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology Volume 2 by José Manuel García Valverde and Peter Maxwell-Stuart |
| title_short | Gómez Pereira's "Antoniana Margarita" |
| title_sort | gomez pereira s antoniana margarita a work on natural philosophy medicine and theology |
| title_sub | a work on natural philosophy, medicine and theology |
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