A theory of legal obligation:
The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of le...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2019
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 FHN01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Oct 2019) Introduction -- The Concept of Obligation -- Contemporary Approaches to Legal Obligations : A Preliminary Map -- The Social-Practice Account -- The Interpretivist Account -- The Conventionalist Reason Account -- The Exclusionary Reason Account -- A Revisionary Kantian Conception -- Further Dimensions of the Revisionary Kantian Conception -- The Robust Reason Account -- The Method of Presuppositional Interpretation -- Conclusion |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (x, 368 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9781108566216 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781108566216 |
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| 520 | |a The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Bertea, Stefano 1970- |
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| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 340 - Law |
| dewey-raw | 340/.112 |
| dewey-search | 340/.112 |
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| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/9781108566216 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| isbn | 9781108566216 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Bertea, Stefano 1970- (DE-588)1197809570 aut A theory of legal obligation Stefano Bertea Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2019 1 Online-Ressource (x, 368 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Oct 2019) Introduction -- The Concept of Obligation -- Contemporary Approaches to Legal Obligations : A Preliminary Map -- The Social-Practice Account -- The Interpretivist Account -- The Conventionalist Reason Account -- The Exclusionary Reason Account -- A Revisionary Kantian Conception -- Further Dimensions of the Revisionary Kantian Conception -- The Robust Reason Account -- The Method of Presuppositional Interpretation -- Conclusion The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct Law / Philosophy Obligations (Law) / Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd rswk-swf Rechtspflicht (DE-588)4177251-9 gnd rswk-swf Rechtspflicht (DE-588)4177251-9 s Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-1-108-47510-5 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Bertea, Stefano 1970- A theory of legal obligation Law / Philosophy Obligations (Law) / Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd Rechtspflicht (DE-588)4177251-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4126505-1 (DE-588)4177251-9 |
| title | A theory of legal obligation |
| title_auth | A theory of legal obligation |
| title_exact_search | A theory of legal obligation |
| title_full | A theory of legal obligation Stefano Bertea |
| title_fullStr | A theory of legal obligation Stefano Bertea |
| title_full_unstemmed | A theory of legal obligation Stefano Bertea |
| title_short | A theory of legal obligation |
| title_sort | a theory of legal obligation |
| topic | Law / Philosophy Obligations (Law) / Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd Rechtspflicht (DE-588)4177251-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Law / Philosophy Obligations (Law) / Philosophy Rechtstheorie Rechtspflicht |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216 |
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